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Abstract 
The dancer's consciousness is an integral component of choreography and 
performance, but has been afforded little significant attention within dance theory or 
practice. This thesis aims to investigate the nature of the dancer's consciousness and 
it develops a model which allows dancers to access particular conscious states in 
choreography and performance. This model is entitled the Dance Consciousness 
Model. 
The model is founded on consciousness theory and, within it, two states of dance 
consciousness. have been defined: intrattentive consciousness and non-intrattentive 
consciousness. These are based on the states of consciousness described by 
consciousness researchers, dance theorists and practitioners and theatre theorists. 
The Dance Cons 
' ciousness 
Model comprises methods for examining and accessing 
the dance consciousness. During the formulation of these methods a variety of 
theories and practices were explored: phenomenological reduction, the explicitation 
session, somatics, sport psychology, visual and verbal processing, attention studies, 
Buddhist Introspection and Bodyweather. Relevant components were extracted from 
each theory and practice and applied to the discipline of dance. This resulted in the 
development of a series of methods for examining and accessing states of 
intrattention and non-intrattention. These methods were explored, by trained dancers, 
in three empirical projects which comprised exploratory workshops, choreographic 
and rehearsal processes and performances. 
The projects were recorded on video and the dancers were interviewed at regular 
intervals. The analysis of the information collected was combined with the 
consciousness theory established at the start of the study and resulted in the 
formulation of a consciousness training programme and the Dance Consciousness 
Model. The training precedes the application of the model and comprises a series of 
workshops in which dancers are taught to access, examine and switch between states 
of intrattention and non-intrattention. The Dance Consciousness Model is believed to 
be the first of its kind and is intended for application by dancers in the choreography 
and performance of contemporary dance. 
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I 
Introduction 
Research focus - the dancer's body and mind 
In the creation, performance and viewing of current Western contemporary dance 
utmost attention is paid to ensuring the dancer's body, as a physical form, is primed 
for performance. Dance is frequently considered as an aesthetic activity that is 
concerned with the moving body; as Smith acknowledges, 'in dance ... the body is 
the locus of the art' (2002, p. 125). It is commonly considered that a dancer's body 
should be trained and shaped in a particular fashion, with the main purpose being to 
use the body as a means to perform movement. Jowitt claims that dance takes 
caccount only of the body' (1988, p. 77), and Foster recognises that dance 'stresses 
the body's ability (and inability) to conform to specified shapes at a given time' 
(2000, p. xiv). Little relevance is placed on the facts that a dancer also has a mind and 
that dance is not merely a structure of different shapes, actions and dynamics to be 
presented by a body. 
One could suggest that, within the Western contemporary dance context, there exists 
a set of aesthetic values relating to the dancer's body that underpin concepts of 
dance. For example, as Jowitt claims, the reason that some people view dance is that 
it offers an 'excuse for watching pretty, lightly clad women disporting themselves' 
(1988, P. 77). Even Duncan, who displayed fairly revolutionary thinking at the turn of 
the twentieth century when she began to place emphasis on what she called the 
'dancer's soul', admitted that it is really only the 'body that had to be primed for 
dancing' (cited in Jowitt, 1988, p. 78). 
The dancer's mind is not prepared to the same degree and one could suggest that a 
'dualistic point of view' about the body and mind 'has always been widespread in the 
dance community' (Fortin et aL, 2002, p-173). According to Leach and Stevens, 
many 'dancers inwardly believe' that the dancing mind 'is a separate entity from the 
dancing body' and 'most feel, and try to behave as though, the mind and body are not 
functionally united' (1996, p. 113). Dance theorist McCaw notes that 'I had an image 
of myself as consisting of a mind and a separate body' (2001, pp. 7-8). Jowitt goes so 
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far as to say that, 'a dancerly body and mind set' are 'not only not prerequisites; they 
might actually get in the way' (1988, p-317). Fortin et aL consider that: 
The goal orientated environment of professional dance schools 
encourages students to emphasise the representational body [which is] 
how the body looks from a third person viewpoint. 
(2002, p. 172) 
Smith notes that dancers often have 'perceptions of a mind-body split', perform with 
a 'body mind disconnection' and consider the 'body as object' (2002, pp. 124-7). 
Smith continues with the comment that often, whilst dancers are performing, they are 
'perceiving themselves as objects to be studied ... rather than through experience of 
the body as being' (2002, p. 128). In the light of all this, one might consider that 
dancers have lost 'connection with [themselves] as psychophysical totalities' 
(McCaw, 2001, p. 8) and view only the body as the 'instrument of dance' (Sparshott, 
1988, p. 18). 
Specific research focus - the dancer's consciousness 
With the neglect of the dancer's mind comes a neglect of the dancer's consciousness. 
Few dance theorists have considered the varying dispositions of a dancer's 
consciousness or provided solutions to the question posed by Sheets-Johnstone; 
'What is a dancer conscious of while dancing? ' (1966, p. 39). One may ask why it 
matters. Why is the dancer's mind, or more specifically the dancer's consciousness, 
of importance within dance -a discipline that seems so concerned with the body? 
There were three aspects underlying the motivation for this thesis which were 
prompted by Sheets-Johnstone's question 'what is a dancer conscious of. while 
dancing? ' 
(1) Dance consciousness in process and performance 
Consider for a moment the fact that it is customary, within conventional, Western 
contemporary dance, for the choreographer to spend the choreography and rehearsal 
time stressing the importance of an increased body awareness. Within the dance 
process the dancer is often required to attend to each individual movement in order to 
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polish and perfect it. The choreographer then directs the dancer to go on stage and 
just perform. ' How is the dancer to make the transition from such a reflective process 
to a non-reflective performance? After weeks of performing, with increased 
awareness directed intently towards every detail of the content and form of the 
dance, how can the dancer then move on simply to just perform? 
The ability to do so necessitates the dancer having control not only over the dancing 
body but also over the dancing mind, namely the dancing consciousness. Although 
dancers are not trained explicitly to use their dance consciousness, they are 
nevertheless expected to use it in specific ways within the dance process and within 
dance performance. It would appear, however, that there is a lack of consideration of 
the nature and significance of the dancer's consciousness. 
(2) Dance consciousness as an altered state of consciousness 
It seems that dance necessitates a certain type of consciousness: a dance 
consciousness. One may wonder why a dance consciousness is different from any 
other type of consciousness. The answer presented here and in Shacklock (2005), is 
that 'dance can act as a means of access to altered states of consciousness' 
(Shacklock, 2005). The term 'states' is intended here to mean states of consciousness 
and the term 'altered' refers to a situation in which states of consciousness have 
changed in character in some way or another, those which are different from one's 
ordinary and everyday states of consciousness. Many theorists of philosophy, 
spiritualism and dance, such as. Haggendorn (2004), Natale (1995) and Fraleigh 
(1987), have endorsed the viewpoint that dance can alter consciousness, a viewpoint 
which is by no means new. For example, trance dance, a practice in which people use 
rhythm and dance to alter their state of consciousness and 'enter non-ordinary 
reality' (Natale, 1995, p. x) with the intention of transforming and/or healing the mind 
and body, is said to date back around '40,000 years or more' (ibid. ). Another 
example is the Sufi dance, which was first practised in Turkey in the mid thirteenth 
1 'Just perform' was precisely the direction that I personally received from Kevin Finnan from 
Motionhouse Dance Theatre. I worked with Finnan for six weeks, during which he encouraged eight 
other dancers and me to choreograph and rehearse with attention focussed absolutely on the way in 
which our bodies were moving. On the night of the first performance Finnan stated that 'the process is 
over now, go on, don't think about anything, lose yourself, and just perform' (February, 2002). 
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century and which acted as a means of access to a heightened consciousness or a type 
of ecstasy and was believed to bring the dancer into closer contact with God. 2 
Within the Western contemporary dance context, the altered state view is also 
endorsed. Dance theorists such as Fraleigh speak of dance as an experience of 'pure 
consciousness' (1987, p. 40) that is 'beyond ordinary consciousness' (1987, p-5); 
Hawkins -refers to a 'special state of consciousness' (1991, p. 9), Adler to a 
ssuperconsciousness' (1987, pp. 14-15), Geissinger et aL to an 'increased 
consciousness' (2003), 3 and McCaw considers that dancers can develop a 
'heightened awareness' (2001, p. 8). Fraleigh (1987) suggests that, as a dancer 
embodies the dance, he or she moves away from the thinking, speaking,, moving, 
everyday consciousness, beyond normal limitations, into a dance consciousness. In 
addition, Smith acknowledges that: 
In dance 
... we are presented with many opportimities to go beyond 
our daily self, to shift our ordinary perceptions of self-identity into 
other ways of feeling, seeing, believing, and experiencing the world. 
(2002, p. 12 8) 
It seems then that, as noted by Meyer-Dinkgrafe, the artist's experiences 'represent 
states of consciousness that are certainly not common, or everyday' (2005, p. 20). If 
this is the case, and choreographers are expecting dancers to access such states, one 
can perhaps see why the question relating to the nature of the dancer's consciousness 
is so significant. 
(3) Dance consciousness as the key to performance 
One may consider that a dancer's ability to access such non-ordinary states of 
consciousness might alter the way in which the dancer performs. Part of the initial 
motivation for undertaking this research was an observation, made during personal 
experiences as a dancer, that the experiential sensation of performing can differ from 
performance to performance, or even within the same performance. The observation 
that one can be completely unaware of self or the experience of the performance 
during some performances, whereas one can be utterly aware of self and the 
2 See www. sfusd. kl2. ca. us/schwww/sch6l8/Music/Dance2. html and 
www. towardtheone-com/sufidance/about. htm for infonnation on Sufi dance. 3 www. movingjoumal. org 
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experience in other performances of a technically identical dance, is particularly 
significant. An important consideration here is whether these differences in 
experience are intrinsically interrelated with consciousness and the states of dance 
consciousness being accessed by the dancer in the performance. 
The above observation is also related to the notion that, whilst viewing a 
performance, there can be a strong desire to watch a particular performer and not 
others, almost as if a powerful connection of some sort exists between self as 
audience and that performer. In this respect, Hagendoom poses the following 
question: 
Why is it that we are sometimes fascinated by one or several people 
moving about on a stage, while at other times it leaves us completely 
indifferent? 
(2004)4 
Barba asks a similar question - although he is in this instance referring to actors, the 
observation is of the same nature and can perhaps be applied generically to different 
types of performers. 
Why when I see two actors doing the same thing, I get fascinated by 
one and not by the other? 
(1985, p. 12) 
Theorists have different views in relation to this observation, as illustrated by 
Hagendoorn and Barba. For example, it was this simple observation that inspired 
Hagendoorn to combine a 'phenomenological analysis of dance with what is known 
about individual brain processes' in order to examine 'what might be going on inside 
the brain when watching a dance performance' (2004, ibid. ). For Hagendoorn, the 
answer to the question of 'why [we are] drawn to some performers and not others' is 
related to the audience's state of consciousness (ibid. ). For Barba, the fascination is 
related to the performer's technical ability. In the context of this thesis, the answer 
lies within the dancer's consciousness which is connected to the dancer's experience 
of that consciousness. Indeed, one may consider that the state of consciousness that 
the dancer accesses during performance may have a significant effect on the way in 
which the dancer performs. This, in turn, may affect the audience's perception of the 
4 www. ivarhagendoom. com/research/perception. html 
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performance. The nature of the dancer's consciousness is therefore, of great 
importance. 
Preliminary research questions 
If one considers that: (1) choreographers implicitly require dancers to control their 
conscious states and to enter particular states of dance consciousness within dance 
process and performance; (2) the states that are required are altered states and 
certainly not common nor everyday; (3) the states that the dancer accesses during 
performance affect the way in which the dancer performs, then one may begin to see 
why the question - what is a dancer conscious of while dancing? - is so significant. 
This thesis therefore considers dancers as psychophysical totalities and its specific 
research focus is the dancer's consciousness. The preliminary research questions of 
this thesis are as follows: 
9 What is the nature of the states of consciousness that are experienced by dancers 
within the choreography and performance of Western contemporary dance? 
* How can dancers access and control such states of consciousness within the 
choreography and performance of Western contemporary dance? 
With regard to these questions it is important to identify what is intended by the 
terms 'choreography' and 'performance'. The term 'choreography' is used within the 
context of this thesis to encapsulate a process in which movement is constructed. 
Such movement may be structured methodically by a dancer or generated through 
improvisation. Such movement may also be created for the purposes of teaching it to 
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another dancer or indeed may be leamt by a dancer when taught by a choreographer. 
The choreographic process may thus comprise the improvisation, learning, teaching 
and structuring of movement. The term 'performance' is used within the context of 
this thesis' to encapsulate a process in which movement is performed either in a 
formal setting, such as a theatre, or an informal setting, such as during training 
workshops or the choreographic process. The terms 'choreography' and 
5 The term 'teaching' is used within the thesis and should always be understood in relation to the 
choreographic process. The term is not intended to refer to the practice of teaching within an 
education context, but to the process of a dancer or choreographer teaching movement material to 
another dancer. 
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sperformance' will be applied in accordance with the above definitions for the 
remainder of this thesis. 
Research methodologies 
The research methods used to answer the above preliminary research questions can 
be categorised as theoretical and empirical research methodologies. The theoretical 
methodology was crucial in obtaining a comprehensive and conceptual 
understanding of the nature of consciousness and supplying possible methods 
through which conscious states can be accessed. The aim of the empirical 
methodology was to validate such conceptual understanding and to provide 
opportunities for testing out any proposed methods of access. 
Indeed, is it possible to understand the nature of a state of consciousness without 
empirically experiencing that state and, equally, is it possible to understand what that 
experience is conceptually without theoretical knowledge? Similarly, how can one 
purposefully and empirically access a particular state of consciousness without the 
theoretical knowledge of how to do so, and how can one validate such theoretical 
knowledge without empirically accessing the states? In the context of this thesis the 
theoretical and empirical methodologies, therefore, are entirely co-dependent in that 
the former informs the latter and vice versa, thus resulting in an inter-reliant cycle of 
development which has culminated in the formulation of the research outcome, 
which is introduced in Chapter 1. 
Despite the existence of this inter-reliant cycle, it is essential to clarify that, whilst 
the theoretical methodologies are used for the purposes of supporting and informing 
the empirical methodologies, and the research outcome, they are not directly applied 
within the empirical methodologies, or the research outcome. For example, 
theoretical methodologies such as phenomenological reduction inform the research 
outcome, however under no circumstances is phenomenological reduction actually 
applied within the empirical research undertaken in order to formulate the research 
outcome. It is for this reason that Chapters 2,3,4,5 and 6 of this thesis appear to be 
predominantly concerned with theoretical methodologies and Chapter 7 focuses 
almost completely on empirical methodologies. However, the chapters of this thesis 
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by no means represent a chronological overview of the research. Rather, the reader is 
asked to maintain an awareness of the fact that the theoretical content of Chapters 2, 
3,4,5 and 6 evolved simultaneously with the empirical content of Chapter 7 and that 
both the theoretical and the empirical research was undertaken through a cyclical 
process. 
Both the theoretical and empirical methodologies used within this research employ a 
framework of triangulation. Triangulation can be considered as the combining of 
'methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon' (2005). 6 It is 'a process used 
to validate the data obtained in a study' (2005)7 and to establish the 'accuracy of 
information by comparing three or more types of independent points of view' 
(2005). 8 Triangulation allows 'a more complete picture' and a 'more credible 
interpretation of the data' (2005). 9 Throughout this research, therefore, first-, second- 
and third-person perspectives have been considered and the methodologies 
subsequently incorporate first-, second- and third-person information. In the context 
of this thesis: 
First-person information has been collected from the phenomenological accounts 
of dance theorists, such as Sheets-Johnstone (1966) and Fraleigh (1987), and the 
experiences of the dancers involved in the empirical projects; 
Second-person infonnation has been supplied by the researcher - author of this 
thesis; 
* Third-person information has been extracted from consensus accounts on 
consciousness, such as those supplied by Chalmers (1996). 
The notion of first-, second- and third-person methodologies and the use of 
triangulation within the empirical methodology, are discussed in detail in Chapter 3, 
in which methods for empirically examining consciousness are considered. The use 
of triangulation within the theoretical methodology is more straightforward, and all 
6 http: //www. ojp. usdoj. gov/BJA/evaluation/glossary/glossary2. btm 7 http: //education. massey. ac. nz/wellington online/bedu6205/course/205dictqual. htm 8 
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http: //www. ojp. usdoj. gov/BJA/evaluation/glossary/glossary2. htm 
http: //web. isp. cztjcrane/IB/Qualitative. html 
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the theoretical inforination presented in this thesis takes into account first-, second- 
and third-person information. 
The research for this thesis was carried out over a period of three years. Work 
undertaken during the first year comprised only the theoretical methodology which 
included a review of current literature, a clarification of the concepts of dance 
consciousness to be examined, the researching and formulation of a method for 
examining the concepts of consciousness and the researching and formulation of 
methods for accessing consciousness. 
In the second year, with the help of a group of eight dancers, all of this theory was 
applied in Empirical Project I and Empirical Project 2. Within these projects the 
nature of the concepts of consciousness was determined and methods for examining 
and accessing the states of consciousness were explored and refined. This empirical 
methodology was supported by the theoretical methodology. Each new finding that 
arose during the empirical projects prompted a new direction for the theoretical 
research. For example, an observation made by one dancer in Empirical Project I 
with reference to the way in which they processed information led to research into 
visual and verbal processing theories. This theoretical research, in turn, affected the 
empirical research and resulted in a new method of empirical access being 
formulated. 
At the end of the second year, all the information from the theoretical and empirical 
research was collated, interpreted and analysed. This information took the form of 
third-person theoretical accounts, first-person experiential accounts and second- 
person observed accounts. The information was both qualitative and quantitative and 
was collected through video recordings, structured and unstructured interviews, 
questionnaires and recorded discussions. The analysis of the information led to the 
design of the research outcome and the final empirical project. 
Year three of the research comprised Empirical Project 3, in which four dancers 
applied the research outcome. The dancers applied, explored and refined the concepts 
of consciousness, the methods of examination and the methods of access defined in 
years one and two. Again, first-, second- and third-person information was taken into 
consideration and collated from video recordings, structured and unstructured 
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interviews, questionnaires and recorded discussions. This theoretically- and 
empirically-based information was used to examine the results of the research and 
present conclusions with regard to the efficacy of the outcome of the research. 
The theoretical and empirical methodologies used to conduct the research for this 
thesis are identified in Chapter 1. 
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Chapter I 
Why is the dancer's consciousness signiflcant? 
Review of Literature 
Chapter 1 begins with a review of the current literature available within the dance 
discipline that is dealing with, or claiming to deal with, the dance consciousness. In 
addition to the theorists mentioned in the Introduction; Smith, Jowitt, Fortin et al., 
Leach and Stevens, McCaw, Adler, Foster, Hawkins, Geissinger et al., Sparshott and 
Hagendoorn, the views of Kleist and Hoffman are presented. The principal sources 
that are considered are Yhe Phenomenology of Dance by Sheets-Johnstone (1966) 
and Dance and the Lived Body by Fraleigh (1987). Chapter I presents an 
examination of the views of Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh on the dancer's body and 
mind, the dancer's consciousness and methods for accessing the dancer's 
consciousness. It continues with a critique on the lack of dance consciousness 
literature that is available, and an explanation as to why it is essential to seek ideas 
and information outside the dance discipline. 
The literature currently available within the theatre discipline concerning the actor's 
consciousness is also reviewed, and it is ascertained why this may be of use. In 
relation to the actor's consciousness and methods for accessing the actor's 
consciousness, the views of the following theorists are considered: Stanislavski, 
Strasberg, Grotowski, Schechner, Diderot, Meyerhold, Brecht, Barba, Bloch and 
Meyer-Dinkgrafe. 
Chapter I then returns to the preliminary research questions. raised in the 
Introduction, and assesses whether the literature discussed might provide any insight 
into these questions. In doing so, it is ascertained that the questions are valid and 
worthy of investigation. Finally, the proposed research outcome of this thesis is 
clarified, a series of focussed research questions is posed and the research methods 
are revisited. Chapter I concludes with a preview of the subsequent chapters in this 
thesis and a final note. 
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A note about the context and the literature 
It must be emphasised that the subject of this thesis is the dance consciousness within 
the context of Western contemporary dance. This by no means implies that the 
notion of the dance consciousness is less significant in different genres, such as ballet 
or Eastern practices like Butoh. It is essential, however, to place some limitations on 
the thesis and to define clearly the parameters of the research. Likewise, although 
any proposals or methods that are formulated are intended for use within this context, 
there is no implication that such proposals or methods are not transferable into other 
genres or practices. In fact, such proposals and methods have been informed by other 
genres and practices. For example, the practice of Buddhist Introspection is 
considered in Chapter 5 and some of its principles are extracted for application to the 
methods formulated for use within the Western contemporary dance context. 
The purpose of reviewing the relevant literature in this chapter is to highlight 
previous research concerning the dance consciousness and to provide some 
background -information; thus much of the literature discussed in this chapter is not 
referred to in subsequent chapters. Many of the sources reviewed were of great use in 
determining the boundaries of this thesis. The concepts, theories and methods 
presented within these sources did not, however, directly inform the concepts, 
theories and methods formulated within this thesis. The selection of literature from 
various other disciplines, such as sport psychology, attention studies and somatic 
practices, which did directly inform these formulated concepts, theories and methods 
are reviewed in subsequent chapters. 
It should be noted, however, that the dance and theatre literature presented in this 
chapter should by no means be considered as exhaustive. A certain amount of 
selectivity was essential as it would have been difficult, within this one chapter, to 
review all the literature which explicitly or implicitly considers the dancer's 
consciousness. The dance literature that is discussed represents the general research 
undertaken to date and the literature presented by two of the dance theorists, Sheets- 
Johnstone and Fraleigh, can be considered as the most significant within the subject 
of the dance consciousness. The theatre literature that is discussed extends various 
viewpoints, some of which contradict each other, and different theorists have 
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different objectives. Only the literature that was deemed to be most useful in the very 
specific context of dance consciousness was selected. 
A review of current literature within the dance discipline 
According to Best, the subject of the dancer's consciousness 'does not appeal to 
many people' (1974, p. 76) within the dance discipline and Sheets-Johnstone 
acknowledges that 'as far as is evident, no one has been concerned with the question, 
'what is a dancer conscious of while dancing? ' (1966, p. 39). Although both these 
statements were made over three decades ago, they still hold some weight. 
Some dance theorists do claim to be dealing with the dance consciousness, but in 
many cases there is little evidence of in-depth research. For example Foster notes 
that 'dancing is always and already sacred in the way that it conjoins body and 
consciousness' (2000, p. xvii) and, in her article 'Dancing Bodies', explicitly claims 
in the introduction that: 
My comments fall into two sections: the first focuses on the formation 
of dancing bodily consciousness ... the second situates this bodily consciousness in a cultural and aesthetic moment. 
(1997, p. 236) 
Despite this, it is difficult to ascertain exactly what Foster intends by her tenn 
'dancing bodily consciousness' and the article deals more with the dancer's body, in 
its aesthetic form within varying dance techniques, as opposed to the dancer's 
consciousness. 
In her book Moving from Within (1991), Hawkins also makes reference to a dance 
consciousness, and even distinguishes between its role in the dance process and 
dance performance. Hawkins states that, in choreography, the dancer's task is 'to 
discover ways of gaining access to the special state of consciousness that makes 
creativity possible' (1991, p. 9). Whilst Hawkins is thus acknowledging that the 
dance consciousness is a special sort of consciousness and that a method of access is 
required, this is as far as the discussion goes. Although Hawkins supplies a concise 
framework for choreography, which is broken down into sections such as expressing, 
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seeing, transforming and forming, she does not consider this preliminary reference to 
the dance consciousness in relation to these processes. 
Sheets-Johnstone's conceptualisation of the dance consciousness 
The dancer's body and mind 
In her book The Phenomenology of Dance (1966), Sheets-Johnstone offers more 
insight into the dance consciousness than the sources mentioned above. Utilising a 
phenomenological approach, in which she attempts to look at dance from the inside, 
Sheets-Johnstone considers the lived experience of dance in great detail; she claims 
that 'it 
, 
is the lived experience which is of paramount significance' (1966, p. 4). 
Sheets-Johnstone does not define the dance consciousness per se, but she does make 
reference to pre-reflective and reflective states. Having employed such terms 
throughout her book, Sheets-Johnstone does not, however, describe in detail what 
she means by them. 
The dance consciousness 
Sheets-Johnstone asserts that 'the consciousness of dance is a pre-reflective 
consciousness' (1966, p. 13). She also dismisses the notion of a reflective dance 
consciousness in the statements 'the dancer is not conscious of ... the dance as an 
object, and neither is she explicitly aware of herself' (ibid. p. 37) and 'consciousness 
is able to take a point of view on all things in the world except its own body, which it 
can only live' (ibid. p. 26). Sheets-Johnstone appears to favour a pre-reflective dance 
consciousness; she claims that the dance 'comes alive in all its rich fullness only as 
the dancers are reflectively aware neither of themselves, nor of the dance' (ibid. p. 6) 
and 'it is only as the dancer reflects upon herself apart from the dance that she is no 
longer one with it' (ibid. p. 39). In addition, Sheets-Johnstone suggests that the 
audience may be able to detect the dancer's conscious state in her claim that: 
It is evident in performance when a dancer becomes explicitly aware 
of herself. As soon as she becomes self-conscious, the audience is 
aware of a separation of the dancer from the dance. 
(ibid. p. 39) 
Here it is clear that Sheets-Johnstone is referring specifically to the performance of 
dance and one could presume that, in her claim that 'the consciousness of dance is a 
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pre-reflective consciousness' (1966, p. 13), she is also referring specifically to the 
dance performance. This is confirmed later in her book when she notes that: 
For choreographers and dancers, reflection may afford insight into 
approaches to choreography, a deeper understanding of what it means 
to create and perform dance, perhaps a growing ability to create 
dance, and to develop as dancers. 
(ibid. p. 7) 
Perhaps, then, Sheets-Johnstone favours a reflective dance consciousness within the 
dance process and a pre-reflective dance consciousness within dance performance. 
She thus not only acknowledges that different states of dance consciousness exist 
but, in addition, believes that they may be accessed in different phases of dance 
practice. 
Accessing the dance consciousness 
Sheet-Johnstone, however, does not provide any clarification as to how a dancer may 
access such states, make the transition from a reflective process into a pre-reflective 
performance or control the dance consciousness. Sheets-Johnstone merely claims 
that in order to access the pre-reflective dance consciousness, for example, 'one must 
only stop reflecting - analyzing, interpreting, judging - long enough to grasp it 
(1966, p. 137). This description does not really offer much insight into an actual 
method of access or control. How is one able just to stop reflecting? Surely, if one is 
aware of having to stop reflecting, then there exists reflection about stopping, thus 
halting any sense of a pre-reflective consciousness. 
Fraleigh's conceptualisation of the dance consciousness 
The dancer's body and mind 
Like Sheets-Johnstone, Fraleigh is interested in the phenomenal experience of the 
dancer and thus, in her book Dance and the Lived Body (1987), she utilises 
existential phenomenology in her consideration of the dancer's mind, body and 
finally the dancer's consciousness. Fraleigh stresses the importance of a 'minded 
body, not a mind in command of something separable, called body' (1987, p. 9). She 
refers to this minded body as the 'lived body' (1987, p-9), so one can see how her 
term involves intrinsically a non-dualistic view of the mind and body. Similarly Todd 
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attempts to ascribe lived attributes to the dancing body and coined the idiom the 
'thinking body' (1959). 
Fraleigh describes the 'lived body' as a concept which attempts to 'cut beneath the 
subject-object split' and claims that she does not recognise a 'dualism of ... body- 
mind ... and assumes an invisible unity of body ... and mind' 
(1987, p. 4). Fraleigh 
states that 'when the dancer succeeds, neither body nor mind is held at a distance; 
they are the same in action' (ibid. p. 11). It is within this 'lived body' that there exists 
a dance consciousness and Fraleigh categorises the same two states to which Sheets- 
Johnstone refers: reflective and pre-reflective states (1987). Fraleigh, however, 
unlike Sheets-Johnstone, does present clear deftitions of these states, as given 
below. 
The dancer's consciousness 
Fraleigh claims that a reflective state occurs when [the dancer becomes] aware of 
[his or her] body as something to be reckoned with ... [and] when 
[he or she focuses] 
on [his or her] body' (ibid. p. 14). A reflective dance consciousness can be defined as 
a state in which the object of attention is the dancing self. Fraleigh states that a 
reflective state 'refers either to the body when it becomes the object of attention or to 
an objective attitude toward the body' (ibid. ). In addition, a reflective state can be 
considered as a state in which one functions predominantly in a comparative or 
evaluative manner, 'when [one stands] back to observe and learn' (ibid. ). Fraleigh's 
reflective state of dance consciousness is not only a lived state but also a known 
state. 
By 'pre-reflective' Fraleigh is referring to a state in which a dancer is explicitly 
unaware of the dancing self, a state 'when she is not reflecting on her self or her 
action' (ibid. p. 13). The pre-reflective is a state of consciousness in which the dancer 
is entirely present-centred; as Fraleigh notes, it is -when the dancer is 'living the 
present-centred moment in her dance' (ibid. ). This presumes a sense of spontaneity, a 
sense of living in one moment and Fraleigh refers to the experience as follows: 
I live as my body spontaneously ... not noticing 
it, not looking back 
upon it, and not anticipating or imagining it in some future state ... my lived and complete wholeness. 
(1987, p. 14) 
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In such a state the dancer is not overtly reflecting on anything; it is a state which 
occurs prior to one reflecting on it - hence the tenn 'pre-reflective'. Indeed, Fraleigh 
describes it as 'before noticing' (1987, p. 14). In contrast to the reflective 
consciousness, the concept of the pre-reflective dance consciousness is a state that is 
entirely lived and not known. 
Similar to Sheets-Johnstone, Fraleigh not only supplies a distinction between these 
two different states of dance consciousness but also establishes that being pre- 
reflective should be of paramount importance for a dancer. Fraleigh claims that the 
dancer should not be 'reflecting on her self or her action' (ibid. ) and should be in a 
state in which 'the dance is lived not as an object but as pure consciousness' (ibid. 
p-40). In addition to this, she notes that 'the dancer is at her best ... when she 
becomes present-centred' (ibid. p. 23), which is a prerequisite of the pre-reflective 
dance consciousness. 
Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh are not the only dance theorists who consider this to 
be the case. Hoffinan, for example, also promotes pre-reflection in his claim that the 
most effective dance state is a state of 'no thought', which arises when dancers are 
'in the moment' (1997). 10 Similarly, Kleist considers that a marionette can perform 
more effectively than a live dancer, as the marionette is not bound by consciousness. 
The marionette is not reflectively aware of self and thus is able to exist entirely in the 
dance. Such reflection can be considered as detrimental to performance as it 
obstructs spontaneity of movement and energy and disrupts any sense of being fully 
in the present. In Dance and the Lived Body, Fraleigh presents Kleist's view that 
9 perfect grace is not possible in conscious human movement, but appears only in the 
lack of consciousness of the marionette' (1987, p. 24). In '11uppet Theatre', written in 
1810, Kleist refers to a reflective type of consciousness and notes that he recognises 
'what a disturbing effect consciousness' can have 'upon the natural grace of human 
beings' (in Cohen and Copeland, 1983, p. 182). With such a view, one could consider 
that Kleist is clearly promoting a pre-reflective state of dance consciousness. This 
thesis is not concerned, however, with which state of dance consciousness is more or 
less effective, but instead is concerned predominantly with the nature of such states 
and how one can access them. 
10 www. nbcds. orglarticies/erikl. htmI 
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Accessing the dance consciousness 
Although Fraleigh does provide some insight into the nature of the dance 
consciousness through distinguishing between two distinct states, along with Sheets- 
Johnstone, she does seem to disregard the need for some sort of methodology for 
accessing, controlling or even practically investigating the states that she defmes. 
Although Fraleigh claims that a dancer is 'at her best' whilst pre-reflective, and 
acknowledges that dancers have some sort of control over consciousness - 
sconsciousness is intentional' and 'I am not just a helpless recipient of stimuli; I 
participate in and control my own destiny' (1987, pp. 15-16) - she does not ascertain 
how a dancer may actually access and/or control such a state. 
In addition, unlike Sheets-Johnstone, Fraleigh does not distinguish between the 
process of dance making and the performance of dance -a distinction which it is 
important to acknowledge in order to understand its significance. One must certainly 
not presume that the experiences, and the conscious states, encountered within these 
two independent events are necessarily the same or even slightly similar. One must 
also consider whether the states experienced in the process have any effect on those 
encountered in the performance. 
Summary 
The literature of Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh represents the dominant research 
undertaken within the dance discipline on the subject of the dance consciousness. It 
is interesting to note that Sheets-Johnstone's The Phenomenology of Dance was 
written in 1966 and Fraleigh's Dance and the Lived Body in 1987. One would have 
hoped for some more recent dance consciousness research, especially considering the 
speed at which consciousness research beyond the dance discipline is developing. 
During a conversation between Fraleigh and the author of this thesis, held at the 
'Daiwa International Butoh Festival' in London in October 2005, Fraleigh herself 
stated that 'there doesn't appear to be any dance theorists who are currently dealing 
with the subject of the dancer's consciousness' (2005). It is also interesting to note 
that Fraleigh was a student of Sheets- Johnstone, which suggests that the breadth of 
research being undertaken throughout the dance community is very narrow. 
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Although neither Sheets-Johnstone nor Fraleigh really cover the second preliminary 
research question outlined in the Introduction - how can dancers access and control 
states of consciousness within the choreography and performance of Western 
contemporary dance? - both theorists do present some insight into the nature of the 
dance consciousness and explicitly discuss two dance states: reflective and pre- 
reflective. It is not clear whether these concepts were formulated by Sheets- 
Johnstone or by Fraleigh. Both theorists utilise the terms, but only Fraleigh defines 
them. This perhaps indicates that Sheets-Johnstone introduced them but Fraleigh 
later clarified them. Whatever the case, both their accounts are constrained by their 
phenomenological research approaches, which 'take the form of first-person 
description' (Fraleigh, 1987, p. xiv). 
Fraleigh acknowledges that her perspective is one of involvement as opposed to her 
having a detached approach (ibid. p. xxix) and Sheets-Johnstone notes that, as a 
phenomenologist, she 'describes the immediate encounter with dance, the lived 
experience of dance' (1966, p. 12). Although, as Sheets-Johnstone states, any 
phenomenological accounts of the nature of the dance consciousness should be 'apart 
from any prejudice, expectation, or reflection' (ibid. ), one cannot disregard the first- 
person nature of the accounts and the possibility that they may contain some opinion. 
Such opinion is evident in Sheets-Johnstone's claim that the reflective dance 
consciousness is desirable for the dance process and the pre-reflective dance 
consciousness is preferable for performance, and in Fraleigh's note that the pre- 
reflective dance consciousness is the more effective state for dance performance. 
Despite this, Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh do go some way in assisting with the 
first preliminary research question outlined in the Introduction - what is the nature of 
the states of consciousness that are experienced by dancers within the choreography 
and performance of Western contemporary dance. Considering, however, that neither 
source presents third-person consciousness theory and that Sheets-Johnstone and 
Fraleigh's sources are the dominant sources within current dance literature, it is 
necessary to review other literature outside the dance discipline. A review of current 
literature within the theatre discipline, literature that implicitly considers the 
preliminary research questions identified in the Introduction, is of value here. Such 
literature is of course related to the nature of the actor's, as opposed to the dancer's, 
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states of consciousness, but it is possible to borrow relevant identified concepts of 
consciousness and methods of access. 
A review of current literature within the theatre discipline 
The actor's body and mind 
Within the theatre discipline, both the actor's body and actor's mind are attributed 
much significance, although views vary about the importance of one over the other 
and it does seem that dualism is present within the theatre literature. Within this there 
is a sense of the objective versus the subjective and, as Zarrilli notes, 'objectivism 
and subjectivism remain two sides of the same problematic, dualistic coin' (2002, 
p. 10). For many theorists and practitioners, there is a 'dichotomy or gap thought to 
exist between the cognitive, conceptual, formal or rational' and the 'bodily, 
perceptual, material and emotional' (ibid. p. 11) and, as a result, actors often 
experience 'a real disjuncture between their minds and their bodies' (ibid. p. 13). 
Viewpoints also differ greatly within the theatre discipline in terms of the role of the 
body within training and practice. Whilst Meyer-Dinkgrafe claims that it is a 'general 
tendency among contemporary theatre theorists and artists to stress the importance of 
the actor's body' (2005, p. 77), Dietchman notes that: 
Very often, I think the body is ignored or cut off in actor training 
[and] body training is either kept separate or ignored altogether' 
(1990, P. 11). 
Likewise, the disposition of the actor's body is also considered from varying 
perspectives. Some theorists, such as Moore (1979), consider the body as the actor's 
tool or instrument, whereas other theorists explicitly discard objectivist suppositions 
about the body existing as an instrument and Schechner advises 'don't treat your 
body as a thing. Your body is not your instrument; your body is you' (19 73, p. 145). 
Considering the body from a more subjective, as opposed to objective, perspective 
may present the opportunity to reduce the sense of dualism. Schrag claims that one 
should consider the body as Merleau-Ponty does, as 'an experienced phenomenon ... 
in the immediacy of its lived concreteness' and 'not as a representable, object ... for 
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the abstractive gaze' (1969, p. 130). Merleau-Ponty refers not to the 'possible body 
which we may legitimately think of as an information machine' but to the 'actual 
body I call mine' (1964, p. 160-1). This viewpoint is similar to Fraleigh's notion of a 
thinking body and is encapsulated here by Schechner: 
All performance work begins and ends in the body. When I talk of 
spirit or mind or feelings or psyche, I mean dimensions of the body. 
The body is an organism of endless adaptability. A knee can think, a 
finger can laugh, a belly cry, a brain walk and a buttock listen. 
(1973, p. 132) 
Such a viewpoint places more significance on the mind in conjunction with the body, 
which may enable the actor to 'be engaged in a total psychophysical process' in 
which 'the performer might realize an organic connection between the body and 
mind' (Zarrilli, 2002, p. 14). It does seem, then, that some theorists, such as 
Schechner (1973), Zarrilli (2002) and Meyer-Dinkgrafe (2005), consider the 
significance of both the actor's body and the actor's mind and, in doing so, these 
theorists make reference to the actor's consciousness. 
The actor's consciousness 
According to Meyer-Dinkgrafe 'theatre can affect the actor's ... consciousness' 
(2005, p. 195). He states: 
Theatre has unfathomed and to a large extent unused potential in 
enabling, in theatre actors and audiences, a holistic experience which 
is non-ordinary, non-day-to-day. 
(ibid. p. 6) 
This is similar to the claims made by dance theorists discussed earlier - tha ,t 
dance 
can act as a means of access to altered states of consciousness. Since the early 1990s 
interest in the connection between theatre and consciousness has really begun to 
develop and the year 2000 saw the launch of the web-based journal Consciousness, 
Literature and the Arts. " Meyer-Dinkgrafe is one of the leading theorists explicitly 
presenting a connection between acting, theatre and consciousness. He organised the 
'International Conference on Consciousness, Literature and the Arts' at the 
University of Aberystwyth in May 2005, which aimed to connect consciousness and 
11 See www. aber. ac. uk/tfts/Jý oumal 
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the arts. Although many of the papers presented were concerned with connecting 
acting and consciousness, only one concerned dance and consciousness. This latter 
paper, 'Delving into the Dancer's Consciousness', was presented by the author of 
this thesis (Shacklock, 2006). The lack of dance papers at this international 
conference confirms that there is very little current research into the dancer's 
consciousness. Meyer-Dinkgrafe's views on the actor's consciousness are reviewed 
later in this chapter. 
It is also of great use to consider some literature which does not explicitly make a 
connection between. acting and -consciouspess per se, but which does present a- 
supposition about the degree to which the actor should be involved with the 
character. In doing so, there is an implication that particular states of consciousness 
are desirable for an actor. For example, in stating that an actor must not be involved 
emotionally with the character he or she is playing, but must instead be aware of that 
character and, through the use of specific techniques, of how to represent that 
character, one may be claiming implicitly that the actor should be in a reflective state 
of consciousness. On the other hand, in stating that an actor must be involved 
emotionally with the character and exist completely as that character with no 
awareness of technique, one may be claiming implicitly that the actor should be in, 
what Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh would term, a pre-reflective state of 
consciousness. 
This chapter now considers the theories and methods presented by Diderot, 
Stanislavski, Strasberg, Grotowski, Schechncr, Meyerhold, Brecht, Barba and Bloch. 
This list of theorists and practitioners is by no means exhaustive and those mentioned 
here have been selected because their theories and methods have had a significant 
impact on contemporary Western theatre practice. It is important to note that the 
following discussion has taken these theories and methods out of context, and here 
they are being considered in relation to consciousness and in relation to dance as 
opposed to the theatre discipline. Each theory and method will be considered 
cautiously and in as much detail as is deemed necessary for this particular discussion; 
thus Stanislavski's method, for example, will not be discussed in its entirety and only 
principles that are considered relevant will be extracted. 
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Pre-reflective states 
Diderot (1955) was one of the first Western theorists to consider the degree to which 
the actor should be emotionally involved with the character and with the acting itself, 
and he considers this to be the paradox of acting. Diderot distinguishes clearly 
between two sorts of involvement and, in fact, two types of actor. One type of actor 
is: 
The one [who] plays from the heart, from sensibility, immersing 
himself, while acting, in the feelings of the character he plays. 
(Meyer-Dinkgrafe, 2005, p. 56) 
This type of actor seems to be similar to the pre-refleotive dancer, described by 
Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh, who lives 'the present-centred moment in her dance' 
(Fraleigh, 1987, p. 13). Unlike Fraleigh, however, who considers the pre-reflective 
dancer as the most successful dancer, Diderot considers this kind of acting as the 
least effective and notes that it is 'alternately strong and feeble, ffiry and cold, dull 
and sublime' (1955, p. 15). Diderot claims that this type of acting is unpredictable 
and uncontrollable and too reliant on chance, and that the performance may vary 
significantly each time, as the actor will lack self-control. 
Stanislavski (1986) takes the opposite view to Diderot and the former's views seem 
more in keeping with those of Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh. Stanislavski 
formulated'a particular system of actor training -a system which has had a major 
influence on Western theatre - which promotes the notion that: 
An actor is under obligation to live his part inwardly, and then to give 
to his experience an external embodiment. 
(1986, p. 15) 
For Stanislavski, the aim of acting is 'the creation of this inner life of a human spirit, 
and its expression in an artistic form' (1986, p14). It is essential that this inner life is 
created and truly and holistically lived in every single perfortnance; the actor must 
'fit his own human qualities to the life of this other person' and 'pour into it all of his 
own soul' (ibid. ). In addition: 
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The work of the actor is not to create feelings but only to produce the 
given circumstances in which true feelings will spontaneously be 
engendered. 
(Stanislavski, 1949, p. 266) 
Stanislavski believes that the actor must live the character as opposed to being 
knowingly aware of the character and using technique to represent the character. This 
ensures that the acting and the character are 'real, live and human, not dead, 
conventional, or theatrical' (1986, p. 1 19). In his book An Actor Prepares, Stanislavski 
notes: 
The very best thing that can happen is to have the actor completely 
carried away by the play. Then regardless of his own will he I, iVes the 
part, not noticing how he feels, not thinking about what he does, and it 
all moves of its own accord, subconsciously and intuitively. 
(1986, p. 13) 
The above statement implies that the actor might lose control, but Stanislavski does 
warn. 'never lose yourself on the stage. Always act as your own person, as an artist' 
(ibid. p. 177). He therefore formulated a series of techniques which can be used to 
access subconscious material, whilst maintaining self-control, in the form of a 
conscious control of the acting. 
One technique created by Stanislavski is that of emotion memory, which is intended 
to allow the actor to achieve control and repeatable access to the subconscious. 'Me 
actor must use personal past emotions and experiences and those 'feelings that we 
have had in sympathising with the emotions of others' (ibid. p. 190) in order to create 
and live a new experience, the experience of the character. Stanislavski describes 
emotion memory in the following text: 
Just as your visual memory can reconstruct an inner image of some 
forgotten thing, place, or person, your emotion-memory can bring 
back feelings you have already experienced. They may seem to be 
beyond recall, when suddenly a suggestion, a thought, a familiar 
object will bring them back in full force. Sometimes the emotions are 
as strong as ever, sometimes weaker, sometimes the same strong 
feelings will come back but in a somewhat different guise. 
(ibid. p. 168) 
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Not only, then, does Stanislavski define a particular type of acting consciousness, a 
pre-reflective consciousness in which the actor is not explicitly aware of self or the 
character, he also attempts to provide techniques which may be used in order to 
access such a state. 
Strasberg (1988) developed and modified Stanislavski's system and his predominant 
interest was Stanislavski's 'magic if. The latter, for Strasberg, is a series of 
questions relating to character that the actor must ask self prior to performance or 
even prior to creating the role. Questions take the form of, for example: 
Given the particular circumstances of the play, how would you 
behave, what would you do, how would you feel, how would you 
react? 
(Strasberg, 1988, p. 85) 
Strasberg ascertains that using the 'magic if assists the actor in becoming 'close to 
the ... psychological experience' (ibid. ) and experience of consciousness. 
To accompany Stanislavski's 'magic if, Strasberg formulated a motivation 
technique, which encourages the actor to consider the following question: 
The circumstances of the scene indicate that the character must behave 
in a particular way; what would motivate you, the actor, to behave in 
that particular way? 
(ibid. ) 
One may presume that, in order to apply this question, the actor must imagine 
himself or herself to be the character and to be involved in the particular situation. 
Strasberg did not, however, wish this to be the case and so formulated the 
substitution technique, which also uses emotion memory and is described as follows: 
The actor is not limited to the way in which he would behave within 
the particular circumstances set for the character; rather, he seeks a 
substitute reality different from that set forth in the play that will help 
him to behave truthfully according to the demands of the role. It is not 
necessarily the way he himself would behave under the same 
circumstances, and thus does not limit him to his own natural 
behaviour. 
(ibid. p. 60) 
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This sort of substitution supposedly allows the actor to access an altered state of 
consciousness. Grotowski (1969) also refers to an altered or heightened state of 
consciousness, and Meyer-Dinkgrafe notes that 'theatre created by Grotowski strives 
to achieve non-ordinary states of consciousness in ... actors' (2005, p. 
111). 
Grotowski refers to accessing these non-ordinary states of consciousness as a process 
of 'translumination' (1969). 
Grotowski considers the 'personal and scenic technique of the actor as the core of 
theatre art' (ibid. p. 15). His method of translumination promotes authenticity and real 
experience and disregards techniques behind which the actor can hide - again 
promoting a sense of a pre-reflective, as opposed to a reflective, state of 
consciousness for the actor. In translumination, the actor must open himself or 
herself up, present part of his or her private self and personality, and completely strip 
the self emotionally and psychologically in order to present pure inner self. 
In order to do this, Grotowski believes that the actor must reach a state of mind 
characterised by 'passive readiness to realise an active role' (ibid. p. 7). He 
formulated a series of physical training techniques, the aims of which are to 
transcend any form of body mind dualism, surpass incompleteness and achieve a 
holistic totality. The actor must become completely absorbed in the present moment 
of the action and achieve a certain state of altered or heightened consciousness, 
which seems analogous with Fraleigh's pre-reflective state of consciousness. 
Grotowski defines this state of consciousness or translumination as a 'transcendental 
state of being' (ibid. p. 16). 
Schechner (1985) also speaks of accessing altered states, which seem to have a pre- 
reflective and experiential nature as opposed to a knowingly reflective nature. He 
defines a state of transportation, which exists in performances when the actor is 
'taken somewhere', after which the actor will 're-enter ordinary life just about where 
they went in' (1985, p. 125) to the performance. Schechner describes this 
transportation as follows: 
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The performer goes from the "ordinary worW to the "performance 
world", from one time/space reference to another, from one 
personality to one or more others. He plays a character, battles 
demons, goes into trance, travels to the sky or under the sea or earth: 
he is transformed, able to do things "in performance" he cannot do 
ordinarily. But when the performance is over, or even as a final phase 
of the performance, he returns to where he started. 
(1985, p. 125) 
In addition, Schechner defines a state of transformation, which appears to be -a 
heightened and more intense pre-reflective state, and which may result from an 
intensive series of transportations. Having accessed the performance world and been 
transported a number of times in a number of performances, a performer, according 
to Schechner, may begin to transform pre-reflectively and will no longer return 
unchanged to the ordinary world - as is the case in transportation. 
It seems, then, that many theatre theorists and practitioners - namely Diderot, 
Stanislavski, Strasberg, Grotowski and Schechner - define and promote states, and in 
some cases even provide methods of access to these states, that seem analogous with 
Sheets-Johnstone's and Fraleigh's state of the pre-reflective dance consciousness. 
This is not the case, however, for all the theorists and practitioners and some refer to 
more reflective states, as discussed below. 
Reflective states 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter Diderot distinguishes between two types of 
actor: the first is the actor who acts from the heart; the second is the actor who has 
'in himself an unmoved and disinterested onlooker. He must have, consequently, 
'penetration and no sensibility' (Diderot, 1955, p. 56). Such an actor must have the 
capacity to gain complete -insight into and have total understanding of the character, 
without becoming emotionally involved with that character. This experience is 
known and intellectually controlled, rather than simply lived in the moment. 
This type of actor, deemed to be most successful by Diderot, appears to be very 
similar to Sheets-Johnstone's and Fraleigh's reflective dancer, who is 'aware of [the] 
body as something to be reckoned with' (Fraleigh, 1987, p. 14). The actor must 
almost observe the character objectively rather than exist as the character and, having 
observed, must non-emotively imitate the patterns and behaviour of that character 
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and recreate the outward signs of feeling. In other words, the actor must represent 
non-emotively the character's emotions. Diderot explains that, in this instance, the 
actor is someone 'who, having leamt the words set down for him by the author, fools 
you thoroughly' into believing that the emotions are being experienced by someone 
onstage (1955, p. 37). 
Meyerhold (1969) also considers this to be the case and notes that actors should not 
involve themselves emotionally with their characters, but should maintain a 
reflective state and 'consciously comment on the character by remaining clearly 
distinct from it, (cited in Leiter, 1991, p. 57). Meyerhold formulated an acting method 
called 'biomechanics' (1969), which places great significance on the actor's physical 
training and promotes a reflective consciousness. According to Meyerhold, through 
mastering the physical method of biornechanics the actor should be able to position 
the body accurately and move it in a way which stimulates an emotional state within 
the actor. The physical movements act as stimuli to the emotions, as opposed to 
being the effect of emotions. Meyerhold believes that it is possible to create emotions 
by manipulating the body in particular ways. 
Brecht (1940) also promotes a reflective state of consciousness in which the actor is 
distinct from the character: 
The actor does not allow himself to become completely transformed 
on the stage into the character he is portraying. 
(ibid. p. 95) 
In order to maintain such a distance from the character, Brecht formulated the 
concept of the 'alienation effect' (1940). The aim is for the actor to demonstrate the 
character and reproduce the words and movements of the character as authentically 
as possible. The actor must find meaningful actions, by externalising the character's 
emotions, which illustrate what is going on internally, without necessarily having to 
connect via empathy to such emotions. Brecht notes that: 
[The actor] produces [the character's] remarks as authentically as he 
can; he puts forward their way of behaving to the best of his abilities 
and knowledge of men; but he never-tries to persuade himself (and 
thereby others) that this amounts to a complete transformation. 
(ibid. p. 95) 
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This is not to say that Brecht discourages emotions, indeed his epic theatre employed 
emotional effects. He believes that the actor must present the emotions reflectively 
and intellectually, rather than pre-reflectively and emotionally. Brecht notes that 'the 
actor should refrain from living himself into the part' (1940, p-94). 
Pre-reflective and reflective states 
Having ascertained that some theorists and practitioners promote pre-reflective 
states, and some promote reflective states, it is interesting that yet others advocate 
states of pre-reflection and states of reflection. Earlier in this chapter it was noted 
that dance theorist Sheets-Johnstone attributes states of reflection to the dance 
process - namely choreography and rehearsal - and states of pre-reflection to dance 
performance. Some theatre theorists and practitioners hold a similar viewpoint and 
some even support a dual consciousness, in which the two states exist concurrently. 
Barba (1985) considers the psycho-physiological nature of acting and is concerned 
with theatre anthropology and specifically the actor's presence. By presence, Barba 
is referring to a particular state of consciousness, a state of pure consciousness. He 
ascertains that three distinct concepts are inherent to presence: 1) extra-daily 
behaviour, 2) the organ of u-topia and 3) the elusive third organ (ibid. ). 
Barba defines two different types of behaviour: daily behaviour and extra-daily 
behaviour. Daily behaviour comprises mainly pre-reflective, unconscious 'processes 
through which our bodies and voices absorb and reflect the culture in which we live' 
(ibid. p. 32). Extra-daily behaviour comprises particular codes of movement that are 
relevant to specific forms of performance, which are different from the codes in daily 
behaviour in terms of their aesthetic function (ibid. ). 
It is this notion of extra-daily behaviour which is inherent in the concept of presence. 
According to Barba, the actor must master extra-daily behaviour to be able to 
perform with complete presence. In order to do so, the actor must initially dispose of 
any pre-reflective automatic or unconscious behaviour and replace it with more 
artificial reflective extra-daily behaviour. Presence may be achieved when this 
artificial behaviour becomes pre-reflective, automatic and unconscious. In this 
process it is evident that the actor must move from states of pre-reflection to states of 
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reflection and then again to states of pre-reflection. Barba is therefore promoting two 
distinct states of consciousness which must be used alternately. 
In addition, though, it seems as if Barba is promoting a simultaneous experiencing of 
these two distinct states. One may consider that, even during the pre-reflective 
stages, there must still be a controlling agent, something which observes reflectively 
and monitors the behaviour whilst the behaviour exists pre-reflectively. Barba refers 
to a principle supported by Grotowski and notes that: 
If an actor wants to express, then he is divided. One part of him is 
doing the willing, another the expressing; one part is commanding and 
another is carrying out the commands. 
(1995, p. 33) 
Thus not only are the two states experienced subsequent to one another, but they are 
also experienced concurrently in the form of a dual consciousness. Barba notes that 
actors are trained to use extra-daily behaviour through distancing self from 
'incultured' spontaneity and performing with 'accultured' spontaneity (1995). Within 
this, the actor must learn to recognise the difference between self in daily behaviour 
and self in extra-daily behaviour (Barba, 1989, p. 312). The problem is that the more 
the actor becomes conscious of the extra-daily behaviour, the more difficult it is 
simply to exist within that behaviour - this is why 'accultured' spontaneity is 
desirable. 
According to Barba, this extra-daily behaviour, along with the organ of utopia - 
which transforms the technique and raises it 'to a social and spiritual dimension', and 
the elusive third organ - which 'renders our actions incandescent', allow actors to 
establish presence (1988, p. 291). Although he acknowledges that actors can be 
trained to understand kinaesthetically extra-daily, as opposed to daily behaviour, 
Barba does not feel that the elusive third organ can be trained. He notes that it is 'Our 
personal identity. If we don't have it, no one can teach it to us' (1988, p. 291). Thus 
he does not think that presence, or the particular state of consciousness represented 
by his term presence, can be trained either and therefore provides no real method of 
access to the state of which he speaks so highly. 
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Bloch also advocates a type of dual consciousness and developed a technique called 
'Alba Emoting' (1993), which attempts to collate pre-reflective principles, such as 
those promoted by Stanislavski, and reflective principles, such as those endorsed by 
Diderot. The technique requires the actor to recreate reflectively the 'emotional 
effector patterns', which comprise the facial expressions, posture and breathing 
patterns which correspond to the emotions of the character (Bloch, 1993, p. 121). 
Bloch claims that: 
If instructions for reproducing an emotional effector pattern are 
correctly followed, the appropriate actions will trigger the 
corresponding subjective experience in the performer. 
(ibid. p. 127) 
The effect is that, despite the emotions being reflectively and technically recreated, 
the physiological parameters of the emotions arise pre-reflectively and thus it appears 
as if the emotions are really being experienced without the technique. In this 
instance, then, the actor would be experiencing reflection and pre-reflection 
concurrently in the form of a dual consciousness. 
Bloch claims that the effect of Alba Emoting can be so strong that 'step out' and 
'switch off (1993, p. 127) techniques are needed in order for the actor to stop feeling 
the emotions of the character. These techniques indicate even more strongly that a 
dual consciousness is necessary. Indeed, in order to apply a technique at all and use 
methods such as the step out, one must maintain some sense of control over 
consciousness. One cannot delve completely and holistically into the realms of the 
pre-reflective, because how would one administer such techniques? A dual 
consciousness comprising reflection and pre-reflection is thus considered to be 
essential. 
Accessing the actor's consciousness 
Having reviewed the accounts presented by Diderot, Stanislavski, Strasberg, 
Grotowski, Schechner, Meyerhold, Brecht, Barba and Bloch, it is possible to discern 
the nature of various types of an actor's consciousness - reflective, pre-reflective and 
dual. What is not so clear, however, is how one may access such states. 
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Mnouchkine refers to a particular type of consciousness that she defines as 'state', 
and claims that 'state' should be the 'primary passion which preoccupies the actor' 
(cited in Williams, 1999, p. 95). Although Mnouchkine claims that she can define this 
particular type of consciousness and can identify the moments in which the actor is, 
and is not, in the desired state, she also acknowledges that she has no method with 
which to equip actors with the ability to access or achieve that desired state. 
According to Meyer-Dinkgrafe, 'performative means have to be developed' which 
ensure that 'the performer is enabled to experience higher states of consciousness 
during performance' (2005, p. 91). There does not, however, seem to be a general and 
consensus method of access to such states within either the theatre or dance 
discipline. Meyer-Dinkgrafe notes that, although theorists and practitioners are able 
to describe their reflective and pre-reflective experiences, they do 'not have 
technique[s] to facilitate the same experience to recur systematically in themselves or 
in others' (ibid. p. 171). Theorists and practitioners such as Grotowski have 
apparently as yet 'failed to find systematic methods' for accessing the states 'which 
they had encountered coincidentally' (ibid. p. 189), and theorists have: 
... so far not really succeeded in developing a set of techniques which 
allows the systematic development of higher states of consciousness 
in the theatre. 
(ibid. p. 79) 
In his book Theatre and Consciousness (2005), Meyer-Dinkgrafe faces up to this 
problem; he discusses the relationship between theatre and consciousness and also 
questions 'whether the actor should be emotionally involved with the emotions their 
characters are supposed to be feeling' (ibid. p. 55). Within this he considers two key 
issues: 
... whether we can better understand theatre as a result of such an 
analysis [and] the implications of the Natyashastra PS 12 claim that 
theatre may serve as a tool to the development of ... higher states of consciousness. 
(2005, p. 1) 
12 The Natyashastra is the 'main treatise in Indian philosophy that deals with theatre aesthetics' 
(Meyer-Dinkgrafe, 2005, p. 1). 
33 
Unlike the theorists and practitioners discussed so far in this chapter, Meyer- 
Dinkgrafe considers these two key issues completely from within the context of 
consciousness studies and his theories are based on sound consciousness theory. 
Meyer-Dinkgrafe notes that: 
Since the main focus of Indian philosophy has been human 
consciousness and practical techniques for its development, it is worth 
looking at theatre aesthetics provided within the framework of Indian 
philosophy. 
(2005, p. 173) 
Meyer-Dinkgrafe believes that the classical Indian treatise on drama and theatre, the 
Natyashastra, might assist with the problem of the absence of a method of access. He 
claims that the Natyashastra serves 'as a means of development of consciousness for 
the ... actor' (ibid. p. 125) as it presents 'yogic techniques' which can condition 'the 
mind and body to function in higher states of consciousness' (ibid. p. 91). Meyer- 
Dinkgrafe also believes that the Natyashastra, along with some 'general aspects of 
Indian philosophy', has had a significant influence on 'eminent nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century theatre artists, Stanislavski, Artaud, Grotowski, Barba and Brook' 
(ibid. p. 105). 
The Natyashastra refers to a state of pure consciousness - or Samadhi in Sanskrit -a 
state that 'is without contents but fully awake' (ibid. p. 23). Meyer-Dinkgrafe 
suggests that: 'everyone can gain access to pure consciousness within their own 
minds' either 'coincidentally, or through the practice of appropriate meditation 
techniques' (ibid. p. 3 1) and states: 
It is possible not only to have occasional experiences of higher states 
of consciousness ... but to systematically develop much more 
advanced states of consciousness as phenomena of permanent daily 
experience. 
(ibid. p. 25) 
The precise nature of the state of pure consciousness referred to within the 
Natyashastra is not easy to ascertain. Meyer-Dinkgrafe speaks of 'the impossibility 
of expressing the experience [of pure consciousness] in conventional language' and 
notes that 'the experience simply cannot be put into words' (ibid. p. 30). Despite this, 
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the Natyashastra appears to promote that the 'actor has to fully identify with the 
character he plays' (2005, p. 97) and exist in the moment as that character. It 
therefore seems that the Natyashastra is encouraging the actor to encounter a state of 
consciousness similar to Fraleigh's pre-reflective dance consciousness. The treatise 
also states, however, that 'tears and horripilation should respectively be shown by 
persons who are not [actually] sorry or happy' (ibid. p. 97) and the actor should 
therefore knowingly use technique to create them. It thus appears that the 
Natyashastra is also encouraging the actor to encounter states of reflection. A 
paradox is therefore apparent. As Meyer-Dinkgrafe notes: 
In requesting the actor to be of utmost concentrated mind, [the 
Natyashastra] appears to suggest involvement. In stating that the 
temperamental states ... should be shown by persons (i. e. actors) who 
are not actually feeling the emotions that cause those states, the text 
appears to suggest emotional non-involvement on the part of the actor. 
(ibid. p. 99) 
There seems, therefore, to be a contradiction between reflective involvement and pre- 
reflective non-involvement; two different conscious states. Perhaps, though, this is 
not a contradiction; perhaps it is implying the use of a dual consciousness or it is 
acknowledging that the two states are of use in different contexts, as acknowledged 
by Barba, Bloch and Sheets-Johnstone. 
It is worth noting here that this notion of dual consciousness can be found within the 
Indian dance of Kathakali, a contemporary Indian dance fom, that incorporates some 
of the principles presented within the Natyashastra. Kathakali dancer Nair notes that: 
A good actor is one who understands the character very well, thus 
becoming the character itself. [But] we should not forget ourselves 
while acting. While acting, half of the actor is the role he does and 
half will be himself. 
(cited in Schechner and Appel, 1990, p. 36) 
This acknowledges that the Natyashastra subscribes to the concept of a dual 
consciousness. The question remains, however: how can the actor access this state of 
consciousness? Meyer-Dinkgrafe has researched the subject and, in 2000, he 
conducted an exploratory study 'into the potential of using theatre training to achieve 
an impact on consciousness' (2005, p. 80). The study focussed entirely on using the 
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Indian Natyashastra and another eclectic method as a means of access to states of 
pure consciousness. The conclusion of the exploratory study was that: 
Much work is needed to find ways of systematically applying the 
range of insights I propose ... in theatre training and practice. (Meyer-Dinkgrafe, 2005, p. 196) 
Meyer-Dinkgrafe also questions whether 'theatre following Western aesthetics [can] 
achieve effects similar to those Natyashastra-based theatre claims for itself' (ibid. 
p. 165). In response to this, Meyer-Dinkgrafe notes that in order to reach any 
substantial answers to this question 'fin-ther theoretical elaboration is needed, leading 
eventually to practical, empirical testing of relevant cogent hypotheses' (ibid. ). 
Although Meyer-Dinkgrafe has begun to make connections between theatre and 
consciousness, and has suggestions as to appropriate methods that may be of use in 
accessing particular states, he has yet to present a theoretical model. 
Summary 
It is possible to locate more literature concerning theatre and consciousness than that 
concerning dance and consciousness. Since the early 1990s, the subject of theatre 
and consciousness has increased in significance within the theatre discipline. There is 
an increasing number of publications devoted entirely to the relationship between 
theatre and consciousness, and the idea that theatre can enable theatre artists and 
audiences to have holistic and non-ordinary experiences. Examples are Meyer- 
Dinkgrafe's Yheatre and Consciousness (2005), Demastes' Staging Consciousness: 
Theatre and the Materialization of Mind (2002), Yarrow's Neutral Consciousness in 
the Fxperience of Theatre (1987) and Malekin and Yarrow's Consciousness, 
Literature and Theatre: Yheory and Beyond (1997). In addition, there is a web- 
journal and international conference Consciousness, Literature and the Arts and an 
acting school, The School of the Science of Acting 13 based in London, which trains 
actors to consider the consciousness of their character. 
There are also many theatre sources that, through presenting ideas relating to the 
extent to which actors should be involved with their character, provide theories and 
13 See www. scienceofacting. org. uk 
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methods relating to the actor's conscious state. Theorists and practitioners 
Stanislavski, Strasberg, Grotowski and Schechner promote a pre-reflective state of 
consciousness for the actor. Theorists and practitioners Diderot, Meyerhold and 
Brecht advocate a reflective state of consciousness for the actor. Barba, Bloch, and 
Meyer-Dinkgrafe in his consideration of the Natyashastra, promote a dual 
consciousness for the actor comprising both pre-reflection and reflection. 
These sources indicate that there is some consensus on the nature of the states of the 
actor's consciousness, states which seem to be analogous with those presented within 
the dance literature in relation to the dancer's consciousness. Such sources may assist 
with answering the first preliminary research question outlined in the Introduction; 
which was to ascertain the nature of the states of consciousness that are experienced 
by dancers within the choreography and performance of Western contemporary 
dance. 
In addition to ascertaining the nature of the actor's consciousness - explicitly or 
implicitly - some of the theories and methods discussed also attempt to provide 
methods which may be used to access such states. Although Meyer-Dinkgrafe uses 
the principles of the Natyashastra, he acknowledges that further empirical 
investigation is necessary before it will be possible to transfer the techniques into 
Western theatre practice. Many of the theatre theorists who implicitly discuss states 
of consciousness also present methods of access. For example, Stanislavski's system 
enables actors to access their character, and thus one could consider that this permits 
access to a pre-reflective state of consciousness. Such methods may be of use in the 
context of this thesis and may assist in reaching conclusions regarding the second 
preliminary research question outlined in the Introduction - how can dancers access 
and control states of consciousness within the choreography and performance of 
Western contemporary dance? 
It is important to note here, however, a significant distinction between the purpose of 
the methods of access presented by Stanislavski, for example, and the purpose of the 
method of access required in the study presented in this thesis. All of the methods of 
access presented by theatre theorists such as Stanislavski and Brecht, regardless of 
whether they are promoting reflective or pre-reflective actors, are concerned 
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predominantly with the extent to which the actor is involved, reflectively or pre- 
reflectively, with the character. Thus, although the methods do allow actors to access 
particular states of consciousness, the means of access to these states is the character 
itself. 
In Stanislavski's system, for example, it is the use of emotion memory that enables 
the actor to become emotionally involved with the character and exist as that 
character, and subsequently to function pre-reflectively. The character is therefore 
the means of access to the pre-reflection. Conversely, with Diderot's method, for 
example, the actor is able to function reflectively by removing self from the 
character, becoming a disinterested onlooker with no sensibility, imitating non- 
emotively the patterns and behaviour of that character and recreating the outward 
signs of feeling. In this case, the character is the means of access to the reflection. In 
both instances the character acts as the means of access, and without the character the 
method would be purposeless. One might even argue that the state of consciousness 
being accessed within these methods is actually the character's consciousness as 
opposed to the actor's consciousness. This, however, is a completely separate 
discussion that is outside the scope of this research in which it is purely the dancer's 
consciousness that is of interest. 
It is intended that the method of access presented within this thesis be easily 
comprehensible and appropriate for all forms of contemporary dance, whether literal 
or non-literal. 14 The method of access must allow the dancer to enter particular states 
through means that are not necessarily related to character, as of course, not all 
dances require the dancer to portray a character. The theatre theories and methods 
discussed above are of use in discerning the nature of the different types of the 
actor's consciousness, which may in turn inform any discussion on the dancer's 
consciousness. They are not, however, of great use in ascertaining a method of 
access that can be used to enable dancers to access particular states of consciousness. 
14 The terms literal and non-literal are intended here to distinguish respectively between movement 
that is accurate, exact and truthful, and movement that is figurative, symbolic, abstract, metaphoric or 
allegorical. 
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Revisiting the preliminary research questions 
Having considered the relevant available literature within both the dance and theatre 
disciplines it is now pertinent to return to the preliminary research questions outlined 
in the Introduction. It is important to assess whether the literature discussed has 
provided any insight into the questions outlined, in order to ascertain the research 
outcome of this thesis. Indeed, had the available literature provided complete insight 
into the questions outlined then this thesis may have been deemed invalid and 
unnecessary. 
Evidence of various different states of dance and acting consciousness can be found 
within the literature discussed. All the literature acknowledges that such states of 
consciousness are beyond ordinary consciousness or at least differ in some way from 
the everyday consciousness. Different sources promote various states, although most 
seem to acknowledge the existence of a particularly reflective state, in which the 
dancer or actor is aware of self, and also the existence of a non-reflective state, in 
which the dancer or actor is not aware of self. Some sources even combine these 
states and ascertain that it is possible for them to exist simultaneously. These 
concepts are of use for this research and go some way to providing insight into the 
first preliminary question outlined in the Introduction: 
* What is the nature of the states of consciousness that are experienced by dancers 
within the choreography and performance of Western contemporary dance? 
Further investigation is required, however, in order to substantiate the existence of 
such states. As noted earlier in this chapter, the accounts supplied by dance theorists 
Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh are both based predominantly in the first person and 
lack third person consciousness theory. This is also the case in the majority of the 
concepts presented by the theatre theorists. An understanding of the dance 
consciousness is without doubt dependent entirely on an initial understanding of 
consciousness itself. 
Chapter 2, therefore, considers third-person consciousness theory in some depth. It is 
interesting to note that despite, for example, neuroscientist Freeman stating that 
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dance is central to human consciousness (1998)15 and consciousness theorist 
Ginsburg claiming that 'everything we know of consciousness is connected to 
movement' (1999, p. 79), there is very little literature within consciousness studies 
that even goes so far as to mention dance. Thus the literature that is considered is 
selected sensitively and applied to the discipline of dance in order to make sense of 
the concepts of the dance consciousness. Following such a consideration, the 
accounts presented in Chapter I are then conflated with the third-person theory, and 
Chapter 2 presents two independent and theoretically infon-ned concepts of the dance 
consciousness. Such concepts do not currently exist within dance, theatre or 
consciousness literature. 
In addition, it does not seem that a method for accessing the different states of the 
dance consciousness is currently in existence within the dance literature. Although 
some methods of access are presented within the theatre literature, as noted above 
these are of limited use as they are interrelated with the notion of character. The 
literature reviewed thus far in this chapter can therefore contribute little to the second 
preliminary question presented in the Introduction: 
9 How can dancers access and control such states of consciousness within the 
choreography and performance of Western contemporary dance? 
It is essential, therefore, to move again outside the discipline of dance and search for 
methods of access which appear in other disciplines, but which might be adapted 
effectively and applied to the discipline of dance. Such methods are discussed in 
Chapters 3,4,5 and 6 and relevant principles are extracted. The second preliminary 
research question presented above indicates that, for the purposes of this research, it 
is necessary to search for methods that enable dancers to access and control 
particular states of dance consciousness - namely those of a reflective and pre- 
reflective nature. 16 
15 www. paulagordon. com/shows/freeman 
16 Until the exact nature of these states is determined in Chapter 2 they are referred to as reflective and 
pre-reflective states. 
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The research outcome - The Dance Consciousness Model 
Having considered the significance of the dancer's consciousness and the validity of 
the preliminary research questions, it is now possible to disclose the overall research 
outcome of this thesis, which is: 
* To create a model that can be used to enable dancers to access particular 
conscious states for performance. 
This model is entitled the: 
fo Dance Consciousness Model 
The model comprises four strands and attempts to provide dancers with a method for 
accessing heightened and altered states of consciousness, specifically the reflective 
and pre-reflective states that are defined in Chapter 2. The model presents means of 
access to these states within choreography, rehearsal, and performance. Unlike much 
of the literature presented in this chapter, the Dance Consciousness Model does not 
promote any particular state as being more or less effective, but instead allows the 
dancer to select actively the desired state and access it successfully. 
Having provided some background information on the subject of the dancer's 
consciousness and ascertained the research outcome of this thesis, it is now possible 
to present the focussed research questions of this thesis. it would not have been 
beneficial to introduce the focussed research questions in the Introduction, as an 
understanding of them is dependent on an appreciation of the significance of the 
dancer's consciousness and on the background information discussed in this chapter. 
The questions are encapsulated within the preliminary research questions; the 
focussed research questions are, however, more defined and detailed. 
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Focussed research questions and revisiting the research 
methodology 
The focussed research questions of this thesis are: 
1. What is the nature of the dance consciousness? 
2. How can one examine the dance consciousness? 
3. How can one access the intrattentive 17 dance consciousness? 
4. How can one access the non-intrattentive 18 dance consciousness? 
5. How can one switch between the intrattentive dance consciousness and the non- 
intrattentive dance consciousness? 
6. What constitutes the full Dance Consciousness Model? 
7. How effective is the Dance Consciousness Model? 
Each of these focussed research questions has been investigated theoretically and 
empirically. 
The theoretical and empirical methodologies used to conduct the research are 
identified in Table 1 in outline and in general terms only, since each subsequent 
chapter provides detailed description of the specific methods employed to investigate 
the research questions. For example, the focus of Chapter 3 is the method used to 
examine empirically the states of dance consciousness and Chapters 4,5 and 6 focus 
on the methods used to access empirically states of dance consciousness. The 
structural breakdown for each chapter is provided subsequent to Table 1. 
17 The term 'intrattentive' is introduced and defined in Chapter 2. For now, however, it may be 
considered as an alternative to the term 'reflective' utilised by theorists such as Fraleigh (1987). 
18 The term 'non-intrattentive' is also defined in Chapter 2. For now, however, it can be considered as 
an alternative to the term 'pre-reflective' utilised by theorists such as Fraleigh (1987). 
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Table 1: Theoretical and empirical methodologies 
Theoretical methodology 
I 
Empirical methodology 
Consideration of focussed research 
question I led to: 
Research into consciousness studies, in 
order to ascertain the nature of 
consciousness according to 
consciousness theorists. 
This resulted in the formulation of two 
independently created concepts of dance 
consciousness to be investigated 
empirically. 
Consideration of focussed research 
question 2 led to: 
Theoretical research into existing 
methods for examining consciousness. 
This resulted in the formulation of an 
independently created method of 
examination to be tested empirically. 
Consideration of focussed research Empirical Project 1 included: 
question 3 led to: - 'Me application of the independently 
Theoretical research into existing created method of examination. 
methods for accessing the intrattentive - The application of the independently 
consciousness. created methods of intrattentive access 
This resulted in the formulation of a and the experimentation on and 
series of independently created methods subsequent refining of these methods. 
of access to be tested empirically. 
Consideration of focussed research Empirical Project 2: 
question 4 led to: The application of the independently 
Theoretical research into existing created method of examination. 
methods for accessing the non- The application of the independently intrattentive consciousness. created methods of non-intrattentive 
This resulted in the formulation of a access and the experimentation on and 
series of independently created methods subsequent refining of these methods. 
of access to be tested empirically. 
Consideration of focussed research Empirical Project I 
questions 5 and 6 led to: - The application of the independently 
A theoretical analysis of the methods created method of examination. 
of examination and methods of access, - The application of the switching states based on the empirical evidence. method and the final research outcome. 
This resulted in the creation of a method 
for switching states and the final 
formulation of the research outcome. 
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Theoretical methodology Empirical methodology 
Consideration of focussed research 
question 7 led to: 
A theoretical analysis of the efficacy of 
the research outcome based on the 
empirical evidence. 
This resulted in the formulation of the 
conclusion for this research. 
Breakdown of subsequent chapters 
Chapter 2: What is the nature of the dance consciousness? 
Understanding the states of the dance consciousness necessitates a preliminary 
appreciation of the ordinary everyday states on which they are based. Chapter 2 
therefore takes a trans-disciplinary approach, entailing a thorough exploration into 
consciousness theory within philosophy, psychology and cognitive science. This 
exploration aims to ascertain and explain the meaning, theoretical conceptualisation. 
and nature of the dance consciousness. Chapter 2 explores different researchers' 
views on the nature of consciousness and then considers the hierarchical levels of 
consciousness. A distinction is made between fundamental and supplementary states 
and the levels are discussed as distinct concepts, with a clear explanation as to any 
varying degrees of consciousness within each of the concepts. Finally, Chapter 2 
distinguishes between two particular types of dance consciousness and presents the 
concepts and terminology that have been created for the purpose of this research, and 
the Dance Consciousness Model, to represent these states. 
Chapter 3: How can one examine the dance consciousness? 
Creating a method for a dancer to articulate the experience of his or her conscious 
state during and after the experience itself is essential in order to allow dancers to 
understand fully the Dance Consciousness Model and its inherent states. Chapter 3 
therefore discusses methods of examination. Within this, there is a consideration of 
what constitutes a suitable and dependable method for the examination of conscious 
experience. Chapter 3 contemplates objective versus subjective methods and 
distinguishes between first-, second- and third-person methods. Each of these 
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methods is explained, and then a conclusion reached as to which methods are utilised 
within the Dance Consciousness Model's method of examination. 
Existing methods of examination that are presented in current dance literature and in 
current consciousness literature are then discussed. Within this, two particular 
theories are introduced - phenomenological reduction and the explicitation session. 
These theories are referred to as the chapter proceeds to discuss present-centred and 
retrospective accounts, and verbal and non-verbal information. The chapter then 
presents the actual method of examination used within the Dance Consciousness 
Model and clarifies how the method is applied within this context. Finally, the nature 
of the Dance Consciousness Model itself 'is. introduced, along with a diagram 
showing the skeletal structure of the model. 
Chapter 4: How can one access the intrattentive dance consciousness? 
Chapter 4 presents the first strand of the Dance Consciousness Mode I- the 
intrattentive, strand. Discussion focuses on three existing practices and theories which 
contributed to the formulation of the intrattentive strand and the training that 
precedes its use. These practices and theories are: somatic practices - specifically the 
Feldenkrais Method; sports psychology - including theories on imagery and self- 
talk; and visual and verbal processing theories - in particular the Dual Coding 
Theory. Each discussion culminates with a summary explaining exactly how the 
practice or theory contributed to the Dance Consciousness Model. 
The intrattentive training that is required for the intrattentive strand of the model is 
then described. This description includes how to access fundamental and higher 
states of intrattention. and a breakdown of each intrattentive training workshop. 
Finally, the chapter presents a description of the intrattentive strand and a 
clarification as to how it is applied within choreography, rehearsal and performance 
in order to create an intrattentive dance consciousness. 
Chapter 5: How can one access the non-intrattentive dance consciousness? 
Chapter 5 takes a similar structure to Chapter 4 in presenting the second strand of the 
Dance Consciousness Model - the non-intrattentive strand. Discussion centres on 
three existent practices which contributed to formulation of the non-intrattentive 
strand and the training that precedes its use. These practices are: attention studies, 
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Buddifist Introspection and Bodyweather. 19 Each discussion culminates with a 
summary of exactly how the practice contributed to the non-intrattentive strand. 
A-description is provided as to the nature of the non-intrattentive training that is 
required. This description includes how to access fundamental and higher states of 
intrattention in order to access non-intrattention and a breakdown of each non- 
intrattentive training workshop. Finally, this chapter describes the non-intrattentive 
strand and clarifies how it is applied within choreography, rehearsal and performance 
in order to create a non-intrattentive dance consciousness. 
Chapter 6: How can one switch between the intrattentive dance consciousness 
and the non-intrattentive dance consciousness? What constitutes the full Dance 
Consciousness Model? 
Again Chapter 6 takes a similar structure to Chapters 4 and 5 but presents the third 
and fourth strands of the Dance Consciousness Model - the intrattentive to non- 
intrattentive strand (I-NI) and the non-intrattentive to intrattentive strand (NI-I). 
Chapter 6 introduces the two strands and the training that is required for the strands - 
the switching states training. Within this is a clarification as to why the ability to 
switch states is essential and in what context this switching may take place. The 
chapter moves on to discuss switching states within the dance process and describes 
the purpose and content of WorkshoP 1 of the switching states training. Following 
this is a discussion on switching states within dance performance. The 'Cyclic State 
Training' that is utilised within the practice of Bodyweather is introduced, and the 
idea of interchanging within the Cyclic State Training is considered. After 
ascertaining the influence of the Cyclic State Training on the switching states 
training, this chapter describes a consciousness circuit and the purpose and content of 
Workshop 2. Finally Chapter 6 presents the Dance Consciousness Model in its 
entirety. 
Chapter 7: How effective is the Dance Consciousness Model? 
Chapter 7 begins with descriptions and brief analyses of Empirical Projects 1 and 2 
in which the intrattentive and the non-intrattentive strands were created. Chapter 7 
19 Bodyweather is a practice which was established in Japan in the early 1980's, which conflates 
Eastern and Western philosophy and draws on a variety of dance and physical training practices, such 
as martial arts, contemporary dance, yoga and Shiatsu. 
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then presents an in-depth analysis of Empirical Project 3, which comprises seven 
phases, and the first complete application of the Dance Consciousness Model. 
Subsequently, Chapter 7 formulates a conclusion regarding the efficacy of the Dance 
Consciousness Model in the context of Western contemporary dance. Within this, 
possible modifications for the model are suggested and it is indicated how the 
research could develop further in the future. Chapter 7 closes with a hypothesis 
concerning the possible significance of the model within current dance practice and 
its potential as a new practice. 
A final note 
As the above preview of the chapters demonstrates, this thesis presents the Dance 
Consciousness Model in progressive stages. Each chapter discusses different existing 
theories which have been adapted and subsequently applied to dance to inform 
conceptualisation and development of the model. The existing theories that have 
been adapted for application come from various disciplines, practices, contexts and 
cultures and for this reason they were carefully selected and interpreted. This thesis 
endeavours to explain as fully as possible and necessary the theories which are 
considered relevant for the Dance Consciousness Model. 
When applying theories, especially those from different cultures such as Buddhist 
Introspection, it is not the intention to import a different culture per se. Any specific 
principles from such theories that are selected are done so extremely sensitively with 
a continual awareness of the origin and intended purpose of the theory. One may 
consider that it would be less problematic to use only Western theories, and thus 
negate the difficulties concerned with borrowing from, for example, an Eastern 
culture. The decision to extract principles from practices such as Buddhist 
Introspection, however, is considered to be justified; it is felt that non-Western 
philosophy has much to offer on the subject of consciousness as, according to Koltai, 
'the search for transformation of consciousness - both individual and collective - is 
relatively recent in Western contemporary culture' (2002, p-47). Meyer-Dinkgrafe 
also notes that in non-Western philosophy: 
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... a more holistic, all encompassing view of consciousness is not only 
theorised, but ... numerous physical and mental techniques are 
provided. 
(2005, p. 22) 
Bearing this in mind, it would not have been feasible to disregard non-Westem 
practices and theories. Although the existent theories referred to have been carefully 
selected, they are by no means the only theories that could have been used in this 
context, nor the only theories that can provide answers to the focussed research 
questions. One may find the practices of Butoh 20 or authentic movement, 21 for 
example, just as applicable. Clearly it would be difficult to utilise all the many 
practices that could be considered pertinent; the few that were selected were 
considered the most relevant in this particular context. 
Through the application and amalgamation of various existing theories, new theories 
have been formulated. These new theories, alongside much independent thought and 
empirical research, have culminated in the Dance Consciousness Model - an original 
model that does not currently exist within the discipline of dance. Although this 
thesis deems the model to be effective and convincing, there is no intention to imply 
that the model is exclusive or exhaustive, or that it provides all the definitive answers 
relating to dance and consciousness. 
The Dance Consciousness Model presented within this thesis is open, of course, to 
further theoretical modification and supplementary empirical research. Indeed, the 
model has thus far been empirically tested only within a few particular dance 
processes and performances. The remarks made in Chapter 7 regarding the 
significance of the model within current Western dance practice, therefore, stand as 
comprehensively argued hypotheses that are open for further theoretical debate and 
empirical investigation. To concur with Meyer-Dinkgrafe, 'while I claim to present 
alternative, new thoughts in relation to ... theory and practice, 
I do not claim 
exclusivity. Other approaches to consciousness exist' (2005, p. 195). 
20 The experiential dance consciousness can be recognised in some Eastern forms of dance such as 
Butoh. According to Fraleigh, 'Butoh taps the subconscious body' (1999, p. 6) and is essentially based 
upon the experiential inner consciousness; Butoh is not 'objectively calculated; it sprang from 
subjective, felt life' (ibid. p. 46). 21 According to the Moving Journal web-site, which is dedicated to authentic movement, 'people 
engage in authentic movement ... to increase consciousness' (Geissinger, 2003). Ramsay notes that authentic movement allows an 'active dialogue between conscious and unconscious material emerging 
from one's psyche and leading to creative expression' (2002, p. 18). 
48 
Chapter 2 
What is the nature of the dance consciousness? 
Introduction 
In Chapter 1 the proposed research outcome of this thesis was identified as the Dance 
Consciousness Model, a model that can be used to enable dancers to access particular 
conscious states for performance. In order to create such a model it is essential to 
consider primarily the first focussed research question: What is the nature of the 
dance consciousness? To substantiate any conclusions regarding this question, one 
must essentially consider: What is consciousness? 
The initial problem faced by consciousness researchers is the uncertainty about what 
the phenomenon of consciousness is. Dance consciousness researchers are faced with 
the additional problem of what the nature of the phenomenon of the dance 
consciousness is. From research into the literature, it seems that no comprehensive 
definition for dance consciousness has been proposed to date. As indicated in 
Chapter 1, dance researchers Sheets-Johnstone (1966) and Fraleigh (1987) make 
reference to the dance consciousness in general and superficial terms only. Fraleigh 
merely claims that 'consciousness is consciousness of something' (1987, p. 6), and 
thus goes no fin-ther than Sheets-Johnstone who notes that 'it is phenomenologically 
evident that consciousness is consciousness of something' (1966, p. 35). 
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to provide ftirther insight into the nature of 
consciousness and subsequently into the nature of the dance consciousness. Although 
it may not be possible to find ultimate definitions, it is necessary to at least secure 
ostensible definitions to underpin research that explores the essence of consciousness 
in the dance context. 
Chapter breakdown 
This chapter begins with an exploration into the history of the study of 
consciousness, within which is a consideration of various models of understanding of 
consciousness theory. Chapter 2 discusses monist and dualist theories; the former 
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include materialist, epiphenomenonalist, mentalist and idealist theories and the 
discussion of the latter includes an examination of the relationship between body and 
mind within interactionism and psychophysical parallelism. A summary of 
psychology theories is then given, and the effect existentialism, phenomenology and 
introspection has had on the development of consciousness studies is examined. 
Having ascertained that the study of consciousness has remained dormant for some 
time, Chapter 2 then provides a synopsis of the return of attention to consciousness 
theory and an indication as to its modem-day significance. 
The question 'what is consciousness? ' is then posed and followed by a discussion of 
everyday concepts of consciousness and concepts of consciousness in consciousness 
studies. Included in this discussion are philosophical, psychological and scientific 
concepts - namely relational concepts, causal concepts, non-causal concepts, 
functionalist concepts, the Global Workspace Theory (Baars, 1988) and the concept 
of 'what it is like to be... ' (Nagel, 1974). 
Chapter 2 then addresses the problem of consciousness and ascertains that a 
generally accepted definition of consciousness does not exist. As a result, the chapter 
provides a consideration of the hierarchical levels of consciousness disclosed by 
consciousness researchers from various disciplines. This discussion includes 
fundamental states and supplementary states, within which the varying degrees of 
these states are discussed. This knowledge and understanding is then applied to the 
discipline of dance and the chapter introduces two concepts of dance consciousness. 
The concepts are thus entirely grounded within consciousness theory, unlike the 
concepts provided within dance literature to date. Finally, the chapter explains the 
terminology to be used to represent the newly-formulated concepts of dance 
consciousness, and closes with a chapter summary. 
Important note 
Although this chapter discusses the concepts of consciousness, it is not possible to 
consider all concepts in existence or to provide any final or innovative solutions to 
the definitive mystery of the nature of consciousness. The information presented has 
been extracted from a wide range of sources within psychology, philosophy, science 
and the dance discipline in order to provide a more rounded depiction of the nature of 
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consciousness. The information is considered sufficient for the context in that it aids 
understanding of the dance consciousness for dancers and choreographers as well as 
theorists. 
The concepts and ostensible definitions provided within this chapter are specifically 
for use within the context of this research and the Dance Consciousness Model. It is 
not intended that the concepts should be used in another context, for example within 
general consciousness studies. The Dance Consciousness Model is a highly 
accessible model which was created to be used, applied and understood by any 
dancer or choreographer, and thus does not necessitate an in-depth philosophical, 
psychological or scientific understanding of consciousness. 
The history of consciousness 
The nature of consciousness has engaged the minds of psychologists, philosophers, 
cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, spiritualists, artificial intelligence researchers 
and many others for centuries22 and the subject is a 'multidisciplinary subject' 
(Blackmore, 2003, p. 2). One can trace implicit theories on consciousness, such as 
ideologies relating to 'inner thought', back to the third century BC. 23 It seems, 
however, that the term conscious was not used with such preoccupation prior to the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The term conscious derives from the Latin 
words cum, meaning together with, and scire, meaning knowing. In this conjunction 
the preft is emphatic so that 'being conscious of something simply means knowing 
it, or knowing it well' (Lormand, 1996). 24 
Consciousness theorists 'over the millennia have struggled' (Blackmore, 2003, p-9) 
with the nature of consciousness and central to this struggle is ascertaining the 
relationship between mind and matter. Since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
different theories of consciousness have developed and subsequently been disposed 
of These theories can be roughly divided into two categories: monism and dualism. 
22 For an in-depth discussion on 'The Problem of Consciousness' see Metzinger (1995). 23 For a detailed account on both pre-Cartesian (pre Descartes) and post-Cartesian (post Descartes) 
ideologies on consciousness see Lormand (1996). 
24 www. consciousness. arizona. edu 
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Monist theories 
Monist theories assert that 'there is only one kind of stuff in the world' (Blackmore, 
2003, p. 9) or that 'all reality is basically of one kind' (Hanfling, 1973, p-20). One 
monist theory is that of materialism which endorses the view that only matter exists. 
Classical materialists, such as Democritus and later Hobbes, held the view that the 
'world should be deemed as a clockwork mechanism of bodies which push each 
other like cogwheels' (Popper and Eccles, 1977, p. 6). 'Mis type of materialist 
thinking is evident within current dance literature; Blom and Chaplin, for example, 
state explicitly that 'a dancer's instrument is her body' (1982, p. 16) and Banes notes 
that 'audiences and critics have loved Paxton for his revelation of the body as a 
physical machine' (1987, p. 57). 
Materialists such as Popper and Eccles consider that conscious processes do not 
existý rather that 'their existence can be repudiated' (1977, p. 51). Although some 
materialists do accept the existence of a mind, it is considered merely as a 'collateral 
product ... without any power' (Hanfling, 1973, p. 35). This is a general theory of 
epiphenomenalism which encapsulates the idea that the 'mind is a mere 
epiphenomena attached to a certain material phenomena' (Vesey, 1964, p. 248). 
Epiphenomenalists, such as Huxley, believe that, although physical events cause 
mental events, mental events do not have any causal effect on physical events and 
thus they have no actual causal role to play. Thus although epiphenomenalists do not 
refute the existence of consciousness entirely they do consider that consciousness has 
no causal influence. 
At the beginning of the eighteenth century some theorists, such as Berkeley, 
discarded materialism as a theory of consciousness, as ihey felt that it reduced the 
subjective and phenomenal nature of consciousness, and they replaced physical 
matter with the sensations of the mind. This supports a different monist theory - 
mentalism or idealism - which endorses the view that only the mental exists. Some 
mentalists and idealists attribute little significance to the role of the body and 
emphasise the subjective consciousness; for example Plato believed that: 
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The true self or the real man is somehow within, and ... the body is an 
appendage or a framework of some sort. 
(cited in Macquarrie, 1973, p. 68) 
Some radical idealists, such as Berkeley, even went so far as to refute the existence 
of physical matter and claim that 'the notion that there are material things outside our 
consciousness is an illusion' (Hanfling, 1973, p. 20). 
Dualist theories 
Dualist theories assert that there are 'two kinds of stuff in the world' (Blackmore, 
2003, p. 9) or that 'reality is two-fold' (Hanfling, 1973, p. 20). The most prominent 
dualist was French philosopher Descartes, whose understanding of dualistic 
consciousness is referred to as Cartesian dualism. Descartes believes that 
consciousness is separate from the physical body, but that there is some kind of 
interaction between consciousness and body., Descartes generally speaks of being 
conscious as referring to a supposedly intimate source of knowledge about one's own 
mental occurrences. In the 'Conversation with Burman' he stated that 'to be 
conscious is both to think and to reflect on one's thought' (cited in Lon-nand, 
25 1996), indicating some sort of internal knowledge. This definition may well 
account for many of the modem uses of the terms conscious and unconscious, and 
their use in marking the distinction between two mental states. 
Dualist thought encapsulates the idea that the consciousness and the mind are not 
detached from what one can identify as the physical, but instead consciousness and 
the body are intrinsically bound. One could perhaps consider them as 'diasporatic' 
(Sheets-Johnstone, 1966, p. 18), meaning that although there may be some distinction 
between'them, their existence is mutually dependent and there is a fundamental unity 
between them. As Merleau Ponty states, 'they can never be distinguished absolutely 
without ceasing to be' (1963, p. 185). Dualism encapsulates a sense of the human 
being in its entirety and, as Fraleigh maintains, 'dancing requires a concentration of 
the whole person as a minded body' (19 8 7, p. 9). 
25 www. consciousness-arizona. edu/ 
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Within dualist theories there is some dispute as to the nature of the relationship 
between mind and body, with theorists questioning whether the mind controls the 
body and thus the 'mind is the pilot of the ship - the body' (Popper and Eccles, 1977, 
p. 120), or whether the body controls the mind and thus the mind is 'the ghost in the 
machine' (Ryle, 1949, p. 17). The theory of psychophysical parallelism repudiates 
such ideas and employs the notion that, rather than the relationship being one of 
cause and effect, it is merely one of accompaniment in which the body and mind 
'habitually accompany one another' (Ayer cited in Hanfling, 1973, p. 30). Theories of 
psychophysical parallelism promote an integrated body, what Todd (1959) and 
Fraleigh (1987) refer to as a 'thinking body'. 
Psychology theories, existentialism, phenomenology and introspection 
Such forms of dualism were rejected at the end of the eighteenth century with the 
emergence of psychology and, in fact, 'almost all contemporary scientists and 
philosophers' have dismissed dualism and 'there are very few dualists today' 
(Blacýmore, 2003, p. 13). 26 The term psychology was first used to describe the 
philosophy of mental life and, at the end of the nineteenth century, psychology 
became a science. This was aided by James' The Principles of Psychology (1890). 
Consciousness was central to James's psychology and it was he who coined the 
phrase 'the stream of consciousness' (1890). Sully noted that psychology, or mental 
science, is 'the science that investigates and explains the phenomena of mind, or the 
inner world of our conscious experience' (18 92, p. 1). 
The development of the study of consciousness was assisted ftirther by the surfacing 
of existentialism, phenomenology and introspection. Existential phenomenology can 
be considered as 'both a philosophy and a psychology based on putting subjective 
experience first' (Blackmore, 2003, p. 15). Existential phenomenology was brought to 
prominence by Husserl (1917), who believed that humanity should go back to things 
in themselves, to the immediate and subjective conscious experience. 27 Introspection 
was initially developed by Wundt and provides a method of examining subjective 
26 Popper and Eccles remain some of the only dualist theorists and propose a modem theory of dualist 
interactionism (1977). 
27 Husserl's suggestion as to how this is possible is encapsulated within his theory of 
phenomenological reduction, which is discussed in Chapter 3. 
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experiences, the experiences of consciousness. Wundt trained people to observe 
introspectively and examine their own inner experiences. 
Existentialism, phenomenology and introspection can all be considered as first- 
person approaches to consciousness, approaches which explain the nature of 
consciousness through one's first-person experience of consciousness. Such 
approaches were dismissed at the beginning of the twentieth century and were 
replaced with behaviourist theories in which psychologists, such as Watson, noted 
that psychology could manage without concepts of consciousness. Watson claimed 
that psychology would become a. 'purely objective branch of natural sciences' (1913, 
p. 158). Watson's biographer, Cohen, notes that 'behaviourism. was a self-conscious 
revolution against consciousness' (1987, p. 72). In 1962 Miller stated: 
Consciousness is a word worn smooth by a million tongues. 
Depending upon the figure of speech chosen it is a state of being, a 
substance, a process, a place, an epiphenomenon, an emergent aspect 
of matter, or the only true reality. Maybe we should ban the word for a 
decade or two until we can develop more precise terms for the several 
uses which "consciousness" now obscures. 
(1962, p. 40) 
Indeed, the study of consciousness and attempts to conceptualise, define or examine 
it remained comparatively absent within philosophy, psychology and the sciences 
until the 1990s. 
The study of consciousness returns 
1994 saw the first Tucson conference on consciousness, 28 at which Australian 
philosopher Chalmers reintroduced what he entitled the 'hard problem' of 
consciousness, 'how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective 
experience' (1995, p. 63). Chalmers openly questioned the nature of consciousness, 
which resulted in four special issues of the peer reviewed Journal of Consciousness 
Studies. 29 Since then consciousness studies as a distinct discipline, or science, has 
28 This is now a biannual conference called Towards a Science of Consciousness and facilitated by the 
Centre for Consciousness Studies at the University of Arizona in Tucson. See 
www. consciousness. arizona. edu 29 The journal was also founded in 1994 and by the year 2002 it had increased its publication to eight 
issues per year. See www. imprint. co. uVWelcome. html 
_ 
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thrived. In 1996 the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness 30 was 
founded, along with the journal Consciousness and Cognition. Meyer-Dinkgrafe 
notes that 'for the last ten years, many disciplines of learning have seen a remarkable 
rise of interest in human consciousness' (2005, p. 1). 
Such developments within consciousness studies have resulted in a number of 
philosophers, psychologists and scientists resurrecting the attempt to conceptualise 
and define the nature of consciousness. It is these concepts which provide the 
foundation for the concepts of the dance consciousness introduced within this 
chapter. 
What is consciousness? 
Everyday concepts of consciousness 
So what exactly is consciousness? How is it defined or conceptualised within 
contemporary society and within current consciousness research? The term 
consciousness is commonly utilised within present everyday life; for example, the 
term is often contrasted with the term unconscious and is intended to imply a sense 
of being responsive, awake or engaged. The term is also interchanged with synonyms 
such as awareness, attention or knowing and used in relation to subjectivity or 
phenomenal and personal experience. 
The Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind defines consciousness as 'self-awareness' 
(2004)31 similarly WordNet, an online lexical database for the English language, 
defines consciousness as 'an alert cognitive state in which you are aware of yourself 
and your situation' (2005). 32 According to WordNet this awareness is related 
intrinsically to knowledge and it states that 'awareness [is] having knowledge of' 
(ibid. ). Consciousness researcher Blackmore believes that 'consciousness is our first- 
30 See bttp: //assc. caltech. edu/ 31 www. artsci. wustl. edu/-philos/MindDict/consciousness 32 www. cogsci. princeton. edu/cgi-bin/webwn 
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person view on the world' (2003, p. 3). In the light of this one could consider 
consciousness to be 'subjective experience' (2004). 33 
The above definitions may be seen as slightly vague, but 'if we always insisted on 
precise definitions we all would be speechless almost all of the time' (Weiskrantz, 
1988, p. 183). The definitions can be considered as ostensible definitions which are 
little more than a 'useful shorthand that are temporarily employed in a restricted 
linguistic setting' (Antony, 1999, p. 43) in order to provide some clarity and 
consensus understanding. 
Some consciousness researchers, such as Churchland (1986), however, claim that 
such definitions may not be constructive, functional and valuable as they have little 
or no scientific or philosophical significance and, therefore, are not suitable for a 
research study. Although the definitions formulated for specific use within the 
context of this study have to be comprehensible to dance exponents generally, and 
not require a deep conceptual or intuitive understanding of the nature of 
consciousness, it is essential that they are based in sound conceptual and theoretical 
consciousness theory. Thus the provision of fin-ther detail and a consideration of the 
concepts employed by current consciousness researchers are necessary. 
Concepts of consciousness within consciousness studies 
At the time of writing, the term consciousness continues to be readily interchanged 
by, for example, scientists, psychologists and philosophers who have used the term 
within the context of topics such as: knowledge, introspection, intentionality, 
phenomenal experience, qualia, awareness, attention and subjectivity. Lycan states 
that this diverse collection is not a subject, but a 'flea market or jumble sale' 
34 (2002), Clark considers that there are many different subjects all 'corralled under 
one heading by a regrettable ambiguity in our terminology' (2001, p. 48), and Bieri 
notes that 'the word consciousness does not designate a homogenous phenomenon. 
The word is ambiguous, its use is plastic' (1995, p. 45). 
33 www. artsci. wustl. edu/-philos/MindDict/consciousness 
34 www. consciousness. arizona. edu/ 
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This ambiguity surrounding the term has become of such significance that the 
consciousness research area has seen an upsurge of literature dealing directly with 
the lack of consensus, with papers such as 'Is Consciousness Ambiguous' (Antony, 
2001), 'The Plurality of Consciousness' (Lycan, 2002) and 'The Vicissitudes of 
Consciousness' (Clark, 2002) being published. In fact, as Antony notes: 
In spite of there being little widespread agreement among researchers 
on most matters falling within the domain of consciousness studies, 
when it come to "consciousness" it is virtually universally agreed that 
the term is multiply ambiguous. 
(200 1, p. 19) 
Despite this, some consciousness researchers have attempted to defme concepts of 
consciousness. One concept is that consciousness is a type of 'internal monologue 
that is always present' (Birch and Malim, 1998, p. 204). Such a monologue is the 
product of a reflection of the exterior world, which is created through an integration 
of the information processed through aesthesis - which can be considered as sensory 
perception and is the means through which one perceives the world. Crook believes 
consciousness is an 'internal analogue of the exterior world' (1980, p. 29) and that 
our inner consciousness is dominated by our visual perception. Crook contemplates 
that this 'internal analogue' is not merely an 'interpretation' but a 'representation' of 
experience (ibid. pp. 29-30) and that, in the subjective sense, 'an individual is his 
experience, is his consciousness' and 'consciousness is being' (ibid. p. 30). 
Although consciousness is related intrinsically to experience and being, as inferred 
by the more ostensible definitions, it is not of common consensus that consciousness 
always involves an internal monologue. It would appear that, within some states of 
consciousness, one may encounter an internal monologue; it is not necessarily, 
however, a prerequisite of consciousness. The definition provided by Crook, for 
example, is not considered to be a consensus definition. 
Other consciousness researchers attempt to define consciousness through reference to 
the type of actions which would supply public or external confirmation for 
consciousness. An example of this is Block's claim that a conscious state is one 
which is obtainable for verbal account (1995). This notion, however, is disregarded 
by many consciousness researchers who claim that verbal accountability is not an 
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essential condition of consciousness. Such a definition does not, for example, 
account for individuals with speech impediments who may be unable to report 
verbally on their conscious states - and these states should not be automatically 
rendered as unconscious. 'Nor does it take into account states of consciousness which 
may be too brief or too detached provisionally from report possibilities to connect 
with the apparatus of verbal account. The definition would also exclude animals from 
having states of consciousness; it is not a certainty that animals are consciously 
aware, but it is a possibility, despite their lack of account capability. Finally, it would 
also imply that machines and robots could encounter conscious states, as they may be 
capable of giving accounts of their internal states through particular programming, 
this would notý however, be sufficient to confer awareness of those states. Such a 
relational definition is also, therefore, not a consensus definition. 
Many different concepts of consciousness exist within current consciousness 
research. It would be difficult to discuss each of these concepts in this chapter but a 
few are summarised below: 
Some consciousness researchers, such as Dennett (1995), present functionalist 
concepts of consciousness, in which they deem consciousness to be completely 
functional. Functionalists believe that 'the functions carried out by the system are 
what matters, and there is no consciousness separate from these abilities and 
performances' (Blackmore, 2003, p. 48). 
* Consciousness researcher Baars formulated the Global Workspace Theory (GWT) 
in 1988. In the GWT, unconscious processes contend with one another for 'access 
to the bright spotlight of attention that shines on the stage' from which 
'information is broadcast globally to the unconscious audience', and it is this 
'global broadcast that constitutes consciousness' (Blachmore, 2003, p-48). Baars 
(1988) claims that consciousness is normally reserved for messages that are in 
some way informative. Here he means informative in the technical sense of 
reducing uncertainty. He claims that when uncertainty is at, or close to zero, 
messages tend to be removed from consciousness. 
Another common approach is to present representational concepts and define 
consciousness with reference to self-knowledge, self monitoring or higher order 
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reflection. Consciousness researchers such as Lycan (2002), Armstrong (1980) 
and Rosenthal (2002) endorse this approach which proposes that for a state, S1, to 
be conscious, the holder of S1 must have an additional state, S2, which is 
conscious of S1 at the exact time of its happening. 
Some consciousness researchers, such as dualist interactionists Popper and Eccles 
(1977), offer causal concepts of consciousness in which they claim that 
consciousness causes brain events. For example, if consciousness were to desire a 
drink, consciousness would interact with the brain and cause the brain to carry out 
that desire by sending information to the appropriate sources. 
9 Other consciousness researchers dismiss the notion that consciousness can cause 
events or have any effect on the brain and present non-causal concepts of 
consciousness. In this instance, if consciousness were to desire a drink, it would 
have no effect on brain processing. The existence of consciousness is not 
repudiated, but it does not have any causal effect. 
It is clear from the above that many different concepts of consciousness are utilised 
by current consciousness researchers. The question remains however: does a 
consensus definition exist? 
What is it like to be ... ? 
In 1974 philosopher Nagel posed the question: what is it like to be a bat? Nagel 
states that, when one says that another organism is conscious, one is intending that 
'there is something it is like to be that organism ... something 
it is like for the 
organism' (1974, p. 436). This is, for consciousness theorists such as Blackmore, the: 
... closest we can come to a definition of consciousness - that 
consciousness is subjectivity, or what it is like to be ... (2003, p. 23) 
According to Blackmore, Nagel's question 'clarifies the central meaning of the terrn 
consciousness' (ibid. p. 24). Nagel's -definition could perhaps be considered as the 
closest to a consensus definition of consciousness. 
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So what is it like to be? What is it like to smell freshly cut grass? What is it like to 
see the colour red? What is it like to hear birds singing? What is it like to feel 
hungry? What it is like to have these experiences can be private and somewhat 
ineffable. Each of these experiences has its own particular quality. Within modem 
philosophy these qualities are defined as qualia. One's smell of grass is a quale, 
one's vision of red is a quale, the sound of birds one hears is a quale and one's 
feeling of hunger is a quale. 
According to consciousness theorists, such as Chalmers (1996), consciousness 
comprises qualia, not knowledge", and one's conscious experiences are ihus made up 
of quale. Chalmers notes that no amount of knowledge or understanding can be a 
substitute for what it is like, for example, to smell freshly cut grass. Thus, it is 
impossible to know what it is like to be a bat, for the answer remains within the 
consciousness of the bat. Likewise, what it is like to be you can really only be 
understood through your consciousness, as what it is like is your consciousness. 
Applying this concept of consciousness to the discipline of dance, one can discern 
that the dance consciousness comprises what it is like to dance and therefore this 
would be its definition. If the definition of consciousness is what it is like to be, then 
the dance consciousness could be defined as what it is like to be whilst dancing. But 
exactly what is it like to be whilst dancing? 
The quandary of consciousness 
Although the above definition appears to be incomplete, the concept that 
consciousness is 'what it is like to be' is as near to a consensus definition as 
consciousness theorists have reached. It is apparently generally agreed amongst 
consciousness researchers that, although defining consciousness has 'historically 
been an elusive endeavour' (Katz, 200 1), 'human consciousness is just about the last 
surviving mystery' (Dennett, 199 1, p. 2 1). Chalmers notes that: 
Consciousness poses the most baffling problems in the science of the 
mind. There is nothing that we know more intimately than conscious 
experience, but there is nothing that is harder to explain. 
(1995a, p. 200) 
Similarly, philosopher McGinn claims that: 
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You can look into your mind until you burst, and you will not discover 
neurons and synapses and all the rest; and you can stare at someone's 
brain from dawn till dusk and you will not perceive the consciousness 
that is so apparent to the person whose brain you are so rudely eye- 
balling. 
(1999, p. 47) 
It seems, then, that theorists have yet to solve defmitively the consciousness mystery. 
Perhaps this is because there is still a significant gap within consciousness 
knowledge which philosophers, such as Levine (1983), have referred to as the 
dexplanatory gap'. 35 Flanagan's 'Unified Theory of Consciousness' (1992) indicates 
that closing the explanatory gap is possible only through combining science, 
philosophy and psychology, and amalgamating philosophical and theoretical enquiry 
with empirical practice. Flanagan indicates that this could result in an 
interdisciplinary science of consciousness, which would be open for theoretical and 
empirical understanding. Some consciousness researchers claim, however, that the 
quandary of consciousness can be solved only with 'a real humdinger of a solution' 
(Churchland, 1996, p. 40), which comprises a new and fundamental understanding of 
the universe. So where does this leave this chapter and the intention to answer the 
first focussed research question and discern the nature of the dance consciousness? 
It is of use, here, to consider some other existing concepts presented by current 
consciousness researchers. Although many of these researchers do not define 
consciousness as a homogenous phenomenon per se, they do often refer to, and 
distinguish between, particular types or levels of consciousness. It may therefore be 
helpful to clarify exactly what type or hierarchical level of consciousness one is 
referring to, rather than attempt to define consciousness itself 
Hierarchical levels of consciousness 
I Although various terms are utilised by consciousness and dance consciousness 
researchers to represent different types or levels of consciousness, it does seem that 
they can all be categorised similarly. Most of the terminology for types or levels of 
consciousness offered by consciousness researchers from across the research fields 
comes in pairs for example 'phenomenal' and 'access' consciousness (Block, 1995). 
35 Marback discusses the 'explanatory gap' and possible ways in which to overcome it, in 'Building 
materials for the Explanatory Bridge (19919, pp. 252-6). 
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What is indicated by each of these pairs is a sense that there are two antithetical 
concepts of consciousness. 
Each of these pairs represents a distinction of the same type, and it seems that there 
exists some sort of consciousness scale with opposing components situated at each 
end. This reflects Farthing's suggestion of a 'non-conscious - conscious continuum' 
(Atkinson et al, 1996, p. 190). It could be considered that consciousness moves from 
one extremity of wholly unconscious processes, through innumerable phases, to the 
other extreme of the most reflective form of consciousness (ibid. ). 
There are thus two distinct categories which encapsulate clearly different levels of 
engagement of the consciousness. This thesis defines these as fundamental conscious 
states and supplementary conscious states, as it seems generally that those in the 
second category occur in addition to those in the first. The terms fundamental and 
supplementary have been selected for specific use within this thesis and are not 
utilised by other consciousness researchers. Clearly, there is a conceptual distinction 
to be made between the fundamental conscious states and the supplementary 
conscious states, a distinction between different ways in which a mental state can be 
conscious. 
Fundamental consciousness 
Fundamental states of consciousness can be considered as the primary and essential 
conscious states of experience which consist of qualia. Numerous different terms are 
used to encapsulate this concept, some of which are illustrated in Table 2. Following 
the advice of Flanagan and his 'Unified Theory of Consciousness' (1992), these 
examples have been taken from science, philosophy, psychology and, in addition and 
relevant here, from dance sources. It is important to note that these terms have been 
categorised for the purpose of this particular study and have not been presented by 
other researchers in such a way. The meanings represented by each of these terms are 
not necessarily completely analogous with each other, but can be considered to hold 
similar principles or meanings. 
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Table 2: Concepts of fundamental consciousness 
Term Source Discipline origination 
Phenomenal consciousness Block, 1995 Consciousness studies 
Intransitive creature 
consciousness 
Rosenthal, 1998 Consciousness studies 
Pre-reflective consciousness Fraleigh, 1987 Dance theory 
Target states Rosenthal, 2002 - 
Consciousness studies 
Non-introspective 
consciousness 
Vermersch, 1999 Philosophy 
Habituation Birch and Malim, 1998 Psychology 
Flow Csikszentmihalyi, 2002 Psychology 
Subjective consciousness Crook, 1980 Cognitive science 
Trophotropic states Fischer, 1971 Psychology 
The basic meaning of all the concepts within the fundamental category is 
surnmarised by the definition provided for the concept of 'intransitive creature 
consciousness' (Rosenthal, 1998). Intransitive consciousness applies primarily to 
people and other sentient creatures when they are awake and receptive to qualitative 
sensory input. In addition, Armstrong considers that a creature is conscious only if 
there is some mental activity currently taking place (1980, p. 58). This concept is 
often used to distinguish between someone being in an ordinary state of wakefalness 
and being asleep. 
It could be said, however, that more is being represented within some of these 
concepts than the me re idea of one being awake. Of course, one is also conscious, 
but to what sort of consciousness are these concepts referring? They are referring to 
states that are conscious but not reflectively or introspectively so, states which are 
indeed 'non-intrpspective' (Vermersch, 1999, pp. 17-42). Fraleigh notes that a pre- 
reflective state is one in which a dancer is explicitly unaware of self and 'is not 
reflecting on her self or her action' (1987, p. 13). In other words, the fundamental 
concepts relate to states in which one is conscious in a casual, unattended way that is 
characteristic of what one may consider to be an ordinary conscious state. Block 
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refers to fundamental states of consciousness as 'phenomenal consciousness' and T- 
consciousness' (1995, pp. 227-88). 
It is difficult to supply a definitive meaning of the concept of fundamental 
consciousness and Block himself states, 'I cannot define P-consciousness in any 
remotely non-circular way' (1995a), 36 which may be because phenomenally 
conscious experiences are 'non-physical or at least inexplicable in the manner of 
other physical entities' (Lormand, 1996). 37 Some consciousness theorists resort to 
examples such as the way things look and the way pain feels. Examples of 
phenomenal consciousness include sensory experiences such as smelling freshly 
baked bread, hearing music or having a headache, and also the experience of having 
a mental image or feeling an emotion. According to Chalmers, colour sensations 
provide the 'paradigm examples of conscious experience' (1996, p. 6); seeing the 
colour red is an example commonly used by theorists. It seems, therefore, that 
fundamental states have a qualitative character and comprise sensory qualities. Block 
describes phenomenal consciousness as follows: 
P-consciousness is experience. P-consciousness properties are 
experiential ones. P-conscious states are experiential, that is, a state is 
P-conscious if it has experiential properties. The totality of the 
experiential properties of a state are "what it is like" to have it ... We have P-conscious states when we see, hear, smell, taste and have 
pains. P-conscious properties include the experiential properties of 
sensations, feelings and perceptions ... thoughts, wants and emotions. (1995, p. 230) 
Phenomenal consciousness can be considered as the subjective, qualitative character 
of experience. In such a fundamental conscious state, one would not necessarily be 
aware that one is in such a state; one has the experiences but is not explicitly 
conscious of having them. Crook describes subjective consciousness as being 'when 
human self is unaware of itself' (1980, p. 312) and when one is 'aware of his actions 
but not of the awareness itself' (ibid. p. 323). Fraleigh describes the pre-reflective 
consciousness as 'a state of being when the dance is lived not as an object but as pure 
consciousness' (1987, p. 40). 
36 www. nyu. edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/ 
37 www. consciousness. arizona. edu/ 
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The pre-reflective is, Fraleigh believes, a state of consciousness in which one is 
entirely present-centred; it is when the dancer is 'living the present-centred moment 
in her dance' (1987, p. 13). Fundamental states can therefore be considered as states 
that are 'lived and not known' (Sartre, 1969, p. 300), which is certainly what 
Rosenthal intends by his concept of a 'target state' as one which is lived in the 
present and then may later be known by a 'higher order thought' (Rosenthal, 2002). 
Block states that T-conscious states are experiential' (1995, p. 230) and Chalmers 
claims that 'what it means for a state to be phenomenal is for it to feel a certain way' 
(1996, p. 12). Although Block and Chalmers are referring specifically to the concept 
of phenomenal consciousneý§§, it would be possible to interchange any of the other 
concepts within the fundamental category with the concept of phenomenal 
consciousness and in doing so these claims would remain valid. 
Varying degrees of fundamental consciousness 
The gradations on the consciousness continuum are equally as significant as the 
dominant concepts located at either end, but it seems that some theorists, such as 
Fraleigh (1987), fail to identify these gradations. Although, for example, Fraleigh 
defines a fundamental state of dance consciousness, there is no acknowledgement 
that it may be encountered to varying degrees and that there are far more states upon 
the consciousness continuum. One may contemplate whether the nature of some of 
the fundamental concepts discussed above could also be used to represent ordinary 
states of consciousness; indeed one may experience moments in which one is 
particularly unaware and non-reflective in everyday life. Thus why can dance be said 
to permit access to altered stateS? 38 . 
The concept of 'habituation' (Birch and Malim, 1998), for example, refers to a 
wholly experiential state in which one is not explicitly aware of oneself or one's 
surroundings. The reason for this lack of awareness is due to the fact that, if 
something is repeatedly encountered, there will generally be a gradual reduction in 
the focal awareness invested in that something. If the stimuli or processes become so 
constant that they do not attract any focal attention, one will have encountered 
complete stimulus habituation and the message will be removed from consciousness; 
Blackmore refers to this as 'automatisation' (2003, p. 44). It is quite feasible to 
38 The notion that dance permits access to altered states was discussed in the Introduction. 
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imagine experiencing such states, for example when one is driving or brushing one's 
teeth. It seems that this concept is much the same as that which is intended by the 
phenomenal, intransitive, target states, non-introspective and subjective concepts. 
At what could be considered asa further extreme of these conscious states, however, 
is the concept of 'flow' (Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). This relates to 'the state in which 
people are so involved in an activity that nothing else seems to matter' (ibid. p. 4), it 
is 'so intense that there is no attention left over to think about anything irrelevant 
[and] self-consciousness disappears' (ibid. p. 71); one is transported 'into a new 
reality' (ibid. p. 74). This differs from the everyday sensation of habituation, as it is 
not a result of stimuli becoming constant that one is unaware of oneself but of giving 
oneself completely to the task in hand. It has been observed that dancers often claim 
to experience such a sensation when performing on stage and Fraleigh's concept of 
the pre-reflective seems to be dealing with this very experience. It appears that it is 
an altered and heightened sense of fundamental consciousness that is apart from that 
of an everyday experience; it is a 'peak experience' which is 'beyond ordinary 
consciousness' (Maslow cited in Fraleigh, 1987, p. 5). Csikszentrnihalyi also 
confirms that it is not entirely the same as losing awareness in everyday life, which is 
called 'micro-flow' (2002) and which is the sort of state one may encounter when 
watching television, doodling, or smoking. It seems that micro-flow is more 
comparable to the concepts mentioned above with respect to habituation. 
Fischer also distinguishes between the varying degrees of consciousness in what he 
terms a 'trophotropic state' (1971), which is characterised by a decrease of arousal. 
Within this concept Fischer identifies a scale on which trophotropic states can be 
charted from tranquil, to hypoaroused, to yoga samadhi. The latter is described as a 
state in which 'the conscious mind drops back into ... unconscious oblivion' (2005). 
39 
It is proposed here that a tranquil state is comparable with an everyday state of 
consciousness and, at the other extreme, a yoga samadhi state is comparable with an 
altered state which is beyond ordinary consciousness (Fischer, 1971, pp. 897-904). 
It is acknowledged in this thesis that the distinction between habituation and flow, 
tranquil and yoga samadhi, and their counterparts, may not be entirely clear. It is a 
39 www. holistic-online. cOm/Yoga/yoga, 
_ashtanga_samadhi. 
htm 
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particularly intangible distinction and one that is entirely dependent on an 
understanding gained through experiencing the states. It is a felt difference and 
consequently exceptionally problematic to describe in words. It is evident, though, 
that there are various degrees within the concept of fundamental consciousness. 
Whilst it is difficult to appraise exactly where the existing concepts would be located 
on a continuum, it is clear that there are at least two distinguishable phases. 
A dancer may therefore experience an ordinary everyday state of fundamental 
consciousness whilst dancing and be unaware of the dance as a result of being 
habituated-to the movement. In this instance, perhaps because of thorough rehearsal, 
the dancer is able to execute the movement without particularly attending to it. At the 
other extreme, a dancer may experience a heightened fundamental consciousness 
whilst dancing and be completely unaware of the dance as a result of being utterly 
within the dance and existing as the dance. The experiential sensation, for the 
dancing body and mind, of a heightened state differs from that of an ordinary state 
and can be considered as an altered state. 
The concept of fundamental consciousness 
As noted above, although the concepts of fundamental consciousness are not 
completely comparable, it is possible to identify a list of conditions inherent in all the 
concepts presented. T'hese are summarised below: 
A fimdamental state is one: 
Which is experiential, subjective, qualitative, lived and not known; 
In which one is awake, receptive to sensory input and present-centred; 
In which there is current mental activity; 
In which one is non-introspective and explicitly unaware of self; 
In which one is conscious in a casual, unattended way that is characteristic of 
what one may consider to be an ordinary conscious state; 
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* In which one would not necessarily be aware that one is in such a state. One has 
the experiences but is not explicitly conscious of having them; 
* In which there are two distinguishable phases - an ordinary fundamental 
consciousness and a higher order fundamental consciousness. 
Through amalgamating the concepts and conditions above, it is possible to formulate 
an all-encompassing ostensible defmition for fundamental consciousness to be used 
within the context of this thesis. 
The fundamental consciousness is a fundamental state, based inherently on pure 
experience, which is wholly experiential, qualitative and lived as opposed to being 
known. It is a state in which one is entirely awake and engaged in experiences and 
mental activity but nonetheless explicitly unaware of those experiences and that 
mental activity and, indeed, oneself. Hence one is undoubtedly conscious, but in a 
state of fundamentally unattended consciousness. Such a state may occur either as a 
result of stimulus habituation or total involvement in a task. Thus there is a 
differentiation between varying levels of engagement within one's fundamental 
consciousness, and the experiential sensation of these levels differs. 
It is considered that the ostensible definition above gives sufficient insight into the 
nature of a fundamental conscious state. It was noted at the beginning of this chapter 
that gaining an understanding of the nature of the concepts of consciousness would 
help in urfderstanding the nature of the concepts of the dance consciousness. Through 
applying the understanding and knowledge gained from the discussion thus far in this 
chapter, for the purposes of this thesis it is also possible to provide an ostensible 
definition for the fundamental state of dance consciousness. 
The fundamental state of dance consciousness is a state in which a dancer is purely 
living and experiencing the dance, without thought or knowledge of that experience. 
The dancer is in a state of unattended consciousness and is awake and engaged in the 
qualitative experience of the dance, but is nonetheless explicitly unaware of what the 
experience is or what the dancing body and mind are doing. Such a state may occur 
as a result of the dancer having become either habituated to the dance or totally 
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involved in the dance, the experiential sensation for which is different for the 
dancing body and mind. 
Having defmed the fundamental dance consciousness this chapter now moves on to 
consider the states of consciousness that are situated at the opposite end of the 
consciousness continuum - supplementary states. 
Supplementary consciousness 
Supplementary states of consciousness can be considered as states which arise in 
addition to fundamental states. Different theorists use various terms to encapsulate 
this concept, some of which are presented in -Table 3. Again following the 
recommendation of Flanagan in his 'Unified Theory of Consciousness' (1992), the 
examples below have been extracted from science, philosophy, psychology and 
dance sources. As with the fundamental terms discussed earlier in this chapter, the 
supplementary terms have been independently categorised for the purpose of this 
particular study and have not been presented by other researchers in such a way. The 
meanings corresponding to each of these terms are not necessarily entirely 
analogous, but can be deemed to hold similar principles or roots of meaning. 
Table 3: Concepts of supplementary consciousness 
Term Source Discipline origination 
Access consciousness Block, 1995 Consciousness studies 
Transitive creature 
consciousness 
Rosenthal, 1998 Consciousness studies 
Reflective consciousness Fraleigh, 1987 Dance theory 
Higher order thoughts Rosenthal, 2002 Consciousness studies 
Introspective consciousness Verrnersch, 1999 Philosophy 
Monitoring consciousness Block, 1995 Consciousness studies 
Objective consciousness Crook, 1980 Cognitive science 
Ergotropic states Fischer, 1971 Psychology 
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The majority of the above terms can be linked with the fundamental terms discussed 
earlier in this chapter to form pairs of opposites. For example: Rosenthal refers to a 
fundamental state of 'intransitive' consciousness and a supplementary state of 
'transitive consciousness' (1998); Fraleigh refers to a fundamental state of 'pre- 
reflective' consciousness and a supplementary state of 'reflective' consciousness 
(1987); Vermersch makes reference to 'non-introspective' and 'introspective' states 
(1999); Crook refers to 'subjective' and 'objective' consciousness (1980); and 
Fischer refers to 'trophotropic' and 'ergotropic' states (197 1). 
The basic meaning of all the concepts. within the supplementary category is 
summarised clearly by the definition provided, for the concept of 'transitive creature 
consciousness' (Rosenthal, 1998). Transitive consciousness concerns a person being 
'deliberately and attentively' conscious of something (Rosenthal, 2002) . 
40 Thus 
transitive consciousness always has a specific object and that object is often oneselL 
This is certainly encapsulated by Crook in his description of the aptly termed 
'objective' consciousness (1980) which he claims to be a state in which the object of 
attention is the actual subject or the human self. Fraleigh notes that a reflective state 
arises when she becomes 'aware of [her] body as something to be reckoned with ... 
when [she focuses] on [her] body' (1987, p. 14). A reflective state 'refers either to the 
body when it becomes the object of attention or to an objective attitude toward the 
body' (ibid. ). 
In addition, Crook notes that a distinctive element of this state is that it functions 
predominantly in a comparative ofevaluative manner (1980, pp. 312-3). Similarly, 
Block describes 'access consciousness' as a 'cognitive or intentional or functional' 
concept (1994, p. 213) and Katz describes it as involving 'directed attention, 
cognitive awareness, decision making' (200 1). 41 Fraleigh notes that a reflective state 
occurs when'when we stand back to observe and learn' (1987, p. 14). 
Unlike fundamental states, supplementary states do not have a qualitative nature and 
are typically intentional mental states, which characteristically lack sensory qualities. 
Fundamental states comprise qualia and one could therefore consider qualia as the 
object of attention for the fundamental state. Supplementary states are directed 
40 www. consciousness. arizona. edu/ 
41 www. consciousness. arizona. edu/ 
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towards fundamental states and thus, in this case, the fundamental states are the 
object of attention. Supplementary states, such as desires, doubts, yearnings, hopes, 
and thoughts, do not comprise qualia and thus have no qualitative character, although 
they are accompanied by fundamental qualitative states. 
Contrasting with fundamental states, supplementary states can be considered as states 
which are known as opposed to just lived. For example, Fraleigh's state of pre- 
reflective consciousness could be said to be just lived in the moment, whereas a state 
of reflective consciousness is not only lived but also simultaneously reflected upon 
and subsequently immediately known about. This also applies to Rosenthal's concept 
of a 'target state', which is lived in the present and then may later be known by a 
'higher order thought' (2002). Although Fraleigh and Rosenthal are referring 
specifically to their own concepts, it does seem that it would be possible to 
interchange any of the other concepts within the supplementary category and these 
claims would remain valid. 
There is a certain sense of immediacy that characterises one's knowledge or 
awareness of one's conscious states. Rosenthal refers to this direct sense of 
immediacy as 'subjective immediacy 42 which necessitates that being conscious of 
one's conscious states must be spontaneous and uncaused, and thus supplementary 
states 'are based on no inference of which one is aware' (1998). 43 This means that 
supplementary states must not occur because of some external suggestion that one is 
in a particular state, or through some intentional objective deduction such as gaining 
knowledge of one's state from another, or through applying a theory to oneself 
Supplementary states should therefore be considered to be states that are lived and 
non-inferentially known. 
This knowing that one is in a state of supplementary consciousness may permit one 
to report on the experience of the state. This is summarised here by Block: 'in the 
case of language using organisms such as ourselves, a major symptom of access 
consciousness would be reportability' (1994a). 44 In fact, one could consider that 
42 The term 'subjective' used by Rosenthal in this context should not be confused with Crook's use of 
the same term in relation to fundamental consciousness. 43 www. consciousness. arizona. edu/ 44 www. consciousness. arizona. edu/ 
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reportability 'is the best practical guide to taccess] consciousness' (Block, 1995a), 
4' 
46 er although it is not absolutely essential. Reportability is a term that Block and oth 
consciousness researchers use which is defined as the ability to give an account of 
one's experience. This obviously differs from the concepts of fundamental 
consciousness in which one is not aware of one's states and therefore one would 
presume that it would be difficult to report on them whilst actually experiencing 
them. It could be considered that one's ability to report mental states non- 
inferentially is what underlies the traditional intuition that one has access to, and is 
consequently able to have thoughts about or reflect on one's mental states (Sellars, 
1963, p. 127). Rosenthal considers that the: 
... best explanation of this ability to report one's mental states non- inferentially is that one actually has the [higher order thoughts] that 
those reports would express. 
(2002a) 7 
Varying degrees of supplementary consciousness 
As with the fundamental consciousness category, it is important to note that, within 
the supplementary consciousness concept, there are varying degrees or phases which 
can be placed on the consciousness continuum. Again, although Fraleigh, for 
example, defines a supplementary state of dance consciousness, there is no 
acknowledgement that it may be encountered to varying degrees. Given the nature of 
some of the supplementary states described above, they could also be used to 
represent ordinary states of consciousness experienced during everyday life when 
one is particularly aware and reflective. Why, therefore, can dance be said to permit 
access to altered states? 
Although many of the concepts are very similar in nature, there are some 
oppositional extremes even within this tight category and, in some instances, within 
the concept itself. Block, for example, acknowledges that 'access comes in varying 
45 www. nyu. edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/ 
46 As explained earlier in this chapter, if reportability were an essential condition then this would 
presume that, for example, subjects with speech impediments are not conscious. Reportability is 
therefore not essential for validating the existence of a supplementary state, although it can be used to 
do so. 
47 www. consciousness. arizona. edu/ 
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degrees' (1995aý 8 and defines these simply, though fairly arbitrarily, as (1) really 
high quality access, (2) medium access and (3) poor access 
Fischer also acknowledges a scale within his concept of 'ergotropic states' (1971), 
which are characterised by an increase in arousal. Ergotropic states can be charted on 
a scale ranging from aroused, to hyperaroused, to ecstatic. An aroused state is 
comparable with an everyday supplementary state of consciousness and, at the other 
extreme, an ecstatic state is comparable with an altered state, a supplementary state 
beyond ordinary consciousness (Fischer, 1971, pp. 897-904). 
Rosenthal's concept of higher order thought is slightly more complex. The basis of 
this concept of is that it is possible to have a higher order thought, or sensation or 
perception, about another mental state known as the target state. Higher order 
thoughts are essentially about fundamental states of consciousness. This particular 
concept, however, also gives rise to another supplementary level and considers that 
one may not only be conscious of one's own mental states, but may also be 
conscious concurrently that one is conscious of them. Rosenthal refers to this as 
having a third order thought. This third order thought gives rise to a certain sort of 
introspection which is the intentional examination of one's own mental states. Dance 
theorist Hay (2000) also makes reference to similar hierarchical levels and believes 
that it is possible to observe self observing self. According to dance theorist Foster: 
Hay projects the existence of an observer who is watching her 
exploration of bodily cellular consciousness. Hay ftirther projects a 
second observer who watches the first. Hay's moving body is thus 
watching itself moving and watching itself watching itself 
(2000, p. xviii) 
Fischer's, Rosenthal's and Hay's ideas seem to go a step Ruffier than the foundations 
of the supplementary concepts, and perhaps even further than Block's very high 
quality access. Whilst it is difficult to appraise exactly where the existent concepts 
would sit in relation to one another on a continuum, it is clear that there are at least 
two phases that should be distinguished. 
48 www. nyu. edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/ 
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A dancer may therefore experience an ordinary everyday state of supplementary 
consciousness whilst dancing, in which the dancer's attention is focused entirely on 
the dance and the dancer is aware of what the dancing body is doing. At the other 
end of the scale, it is possible for a dancer to experience a heightened supplementary 
state in which the dancer directs absolute attention towards the dance, and is 
concurrently fully aware and in control of that attention. The dancer has complete 
access to the experience of the dance and exists entirely within the supplementary 
consciousness. The experiential sensation of this heightened state is entirely different 
from the ordinary state, and can be considered as an altered state. 
The concept of supplementary consciousness 
As noted above, although the concepts of supplementary consciousness are not 
completely analogous, it is possible to compile a list of conditions inherent in all the 
concepts. These are surnmarised below: 
A supplementary state is a state: 
" Which is non-inferentially known as well as lived; 
" In which one is deliberately and attentively conscious of something; 
" In which the objects of attention are the actual subject/human self, one's 
experiences and additionally one's mental activity; 
In which one functions predominantly in a comparative or evaluative manner; 
Which has no qualitative character in itself, although it is accompanied by and 
dependent on fundamental qualitative states; 
On which one is able to report non-inferentially providing one has effective 
report-making mechanisms; 
In which there are two distinguishable phases - an ordinary supplementary 
consciousness and a higher order supplementary consciousness. 
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Through amalgamating the concepts and conditions described above, it is possible to 
formulate an all-encompassing ostensible definition for supplementary 
consciousness, to be used within the context of this thesis, as follows: 
The supplementary consciousness is a supplementary state: which is intrinsically 
dependent on a fundamental qualitative conscious state; which involves having full 
consciousness o something, an explicit object of attention; which is active, )f 
intentional, and attentive; in which one holds awareness of one's experiences, mental 
activity and oneself and which is not only experiential but also exists in conjunction 
with non-inferential knowing. Such a state may involve an ordinary sense of 
supplementary consciousness in which there are varying levels or, in addition to this, 
the state may hold an elevated sense of supplementary consciousness. Thus there is a 
differentiation between varying degrees of introspection. Such a state may be 
ascertained by one's ability to report non-inferentially on it. 
It is considered that the ostensible definition above provides adequate insight into the 
nature of a supplementary conscious state. Through applying this ostensible 
definition and the understanding and knowledge gained through the discussion thus 
far in this chapter, it is also possible to present an ostensible definition for the 
supplementary state of dance consciousness. For the purposes of this thesis, the 
definition is as follows: - 
The supplementary state of dance consciousness is a state in which a dancer not only 
experiences the dance, but also is knowingly, intentionally, attentively and non- 
inferentially aware of the dance. The dance is the dancer's explicit object of 
attention. The dancer is actively aware of the qualitative experience of the dance, 
including the dancing body, the dancing mind and external factors surrounding the 
dance. In addition, the dancer is aware of any mental activity concerned with the 
dance. The dancer may experience either an ordinary state of supplementary 
consciousness in which complete awareness is focussed on the dance, or a higher 
state of supplementary consciousness in which the dancer is additionally able to 
monitor introspectively that awareness - the experiential sensation of which differs 
for the dancing body and mind. The dancer is able to report non-inferentially on the 
state. 
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Having defined the fundamental and supplementary dance consciousness, this 
chapter now moves on to ascertain the appropriate terminology that may be utilised 
to represent these two concepts. 
The terminology 
Each of the concepts provided by the varying consciousness researchers uses 
different terminology. Having formulated two concepts it was decided that using 
existing terminology to represent such concepts would be problematic and a cause of 
confusion. In addition, it was considered that the available terminology was not 
sufficient for use in the context of the dance consciousness. Table 4 is a brief 
synopsis as to why the terminology was dismissed. 
Table 4: Terminology from other authors and reasons for its dismissal 
Term Reason for dismissal 
Phenomenal and Too many ambiguities surrounding the term 'phenomenal'; 
access/monitoring within consciousness studies there is much debate concerning 
consciousness its actual meaning. The term may, for some, have 
(Block, 1995) connotations of something being extraordinary. The term 
'access' does imply a state that is available for accessing; it 
does not, however, involve any sense of attention or 
evaluation. The term 'monitoring' is more apt; it does not, 
however, infer a sense that the monitoring is internal. 
Intransitive and The term 'intransitive' means not taking the direct object and 
transitive creature 'transitive' means taking the direct object. Although these 
consciousness terms imply the appropriate direction of attention, they do not 
(Rosenthal, 1998) indicate that the attention is internal. 
Pre-reflective and The term 'pre-reflective' clearly encapsulates a state in which 
reflective one is not presently reflecting. The prefix 'pre' is, however, 
consciousness rather restrictive as it implies that the state being described is 
(Fraleigh, 1987) one that is experienced prior to reflection, which in turn 
implies that it is always a state that is reflected upon. Not all 
states are necessarily reflected upon and some remain non- 
reflective. 
Target states and The term 'target state' is used alongside the concept of 'higher 
higher order order thought' and the term can be used only in conjunction 
thought with the supplementary state. Not all fundamental states are 
(Rosenthal, 2002) accompanied by supplementary states; many do exist 
independently. The term 'higher order thought' implies that 
the supplementary state must always be a thought; but it may 
also be, for example, a belief, want or emotion. 
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Term Reason for dismissal 
Non-introspective The term 'introspective' refers to the internal examination of 
and introspective one's self and one's thoughts. Thus non-introspection refers to 
consciousness not examining one's self or one's thoughts. The 
(Vermersch, 1999) supplementary state formulated above does not necessitate 
examination - although this may arise - only awareness and 
attention. 
Habituation (Birch Although the concept of 'habituation' represents an ordinary 
and Malim, 1998) state of fundamental consciousness, it is not considered to 
accommodate heightened states and therefore does not take 
account of the various phases of the continuum. 
Flow Although the concept of 'flow' draws attention to a 
(Csikszentmihalyi, heightened state of fundamental consciousness, it does not 
2002) include any acknowledgement of an ordinary state and 
therefore does not take account of the varying phases of the 
continuum. The term 'flow' is also not considered to represent 
the complete nature of the fundamental consciousness. 
Subjective and The terrn 'subjective' has many meanings within 
objective consciousness studies and is also used in different disciplines, 
consciousness for example, to imply that something is dependent on personal 
(Crook, 1980) opinion. The term 'objective', when utilised in relation to 
'subjective', may hold inappropriate connotations of a 
distinction between the real and un-real, and imply that the 
objective deals with something external to the mind. 
Trophotropic and The terms 'trophotropic' and 'ergotropic' were coined by 
ergotropic states Fischer to represent what he refers to as particular 'mystic 
(Fischer, 1971) states' (19 7 1). It would thus not be appropriate to extract these 
terms from that particular context and apply them to the 
independent concepts formulated for use within the dance 
context. 
Having dismissed the available existing terms, for the purpose of this study, two new 
terms have been independently coined. For use specifically within the dance 
consciousness context, these tenns are an oppositional pair and represent the concept 
of the fundamental dance consciousness and the supplementary dance consciousness. 
The fundamental and supplementary concepts defmed in this chapter share two 
characteristics which were considered to be particularly relevant and which should 
therefore be captured within the terms to be coined. These characteristics are: 
9 The wholly internal nature of the experience of the individual; 
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* The focus on the lack of attentive awareness or presence of intentional awareness 
on the part of the individual. 
The independently coined terminology therefore contain the prefix 'intra' and the 
term 'attend', chosen because 'intra' means 'on the inside' and 'within' (Hoad, 1996, 
p. 240) and to 'attend' means to 'direct the mental or physical faculties' and to 'apply 
oneself' (ibid. p. 27). The combination of 'intra' and 'attend' gives an impression of 
internally attending - which is analogous with the concept of supplementary 
consciousness and, at the other extreme, of not internally attending - which is 
analogous with the concept of fundamental consciousness. 
This study therefore refers to the fundamental dance consciousness as: 
Non-intrattentive consciousness 
And the supplementary dance consciousness as: 
Intraftentive consciousness 
It was also considered essential that the terms should capture the idea that, within the 
non-intrattentive consciousness and intrattentive consciousness, there may be varying 
degrees of consciousness and thus a higher order state. As a result, one may also 
refer to: 
Higher order non-intrattention 
Higher order intrattention 
Summary 
Following a consideration of the history of consciousness theory, the quandary of 
consciousness, concepts of consciousness and the available terminology used to 
represent states of consciousness, this chapter answered the first focussed research 
question: What is the nature of the dance consciousness? 
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The answer led to the introduction of two independently formulated terms for dance 
consciousness - intrattentive and non-intrattentive - which are intended for use 
specifically within the context of the dance discipline. The remainder of this thesis 
focuses entirely on the concepts captured by these two terms and the means through 
which dancers are able to access the states they describe. 
Chapter 3 considers how dancers are able to examine states of intrattention and non- 
intraftention. 
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Chapter 3 
How can one examine the dance consciousness? 
Introduction 
This thesis is ultimately concerned with the two states of dance consciousness 
identified in Chapter 2- the intrattentive dance consciousness and the non- 
intrattentive dance consciousness - and the means through which dancers are able to 
access and control such states. Subsequent chapters will identify how dancers can be 
trained to access states of intrattention and states of non-intrattention. Such training 
is fundamental in enabling dancers to apply the Dance Consciousness Model. In 
addition, it is essential that the dancers learn how to understand, examine and gain 
the knowledge that they are actually experiencing these states of intrattention and 
non-intrattention. This is facilitated through a method of examination, which 
provides dancers with techniques for communicating and describing conscious states. 
Consciousness theorist Chalmers acknowledges that, in order to examine states of 
consciousness, 'we need good methodologies for collecting the data' - methods of 
communication - 'and good languages and formalisms for expressing them' - 
methods of description (1999). 49 Otherwise how is a dancer able to know whether or 
not he or she has successfully accessed the desired state? 
To put this into context, imagine a situation in which a dancer is training to access 
non-intrattention whilst improvising. At the end of the improvisation, the dancer 
claims that they definitely accessed non-intrattention during the improvisation. When 
asked by the choreographer how they know this, the dancer replies "because I was 
aware of if, not realising that non-intrattention is a state of which one is not aware. 
There are a number of reasons why the dancer may have made the above statement: 
* The dancer did not access non-intrattention at all and was actually in some type of 
intrattentive state; 
The dancer did access non-intrattention, but did not know how to communicate 
how he or she knew that he or she was in a state of non-intrattention; 
49 http: //consc. net/papers/firstperson. html 
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Although the dancer did access the desired state and was able to communicate that 
he or she knew that he or she was in a state of non-intrattention, the dancer was 
unable to describe the experience sufficiently; for example what the dancer had 
intended by the term aware; may not have been what the choreographer 
understood by the same term. 
Having demonstrated, with the above example, the importance of dancers having 
methods of access, communication and description to enable them to use the Dance 
Consciousness Model effectively, this chapter considers the second focussed 
research question: How can one examine the dance consciousness? 
Methods of examination are not only essential for dancers using the Dance 
Consciousness Model, but they were also necessary for the fon-nulation of the Dance 
Consciousness Model as it was not possible to complete the model without first 
being able to examine the states to be included in it. In the Introduction and in 
Chapter 1, theoretical and empirical research methodologies were discussed and it 
was noted that particular methods of research exist within these methodologies. The 
method of examination described in this chapter can be considered as one such 
method of research - indeed, the method of examination is the method through 
which the dance consciousness was researched in Empirical Project 1 and 2 for the 
formulation of the Dance Consciousness Model. The purpose of the method of 
examination in the context of this research is thus two-fold -a method of research 
and a method for application. 
In this chapter, different methods for examining consciousness are considered, 
including methods of communication and description. This provides background 
information for Chapters 4,5 and 6 which describe the methods of access to 
intrattention and non-intrattention as well as the sequence and content of the access 
training workshops. It should be noted that the dancers who participated in the 
research were not trained to use methods of examination prior to the access training 
workshops. This is because the examination training occurs alongside the access 
training as the methods are co-dependent. Throughout the access training workshops 
the dancers were taught both how to examine their conscious states and how to 
assess their access to these states. 
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Chapter breakdown 
This chapter begins with a consideration of what a method of examination actually is 
and what would constitute a suitable and dependable method for the examination of 
conscious experience. Within this, the chapter contemplates objective versus 
subjective methods and distinguishes between first-, second- and third-person 
methods. Each of these different methods is explained and reasons given for those 
chosen for use in the Dance Consciousness Model's method of examination. 
Chapter 3 then discusses existing methods of examination which appear in current 
dance literature and current consciousness literature. Two theories which are 
particularly relevant to this research are introduced: phenomenological reduction and 
the e, xplicitation session. As the chapter progresses, reference is made to these two 
theories in a discussion of present-centred and retrospective accounts, and verbal and 
non-verbal information. The chapter then describes the method of examination used 
to create the Dance Consciousness Model and proposed for use within the 
application of the model. Finally the Dance Consciousness Model is introduced and a 
diagram of the skeletal structure of the model is provided. 
Methods of examination 
As mentioned in the chapter introduction, the method of examination, in the context 
of the Dance Consciousness Model, comprises methods of communication and 
methods of description. Methods of communication are the means through which a 
dancer is able to communicate whether or not he or she has accessed, and is 
maintaining a state of, intrattention or non-intrattention. Methods of description are 
the means through which a dancer is able to describe the intrattentive or non- 
intrattentive experience in order to validate it. 
Before it was decided which methods of examination were to be used during the 
research, however, it was necessary to ascertain which types of methods would be 
suitable for use in the context of the Dance Consciousness Model. For example, 
should a method of examination take an objective or a subjective perspective? 
Within the research into consciousness, there is a clear schism between the beliefs of 
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the neuroscientists and cognitive scientists and those of the philosophers and 
psychologists with respect to the validity of objective as opposed to subjective 
methods of examination. Objective methods tend to take a third-person perspective 
whereas subjective rnethods tend to take a first-person perspective. 
First-, second- and third-person methods 
Consciousness, whilst difficult to define, undoubtedly relates to one's inner 
experience, which is a concealed and somewhat exclusive world which is continually 
transcending, developing and disappearing. Consequently, one may claim that one's 
consciousness is a phenomenon that is bound to one's individual perspectives of 
experience and 'our direct knowledge of subjective experiences stems from our first- 
person access to them' (Chalmers, 1999). 50 First-person methods are concerned 
directly with the experience of the subject from the subject's point of view and 
require the subject to reflect introspectively on his or her own experience and provide 
an account of the experience. 
It may, therefore, be appropriate to use a first-person method rather than using only a 
purely objective method when examining consciousness, especially since the very 
essence of ob ective methods is that they are disassociated as much as possible from j 
the individual phenomenological perspective. Chalmers echoes this view in his 
statement that 'first person data can't be expressed wholly in terms of third person 
data' (ibid. ) and Varela and Shear claim that to: 
... deprive our scientific examination of this phenomenal realm 
amounts to either amputating human life of its most intimate domains, 
or else denying science explanatory access to it ... (1999, p. 4) 
If one is to rely solely on the first person then some issues need be considered. 
Should the first person be made aware of the research, the purpose of the 
examination and any third-person theory relating to the method? If the first person is 
uninformed, their accounts may not be of use or sufficiently descriptive, they may 
include subjective judgements or be completely irrelevant. An informed first person, 
on the other hand, may offer reports which are shaped by the knowledge of the 
50 http: //consc. net/papers/firstperson. html 
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purpose of the examination or by third-person theory or, as Overgaard considers, 
subjects 'may become overtly co-operative, giving the answers you want' (2001). 51 
Despite this 'informed subjects ... are much preferred ... because no matter 
how much 
methodological criticism we might point out' (ibid. ) an informed first person is likely 
to provide 'better access to and description of subjective experience' (Vermersch, 
1999, p. 22). 
Although first-person accounts can provide direct insight into subjective experience, 
it is important to note that they are not valid enough to be turned into a 'body of 
regulated knowledge' (Varela and Shear, 1999, p. 1). Chalmers believes that, 'when it 
comes to first person methodologies, there are well known obstacles' (1999). 52 Such 
obstacles are commonly disputed within consciousness literature and it is often 
considered that (1) there is a 'lack of incorrigible access to our experience'; (2) 
'introspecting an experience changes the experience'; (3) it may be impossible to 
access 'all our experience at once' (ibid). Perhaps, then, first-person methods should 
not be used in isolation. 
Varela and Shear state that 'the progress in becoming familiar with a particular 
method requires mediation' (1999, p. 8). What is intended here by the term 
'mediation' is that a second person provides a 'curious intermediate position' (ibid. ) 
between those in the positions of the first person and the third person. The second 
person can observe the first person and subsequently interview them about the 
experience. The second person must be 'eccentric to the lived experience' of the first 
person but nevertheless 'takes a position of one who has been there to some degree, 
and thus provides hints and further training' (ibid. ). Varela and Shear suggest that the 
second person is 'an emphatic resonator with experiences that are familiar to him and 
which find in himself a resonant chord' (ibid. p. 10). 
It is essential that whilst in the second-person position, however, one must renounce 
explicitly one's detachments in order to become 'identified with the kind of 
understanding and internal coherence of [one's] source' (ibid. ). The second person 
can guide, in a non-inductive manner, and assist the first person to develop the ability 
to access, communicate and describe the lived experience. As Vermersch suggests, a 
51 http: //humanides. ucsc. edu/NEH/kelly. btml 
52 http: //consc. net/papers/firstperson. html 
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second person may assist the first person with the 'unfolding of the internal act' and 
thus make access to the lived experience possible, and may then 'guide the process of 
verbalisation' (1999, p. 35). The role of the second person should be: 
... grounded on a sensitivity to the subtle indices of his 
interlocutor's 
phrasing, bodily language and expressiveness, seeking for indices 
(more or less explicit) which are inroads into the common experiential 
ground. 
(Varela and Shear, 1999, p. 10) 
It is important to consider, however, that the second person's expertise might also 
affect the reports of the first person. The second person might, for example, 'induce 
the content of the replies by the formulation of questions' (Vermersch, 1999, p. 36) 
and consequently might eliminate spontaneous answers. When interviewing, the 
second person must be sure to 'avoid infiltrating his own presupposition' (Peugeot, 
1999, p. 47). It therefore seems that, although a second person is of use within a 
method of examination, one must take care to compare and contrast the accounts of 
the second person with those of the first person. 
Varela and Shear also make reference to a third person, which they describe as the 
'standard observer of scientific discourse' (1999, p. 9). Third-person accounts are 
generally more objective and offer an opportunity to prove or verify accounts 
provided by first and second persons. They are therefore more likely to indicate 
general consensus; Varela and Shear describe them as accounts that 'can be turned 
from individual accounts into a body of regulated knowledge' (ibid. p. 1). 
Although third-person accounts cannot access the inner phenomenal quality of 
conscious experience. and cannot 'express precisely the data we want to explain ... 
they may play a central role' in methods of examination (Chalmers, 1999). 53 It is not 
advisable, therefore, for third person methods to be used in isolation but rather they 
should be used to complement first- and second- person accounts. 
The above discussion indicates that, whilst first-, second- and third-person methods 
of examination can all be of use and have certain positive qualities, each method also 
has disadvantages. It is for these reasons that the method of examination used in the 
53 http: //consc. net/papcrs/firstperson. htmi 
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creation and application of the Dance Consciousness Model incorporates first-person 
verbal information, second-person observable information and third-person verified 
and theoretical information. 54 In doing so the advice of Vermersch, who states that 
all the methods should be 'retained and employed in a complementary manner' 
(1999, p. 3 5), has been followed. Varela and Shear also believe that: 
It would be futile to stay with first-person descriptions in isolation ... 
we need to harmonize and constrain them by building the appropriate 
links with third-person studies. 
(1999, p. 2) 
Chalmers notes that the 'job ... is to connect the first-person 
data to third-person data' 
to come up with 'systematic theoretical connections between the two' (1999)55 in 
order to move towards an 'integrated or global perspective on mind' where neither 
$experience nor external mechanisms have the final word' (Varela and Shear, 1999, 
p. 2). Such connections have been developed in relation to the Dance Consciousness 
Model and are described below. 
In the context of the Dance Consciousness Model, the first person is the dancer who 
is experiencing the states of intrattention or non-intrattention. The dancer is informed 
of the purpose of the method of examination. it is the dancer's phenomenal realm 
that requires explanatory access and it is important that the dancer is able to enter his 
or her intimate domains. 
It could be argued that a more valuable result would be provided by an account from 
a dancer who is being choreographed or trained by a choreographer who has at some 
time entered into the experience under examination and who has first-hand 
knowledge and an emphatic understanding of that experience. The dancer is, 
therefore, assisted to examine his or her conscious state by a second person who, in 
the context of the Dance Consciousness Model, is the choreographer. The 
choreographer trains the dancer to use the model and, for the purposes of this 
research, is also regarded as the consciousness trainer. The choreographer is able to 
validate the experience of the dancer, through observing or interviewing him or her, 
54 This notion of triangulation was introduced in the introduction with reference to the research 
methodologies used for this thesis. 55 http: //consc. net/papers/firstperson. html 
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and thus ensure that the process or experience of the dancer is neither private nor 
solipsistic. 
An effective framework through which the choreographer is able to extract the 
dancer's reports is therefore crucial. The success of an effective framework is highly 
dependent on the interview technique used. The technique should encourage wholly 
descriptive statements; questions need to be open, but structured and focussed; and 
the questions should direct attention to a relatively well-defined and identifiable 
moment. The choreographer must take care not to influence the dancer's experience 
or choice of words to describe that experience as, even if detached or objective, the 
choreographer 'is still bound by ... his preconceptions, 
his implicit blinkers-, his 
unconscious projections' (Vennersch, 1999, p. 38). 
A successful framework can provide the dancer and choreographer with 
opportunities to indulge in an intellectual exchange concerning the nature of the 
intrattentive or non-intrattentive experience and subsequently propose how access to 
these states might be improved and developed. In addition, through conflating the 
dancer's accounts with those of the choreographer, one may be able to identify some 
information which can be verified by more than one person and thus holds general 
consensus. This information can therefore be considered as a third-person account. 
The validity of such an account is dependent on both the dancer and choreographer 
having some third-person knowledge. For the dancer and choreographer to provide 
accounts that can be considered reliable and informed, they must have an 
understanding of the concepts of intrattentive and non-intrattentive consciousness 
and of the method of examination described later in this chapter. The concepts and 
method represent the third-person accounts used within the context of the Dance 
Consciousness Model. 
To summarise, first-, second- and third-person methods are all incorporated within 
the Dance Consciousness Model as follows: 
e The dancer acts as the first person and is able to provide reliable first-person 
accounts because of his or her knowledge of third-person accounts; 
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e The choreographer acts as the second person and is able to present second-person 
accounts through the observation and interviewing of the first person; 
Existent theories, which hold a general consensus as they have been proven or 
verified by more than one person, provide third-person accounts. 
Having ascertained the nature of the method of examination for the context of the 
Dance Consciousness Model, it is now important to interrogate any methods of 
examination from current dance research and current consciousness research. The 
purpose of this interrogation is to determine; whether any existing methods of 
examination may be used as third-person accounts, how dancers can provide first- 
person accounts, and how choreographers can provide second-person accounts. 
Methods of examination in current dance research 
Some dance consciousness theorists, such as Sheets-Johnstone (1966) and Fraleigh 
(1987), comment on what they consider to be the most successful type of dance 
consciousness. For example 'the dancer is at her best when she becomes present- 
centred' (Fraleigh, 1987, p. 23) - which is a prerequisite of a pre-reflective, or non- 
intrattentive state - and 'the dance comes alive in all its rich fullness only as the 
dancers are reflectively aware neither of themselves, nor of the dance' (Sheets- 
Johnstone, 1966, p. 6). Neither theorist, however, offers a clear explanation as to 
exactly how one might examine such an experience in order to maintain that the state 
accessed is the state as claimed. In fact, in current dance literature, there is an 
absence of a verified method for examining first-person conscious experiences. This 
absence is summarised by Alexander in her claim that dance 'lacks a framework for 
reflecting on or evaluating the first person experience' (2003, p. 19). 
Some dance consciousness researchers do, however, provide certain suggestions; for 
example in her book The Phenomenology of Dance (1966) Sheets-Johnstone 
recommends that one should use phenomenology to gain insight into the dancer's 
consciousness. An intrinsic quality of phenomenology is that it 'often takes the forrn 
of first-person description' (Fraleigh, 1987, p. xiv) and thus the method promoted by 
Sheets-Johnstone can be considered as a first-person method. In Fraleigh's book 
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Dance and the Lived Body (1987), the reader learns predominantly of the dance 
consciousness as experienced by Fraleigh herself. Fraleigh states that the existential 
phenomenological approach she takes is one of involvement rather than detachment 
(1987, p. xxix). Although the suggestion of Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh to apply 
phenomenology is useful, neither theorist really provides insight into how it may be 
an accessible method of examination, and neither provides any applicable third- 
person theory or an intimation about whether they advocate the use of a second 
person. 
It is necessary, therefore, to move beyond the dance discipline into current 
consciousness theory to assess whether a verified method of examination exists. In 
Chapter 2 it was ascertained that an understanding of consciousness theory exterior 
to the dance discipline is imperative in ensuring a coherent understanding of the 
dance consciousness, and thus moving momentarily away from the dance discipline 
in order to establish methods of examination is not problematic. 
Methods of examination in current consciousness research 
According to consciousness theorist Chalmers, 'when it comes to the third-person 
data' methods of examination 'are very well-developed' (1999). 56 For example, 
psychologists have formulated complex methods for studying behaviour and 
neuroscientists have 'developed an ever-expanding group of ingenious methods for 
getting at what is going on in the brain' such as 'EEG, brain imaging [and) single cell 
studies' (ibid. ). In addition, there are 'multiple formalisms for expressing these data' 
such as 'plain language, neurophysiological classification, various sorts of images 
and diagrams [and] computational models' (ibid. ). It is apparent, then, that methods 
for communicating and describing consciousness do exist within a third-person 
format. Such methods are, however, of limited use within the context of the Dance 
Consciousness Model; for example, it was not practical to use brain imaging during 
the formulation of the model in Empirical Project I and 2, nor is it feasible to use it 
within the dance consciousness training. Do any other methods of examination exist 
which take on more of a first-person format? 
56 http: //consc. net/papers/firstperson. html 
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As indicated by Chalmers, 'when it comes to first-person data, things aren't nearly so 
well developed' as there are very few methods for investigating first-person 
information and even fewer formalisms for expressing it (1999). 7 It seems that a 
first-person, general and verified method for examining consciousness does not exist 
within the multidisciplinary science and philosophy of consciousness. 
Although the majority of consciousness theorists omit to consider first-person 
methods, this does not necessarily mean that some consciousness researchers are not 
aware of the need for such methods. Indeed, consciousness theorists such as 
Flanagan (1992), Searle (1992) and Chalmers (1996) state that consciousness 
research necessitates a specific method, and particularly one which incorporates the 
subjective or experiential element of consciousness and an objective understanding 
of consciousness, but this statement is not backed up by any solid methodological 
advances. Some attempts at examination methods which incorporate first-, second- 
and third-person accounts that have been developed were made by '19'h century 
psychological introspectionists, 20al century philosophical phenomenologists, and 
centuries of meditative studies in Eastern thought' (Chalmers, 1999, ibid. ). Theories 
expounded by psychological introspectionists and philosophical phenomenologists, 
namely the 'explicitation session' and 'phenomenological reduction', were of use in 
the formulation of the method of examination for the Dance Consciousness Model. 58 
The explicitation session and phenomenological reduction 
The explicitation session was developed by Vermersch (1999) and is a systematic 
method which attempts to examine the phenomenon of the subjective experience of 
intuition, which Vermersch considers to be wholly experiential and completely 
spontaneous. Although Vermersch does not prescribe which, if any, type of 
conscious state an intuitive experience should inhabit, one could consider that the 
nature of an intuitive experience holds similar characteristics to states of intrattention 
and non-intrattention in that the experiences are absolutely experiential. It is this 
same characteristic that makes states of intrattention and non-intrattention difficult to 
57 http: //consc. net/papers/firstperson. html 
58 Eastern meditative studies, namely Buddhist Introspection, were also of use within the formulation 
of methods of access. These are considered in Chapter 5. 
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examine. The explicitation session provides some indication as to how one may 
examine such an experiential state. 
Phenomenological reduction is the definitive and fundamental method of 
phenomenology. It is a method for rendering access to and examining an internal and 
phenomenological experience. Husserl founded phenomenology at the beginning of 
the twentieth century and theorists such as Heidegger (1954), Sartre (1969), Merleau- 
Ponty (1962) and Schutz (1967) developed it in various ways. Gallagher claims that 
'phenomenology proposes an analysis of the body as we live it' (2000) . 
59 The 
inherent ambivalence - in phenomenology is its duality of the subject, -as both 
theoretical and existential concurrently. The co-existence of a theoretical dimension 
and a practical, embodied and existential dimension is at the very centre of 
phenomenological reduction. Husserl acknowledges that 'phenomenological 
reduction is needed if consciousness is to be systematically investigated in its pure 
immanence' (1917). 60 
The explicitation session and phenomenological reduction exist within their own 
discipline and were formulated for reasons outside the scope of this study. They, 
therefore, are not necessarily intended for application as methods of examination and 
are not related to dance per se. As they deal with examining states of consciousness, 
however, these theories have been carefully analysed, interpreted and adapted for use 
within the method of examination in the Dance Consciousness Model. Both theories 
aided a predominant decision to be made in preparing to test the model, which was 
whether to use present-centred and/or retrospective accounts and what form of 
communication and description should capture these accounts. 
Present-centred accounts 
It could be suggested that, in order to ensure that the experience of an intrattentive or 
non-intrattentive state is accurately described and communicated, the dancer must do 
so whilst actually accessing the intrattention or non-intrattention. The purpose of this 
is to produce what this thesis defines as a present-centred account. Philosophical and 
psychological experiments have been undertaken using such present-centred 
accounts. Schooler and Dougal, for example, describe research in which 'individuals 
59 www2. canisius. edu/-gallaghr/paris2OOO. htm] 
60 www3. baylor. edu/-Scott-Moore/essays/Husserl. btml 
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were reporting thoughts as they occurred rather than trying to reproduce thoughts 
that happened some time ago' (1999, p. 285). 
In the case of an intrattentive experience, the provision of present-centred accounts is 
not likely to be particularly problematic for the dancer, as the nature of such a state is 
that it is a state of which one is aware. States of intrattention are not only lived, but 
also known. Thus, asking a dancer to confirm whether or not he or she is 
intrattentive, and to describe what that feels like, whilst actually experiencing an 
intrattentive state is perfectly feasible. Present-centred accounts of intrattentive 
experiences can therefore be considered as legitimate methods of examination. 
Problems arise, however, when attempting to communicate states of non- 
intrattention. If the nature of a non-intrattentive state is that one is not aware of 
oneself or the experience, how could one reliably communicate that one is in a state 
of non-intrattention, let alone describe the experience? How can a dancer know 
whether or not he or she has accessed a non-intrattentive conscious state and whether 
he or she has managed to maintain it? Peugeot acknowledges that the pre-thought 
nature of a subjective experience renders it difficult to 'elaborate a method which 
would enable one to become aware of it and describe it' (1999, p. 44). One must also 
consider whether becoming aware of it and describing it would actually be 
eliminating the very existence of the non-intrattentive state. Dance theorist Adler 
acknowledges that problems may occur when the 'mover is thinking about what is 
happening instead of experiencing what is happening' (2002, p. 19). Does this mean 
that the characteristic of being 'lived and not known' (Sartre, 1969, p. 300), which is 
inherent in any truly non-intrattentive state, abolishes all potentiality of description? 
The phenomenological reduction method does not consider this to be the case and 
does, in fact, advocate present-centred accounts, which it defines as a certain type of 
temporal lag -a retentional lag. Phenomenological reduction endorses a process of 
splitting consciousness. Depraz describes the gesture, or act, of phenomenological 
reduction as follows: 
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Literally, I lead back my own experience, which gives itself 
immediately to me. This means explicating layers of the experience 
and freeing myself from the object in order to take note of the act of 
consciousness directed towards this object. In this way, I enlarge my 
field of experience by intensifying it, by allowing another dimension 
to emerge from it, a dimension which precisely frees me from the 
ordinary pre-giveness of the world. 
(1999, p. 98) 
The aim of phenomenological reduction, therefore, is to make the subject, in this 
case the dancer, both an 'agent working at a transformation of the world via the 
transformation of ... self' and at 'a mode of self-observation which places 
[the 
dancer] in the overreaching. position of an impartial ... spectator' 
(ibid. p. 97). 
Phenomenological reduction suggests that, for a present-centred examination of a 
lived state such as non-intrattention, one can place the subject in a position from 
which they can concurrently experience non-intrattentively and observe 
intrattentively. To put this in context, the object of the intrattention would be the 
non-intrattention and the non-intrattention would simply exist whilst the intrattention 
examines it. 61 
One must consider, however, that allowing two states to co-exist in this way could 
have some unforeseen consequence. Depraz acknowledges that eventually the two 
states, intrattention and non-intrattention, begin to 'fertilise' each other, 'thereby 
intensifying each other to the point of becoming virtually indistinguishable from each 
other' (ibid. ). In this situation, the intrattention could modify the non-intrattention to 
such an extent that eventually a genuinely non-intrattentive state would no longer 
exist. 
Depraz also notes that, in fact, both states can rarely exist completely 
simultaneously; instead there is a continual exchange between the two: 
61 A similar method of splitting consciousness is introduced in Chapter 5 with reference to methods for 
accessing non-intrattention. In this instance, however, the object of the intrattention is not the non- 
intrattention but other external stimuli. The possibility of dual consciousness was also mentioned in 
Chapter I and Chapter 2, where two states of intrattention were discussed, one which observes the 
other. 
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There is a retention of the object in the act by which it is immediately 
apprehended, even a possible to and fro between the object perceived 
and the perceptual act, but never, it seems, complete coincidence of 
the two. 
(1999, P. 99) 
It seems, then, that experiencing states of intrattention and non-intrattention 
simultaneously, in which the object of the intrattention is the non-intrattention, may 
not be possible. 
In an attempt to overcome this the explicitation session attempts to allow subjects an 
awareness of the intuitive experience through a suspension in thought. Peugeot 
describes this as a 'break'with [one's] habitual attitude, which consists of acting 
without knowing how [one] does it, without knowing what [one] knows' (1999, 
p. 46). The explicitation session encourages a suspension of activity, in the form of an 
interview mediated by an interviewer, thus providing a moment of time for the 
interviewee to become aware of the experience. It is essential that this experience is 
singular, specific, clearly defined and 'precisely situated in time and space' (ibid. ). 
The explicitation session defmes two processes through which such awareness is 
made possible, one of which is entitled 'living the experience in the present' (ibid. 
pp. 46-7), which is comparable to the present-centred accounts defmed in this 
chapter. In this instance, in order for awareness to develop, the subject must allow 
two states of consciousness to arise. The subject experiences a state of non- 
intrattention and then, through a suspension in thought, allows a state of intrattention 
to exist in order to examine the non-intrattention. Phenomenological reduction 
presents an analogous notion in the form of an epoche. Depraz describes the epoche 
as a 'suspension with regard to the habitual course of one's thoughts, brought about 
by an interruption of their continuous flowing' (1999, p. 99). The epoche is used to 
access and examine completely lived states, states of non-intrattention. 
It is vital to consider, however, whether the epoche promoted by phenomenological 
reduction, and the suspensions in thought endorsed by the explicitation session, can 
actually provide present-centred accounts at all. Indeed, if one is intrattending 
'between moments of non-intrattending, it could be claimed that the intrattention 
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occurs only after the non-intrattentive experience; thus the intrattention is attending 
retrospectively to the non-intrattention and so it is not present-centred. 
To put this into the context of dance, if a dancer is dancing and then turns his or her 
attention away from the experience of the dancing, in order to take note of the 
manner in which he or she is experiencing the dance, the dancer would already be in 
the aftermath of the actual experience. When the dancer steps back from the dance, 
metaphorically, in order to take account of the modality of the act in which he or she 
is engaged, he or she is no longer able to attend so readily to experiencing the 
experience of the dance, as he or she would already be 'further off in time' (Depraz, 
1999, p. 98). Thus the dancer would not be able to provide, a present-centred account, 
as retrospection would already be present. Perhaps, then, one should resign oneself to 
any reliable accounts of non-intrattention being constructed retrospectively. Would it 
not be far more efficient to wait for a dancer to have a non-intrattentive experience, 
and then relive that experience in order to communicate and describe it? 
Retrospective accounts 
One could consider using what the explicitation session defines as 'reliving a past 
experience' (Peugeot, 1999, pp. 46-7), phenomenological reduction refers to as 
remembering, and this study calls retrospective accounts, instead of present-centred 
accounts. Various philosophers, for example Vermersch (1999) and Depraz (1999), 
claim that some information is accessible only in the context of a consciousness that 
is directed retrospectively, and such philosophers therefore use retrospection as a 
method of examination. In the context of the Dance Consciousness Model, using 
retrospective accounts would require the dancer to communicate and describe the 
intrattentive or non-intrattentive experience subsequent to having the experience. 
Retrospective accounts would consequently overcome the problem of having to 
create intrattentive awareness within a non-intrattentive experience and, unlike 
present-centred accounts, may therefore be of use not only for intrattentive states but 
also for non-intrattentive states. 
The provision of retrospective accounts raises further concerns of reliability and 
viability. Ginsburg acknowledges some of these difficulties in the following 
statement: 
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My experience was not, cannot be raw sense data. I can describe it 
because I experienced it, but when I am remembering I am not re- 
experiencing exactly, but bringing forth fragments of the experience. 
(1999, p. 8 1) 
Vermersch is concerned about: 
... the reliability of memory and the necessity of establishing the 
nature of the link between what is described from the past and what is 
lived at the very moment it is being recalled and described. 
(1999, P. 19) 
Dance theorist Adler notes that retrospective accounts may affect the actual 
experience: 
The intention to remember the precise experience after moving can for 
some movers result in an awkwardness at first, the effort becoming a 
distraction from being present while moving. 
(2002, p. 18) 
The concerns of Ginsburg, Vermersch and Adler focus on the lack of reliability and 
whether it is possible to re-create experiences accurately enough to be able to 
communicate and describe them. One must question whether, by applying a 
retrospective method to an experience, one is not altering, distorting or even creating 
that experience. One must therefore determine whether it is really any more effective 
to look back on an experience than it is to look inside one. Vermersch is of the 
opinion that retrospection 'succeeds in dodging the difficulty by replacing 
observation in the present by observation bearing upon presentification of past lived 
experience' (1999, p. 19). 
The notion of reliving a past experience presented within the explicitation session 
attempts to rid any problems concerned with memory and remembering. The 
explicitation session attempts to encourage the subject to relive the experience 
already encountered, including all the emotional and sensorial dimensions of the 
experience. This part of the process helps the subject to: 
... operate a thinking through of his experience - that 
is to pass his 
know how from the level of action to the level of representation. 
(Peugeot, 1999, p. 46) 
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A main concern within the method is that of authenticity. The aim is to bring the 
subject 'to the point where he describes what he really does and not what he thinks or 
imagines he does' (Peugeot, 1999, p. 46). As the session involves an interviewer, it is 
a second-person method as well as a first-person method. The interviewer guides the 
subject to a 'position of embodied speech in order to help him evoke a particular 
experience from the past' (ibid. ). It is intended that this occur to such an extent that, 
for the subject, the 'past situation becomes more present than does the situation of 
being interviewed' (ibid. ). The explicitation session defines this particular state of 
consciousness as a 'state of evocation' (ibid. ). 
The session provides various techniques that the interviewer can use to guide the 
subject to a state of evocation. The main technique assists the subject to rediscover 
all the emotions, sensations and images that are associated with the experience. 62 In 
order to do so, the subject must turn attention to the internal self and the act of the 
experience. The explicitation procedure aims at: 
... provoking a reversal of the subject's attention to his internal process 
and a slowing down of the film of his experience. 
(ibid. p. 47) 
Such a slowing down can be achieved by asking the subject directly to slow down 
the rhythm of speech and 'to take his time' (ibid. ). This ensures that the subject is not 
merely reciting 'ready-to-use knowledge' but is -'becoming aware of 
his experiences 
which until then were pre-thought' (ibid. ) 
One must, however, question the reliability of such techniques. How can one be sure 
that one is actually reliving the experience, as opposed to merely believing that one is 
reliving the 6xperience? In addition, how can a second person detect whether or not 
the sub . ect's experience, and subsequently communicated account of that experience, 
is genuine and valid? The explicitation session notes that there are some indications 
that may enable the interviewer to verify the authenticity of the subject's experience, 
for example 'letting go of eye contact, unfocusing [and] using the present tense 
62 This method is similar to one that is used in studies of memory - the model of affective memory - in which subjects are asked to recreate experiences through sensorial images. The model of affective 
memory is also used in method acting when encouraging actors to use memories of past experiences 
to create naturalistic emotions and expressions in the present. 
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instead of the past' (Peugeot, 1999, pp. 46-7). Adler also acknowledges the benefit of 
using the present tense and states that: 
The present tense reminds us, holds us encourages us to remain in the 
embodied, moving experience ... learning to speak experience rather 
than speaking about it means learning how to speak without 
abandoning the authenticity of the moving experience. 
(2002, p. 13) 
Both Peugeot and Adler believe that it is possible to relive an experience and 
produce an authentic retrospective account. 
Two types of account 
There are two distinct types of method of examination presented here: 
communicating and describing 'during the unfolding of the mental event' (Richard, 
1999, p. 277) and thus producing a present-centred account; and communicating and 
describing 'afterwards during a recollection of the event' (ibid. ) and thus producing a 
retrospective account. It appears as if both present-centred and retrospective accounts 
have undesirable outcomes and the 'influence of observation on what is observed is a 
major epistemological problem' (Vermersch, 1999, p. 19). The distortion or creation 
of the experience is called the 'excavation fallacy' or 'hermeneutical objection' by 
philosophers such as Shear and Jevning (1999, p. 13). 
Which type of account is more damaging to the experience itself? Is it merely a 
matter of determining the method which is more viable or should a new method be 
formulated by conflating these two? The methods of communication and description 
used during the formulation of the Dance Consciousness Model and in the training 
for the model provide the capacity for both present-centred and retrospective 
accounts to be made, based on the assumption that two accounts are more effective 
than one. There should, however, be a continual awareness that neither account can 
be considered entirely neutral, as an interpretative structure is always present in the 
gathering of phenomenal information. The information that is accumulated is 
therefore not taken as absolute fact, but instead as a valid intersubjective account 
which is worthy of examination. It is now important to ascertain exactly what sort of 
phenomenal information such accounts are able to produce. 
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Verbal information 
The most accessible and commonly used system for communicating and describing 
phenomenal experience is simple language. Simple language is pure description 
which omits superfluous theoretical knowledge, commentaries, interpretation, 
judgements, beliefs and opinions. In the explicitation session, this process is known 
as 'putting into words' and it enables the subject to clarify the represented experience 
(Peugeot, 1999, p. 47). The interviewer encourages the use of simple language by 
careful questioning which must encourage descriptions that 'privilege the hows to the 
exclusion of the whys' and the language used by the second person must be 'empty 
of content' (ibid. ). Such -language has been. entitled Ericksonian language. 
63 If the 
second person were to include such 'whys' there is a risk that the first person would 
veer off course 'towards a position of abstract speech' (ibid. ). In the context of the 
Dance Consciousness Model, dancers can use simple language to describe their 
experience retrospectively and, in the case of intrattention, in the form of a present- 
centred account. 
Language, however, may impose restraints. Some experiences seem to be 
particularly difficult to express in words. Adler notes that 'there is a longing for a 
language that could describe direct experience, that which is indescribable' (2002, 
p-xix). Chalmers acknowledges that simple language could be deemed 'coarse 
grained and imprecise' (1999)64 and Peugeot, when referring to some empirical work 
in which the explicitation session was used, claims: 
It was difficult, if not impossible, for several of the subjects to live out 
(or to relive) an intuitive experience and simultaneously to put it into 
words. 
(1999, p. 47) 
Describing an experience in words, especially if a confident conceptual 
understanding is lacking, may unintentionally exclude an intrinsic component of that 
experience. One could consider that a huge, varied and significant division of our 
mental reality is immune to linguistic analysis because its contents cannot be named 
(Bailey, 1999, p. 150). The quality of an account depends on the linguistic ability of 
63 Referring to the American psychotherapist Erickson whose technique has been adapted by 
Vermersch. For finther information see Bandler and Grinders (1975 64 http: //consc. net/papers/firstperson. html 
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the person making it and the words used may not truly reflect the very personal 
experience. As Overgaard states: 
It would ... be possible to argue that two persons who give 
identical 
descriptions of something in fact are experiencing the object in 
question in two different ways. 
(200 1)65 
In addition, such a description relies heavily on the second person - the 
choreographer - having had exactly the same phenomenal experience. This is the 
only way to ensure that the description is complete, and meaningful to the 
choreographer. 
Non-verbal information 
In the light of the above, one must consider what other means of communicating and 
describing are at one's disposal. In parallel with verbal reports, one could collect 
information which is non-verbal, para-verbal and epi-verbal (Vermersch, 1999, 
p. 37). Can evidence of one's conscious state, and one's experience of that state, be 
found in one's facial expressions, focus, body language, assurance, precision or 
confidence? The explicitation session endorses the view that information can be 
collected from non-verbal signals such as the direction of the subject's gaze, which 
Peugeot states indicates the 'sensorial register of where the subject is' (1999, p. 47). 
This suggests that it is possible for a second person to collect non-, para- or epi- 
verbal present-centred information which can be used to support retrospective 
accounts collected through retrospective verbal report. 
In the context of the Dance Consciousness Model, a choreographer can observe the 
dancer whilst the dancer is perfon-ning either intrattentively or non-intrattentively, 
and so can attempt to discern the dancer's conscious state and ascertain the 
experience of that state. Whilst such a means of collecting information may not be of 
optimum use as an independent source, it can prove beneficial if used in conjunction 
with verbal report. During the formulation of the model in Empirical Projects 1 and 2 
and within the Dance Consciousness Model, therefore, verbal and non-verbal 
information are collected both retrospectively and within a present-centred context. 
65 hq: //humanities. ucsc-edu/NEH/kelly. html 
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The Dance Consciousness Model's method of examination 
Having considered the existing theories and methods of examination 'there is no 
reason that [one] should be forced to choose one [method] to the exclusion of 
another' (Wallace, 1999, p. 186). The Dance Consciousness Model's method of 
examination thus comprises the following components: 
" First-, second- and third-person methods; 
" Present-centred and retrospective accounts; 
" Verbal and non-verbal information; 
" Theories from phenomenological reduction and the explicitation session. 
These components have been combined, which has facilitated the creation of a 
completely new method of examination to be used solely within the context of the 
Dance Consciousness Model. As noted earlier in the chapter, no such method 
currently exists within dance literature. It is anticipated that such a method can go 
beyond the phenomenological methods of Sheets-Johnstone (1966) and Fraleigh 
(1987), as it does not choose one examination method to the exclusion of another. 
The exact nature of the method of examination that was used during the formulation 
of the model and is also used by dancers when training to apply the model is 
explained below. 
The method of examination 
First person: The dancer involved in accessing the intrattentive and non- 
intrattentive states acts as the first person and provides first person-accounts. The 
dancer is informed of the purpose of the method of examination and of the Dance 
Consciousness Model and is given the opportunity to acquire a comprehensive 
understanding of the different states - intrattention and non-intrattention - and the 
characteristics of these states. This understanding is based upon third-person 
theories, such as those presented in Chapter 2, and first-person accounts, such as 
those provided by Fraleigh in her book Dance and the Lived Body (1987). In 
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addition, the dancer's knowledge is guided by the second person - the 
choreographer - who attempts to ensure continual understanding and 
development. 
Second person: The choreographer's role within the context of the Dance 
Consciousness Model is primarily that of consciousness trainer. The 
choreographer also, however, acts as the second person and provides second- 
person accounts. The choreographer is informed of the purpose of the method of 
examination and of the Dance Consciousness Model. It is essential that the 
choreographer has a sound understanding of the different states - intrattention and 
non-intrattention - in order to guide the first person - the dancer. This 
understanding is based upon third-person theories and first-person experience. It 
is crucial that the choreographer has participated in the consciousness training as a 
first person before undertaking the role of the second person. This allows the 
choreographer to be empathetic and make the necessary connection with the 
dancer. The choreographer must also have an understanding, and preferably 
experience, of appropriate interview and observation techniques. 
Third person: A selection of verified and consensus consciousness theories 
provides the third-person accounts which inform the first person - the dancer - 
and the second person - the choreographer. Within these third-person accounts are 
definitions of the intrattentive and non-intrattentive states of consciousness, and a 
breakdown of the precise nature of these concepts and the terminology to be 
applied. The exact nature of the various methods of access, which are all based 
upon third-person theories, are also included in the third-person account. 66 The 
third-person accounts provide sufficient information to equip the first and second 
person with the understanding and knowledge that is required in order to apply the 
methods of examination and the methods of access, and thus the Dance 
Consciousness Model. 
Present-centred accounts and non-verbal information: Present-centred 
accounts are collected in the form of non-verbal infonnation. The choreographer 
observes the dancer accessing states of intrattention or non-intrattention and 
66 These methods of access and the third person theories on which they are based are discussed in 
Chapters 4,5 and 6. 
103 
makes notes of any non-verbal information that may provide insight into the 
dancer's experience. This information may include the dancer's body language, 
focus, movement pace, quality, dynamic or posture. There are some non-verbal 
indices and signals inherent in, and characteristic of, the two different states of 
consciousness. For example, when performing intrattentively, the dancer's 
movement is often very structured and precise, the pace tends to be fairly slow 
and tlýe dancer's focus is likely to be inwardly directed. On the other hand, when 
performing non-intrattentively the dancer's movement is often very free and 
spontaneous, the'pace tends to be fairly fast and the dancer's focus is likely to be 
externally directed . 
67 The choreographer is able to interpret the non-verbal 
information because he or she has an empathetic understanding of the dancer's 
experience. This understanding is gained by the choreographer having prior 
experience of being the first person before being the second person and through 
having an understanding of third-person theory. 
The dancer is also likely to disclose some more obvious signals which are of use 
in determining whether he or she is accessing the desired state effectively. The 
design of the methods of access makes it possible to collect such information. One 
means of access to intrattentive states, for example, requires dancers to dance and 
simultaneously to describe verbally what their bodies are doing. 68 A significant 
pause in the dancer's verbal report might indicate that the dancer's intrattention 
has ceased. Through observing this sort of present-centred experience, the 
choreographer should be able to discern, to some extent, whether or not the dancer 
is intrattentive or non-intrattentive. It is proposed, however, that information 
collected in this way is not used in isolation, but is combined with the 
retrospective accounts provided by the dancer. 
Retrospective accounts and verbal information: Retrospective accounts are 
provided verbally. The choreographer interviews the dancer immediately after the 
latter has accessed states of intrattention or non-intrattention and the dancer 
provides a verbal account of the experience during the interview. The 
choreographer uses Ericksonian language as much as possible and employs a 
67 These distinctive aesthetic movement qualities that are inherent in the different states are discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 7. 
" This particular means of access and others are discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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particular framework to ensure interpretation and pre-conceptions affect the 
information as little as possible. This framework, given below, comprises open 
questions, encourages the dancer to use simple language and concentrates on 
single experiences. The structured interview is in three parts: 
(1) Retrospective open discussion. The choreographer begins by asking the 
dancer if they have any initial comments about their experience. This allows 
the dancer a 'free rein' and encourages independent and honest reflection 
which is not shaped by questioning. 
(2) Retrospective questioning - experience (qualitative) and stimulus 
(quantitative) related. The dancer is asked a series of specific questions about 
the qualitative nature of the experience. The dancer is expected, therefore, to 
remember as much about the experience as possible. In addition, within the 
non-intrattentive training, the dancer is asked stimulus-based questions, 
which provide quantitative information. 69 
(3) Viewing of recording. The dancer and choreographer view a video recording 
of the intrattentive or non-intrattentive experience. This activity allows the 
dancer to explain and clarify any answers provided during the interview if 
necessary, to jog their memory about particular moments and to reflect on 
whether or not they were intrattentive or non-intrattentive. The video 
recording also enables the choreographer to point out particular moments to 
the dancer and to re-analyse any non-verbal information. In addition, the 
recording provides an opportunity for the dancer to work with the 
choreographer in mapping the dancer's conscious states throughout the task. 
Applying the Dance Consciousness Model's method of examination 
Dancers use the method of examination when they are being trained to apply the 
Dance Consciousness Model. The method of examination enables dancers to ensure 
that they are effectively accessing states of intrattention or non-intrattention. The use 
69 These questions are a crucial part of the non-intrattentive training. They are not discussed any 
further here, however, as an understanding of them is entirely dependent on having knowledge of the 
non-intrattentive method of access. This method of access is discussed, and the exact nature of 
stimulus-based questioning clarified, in Chapter 5. 
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of the method is absolutely essential during the consciousness training whilst dancers 
are learning how to access conscious states intentionally, perhaps for the first time. 
The method teaches the dancers to check introspectively that they are accessing the 
desired state and that they are maintaining that state. It also gives the dancers some 
insight into potential reasons why they might not able to access particular states so 
that they can subsequently overcome such problems. 
The dancers are informed about the method of examination prior to taking part in the 
first consciousness-training workshop and the method is then applied throughout the 
training. Following the consciousness training, and when the time cornes. for actually 
applying the Dance Consciousness Model within a choreography and performance 
context, the method is not necessarily essential. It is anticipated that, by this point, 
the dancers will be successfully accessing states of intrattention or non-intrattention, 
will have control over the access and will thus no longer need to examine the access. 
The method of examination, however, is always there should a dancer experience 
problems within the application of the model; in such an instance, the dancer may 
wish to return to the method in order to become introspective. 
The method of examination as a method of research 
The Dance Consciousness Model was created during Empirical Projects I and 2. 
Within these projects, eight dancers explored various methods of accessing states of 
intrattention and non-intrattention. The method of examination used, and the results 
collected, during these projects led directly to the formulation of the methods of 
access used in the Dance Consciousness Model, and to the model itself As indicated 
at the outset of this chapter, it was only by being able to examine the nature of 
intrattentive or non-intrattentive states that the dancers could ever have known 
whether they were accessing these states. More fundamentally, the method of 
examination also enabled the dancers to understand the states of intrattention and 
non-intrattention in order that they knew what it was they were trying to access. 
The method of examination was thus used as a method of research during Empirical 
Projects I and 2, to assist with the research being undertaken into the nature of the 
states of dance consciousness and the means through which dancers can access the 
states. The formulation of the Dance Consciousness Model was entirely dependent, 
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therefore, on the method of examination as it was this method which provided the 
necessary insight into the dance consciousness. 
The purpose of the Dance Consciousness Model 
This Chapter has thus far explored existing methods of examination and presented 
the method of examination which was applied in order to formulate the Dance 
Consciousness Model. As noted above, it was this method of examination that 
enabled the evolution of the model. It is therefore now pertinent to ascertain the 
precise purpose of the model. 
The purpose of the Dance Consciousness Model is to allow choreographers and 
dancers to actively select the dance consciousness in which the dancer is to 
choreograph and perform, and to subsequently access and control that chosen state, 
whether it be intrattentive and/or non-intrattentive. In doing so, the model affords 
choreographers and dancers more insight into the experience of the dance during the 
choreographic process and performance. Such insight may permit a greater 
understanding of the dance and the ways in which it can be experienced. Such insight 
may also permit a greater means of communication between choreographers and 
dancers. For example, as noted in the Introduction, it is common for choreographers 
to relay, to dancers, instructions such as 'focus on what your body is doing', or 
alternatively 'forget about what you are doing and just experience the dance'. The 
Dance Consciousness Model not only assists in ascertaining what these experiences 
are and how it is possible to access them, but additionally allows choreographers to 
communicate such intentions to their dancers. 
It is important to note that the model is not essentially intended as a means for 
improving the efficacy of choreography or performance in terms of its artistic or 
aesthetic merit or validity. Indeed, the model does not stand as a method for 
choreography or performance in itself. In other words, it is not to be used to ensure 
successful choreography or performance and as such should not be used in isolation. 
The Dance Consciousness Model is to be seen as an addition to choreographic 
process and performance, rather than necessarily replacing conventional 
choreographic or performance techniques. As such, the application of the model will 
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ensure that the subjectivity of experience is considered as well as the objectivity of 
the product outcome. 
Having ascertained the purpose of the Dance Consciousness Model, it is now 
possible to introduce the model itself. 
Introduction to the Dance Consciousness Model 
The Dance Consciousness Model can be used for: 
Improvis ed movement including completely free improvisation or structured 
improvisation; 
Self-generated movement that has been choreographed by the dancer, either for 
the dancer and/or to teach to another dancer; 
Other generated movement that has been choreographed by another dancer or the 
choreographer and is taught to the dancer. 
The Dance Consciousness Model comprises four different strands: 
9 Intrattenfive; 
9 Non-intrattentive; 
e Intrattentive-non-intrattentive (I-NI); 
Non-intrattentive-intrattentive N-1). 
In addition, the Dance Consciousness Model comprises three different phases: 
* Choreography; 
Rehearsal; 
Performance. 
Thus within the Dance Consciousness Model: 
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The intrattentive strand allows dancers, through a particular method of access, to 
access intrattention within the choreography, rehearsal and performance of 
improvised, self-generated or other generated movement material; 
The non-intrattentive strand allows dancers, through a particular method of 
access, to access non-intrattention within the choreography, rehearsal and 
performance of improvised, self-generated or other generated movement material; 
Th e I-NI strand allows dancers to access intrattention within the choreography 
and rehearsal, and non-intrattention within the rehearsal and performance of 
improvised, self-generated or other generated movement material; 
The NI-I strand allows dancers to access non-intrattention within the 
choreography and rehearsal, and intrattention within the rehearsal and 
performance of improvised, self-generated or other generated movement material. 
It is important to note that the model does not assume that all movement material is 
choreographed before rehearsal begins and thus it is not necessary to remain within 
only one phase of the model at any one time. Indeed, within a dance process it is 
common for dancers to be choreographing some material and rehearsing other 
material in the same session. For example, within one session a dancer may use the 
intrattentive strand to rehearse a phrase of movement and the non-intrattentive strand 
to choreograph a new phrase of movement. Whilst it is possible to be present in two 
different phases of the model simultaneously, it is essential that every single piece of 
movement that is improvised, choreographed or leamt follows each phase of the 
model in sequence. One should not, therefore, choreograph a phrase without 
applying any of the strands and then subsequently apply a strand whilst rehearsing or 
performing, as this would affect the efficacy of the model. 
The choreographer or dance company facilitates the application of the Dance 
Consciousness Model. The model has been designed to ensure that it can be applied 
within any dance process and performance. Choreographers are advised to engage in 
a 'normal process' and simply use the model as an addition to this process. This 
ensures that the model is particularly accessible as the model can slot into any dance 
process. Once a choreographer or dancer has completed the training for the first time 
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it is anticipated that they will have mastered the methods of access. The initial 
training needs to be completed only once by an individual; it does not need to be 
repeated every time the choreographer or dancer embarks on a new project. When 
proficient in using the Dance Consciousness Model, choreographers and dancers can 
utilise it within any process. 
It is the responsibility of the choreographer, or company to structure and facilitate the 
process. The only prerequisite for the choreographer or company is an awareness of 
which conscious state(s) is required for the execution of movement. The conscious 
state(s) to be used is determined by the nature of the piece and the intentions of the 
choreographer and dancers. Within any one piece, any combination of strands may 
be applied. It is not necessary for these strands to be agreed prior to the dance 
process; indeed the model permits experimentation and the strands to be applied may 
not be established until some time into the process. It is the responsibility of both the 
choreographer and dancer to ensure that the chosen strand(s) is effectively 
implemented during the process and that the dancer is prepared sufficiently for 
performance. It is the dancer's sole responsibility to apply the strand during the 
actual performance. If the dancer has completed the necessary training and the 
chosen strand(s) is applied effectively, the dancer should be able to successfully 
access and control the desired dance consciousness. 
It is not possible to acquire complete understanding of the Dance Consciousness 
Model before being clear about the nature of the four different strands - which are 
described in Chapters 4,5 and 6. It is possible at this point, however, to present the 
skeletal structure of the Dance Consciousness Model. In Figure I the three phases - 
choreography, rehearsal and performance - are represented, as are the dance 
components; improvisation and self and other generated material. Although the 
location of the four strands is depicted in the diagram, the nature of these four strands 
is not illustrated. In subsequent chapters the nature of these strands is described and, 
as the thesis progresses, the model will become more comprehensible. 
In Figure I the four different strands are represented by the numbers I to 4: 
1 Intrattentive strand 
2 Non-intrattentive strand 
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3 Intrattentive to non-intrattentive strand 
4 Non-intrattentive to intrattentive strand 
Figure 1: The skeletal structure of the Dance Consciousness Model 
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Summary 
Following a consideration of objective and subjective methods, first-, second- and 
third-person methods, phenomenological reduction, the explicitation session, 
present-centred and retrospective accounts, this chapter has answered the second 
focussed research question: How can one examine the dance consciousness? 
The independently formulated method of examination provided in this chapter is 
intended for use specifically in the context of the dance discipline and the Dance 
Consciousness Model. It has been described how the method is applied within this 
context and the skeletal structure of the Dance Consciousness Model, with its four 
inherent strands, has been introduced. 
Chapter 4 presents the first strand of the model and describes how dancers are able to 
access states of intrattention. 
ill 
Chapter 4 
How can one access the intrattentive dance consciousness? 
Introduction 
In Chapter 3 the Dance Consciousness Model was introduced and it was explained 
that the model comprises four strands. This chapter describes the first strand of the 
model; the intrattentive strand, and reaches conclusions regarding the third focussed 
research question: How can one access the intrattentive dance consciousness? 
In its most basic form the intrattentive strand represents the idea that, in order to 
experience an intrattentive performance, the dancer must experience an intrattentive 
process, which includes choreography and rehearsal. The way in which a dancer is 
able to access such intrattentive experiences is discussed in this chapter and 
subsequently an understanding of the intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness 
Model, and the training that is required in order to utilise the strand, can be gained. 
Making the intrattentive strand the first strand, resulting in dancers being trained to 
access intrattention before they are trained to access non-intrattention, was a 
deliberate choice. The nature of an intrattentive state is that it is supplementary to the 
fundamental non-intrattentive state. It may be presumed, therefore, that methods for 
accessing the fundamental state should be addressed first. Non-intrattention is, , 
however, a state in which there is an absence of intrattention. In order for one to be 
able to recognise such an absence, one must primarily be equipped to identify and 
understand intrattention. Indeed, to be able to state that something is absent one must 
firstly be able to state what that something is. In addition, the means of access that 
have been formulated for states of non-intrattention are entirely dependent on states 
of intrattention. 70 It was therefore considered necessary to train dancers to access the 
supplementary'intrattentive states before training them to access the fundamental 
non-intrattentive states and consequently to entitle the intrattentive strand the first 
strand. 
70 The premise behind the notion that in order to access non-intrattention one must initially also 
engage in intrattention is discussed fully in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter breakdown 
This chapter begins with the definition of an intrattentive dance state which was 
introduced in Chapter 2. Three practices and theories that contributed to the 
formulation of the intrattentive strand, and the training which precedes its use, are 
then discussed. These are: somatic practices, specifically the Feldenkrais Method; 
sport psychology, specifically theories on imagery and self-talk; and visual and 
verbal processing theories, specifically the Dual Coding Theory. Each theory and 
practice has foundations in particular disciplines outside the dance discipline and 
thus is not necessarily related to dance. In addition, it is not the case that they exist 
within their own disciplines as methods or models for accessing states of an 
intrattentive nature. 
Many different Eastern and Western traditions, philosophies and martial arts are 
incorporated into the various somatic practices that are discussed. The theories of 
self-talk and imagery used within sport psychology are clearly related to a different 
discipline altogether - sport and exercise - and are based on Western psychology and 
philosophy. The visual and verbal processing theories and the Dual Coding Theory 
are inherent in psychology and the study of mnemonics. A certain amount of 
selectivity, analysis, interpretation, adaptation and application was essential in order 
to make use of these practices and theories in the formulation of the intrattentive 
strand. The theories and practices discussed in this chapter are considered to be the 
most applicable in this context. They are, however, by no means the only ones which 
could offer a means of accessing states of an intrattentive nature. The three theories 
and practices chosen are explained as fully as is necessary in this context without 
disregarding their intended origin, purpose or meaning and each explanation 
culminates in a summary clarifying exactly how the practice or theory contributed to 
the Dance Consciousness Model. 
Following these discussions, the chapter then describes the intrattentive training that 
is required for the intrattentive strand, including how to access fundamental and 
higher states of intrattention, and provides a breakdown of each intrattentive training 
workshop. Finally, the exact nature of the intrattentive strand is described and it is 
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clarified how this strand is applied within choreography, rehearsal and performance 
in order to create an intrattentive dance consciousness. 
Intrattention 
-An 
intrattentive state of dance consciousness is: 
A state in which a dancer not only experiences the dance, but also is knowingly, 
intentionally, attentively and non-inferentially aware of the dance. The dance is the 
dancer's explicit object of attention. The dancer is actively aware of the qualitative 
experience of the dance, including the dancing body, the dancing mind and external 
factors surrounding the dance. In addition, the dancer is aware of any mental activity 
concerned with the dance. The dancer may experience either an ordinary state of 
supplementary consciousness in which complete awareness is focussed on the dance, 
or a higher state of supplementary consciousness in which the dancer is additionally 
able to monitor introspectively that awareness - the experiential sensation of which 
differs for the dancing body and mind. The dancer is able to report non-inferentially 
on the state. 
The intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model provides access to an 
intrattentive state of dance consciousness. In order to utilise this strand of the model, 
and subsequently give an intrattentive performance, a dancer must initially be trained 
to access states of intrattention whilst dancing. 
So, how is it possible to experience or access intrattention? Try now two different 
activities. Firstly, try to have a generally intrattentive experience; in other words, try 
to be particularly aware of your self and your surroundings. This is not as simple a 
task as one would expect. Of course, one undoubtedly experiences numerous 
intrattentive moments each day, but trying purposefully to create these moments and 
experiences is particularly difficult. Secondly, try to be particularly aware of your 
hand and focus all your conscious attention on to your hand - what it looks like and 
feels like. In this second activity, purposefully directing attention and accessing a 
state of focussed intrattentive consciousness, in which attention is directed toward a 
specific object, seems more achievable than creating a general state of intrattention in 
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which one is consciously aware of everything, as in the first activity. Whilst 
focussing intrattentively on your hand, everything else continues to exist, and can be 
attended to through a non-intrattentive conscious state. 
Although focussed attention might be considered as more straightforward to 
maintain, it is still possible for the mind to wander and begin to attend to other 
objects; thus the quality of the directed intrattention decreases. In order to access a 
truly intrattentive state of dance consciousness, therefore, all intrattention must be 
directed towards the dance - including the actual experience of the dance, the 
dancing body, the dancing mind and external factors surrounding the dance such as 
the music - and this intrattention must be maintained throughout the experience. 
Everything outside the dance must be attended to through a non-intrattentive 
conscious state. 
How, then, can a dancer direct all conscious attention towards the dance? The 
intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model and the intrattentive training 
allow dancers to understand how this is possible and provide the means through 
which dancers can achieve intrattention. In order to formulate the intrattentive 
training and the intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model, research was 
undertaken into existing practices that seem, in one way or another, to deal with the 
experiencing or accessing of intrattention. 
Methods for accessing intrattention 
Somatic practices 
Although somatic practices do not claim to deal specifically with consciousness, 
many of the principles were considered within the formulation of the intrattentive 
strand and the intrattentive training. Some insight into the nature of somatic practices 
will clarify why. 
The term somatics, which was coined by Hanna in 1976, comes from the Greek term 
soma. The term soma originally refers literally to the body. In current practice, 
however, the use of the term has been developed by practitioners who refer to it as 
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'the body experienced from within' (Kampe, 2003). 7 1 Hanna claims that somatics is 
'the field which studies the soma: namely the body as perceived from within by first 
person perception' (1986, p. 4). She continues to state that: 
The soma, being internally perceived, is categorically distinct from a 
body, not because the subject is different but because the mode of 
viewpoint is different. 
(1986, p. 4) 
As with the Dance Consciousness Model, it is the experience of the subject that is of 
importance within somatics, an experience that is peculiar to and understood by the 
one experiencing it. As Fortin et al. acknowledge, 'the process orientation of 
somatics favours the experiential soma (how the body feels from a first-person 
viewpoint)' (2002, p. 172). Fitt describes this as 'knowing oneself from the inside 
out' (1996, p. 304). 
Currently, there are several different established somatic practices, such as the 
Barteneiff Fundamentals Technique, the Skinner Releasing Technique and Authentic 
Movement, which, according to Foster, construct the 'body as a site of exploration to 
which the dancer must remain vigilantly attentive' (2000, p. xiv). Although, such 
practices were not all specifically formulated for use within a dancecontext, they are 
'becoming well established in the dance community' with an 'expanding and diverse 
literature', the development of an 'international community of educators and, more 
recently, a community of researchers' (Fortin, 2003, p. 3). Somatics is also 
increasingly used in dance education and it is possible to train at both undergraduate 
and postgraduate level in somatic practice. 72 It is felt that somatic practice has a great 
deal to offer the discipline of dance. For example, in referring to their research, 
Fortin et al. state that: 
By integrating somatics ... we encouraged dancers to attend to themselves from a first person perspective. This has enormous 
repercussions. Not only is the representational body validated but the 
experiential one that is the inner experience of the dancer. 
(2002, p. 175) 
71 Lecture given by Kampe on 14 February 2003 at the University of Leeds, Bretton Hall Campus, 
entitled 'Body, soma, self - Somatic perspectives on dance education and training'. 72 At institutes such as University College Chichester. See 
www. ucc. ac. uk/cfm/courses/courscresults. cfm? courses=dance 
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The principles of somatics noted by Fortin et aL are analogous with the purposes of 
the intrattentive strand. For example, Fortin et aL believe that somatic practices 
require the subject to have an increased awareness of their experience. This view 
corresponds with that of other writers, for example: Smith claims that the somatic 
aim is 'developing self-awareness' (2002, p. 123); Ginsburg states that somatics is a 
'practice of embodied awareness' (1999, p. 83); and Minton claims - that somatics is 
about 'being aware of your body' (1989, p. 49). 
Within somatics and the intrattentive strand, ability to control and direct attention is 
crucial in order to accomplish awareness of self. Fortin claims that: 
Shifting of attention is a key concept of somatic practices. We can 
construct a radically different world via the direction of our attention. 
(2003, p. 7) 
So how can one control and direct attention in order to increase awareness and create 
an intrattentive state? According to Fortin, 'we can teach the movement of attention, 
as we do with any other movement' (ibid. p. 8). Hanna describes attention as 
'functioning somewhat like a lens [which can be] pointed and focussed' (1986, p. 4) 
and Skelton likens the process of controlling attention to the process of tuning a 
radio: 
... because it involves the image of listening; listening to the information as it comes through the source, that is the whole self 
(psychophysical being) and responding to it. [This tuning in requires 
an] act of paying acute attention to the alignment of certain 
wavelengths ... in order to arrive at a clear transmission. (2003, p. 24) 
In order to gain further insight into the means through which it is possible to increase 
awareness of self, it is of use to consider one particular somatic practice which 
claims self-awareness as its aim. This practice is the Feldenkrais Method. 
The Feldenkrais Method 
The Feldenkrais Method is a technique developed by Feldenkrais after he 
experienced a knee injury. The method enables people to move more efficiently in 
everyday life, to detect habitual movement mistakes and correct them, and to ease 
pain and to develop the body and mind so that they can work together harmoniously 
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(Feldenkrais, 1981). Feldenkrais (1972) believes that it is essential to know what our 
bodies are doing in order for them to do what we want them to do, and thus the 
method promotes self-awareness. 
With the rise in somatic dance education, the Feldenkrais Method is, at the time of 
writing, being integrated into dance, creating almost a new practice which Galeota- 
Wozny claims is 'not being appreciated by either the dance community or the 
Feldenkrais community' (2001, p. 12). Nevertheless, practitioners such as Paine 
(2001) run workshops which specifically explore connections between contemporary 
dance and the Feldenkrais principles. The method is also being integrated into some 
dance education. Some practitioners use the method before performance as a 
preparatory exercise or as a warm-up at the beginning of a choreographic workshop 
or rehearsal. Strauch notes that 'world class ... performers 
have enhanced their 
performance using the method' (1996, p. 2). 
The Feldenkrais Method is, however, very much a method of training which exists 
apart from dance practice. In other words, the method may be used by dancers to 
improve or enhance awareness of their bodies and the way their bodies move, but it 
has yet to be integrated into choreography or performance; as Fortin et A state: 
The transfer to stage performance is a primary goal for the 
incorporation of somatic education into dance [and] the incorporation 
of somatics into dance programmes has more or less relied on wishful 
thinking. 
(2002, p. 160) 
Unlike somatic practices, the intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model 
attempts to transfer training principles, similar to those used in the Feldenkrais 
Method, into the dance process - choreography and rehearsal - and performance, and 
it utilises the principles as a form of training. 
Awareness through Movement and Functional Integration 
The Feldenkrais method has two components, Awareness through Movement and 
Functional Integration, both of which have a similar purpose but each has a slightly 
different format. The Awareness through Movement component is a group session in 
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which a Feldenkrais practitioner guides participants through a series of movement 
exercises which: 
... increase the level of awareness of the participant, and at the same 
time increase the level of sensitivity to the nuances of kinaesthetic 
sensation. 
(Ginsburg, 1999, p. 83) 
The Functional Integration component is a one-to-one session in which the 
practitioner works a participant through a personalised series of physical exercises 
using direct contact. It is felt that the method: 
... stimulates the innate learning capacity of the human brain and 
nervous system through simple, directed movements performed with 
focussed awareness. 
(Paine, 2001, p. 47) 
One of the aims of both the Feldenkrais method and the intrattentive strand is to 
encourage the body to move with 'conscious intention rather than through acquired 
habit' (McCaw, 2001, p. 8). Galeota-Wozny notes that 'embedded in Feldenkrais are 
numerous opportunities to self observe, self reflect and self organise' (2001, p. 12). 
Reflecting on oneself encourages one to attend to and think about oneself whilst 
moving; as Feldenkrais states, his training ensures that the participant 'leams to act 
while he thinks and to think while he acts' (1990, p. 60). 
The Feldenkrais Method is particularly thorough in that it does not merely enhance 
awareness of one particular body part during the execution of a movement, but works 
methodically through various body parts, regardless of whether or not they are 
involved directly in the execution of the movement. The method therefore 
encourages full body awareness as a means to creating full body integration. An arm 
movement, for example, involves not just the movement of the arm but also many 
other body parts, such as the back, which are affected in the execution of the arm 
movement. In this instance, the arm is the directly involved body part and the back is 
an indirectly involved body part. McCaw notes that the method is: 
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... achieved by the sensual experiencing of all the component parts of 
a particular movement: for example, the lesson invites you to engage 
the pelvis as you turn your head. 
(2001, p. 9) 
The intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model and the intrattentive 
training also encompass full body integration. Dancers are encouraged to attend 
systematically to all the body parts involved in the execution of a movement during 
rehearsals. This is to ensure that, by the time of the performance, every movement 
and every body part involved, directly or indirectly, in that movement has at some 
point during the process been attended to specifically. 
As previously explained, the main aim of the Feldenkrais Method is similar to that of 
the intrattentive strand. What was needed during the formulation of this strand, 
however, was not merely the identification of a parallel aim but also a means of 
accomplishing this aim. Below is an example of a particular Feldenkrais Awareness 
through Movement lesson, the purpose of which is to expand awareness. Similar to 
many of the lessons of Feldenkrais, this example contains an element of exploration, 
during which the individual is encouraged to experiment with directing attention to 
different body parts whilst moving in various ways. In this instance the aim is to 
direct attention to the quality of the execution rather than the size of the movement: 
Sit cross-legged on the floor. Put hands together in a praying position 
with elbows out. Keeping the palms together, separate the fingers 
without moving the elbows. Experiment with both hands 
simultaneously, and then with each individual hand. Turn the hands so 
that the fingers point away from the body. Repeat the movements. 
Imagine that the right eye contains a small telescope. Look to the right 
and then up and around to make a slow circular movement with the 
right eye. Whilst doing so attend to any parts of the movement that are 
not smooth and easy. Experiment with making circles in different 
directions. Finally combine the hand movement with the eye 
movement. 
(Ginsburg, 1999, p. 83) 
Ginsburg notes the following about his personal experience of the above exercise: 
Phenomenologically one feels one's right eye in a new way. Initially 
as I begin to move my right eye in a circular motion, imagining the 
eye as a telescope, I move the eye in accordance with this image, 
feeling the movement of the eye with an attention that I normally do 
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not bring to moving my eye. At first I may find it difficult to make the 
circle round, at certain points I find that I cannot move the eye the 
way I want. Slowly as I move, directing my attention to where I can 
move with quality ... I find that I can approach the difficult places 
in 
the circle and begin to make a complete smooth and enjoyable 
movement ... Eventually I am directed to return to the movement of the hands, and find my right hand more supple and moveable. 
(1999, p. 84) 
By moving 'very slowly, delicately and attentively' through the 'difficult portions of 
the movement, one begins to improve the quality of moving' (Ginsburg, 1999, p. 83). 
Ginsburg claims that this is a 'clear demonstration of the effect of directed conscious 
awareness' (ibid. p. 84). This effect is of interest, but has little direct relevance to the 
fonnulation of the intrattentive strand and intrattentive training; of greater felevance 
is how the attention is directed. 
In the example above, the method of directing attention seems to be a type of self- 
observation, which leads to a particularly attentive state that can be likened to 
intrattention. In the intrattentive training a similar type of observation is used. For the 
purposes of this research and in the context of the Dance Consciousness Model, this 
observation has been termed physical observation. Within the intrattentive training, 
dancers are encouraged to observe their bodies physically whilst moving. Through 
this intentional and analytical observation, the dancer's attention becomes knowingly 
and entirely directed towards his or her body, thus creating a state of intrattention. 
Physical observation can, therefore, be considered as a means of access to 
intrattention, and this particular means of access was inspired by the self-observation 
practised within the Feldenkrais Method. 
In the Functional Integration part of the FeldenkTais Method, the practitioner touches 
and feels the dancer whilst the latter executes simple movements. The aim is: 
... enhanced awareness in which the person touched realises new 
possibilities of kinaesthetic sensing and feeling, and experiences shifts 
in the body (movement image). 
(ibid. ) 
I/ 
What is of particular interest here is not these realisations, but the idea that one 
person can enhance the awareness of another person. One person directing his or her 
conscious attention to a second person's body can cause that second person to direct 
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conscious attention to his or her own body. This idea is used in the mover/observer 
exercises which have been created specifically for the intrattentive training. 
In one mover/observer exercise dancer A moves, usually through improvisation, and 
physically observes his or her own body. In addition, dancer B physically observes 
dancer A as he or she moves. Dancer B does not merely sit and watch dancer A, but 
moves with dancer A, observing every detail from every angle possible. The 
observation for both dancers is intentional and active, rather than passive; that is the 
dancers do not merely receive a passing image of the body, but instead focus actively 
and reflect on the image. Dancer A is instructed to attend entirely to his or her own 
body and not pay any attention to dancer B, in other words to direct a state of non- 
intrattention towards dancer B. This is achieved through the process of allowing all 
the attention in dancer A's capacity to be directed towards self Dancer B is 
instructed to give all their attention to dancer A and allow his or her own body to 
move around dancer A in a non-intrattentive manner. This is achieved through the 
process of dancer B giving every part of his or her attention within their capacity to 
dancer A. 
During the formulation of the intrattentive strand and the intrattentive training in 
Empirical Project 1, it was claimed by all the dancers that having another dancer 
physically observe their bodies, whilst they were simultaneously physically 
observing their own bodies, increased the quality of attention directed towards self 
and undoubtedly allowed access to concentrated states of intrattention. People are 
often more self conscious when being watched, and dancers often claim that they too 
are more self conscious when performing in front of an audience than when 
rehearsing in a studio. It is clear, then, why a process of external physical observation 
is of use in producing states of intrattention. 
In addition, again during the formulation of the intrattentive training in Empirical 
Project 1, the dancers claimed that working in the role of dancer B allowed them a 
kinaesthetic understanding of how it is possible to intrattend to another body. 
Exercises such as the mover/observer exercises play a vital role in the intrattentive 
training in preparing dancers to access states of intrattention whilst working in a 
duet. The exercises act as a transition between intrattentive solo work and 
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intrattentive duet work. This transition is crucial; this view was supported by dancers 
during Empirical Project 1 who confirmed that learning to focus attention on 
another's body as well one's own body, having just been trained to focus all attention 
on to one's own body, is particularly difficult. In duet work one must be able to split 
the intrattention between self and other. The mover/observer exercises help dancers 
to understand what it feels like to intrattend to another rather than to self before they 
have to progress to intrattending to both self and other. 
Being able to attend entirely to another body is by no Imeans 
straightforward. With 
reference to Functional Integration, Ginsburg claims: 
As practitioner, I find that I am effective when I shift to an open 
awareness, shut down my usual verbal self chatter, and give up any 
attachment to producing results. 
(1999, p. 85) 
This ridding of verbal self chatter and any preoccupation of completing the exercise 
successfully, or moving in an aesthetically pleasing way whilst executing the 
observation, is something that the dancers are encouraged to do in the intrattentive 
training workshops when working with another dancer. Dancers are required to pay 
no attention to any extraneous thoughts that may occur whilst they are attending to 
their partner; this includes thoughts about self. Dancers are advised that, should these 
thoughts occur, it is vital to re-focus, even if this means stopping momentarily and 
taking hold of the attention, and then returning to the physical observation. 
It is worth noting here another somatic practice that utilises the mover/observer 
technique; the practice of Authentic Movement. Adler, who is considered to have an 
authoritative voice in the field of Authentic Movement, describes the practice as 
follows: 
The architecture of the discipline of Authentic Movement is based on 
the relationship between a mover and a witness ... Each work 
is 
centred in the development of the inner witness, which is one way of 
understanding the development of consciousness. In this discipline the 
inner witness is externalised, embodied by a person who is called the 
outer witness. Another person, called the mover, embodies the moving 
self. 
(2002, p. xvi) 
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In the practice of Authentic Movement, the outer witness is responsible for the 
consciousness of the mover and, through observation, directs the mover's awareness 
towards self. The mover is able to bring awareness toward what the body is doing 
and, within this, consider the sensation of the moving (Adler, 2003, p. 21). In 
Authentic Movement 'the witness's experience is completely dependent on the 
presence of the mover' likewise, 'the mover's experience is completely dependent on 
the presence of the witness' (ibid. p. 61). This is not the case within the intrattentive 
training. The intrattentive mover/observer exercises merely act as tools to encourage 
the dancer's awareness towards self, through the self becoming objectified as a result 
of the observation from an observer. The dancer's awareness of self is not, however, 
dependent on the observer, merely aided by it. Indeed, the training essentially 
encourages dancers to access intraftention independently. 
Summary of the contribution of somatic practices to the intrattentive strand 
and training 
Within the formulation of the intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model 
and the intrattentive training, some of the principles of somatic practices, especially 
the Feldenkrais Method, were taken into consideration. These are summarised below: 
* In common with the general ideology underlying somatic practice, the 
intrattentive strand encourages the dancer to have increased awareness of his or 
her experience of moving and to direct and control his or her conscious attention 
in order to access and maintain an intrattentive dance consciousness. 
Although somatic principles are employed within dance training, it is difficult to 
identify how the principles can be transferred into choreography, rehearsal or 
performance. The intrattentive strand, therefore, provides a process of transferral 
from training to practice and includes, within the training, a method of applying 
the various means of access within the contexts of choreography, rehearsal and 
performance. 
In common with the FeldenkTais Method, the intrattentive strand and training 
encompass full-body integration and awareness, and encourage dancers to attend 
systematically to all the body parts involved in the execution of movement. 
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e Within the intrattentive training dancers are taught to utilise physical observation 
as a means of access to non-intrattentive, states of consciousness. This observation 
is similar to the self-observation encouraged by the Feldenkrais Method. 
9 Through the mover/observer exercise the intrattentive training teaches that one 
person can enhance the awareness of another person. Unlike the process of 
Functional Integration this does not necessitate physical contact between two 
dancers; instead it requires merely a shared direction of attention. 
Sport psychology 
Sport and exercise psychology is a multidisciplinary subject and incorporates 
theories and approaches of psychology. According to Gill: 
Sport and exercise psychology ... [involve] the scientific study of human behaviour in sport and exercise, and the practical application 
of that knowledge in sport and exercise settings. 
(2000, p. 7) 
In addition, according to Abernethy et aL: 
Performance of movement skills in both sport and exercise settings 
appears, intuitively at least, to be inextricably linked to the act of 
paying attention to the task in hand. 
(1998, p. 173) 
The preoccupation with the human experience in the field of sport psychology and 
the human's ability to pay attention are the reasons that the practice was considered 
for potential use during the formulation of the Dance Consciousness Model and 
consciousness training. 
The study of an athlete's attention and focussing abilities is of key interest in sport 
psychology as it is felt that 'cognitive skills, such as the ability to focus and maintain 
attention, have clear implications for perfon-nance' (Gill, 2000, p. 57). it is of general 
consensus that successful athletes are those who are able to direct attention to the 
task in hand and block out any extraneous or negative thoughts. This is noted here by 
Gill: 
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We understand that the ability to selectively attend to cues, events, or 
thoughts while disregarding others is a key to successful performance. 
(2000, p. 58) 
In sport psychology, much research has been undertaken into the techniques that 
athletes use in order to focus mentally and prepare for their sport, and these 
techniques are considered to be psychological skills: 
Attention and cognitive styles are key to psychological skills, and 
sport psychology consultants devote considerable time to 
concentration exercises and imagery rehearsal. 
(Gill, 2000, p. 57) 
Gill maintains that 'the cognitive characteristics most prominent in [sport 
psychology] are attention and imagery' (ibid. ). 
Within sport psychology, there is evidence of a consciousness continuum, meaning 
that varying states of consciousness are identified; from highly reflective states - 
intrattentive states - to states in which the athlete has little awareness of self - non- 
intrattentive states. Sport psychology does not deal specifically with intrattention and 
non-intrattention; however, confirmation that they are considered can be found in 
statements such as: 
One distinction particularly relevant to athletes is control versus 
automatic processing. Control processing, which the individual does 
deliberately ... is slow and effortful. Automatic processing, which typically occurs with well learned skills, is fast and effortless and not 
under conscious control. 
(Gill, 2000, p. 58) 
Control processing holds similar characteristics to intrattentive consciousness, and 
automatic processing seems to be referring more to a non-intrattentive consciousness. 
It is of common consensus that different athletes are in different states of 
consciousness when they perform. In their study of marathon runners, Morgan and 
Pollock (1977) found that some runners use dissociative techniques and others use 
associative techniques. A dissociative attentional style uses techniques of distraction 
and focussing on things external to self, for example thinking about what to have for 
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dinner or what to put on the shopping list. 73 Such techniques are likely to cause a 
non-intrattentive consciousness directed towards the running. The subject matter of 
these external thoughts is not important to dissociative runners, as long as it does not 
include thoughts about the present experience of running. An associative attentional 
style uses techniques of focussing entirely on self and the present experience of 
running, such as the physical sensations in the body. This is likely to cause an 
intrattentive consciousness. 
There is some debate within sport psychology as to which type of processing or 
attentional state is more effective. Morgan and Pollock (1977) support the idea that 
control processing and an associative attentional style are generally more effective 
for sport. Gill (2000), however, supports the opposite view. Gill and Strom facilitated 
a laboratory experiment in 1985 in which: 
... female athletes performed an endurance task ... 
for as many 
repetitions as possible using either a narrow-intemal focus on feelings 
in their legs or a narrow external focus on a collage of pictures. 
(Gill, 2000, p. 64) 
Here Gill is making reference to associative and dissociative techniques and she 
claims that 'not only did the external focus', the dissociative technique, 'lead to more 
repetitions, but nearly all participants preferred that style' (ibid. ). 74 Despite the 
results of this experiment, it is difficult to prove whether associative or dissociative, 
or intrattentive or non-intrattentive, techniques lead to more effective performance. 
Indeed, 'dissociation may be useful for some tasks and association more effective for 
others' (ibid. ). 75 Whilst this is an interesting discussion, this particular chapter is 
concerned essentially with sport psychology's notions of control processing and 
associative techniques. These techniques are the most relevant in terms of the focus 
of this chapter - intrattentive consciousness - and hence were of use during the 
formulation of the intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model and the 
intrattentive training. 
73 These sorts of techniques are used within the Dance Consciousness Model in relation to non- 
intrattention and are discussed in Chapter 5. 
74 See Gill and Strom (1985) for more information. 75 It is partly for these reasons that the Dance Consciousness Model incorporates both an intrattentive 
strand and a non-intrattentive strand. Unlike other current practices, such as those used in sport 
psychology, the Dance Consciousness Model also offers the possibility of utilising both intrattentive 
and non-intrattentivc techniques - see Chapter 6. 
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Cognitive control strategies 
Within sport psychology it is thought that, in order to ensure control processing and 
an associative style, attentional control and concentration strategies must be 
developed by the athlete, as 'the focus of attention is crucial' (Hardy et aL, 2001, 
p. 174) and 'concentration is a key psychological skill' (Gill, 2000, p. 175). Being able 
to control attention and concentration is essential in order to access and maintain an 
intrattentive state of consciousness knowingly and intentionally. However, according 
to Hardy et aL 'maintaining concentration can be a problem for sports performers' 
(200 1, p. 174) and by extrapolation, in the context of this study, for dancers. 
As noted previously in this chapter, controlling attention and concentration is not 
necessarily straightforward: 
As with most psychological skills, it is much easier to tell someone (or 
ourselves) to concentrate than to convey how to do it. 
(Gill, 2000, p. 175) 
This may be because 'concentration is not an innate ability, but a skill acquired 
through training and practice' (ibid p. 177). Some sports psychologists, such as 
Hardy, Jones and Gould, have suggested how one may control attention in this way: 
'concentration is about focussing the mind upon one source of information, often to 
the exclusion of others' (2001, p. 174). Despite this, few have actually provided any 
specific techniques. 
Nideffer (1993) provides a series of control techniques using 'Attentional Control 
Training' (ACT). The aim of ACT is to 'develop a personalised intervention program 
to target an individual's specific problem areas' (Gill, 2000, p. 175) in terms of their 
attention capacity. The predominant focus within ACT is on centering, which 
involves 'relaxing muscles, breathing deeply, and focussing on feelings with 
exhalation' (ibid. ). Sports psychologists do not appear to have accepted the ACT 
because there is a lack of empirical evidence of its success. 
Schmid and Peper (1998) developed a series of cognitive control strategies which 
encompass both external and internal concentration techniques. The strategies 
involve various types of rehearsal: 
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9 Dress rehearsal; 
9 Rehearsal of simulated competition experiences (simulation training); 
* Mental rehearsal. 
The internal strategies of Schmid and Peper (1998) involve various types of 
attentional control: 
* Using verbal or kinaesthetic attentional cues and triggers to focus concentration. 
For example a swimmer might focus on 'the feel of the hand pulling through the 
water' (Gill, 2000, p. 176). 
e Turning failure into success. For example, 'one mentally rehearses a successful 
performance immediately after a failure' (Gill, 2000, p. 176). 
e Using electrodermal feedback. The purpose of this is, for example, 'to show how 
thoughts affect the body, to monitor relaxation, to identify stressful points during 
imagery, and to facilitate concentration training' (Gill, 2000, p. 176). 
Developing performing protocols such as performance rituals. Sport psychologists 
such as Boutcher and Crews (1987) believe that pre-performance routines 
instantaneously generate focussed attention. Many athletes develop and practise 
their own personal protocols and mental strategies. 
These cognitive control strategies all encourage a focussed and reflective state of 
consciousness - an intrattentive state - and also provide some particular techniques. 
Some of these techniques can be used to enable dancers to access and maintain an 
intrattentive consciousness. 
In sport: 
[t1he competitive environment clearly includes various factors which 
are not present to the same degree, or even at all, in the training 
environment. 
(Hardy et aL, 200 1, p. 189) 
This is also the case in dance; physical factors, such as the audience, and mental 
factors, such as anxiety, which may be present in a performance produce a different 
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environment from that during the rehearsal. The capacity to maintain focus and not 
be distracted by these factors is essential in order for a dancer to sustain an 
intrattentive state of consciousness. A technique which is commonly used by athletes 
'to enhance their attention control in highly pressured and potentially distracting 
situations' is that of 'simulation training' (Hardy et al., 200 1, p. 18 9). 
Simulation training typically takes two forms: 'physical practice in the presence of 
simulated competition stressors' - similar to a dress rehearsal in the dance context - 
'and mental rehearsal of the actual competitive event' (ibid. ) - the performance. In 
the dance context, the dress rehearsal is-a crucial part of the. dance process and, as 
such, has been incorporated into conventional dance practice. Simulation training, or 
mental rehearsal, does not play such a predominant role in conventional dance 
practice; however it has been incorporated into the intrattentive training and the 
intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model because it can be used as a 
means of access to intrattention. 
During the intrattentive training, dancers are taught to use simulation training and are 
trained to sit with eyes closed and mentally rehearse their movement material as part 
of the choreographic and rehearsal process. Working with the eyes closed is an 
essential part of this process; Adler confirms that with 'eyes closed and with focus 
inward, there is an intention toward staying present' and 'toward practising the art of 
concentration' (2002, p. xix). Within the intrattentive training, this mental rehearsal is 
considered to be a means of access to intrattentive states of consciousness and is 
referred to as motionless blind sensing. This term has been coined for use 
specifically within the context of this research and the Dance Consciousness Model. 
Whilst using motionless blind sensing, dancers are encouraged to implement some of 
the techniques specified by Schmid and Peper (1998), such as attentional cues and 
triggers and electrodermal feedback. For example, dancers are directed to imagine 
the kinaesthetic sensation of a particular movement and to allow electrodermal 
feedback to occur. In other words, through imagining the kinaesthetic sensation of a 
jump, the kinaesthetic experience of that jump can be recreated within the body 
without the dancer actually executing the jump physically. Dancers are also 
encouraged to create perfortning protocols, as recommended by Schmid and Peper 
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(1998), in which they develop a personalised performance ritual which is 
incorporated into the preparation for every performance. For example, a dancer may 
decide that, prior to a performance, he or she will execute a particular motionless 
blind sensing exercise to enable them instantly to generate focussed attention in order 
to access an intrattentive state of consciousness. 
Imagery is related intrinsically to the mental rehearsal and simulation training in 
sport psychology, and to the motionless blind sensing used in the intrattentive 
training. Imagery plays an important role in sport psychology and it is 'often a key 
component in the mental training programs developed and implemented by sport 
psychologists' (Hall, 1998, p. 165). In addition, 'coaches often encourage their 
athletes to use imagery to help them learn new skills' and to 'improve skills they 
already possess' (ibid. ). According to Hall, 'athletes, coaches, and sport 
psychologists all realise mental imagery is a valuable technique for improving 
performance' (ibid. ). So, what exactly is mental imagery? 
Mental imagery 
According to Hardy, Jones and Gould, 'imagery can be defined as a symbolic 
sensory experience that may occur in any sensory mode' (2001, p. 28) and Gill 
believes that 'imagery involves using all the senses to create or recreate an 
experience mentally' (2000, p. 18 1). Thomas states that: 
Mental imagery, often informally described as seeing in the mind! s 
eye, visualization, etc., is quasi-perceptual experience: it significantly 
resembles perceptual experience, but occurs in the absence of the 
appropriate perceptual stimuli. 
(2004)76 
Imagery can be considered to be a mental, sensory representation of a perceptual 
experience, which is distinct from the actual perceptual experience. How, though, 
can one create such a representation? It is possible to train one's mind to use imagery 
to become more efficient in creating high quality images which are vivid and 
controlled (Hardy et aL, 2001, p. 42). Psychologists Gould and Damadian (1996) 
76 http: //www. calstatela. edu/faculty/nthomas/mipia. htm 
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created a list of instructions that they deem essential for imagery training. Some of 
these instructions are also used in the intrattentive training and are: 77 
" Practise imagery regularly; 
" Use all the senses to enhance imagery vividness; 
" Emphasise dynamic kinaesthetic imagery; 
" Use relaxation techniques in conjunction with imagery techniques; 
" Imagine in real time; 
" Use internal and external outlooks. 
(Gould and Damadian, 1996, p. 32) 
Within the intrattentive strand and training, dancers are exposed continually to tasks, 
such as motionless blind sensing, which require them to create images of self in order 
to access states of intrattention. Whilst using imagery, dancers are encouraged to 
recreate all the sensual and kinaesthetic sensations involved with the image of self in 
order to enhance the vividness of the image. Before they undertake any tasks 
involving this type of imagery, dancers are reminded that they must relax the body 
and mind to ensure that extraneous thoughts do not disrupt the imagery. They are 
encouraged to imagine in real time and therefore motionless blind sensing should 
take as long as the actual physical rehearsal of the movement. 
In addition, dancers are trained to understand that 'different visual imagery 
perspectives may be desirable for different tasks' (Hardy et aL, 2001, p. 42) and that 
they should therefore use internal and external outlooks. An internal outlook requires 
the dancer to create images from a first-person viewpoint and have an 
'approximation of the real life phenomenology'; the dancer actually imagines being 
inside his or her body and experiencing those sensations which might be expected in 
the actual situation (Mahoney and Avener, 1977, p. 137). An external outlook 
requires the dancer to view himself or herself from the perspective of an external 
observer, and so create images from a third-person viewpoint. The use of both 
internal and external outlooks can increase the quality of an image. 
77 Note that Gould and Damaýian list many more conditions than those listed here. Only the ones 
deemed to be relevant to this research have been included. For a comprehensive list see Gould and 
Damaýian (1996, pp. 32-3). 
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Self-talk 
Another cognitive control strategy commonly used by athletes is self-talk which 
helps them to control their attention and subsequently their performance. Bunker et 
al. state that self-talk is 'the key to cognitive control' (1993, p. 226). The concept 
underlying this strategy is that 'behaviour can be modified by means of specific 
forms of external and internal talking' (Hackfort and Schwenkmezger, 1993, p. 335), 
where external means spoken out loud and internal means inside the head. 
Self-talk is often used by athletes in association with verbal persuasion or self- 
coaching, when athletes tell themselves that they are capable of succeeding. It is also 
used to initiate -positive thinking, and much research has been undertaken to explore 
the notions of changing negative thoughts to positive ones and reframing these 
thoughts. Experiments have shown that this type of self-talk has positive effects on 
the athlete's performance; for example, Gould, Eklund and Jackson (1992) report 
that self-talk is a common technique for nurturing optimistic expectations and 
focussing attention for Olympic wrestlers. According to Williams and Leffmgwell 
(1996), self-talk has many benefits and can be used to correct bad habits which have 
become automatic, build self-confidence, increase efficacy, maintain exercise 
behaviour and help athletes reach an optimal emotional state. 
All of these benefits are associated with having control over the direction of 
attention. The Dance Consciousness Model has adopted a technique similar to self- 
talk, its predominant purpose within the model and the intrattentive training being 
that of controlling and directing dancers' attention in order to access an intrattentive 
state of consciousness. For the purpose of this research and in the context of the 
Dance Conscious Model, this technique has been termed verbal report. Dancers are 
taught to provide a verbal report, first externally and then internally, and dance 
concurrently. The subjects of this report are the self and the movement being 
executed by self, and the report is used to ensure that intrattention is maintained and 
not interrupted by any extraneous thoughts. 
Even whilst using verbal report, dancers may occasionally find that their mind 
wanders. During the intrattentive training, dancers are encouraged to use a higher 
order state of intrattention alongside the fundamental state that is being accessed 
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through the verbal report. The subject of the fundamental state is the self, the subject 
of the higher order state is the fundamental state. The higher order state can therefore 
be used to monitor the verbal report and ensure that it remains constant and effective. 
In sport psychology, specific techniques have been created to teach athletes to use 
'thought stopping' as a 'cue to interpret unwanted thoughts as they occur' (Gill, 
2000, p. 179). One such technique commonly used by athletes is 'quickly and clearly 
[to] say (or yell), stop! as soon as [an] unwanted thought comes into [the] mind' 
(ibid). Another is to 'use visual cues (e. g. visualising a red stoplight) or physical 
cues (e. g. snapping the fingers)' (ibid. ). Dancers are taught these techniques in the 
intrattentive training. The technique which the dancer chooses on a given occasion 
depends on the means of access being used. For example, whilst verbally reporting, 
dancers often use a verbal cue, but whilst using motionless blind sensing dancers 
often use a visual cue. 
Broad/narrow and internal/external focus 
Verbal report, in which the subject is the self, is particularly effective whilst a dancer 
is working as a solo, but not as effective whilst working as part of a duet or a group. 
In the latter instance, the verbal report must accommodate self and other(s). Within 
sport psychology, there is little research into how self-talk can be effective within 
group situations; most of the current research seems to be concerned. with the 
individual. The Dance Consciousness Model and intrattentive training teach dancers 
the difference between using verbal report as a solo and as a group activity as it is 
essential to ensure that intrattentive consciousness directed towards self differs from 
an intrattentive consciousness directed towards self and other(s). 
Nideffer's (1976) model of attention supports the idea that 'varying combinations of 
attentional width and direction are appropriate for varying activities' and use of 'the 
appropriate attentional focus can enhance performance' (Gill, 2000, p. 60) and thus it 
comprises two dimensions: width and direction. According to Gill: 
Width ranges from narrow to broad; narrow and broad attention focus 
on a limited and wide range of cues, respectively [and] direction shifts 
on a continuum from an internal focus on one's own thoughts and 
feelings to an external focus on objects and events outside of the body. 
(ibid. ) 
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It is of common consensus that 'most activities require shifting of attention' (ibid 
p. 6 1). For example: 
The soccer goalie might use a broad-extemal focus in preparing for a 
shot, shift to a narrow-external focus to make the save, and perhaps 
use some broad-internal analysis to set up the shift to the offence. 
(Gill, 2000, p. 61) 
Hardy, Jones and Gould also note the significance of being able to shift between 
states: 'the performer's ability to switch attention from one stimulus to another ... is 
particularly important'; 'of particular interest is how elite performers are able to 
switch rapidly from one style to another' and how 'they have developed this 
attentional flexibility' (200 1, p. 180-3). Gill warns that using an inappropriate form of 
attention may be detrimental, for example: 
A performer using a broad-internal style might become preoccupied 
with analysis and miss the action. And although a broad-extemal 
focus allows one to take in important information, taking in too much 
irrelevant information may lead to confusion or overreaction. On the 
other hand, an inappropriate narrow-internal focus could lead a 
performer to miss relevant external information. 
(2000, p. 61) 
Nideffer's (1976) model of attention was of use during the formulation of the 
intrattentive strand. In the intrattentive training dancers are encouraged to experiment 
with the width and direction of their intrattention. They are taught that the width and 
direction are dependent on the nature, structure and form of the dance, for example in 
terms of the number of dancers involved or other external factors such as music or 
set. Each dance is different in terms of structure and form and therefore each dance 
necessitates an independent examination of whether it requires narrow or broad, and 
internal or external focus. For example: dancing a solo may require a narrow-internal 
focus; dancing interactively as a duet or part of a group may require a broad-external 
focus; dancing a solo as part of a group may require a narrow-external focus. 
In some performances, a dancer may need to shift between dancing as a solo and 
dancing as part of a duet or group and vice versa. Consider an example in which 
dancer A performs a repetitive solo with narrow-intemal intrattention. The cue for 
dancer A to finish the solo is the entrance of dancer B. If dancer A's intrattentive 
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focus is too narrow and internal, it is possible that he or she will not notice the 
entrance of dancer B and subsequently miss the cue. It is therefore essential that the 
dancer is equipped with the ability to broaden or narrow and externalise or internalise 
the conscious attention, and shift between intrattentive states. For the purposes of this 
research and the intrattentive training, this has been termed intrattentive flexibility. 
During the training, dancers are encouraged to gain an understanding of the different 
types of intrattention. They are given exercises in which they are directed to explore 
actively moving from working as a solo to working in a duet or a group. 
Mover/observer transition exercises, as discussed in the previous section on the 
Feldenkrais Method, are also used in order to assist dancers with their ability to shift 
focus. 
Summary of the contribution of sport psychology to the intrattentive strand and 
training 
In the formulation of the intrattentive strand and training, some of the principles and 
techniques used in sport psychology were taken into consideration. These techniques 
were then adapted and integrated into the model and the training, with an awareness 
of how they can be transferred effectively from the training, into choreography, 
rehearsal and performance. Gill notes the importance of this transition in sport 
psychology: 
The transition from the ... lab to the playing field can 
be a big leap. 
Exercises that incorporate some of these focusing techniques in the 
actual sport or exercise setting are likely to be more effective than 
exercises that do not have transitional steps to tie the skills to the 
activity. 
(2000, p. 176) 
The extracted principles and techniques are surnmarised below: 
The ability to control attention and concentration is of high importance within 
sport psychology and the intrattentive training, in which dancers are taught to 
utilise psychological and cognitive skills in order to access intrattentive states. 
Dancers use simulation training in the form of motionless blind sensing in order to 
access and maintain intrattention. They are taught bow to employ some cognitive 
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control strategies, similar to those used by athletes, such as attentional. cues and 
triggers, electrodermal feedback and personalised performance rituals. 
e Imagery is used in some of the intrattentive means of access. Dancers are 
encouraged to consider the instructions identified by Gould and Damaijian (1996, 
p. 32) and are to recreate sensual and kinaesthetic sensations, relax their bodies 
and minds, prevent extraneous thoughts, imagine in real time and use internal and 
extemal outlooks. 
9 Verbal report is usqd in the intrattentive strand, as a -form of self-talk, and involves 
the dancer literally describing the dance whilst executing it in order to access an 
intrattentive state. 
e Dancers learn how to access a higher order state of intrattention so that they can 
monitor the fundamental state. Whilst in the higher order state, they are able to 
implement specific thought-stopping techniques, similar to those used by athletes, 
in order to stop the mind becoming distracted. 
* Attentional flexibility is a key component within sport Psychology, as is 
intrattentive flexibility within the Dance Consciousness Model. Dancers are 
taught that the width and direction of intrattention is dependent on the nature, 
structure and fonn of the dance. 
Visual and verbal processing theories 
The idea of controlling consciousness is inextricably linked to that of mental 
processing; the methods, or means of access, of the practices anct theories discussed 
thus far in this chapter all bear some relation to visual and verbal processing. For 
example, the Feldenkrais Method and simulation training, which were the inspiration 
for physical observation and blind sensing, both require visual processing, and self- 
talk, which was the inspiration for verbal report, requires verbal processing. 
During the formulation of the intrattentive strand and the intrattentive training, an 
understanding of visual and verbal processing was therefore essential. Although the 
relevant visual and verbal processing theories do not present actual means of access 
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to intrattentive states, and do not deal with dance, they were nevertheless deemed to 
be of use in terms of their contribution in relation to understanding the mental 
processing involved. 
The act of visual and verbal processing is referred to as visual and verbal thinking, or 
the inner eye and inner voice, by cognitive psychologists such as Paivio (1986), the 
visuo-spatial scratch pad and articulatory loop by mnemonic researchers such as 
Gross and McIlveen (1998) and mental imagery and self talk by sports psychologists 
such as Gill (2000). Indeed, many practices explicitly use similar theories involving 
visual and verbal processing. The Dance Consciousness Model is concerned with 
visual and verbal processing in terms of the role it plays within the means of access 
used in the intrattentive strand - physical observation, blind sensing and verbal 
report. The two most relevant theories are the Dual Coding Theory, which is based in 
psychology, and a theory used in memory research. 
The Dual Coding Theory 
Psychologist Paivio (1986) formulated the Dual Coding Theory (DCT), which 
describes how the mind processes and stores information. The DCT places equal 
significance on verbal and non-verbal processes. The theory can be applied to many 
cognitive phenomena and has been used in mnemonics, the study of intelligence and 
educational psychology. 
Paivio states that: 
Human cognition is unique in that it has become specialized for 
dealing simultaneously with language and with non-verbal objects and 
events. 
(1986ý p. 53) 
The human language system is distinctive in that it deals absolutely with linguistic 
input and output, either in the form of speech or writing, whilst simultaneously 
performing a symbolic function in relation to non-verbal objects, events, and 
behaviours. Cooper provides the following example: 
One can think of a house by thinking of the word "house", or by 
forming a mental image of a house. The verbal and image systems are 
connected and related, for one can think of the mental image of the 
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house and then describe it in words, or read or listen to words and then 
form a mental image. 
(2004)78 
The DCT argues that there are two cognitive subsystems which process knowledge 
simultaneously. One of these subsystems, the visual subsystem, is dedicated to the 
representation of non-verbal objects, events and processes and it stores images and 
pictorial information. The other subsystem, the verbal subsystem, is dedicated to 
language and processes and stores linguistic information. Paivio also describes two 
different types of representation units within these subsystems. These are defined as 
imagens and logogens. Imagens are the representational unit for mental images and 
logogens for verbal entities. According to Cooper, 'imagens operate synchronously 
or in parallel' (2004), 79 meaning that they appear as complete images inside the head 
and are instantly accessible. On the other hand 'logogens operate sequentially' 
(ibid. ), meaning that they do not appear as a complete whole. Instead 'words come 
one at a time in a syntactically appropriate sequence in a sentence' (ibid. ). The 
imagens and logogens serve very different purposes and function within the discrete 
visual and verbal subsystems. 
Memory research 
Within mnemonics, a similar differentiation is made between the two different 
subsystems that are used for processing or, in the context of memorising, for storing 
and recalling information. Memory researchers, such as Gross and McIlveen, refer to 
the 'articulatory loop' which is 'a verbal rehearsal loop' (1998, p. 239). The 
articulatory loop is comparable with Paivio's verbal subsystem. The loop can be 
used, for example, when '[one tries] to remember a telephone number for a few 
seconds by saying it to [oneselfl' and 'it is also used to hold words [one is] preparing 
to speak aloud' (ibid. ). In common with Paivio's logogen representational units, the 
articulatory loop uses articulatory code, sometimes referred to as an acoustic 
representation, 'in which information is represented as it would be spoken' (ibid. ). 
For these reasons it is sometimes referred to as 'the inner voice' (ibid 
Memory researchers also refer to 'the visuo-spatial scratch pad' (ibid. ), which is 
comparable with Paivio's visual subsystem. The visuo-spatial scratch pad also 
78 http: //www. konnections. net/lifecircies/paivio. htm 
79 http: //www. konnections. net/lifecircles/paivio. htm 
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rehearses information, but it 'deals with visual and/or spatial information' (ibid. ). It 
is used, for example, when 'we drive along a familiar road, approach a bend, and 
think about the road's spatial layout beyond the bend' (ibid. ). Similar to the imagen 
representational units defined by Paivio, the visuo-spatial scratch pad uses a visual 
code, which represents 'information in the form of its visual features such as size, 
shape and colour' (Gross and McIlveen, 1998, p. 239). It is sometimes referred to, 
especially by philosophers, as the inner eye. 
Visual versus verbal: Visual imprints and internal monologues 
Different people use their verbal subsystem/articulatory loop and their visual 
subsystern/visuo-spatial scratch pad to different degrees. Some people claim to think 
in words, meaning that they speak or hear words inside the mind. Others claim to 
think in images, meaning that they actually see images inside the mind. Atkinson et 
aL state that 'there are innumerable stories about scientists and artists producing their 
most creative work through visual thinking' (1996, p. 323) and indeed: 
Albert Einstein ... said he rarely thought in words; rather, he worked 
out his ideas in terms of more or less clear images which can be 
voluntarily reproduced and combined. 
(ibid. pp. 322-3) 
Yet others claim to think in both words and images. One simple exercise which can 
help individuals to determine which subsystem and representational units they use is 
as follows: 
When you look up a phone number and retain it until you have dialled 
it, in what form do you represent the digits? Is the representation 
visual -a mental picture of the digits? Is it acoustic - the sounds of 
the names of the digits? 
(ibid. p. 260) 
Although people often prefer either visual or verbal representation, it is of common 
consensus amongst psychologists and memory researchers, such as Atkinson et al., 
that different systems are useful for different tasks. For example: 
When a person must store non-verbal items (such as pictures that are 
difficult to describe and therefore difficult to rehearse acoustically), 
the visual code becomes more important. 
(ibid. p. 260-1) 
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Similarly, regardless of whether a person has a preference for visual representation, 
there are undoubtedly times when verbal representations, or the 'acoustic code', are 
more appropriate. In addition, there is some evidence that both visual and verbal 
representation can be used simultaneously in the processing of information, although 
quite often one is more dominant than the other. It is this connection between the two 
systems that allows the dual coding of information - which is one of the principles 
underlying Paivio's DCT. Another is that recall and recognition can be enhanced by 
presenting information in both visual and verbal form, as using two types of 
representation simultaneously can be more effective in terms of mental processing. 
It is evident, then, that humans tend to think in a combination of words and images 
and psychologists consider it essential that any representational theory should 
integrate this dual functionality - which is also incorporated within the Dance 
Consciousness Model. The model and consciousness training therefore encourage 
dancers to use visual and verbal processing through three different means of access, 
two of which deal with visual processing and one which deals with verbal 
processing. 
Within the intrattentive training dancers are taught to report externally and internally 
about their bodies whilst dancing; the purpose of the internal report is to create 
logogens or acoustic code inside their verbal subsystem or articulatory loop. Dancers 
are also taught to observe externally and internally; the purpose of the internal 
observation is to create imagens or visual code inside their visual subsystem or 
visuo-spatial scratch pad. In the context of the Dance Consciousness Model, the 
creating of logogens is referred to as an internal monologue and the creating of 
imagens as a visual imprint. The visual imprints are also created during blind 
sensing. 
Within psychology it is considered that verbal and visual processing can occur 
simultaneously and, as stated earlier and according to the DCT, connecting them in 
this way can improve information processing and recall. The Dance Consciousness 
Model adopts this idea. In the intrattentive training the dancers are taught to use 
physical observation, or blind sensing, and verbal report simultaneously. This 
ensures that the dancer is using visual and verbal processing and thus potentially 
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increasing the ability to access intrattention. The intrattentive strand therefore also 
encourages dancers to access visual imprints combined with internal monologues. In 
the context of the intrattentive strand, connecting visual and verbal processes has 
been termed internal intrattention. 
Summary of the contribution of visual and verbal processing theories to the 
intrattentive strand and training 
Within the formulation of the intrattentive strand, some of the principles underlying 
visual and verbal processing theories assisted with understanding the mental 
processes involved in, for example, the Feldenkrais Method and the method of self- 
talk. This provided a better understanding of the means of access to intrattentive 
states of dance consciousness which, in turn, contributed to the formulation of the 
intrattentive strand and training. A summary of the principles extracted from the 
visual and verbal processing theories is provided below: 
Integrated within the intrattentive strand is a sense of dual functionality, and equal 
significance is placed on verbal and non-verbal processing as advocated, for 
example, by the DCT. The intrattentive strand therefore assumes that there are 
two cognitive subsystems which can be used when accessing intrattention. 
Through using physical observation or blind sensing, dancers are encouraged to 
create visual imprints, which are comparable with imagens. By using verbal 
report, dancers are able to create internal monologues, which are comparable with 
logogens. These visual imprints and internal monologues are used to create 
intrattentive states of dance consciousness. 
Dancers are taught that, although they may have a preference for either the visual 
or verbal means of access, different means of access are useful for different tasks. 
For example, head movement cannot be observed physically by self and verbal 
report is therefore the appropriate means of access to be used. 
Dancers are taught that using two means of access simultaneously allows the dual 
coding of information, which may be more effective in the accessing of 
intrattention. 
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Intraftentive training and the intrattentive strand of the Dance 
Consciousness Model 
Having discussed somatic practices, sport psychology and visual and verbal 
processing theories - all of which were taken into consideration in the intrattentive 
strand - this chapter now describes the exact nature of both the intrattentive training 
and the intrattentive strand of the model. 
Intrattentive training 
During the intrattentive training, through a series of three workshops, dancers are 
taught how to access intrattention. They learn to use a fundamental state of 
intrattention which is directed towards self and a higher order state of intrattention. 
which is directed towards the fundamental intrattentive state. 
Fundamental intrattention 
The training for accessing a fundamental state of intrattention involves learning how 
to use three different means of intrattentive access: 
e Intrattentive verbal report; 
Intrattentive physical observation; 
Intrattentive blind sensing. 
Various dance components are explored during the training and dancers are taught to 
use the means of access whilst: 
" Improvising - within both free and structured improvisation; 
" Choreographing material; 
" Learning material - which has been choreographed by another dancer or the 
choreographer; 
Teaching material - to another dancer; 
Rehearsing material; 
* Perfonning. 
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Dancers are also trained to use the means of access whilst working as a: 
Solo; 
9 Duet; 
* Group. 
At the beginning of each workshop, dancers are required to participate in a warm-up 
which embraces the means of access and therefore prepares both the mind and the 
body. During the workshops the dancers are asked to access intrattention only for 
short periods of time initially. These timd periods are gradually increased in Ouration, 
until dancers can eventually access the state for an hour or more. 
Higher order intrattention 
The higher order state is used to monitor the fundamental intrattentive state and 
ensure that it does not become affected by non-intrattention. Whilst in the higher 
order state, dancers use specific thought-stopping techniques in order to prevent the 
mind from becoming distracted. The techniques used may be visual, verbal or 
physical, depending on the fundamental means of access. 
Training dancers to use a higher order state involves providing them with an 
understanding of the nature of the state and encouraging a heightened sense of 
awareness. It may take some time for a dancer to begin to experience a heightened 
state of intrattention in conjunction with the fundamental state. In the first workshop, 
for example, a dancer may unintentionally stop attending to self and the mind may 
wander, allowing non-intrattention to affect the intrattention. Without the presence of 
the higher state, the dancer may fail to notice this intruding non-intrattention. It is 
therefore the responsibility of the choreographer or trainer to inform the dancer of 
this failure and encourage him or her to reflect on the experiential sensation of the 
occurrence - the way in which the choreographer or trainer is able to detect this is in 
the discussion about the methods of examination described in Chapter 3. Equipped 
with this new experiential understanding, the dancer is ready to begin to access a 
heightened state of intrattention in subsequent workshops. 
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Intrattentive stimuli 
It is essential that all intrattentive states have a direct object of attention or stimulus. 
In the intrattentive training, the principal object of attention is the dancing self 
Whilst using any of the three means of access within a solo, the dancer is attending 
absolutely to the dancing self. This includes the actual movements and the 
experiential sensation of the movements. Whilst using any of the three means of 
access within a duet or group, the dancer is attending absolutely to the dancing self 
and dancing other. This includes the actual movements executed by self and other, 
and the experiential sensation of the movements. Although the direct object of 
attention must be the dancing self or dancing self and other, it is possible to broaden 
the intrattention slightly to accommodate other stimuli which are related directly to 
the dancing self or other, for example the music, props or set. Allowing intrattention 
to broaden in this way must not be allowed to cause the direct intrattention to drift 
away from the dancing self or other. 
Dancers are trained to execute intrattentive flexibility, which allows them to control 
the direction of their intrattention and shift effectively between the various stimuli. 
Through intrattentive flexibility, dancers are able to broaden or narrow and 
internalise or externalise their intrattention. Dancers are taught that the width and 
direction of intrattention is dependent on the nature, structure and form of the dance. 
Intrattentive flexibility is absolutely essential to ensure that the intrattentive dancer is 
efficient not only when dancing individually, but also when dancing with others. 
During training, dancers are provided with exercises which help them to * 
explore 
actively the shift from working as a solo to working as a duet or a group. 
Mover/observer exercises which act as transitions between attending to self, and 
attending to self and other(s), are also used in order to assist dancers in this respect. 
Intrattentive verbal report 
Intrattentive verbal report requires the dancer to talk about what the dancing 
self/other is doing, whilst actually doing it. Dancers are taught to recognise the 
difference between pre-, post- and present-report. The nature of pre-report is that it 
occurs pre-movement, and so the dancer is essentially describing a movement and 
then executing it. The effect of this is that, whilst the dancer may have been 
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intrattentive prior to the execution of the movement whilst delivering the pre-report, 
it is possible that they may become non-intrattentive whilst actually executing the 
movement, as they have no direct means of access to the intrattention. When a 
dancer intrattentively post-reports, they are executing the movement and then, 
providing a report and, again, may not have access to intrattention during the actual 
execution of the movement. The desirable intrattentive verbal report therefore has a 
present-centred nature. Dancers are taught to report precisely whilst executing the 
movement, thus allowing an intrattentive execution. Once mastered, this present- 
report is used throughout the intrattentive training and in the application of the 
intrattentive strand. 
Dancers learn to recognise the difference between the three types of report by 
experimentation and practice. In the first training workshop, dancers are asked to 
stand in a circle and each is asked, in turn, to execute one movement or one short 
movement phrase. On the first occasion, they are asked to report and then execute, on 
the second to execute and then report and on the third to report and execute 
simultaneously. This exercise gradually develops so that, eventually, the dancers are 
able to improvise using the three different types of report. This physical 
experimentation gives dancers the opportunity to experience and understand the 
different reports and to appreciate that the present-report is the most effective method 
of accessing non-intrattention. 
What to talk about? 
The verbal report consists of descriptions of the dance, including the actual 
movements being executed and the experiential sensations involved. The dancer may 
therefore, for example, describe the shape, size, dynamic, pace, quality and 
kinaesthetic sensation of the movement. In addition, the dancer may attend to the 
movement's structure and form in relation to the overall phrase or dance and whether 
the movement makes up part of a motif, is a repetition or is a development of a motif. 
When working with verbal report, it is initially common for dancers to slow their 
movements down in order to provide a detailed report for each movement. The idea 
of full-body integration is promoted, which encourages awareness that the whole 
body is involved in each movement. With this in mind, dancers often become 
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anxious about neglecting a body part and find it difficult to understand how it is 
possible, for example, to describe every body part involved in a jump in the time it 
takes to do the jump. Dancers are reassured that they are not expected to report 
verbally on every body part whilst executing every movement, but that they should 
have an intrattentive state directed towards the full body. Any confusion is overcome 
by taking the following steps: 
Firstly, dancers are taught that each time they rehearse a specific movement, such 
as a jump, they should attend to a different body part involved in the movement. 
By the time they perform the jump, each body part has been attended to at some 
point during the rehearsal process. 
Secondly, dancers are reminded that, whilst reporting on one body part, they are 
often still aware of another body part. The verbal report is simply a means of 
focussing their intrattention and it does not need to encompass the entire content 
of the intrattention. 
9 Thirdly, as the dancers become more proficient at using verbal report, it is 
acceptable for them to create their own verbal language and to create their own 
terms which incorporate an awareness of numerous different body parts. 80 
Intrattentive physical observation 
Intrattentive physical observation requires the dancer to observe visual stimuli, which 
are the dancing self or dancing self and dancing other, whilst dancing. Through 
intentional and analytical observation, the dancer's attention becomes directed 
entirely towards his or her body, thus creating a state of intrattention. It is essential 
that the observation is physical, meaning that it must be an active observation. The 
dancer is taught to position the body in order to observe actively every detail of the 
dancing self or the dancing other(s). 
80 Examples of dancers using intrattentive verbal report whilst improvising, choreographing and 
learning material as a solo and duet can be found in Chapters 2 and 7 and Chapters II to 17 of the 
DVD which accompanies this thesis. 
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The dancers are taught the difference between observing passively and actively. For 
example, dancers are asked to observe one arm. They have the option of merely 
looking at their arm and passively receiving the image of it, or they can observe their 
arm attentively and increase their awareness of every detail such as the shape, size, 
movement and kinaesthetic sensation of the arm. Through observing actively, it is 
possible to objectify the arm so that it appears almost as if it is distinct from the 
body. This active and physical observation provides dancers with a means of access 
to an intrattentive state of consciousness. The use of only passive observation is less 
likely to result in the ability to access intrattention and it is more likely that non- 
intrattention is directed towards the arm. Taking this example one step fin-ther, the 
use of physical observation allows dancers to objectify their entire body and gain the 
ability to view the dancing self as if from a third-person perspective. In conjunction 
with attention being directed towards the kinaesthetic sensation of the dancing self, 
this allows the dancer to access thoroughly an intrattentive dance consciousness. 
What to observe? 
Bearing in mind that the intrattentive strand promotes full body integration, dancers 
are trained to work methodically through the different body parts, irrespective of 
whether each part is directly involved in the execution of a particular movement, 
whilst using physical observation. One simple way for the dancers to practise is 
simultaneously to walk and to observe physically. The choreographer or trainer 
directs this task by initially instructing the dancers to observe one foot whilst they 
walk, then to observe their lower leg, followed by their upper leg and so on. This 
observation must be made from every possible angle so that, by the time the dancers 
reach the top of the body, each body part has been attended to. This ensures that the 
dancers have accessed a wholly intrattentive dance consciousness. As in the verbal 
report training, the dancers are reminded that, even if they are not physically 
observing a body part, it does not mean that they need not be intrattending it. 
81 
81 Examples of dancers using intrattentive physical observation whilst improvising, choreographing 
and learning material as a solo and duet can be found on Chapters 3 and 8 and Chapters II to 17 of the 
DVD which accompanies this thesis. 
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Intrattentive blind sensing 
Physical observation allows dancers to create realistic and detailed visual imprints of 
the moving body which enable them to engage in motionless blind sensing and 
rehearse the movement mentally. Without the initial observation of the body, the 
visual imprints created during blind sensing may be inaccurate and may prohibit a 
genuine connection between the dancing body and the dancing mind, which in turn 
may affect the quality of the intrattention. 
Following the motionless blind sensing, dancers are asked to rehearse the. movement 
using motion blind sensing. Motion blind sensing involves the dancer physically 
rehearsing the movement with eyes closed and, whilst doing so, the dancer is able to 
see his or her body move clearly inside the mind just as an observer sees it moving. 
When the dancer uses motion blind sensing effectively, it is possible to perform the 
movement as precisely as with eyes open in terms of the movement itself, the 
temporal quality of the movement and the spatial orientation. 
In Empirical Project 1, which comprised the exploratory workshops for the 
formulation of the intrattentive strand and training, dancers became so competent at 
using motion blind sensing in a group that they were able to improvise across the 
room with eyes closed and locate each other immediately because they were so 
intrattentively aware of self and other(s). In addition, during Empirical Project 1, and 
as part of a formal theatre performance in front of an audience, two dancers 
improvised together whilst motion blind sensing for half an hour. In this time the 
dancers moved with contact and apart from each other with complete intrattention, 
and behaved exactly as if they could see each other. Both dancers claimed that the 
key to this performance was spending time prior to the performance intensively and 
physically observing each other whilst improvising, and then maintaining clear visual 
imprints throughout the performance. 
How to create visual imprints? 
In order to sustain a state of intrattention it is vital that the dancer maintains visual 
imprints whilst blind sensing. Maintaining imprints is a more complex process than 
maintaining verbal report for the simple reason that it is so internal. Having to talk 
out loud whilst dancing puts dancers under the pressure of keeping the report 
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continuous, as otherwise it is instantly recognisable from a third-person perspective. 
Whilst using blind sensing, the dancer has only self with whom to contend and, 
should the mind wander away from the visual imprints of the dancing self or dancing 
other, only the dancer will know. In some instances, with the absence of a higher 
order state of intrattention, even the dancer may not detect the lapse in intrattention 
directed towards the dance. Dancers are therefore exposed continually to blind 
sensing tasks to ensure that they have plenty of practice. They are also given a list of 
guidelines which assist with the efficacy of their blind sensing: 
" Precede any blind sensing task with relaxing the body and mind; 
" Recreate all the sensual and kinaesthetic sensations involved with the movement; 
" Imagine in real time; 
" Use external and internal outlooks; 
" Use attentional cues and triggers; 
0 Use electrodermal feedback. 82 
All three intrattentive means 
Dancers are trained initially to use the three means of access independently and are 
likely to develop a preference towards one particular means of access, which tends to 
be the one that they generally find most effective. Within Empirical Project 1, 
although each dancer did have a preference about the means of access, they 
acknowledged that different means of access were more effective for different tasks 
and circumstances. It is important that the dancer discover these preferences fairly 
quickly and gain some control over the way in which they access an intrattentive 
dance consciousness. 
After this initial training, dancers are taught to use more than one means of access at 
a time, for example verbal report and physical observation or verbal report and blind 
sensing. It is possible to use only two means of access simultaneously; it would, of 
course, be impossible to use physical observation and blind sensing concurrently. 
82 Examples of dancers using intrattentive blind sensing whilst improvising as a solo and duet can be 
found on Chapters 4 and 9 of the DVD which accompanies this thesis. Various other chapters, for 
example Chapters 12,14 and 16, also illustrate the use of motion and motionless blind sensing within 
the choreographic and rehearsal process. 
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One could, however, use verbal report and physical observation and then use verbal 
report and blind sensing, thus using all three means of access. 
Dancers may have already engaged in combining means of access prior to reaching 
this part of the training. During Empirical Project 1, for example, dancers who had a 
preference over verbal report quite often claimed that they used it during motionless 
blind sensing. When using more than one means of access to access an intrattentive 
dance state, the means of access is entitled external intrattention. 
The training helps dancers to recognise for themselves which means of access, or 
which combination, is most effective for a particular task. During Empirical Project 
1, the dancers agreed that having all three means of access available to them, but not 
necessarily using two simultaneously, was the most effective means of accessing 
intrattention. 83 
Three intrattentive states 
Dancers are taught to use some of the means of access internally - for example 
verbally reporting inside the head - as well as externally. Training in the use of 
intrattentive verbal report, intrattentive physical observation, intrattentive blind 
sensing and external intrattention enables dancers to access an external state of 
intrattention. Training in the use of intrattentive internal report, intrattentive internal 
observation and internal intrattention enables them to access an internal state of 
intrattention. Dancers are encouraged to master external means of access before 
moving on to internalise the means of access. Using external and internal means of 
access to an intrattentive dance state allows the dancer's mind and body to 
experience and understand how it feels to be in an intrattentive state of dance 
consciousness. Having gained this understanding, dancers are trained to maintain 
access to the state without actually using the means of access. Dancers are therefore 
asked to experience the state kinaesthetically; which is termed kinaesthetic 
intrattention. 
93 Examples of dancers using external intrattention whilst improvising, choreographing and learning 
material as a solo and duet can be found on Chapters 5,6 and 10 and Chapters II to 16 of the DVD 
which accompanies this thesis. 
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The external and internal intrattention are therefore the means of access to the 
kinaesthetic intrattention. Once the dancer's mind has achieved that intrattention, it is 
present to just experience. Although the external and internal means are of immense 
use within the training, they are not necessarily appropriate for a performance. It is 
for this reason that dancers are trained to exist kinaesthetically within the 
intrattentive state that they have achieved through a process of intrattentive training. 
Kinaesthetic intrattention is the target state of the intrattentive training and 
intrattentive strand. It may take some time initially for dancers to reach the 
kinaesthetic state; with continual exposure, however, dancers should become 
accomplished in all three states by the end of the intrattentive training. Table 5 
summarises the three different intrattentive states. 
Table 5: Three intrattentive states 
Means of access: Achieved through: 
State 1: 0 Intrattentive verbal report Verbal stimuli 
External intrattention 
- Intrattentive physical Visual stimuli 
observation 
9 Intrattentive, blind sensing Visual stimuli 
State 2: 0 Intrattentive internal report Internal monologue 
Internal intrattention 
- Intrattentive internal 0 Visual imprints 
observation 
State 3: 
Kinaesthetic 
intrattention 
Intrattentive training summary 
The intrattentive training involves training dancers to: 
* Access an intrattentive dance state whilst improvising, choreographing, leaming, 
teaching, rehearsing and performing as a solo, duet or group; 
Access fundamental states of intrattention, directed at the dancing self/other, and 
higher order states of intrattention which can be used to monitor the fundamental 
intrattentive state; 
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9 Use intrattentive flexibility and shift freely between narrow and broad and internal 
and external states of intrattention; 
Understand the importance of continual exposure and of preparing the body both 
mentally and physically through a specific warm-up; 
o Use each of the external means of intrattentive access, verbal report, physical 
observation and blind sensing, in order to achieve an external state of 
intrattention; 
Apply internal means of intrattentive access including internal report and internal 
observation, through the use of internal monologues and visual imprints, in order 
to achieve an internal state of intrattention; 
* Access a kinaesthetic state of intrattention, in which the means of access are no 
longer needed and the dancer is able to exist intrattentively in the dance. 
During the training, the dancers also use the method of examination described in 
Chapter 3. Using this method helps the dancers to examine their experiences and 
ensure effective access to states of intrattention. 
Tables 6,7 and 8 show the structure for each intrattentive training workshop: 84 
Table 6: Intrattentive training: Workshop I 
Task 
number 
Task Means of access 
I Warm up No means 
2 Solo improvisation Pre-movement intrattentive verbal 
report 
84 Only the workshop structures are included here because the workshop descriptions are particularly 
lengthy. A sample intrattentive workshop description can be found in Appendix A. Chapters 2 to 17 
on the DVD which accompanies this thesis provide some examples of dancers applying the 
intrattentive training and the intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model. 
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Task 
number 
Task Means of access 
3 Solo improvisation Post-movement intrattentive verbal 
report 
4 Solo improvisation Present movement intrattentive, verbal 
report 
5 Solo improvisation Intrattentive verbal report 
> intrattentive internal report 
6 Solo set movement and Intrattentive verbal report 
performance > intrattentive internal report 
7 Solo choreography and Intrattentive verbal report 
performance > intrattentive internal report 
8 Mover/observer improvisation Intrattentive verbal report 
9 Duet improvisation Intrattentive verbal report 
10 Duet improvisation Intrattentive verbal report 
> intrattentive internal report 
11 Duet choreography and Intrattentive, verbal report 
performance > intrattentive internal report 
12 Group improvisation Intrattentive verbal report 
> intrattentive internal report 
13 Group choreography and Intrattentive verbal report 
performance 
I 
> intrattentive internal report 
-I 
Table 7: Intrattentive training: Workshop 2 
Task 
number 
Task Means of access 
Warm up Intrattentive verbal report 
2 Solo improvisation Intrattentive physical observation 
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Task 
number 
Task Means of access 
3 Solo improvisation Intrattentive, physical observation 
intrattentive blind sensing 
> intrattentive internal observation 
4 Solo set movement and Intrattentive, physical observation 
performance intrattentive blind sensing 
> intrattentive internal observation 
5 Solo choreography and Intrattentive physical observation 
performance intrattentive, blind sensing 
> intrattentive internal observation 
6 Mover/observer improvisation Intrattentive physical observation / 
intrattentive blind sensing 
7 Duet improvisation Intrattentive physical observation 
8 Duet improvisation Intrattentive physical observation / 
intrattentive, blind sensing 
> intrattentive internal observation 
9 Duet choreography and Intrattentive physical observation 
performance intrattentive blind sensing 
> intrattentive, internal observation 
10 Group improvisation Intrattentive physical observation 
intrattentive blind sensing 
> intrattentive internal observation 
Group choreography and Intrattentive physical observation 
performance intrattentive blind sensing 
> intrattentive internal observation 
Table 8: Intrattentive training: Workshop 3 
Task 
number 
Task Means of access 
I Warm up Intrattentive physical observation 
intrattentive blind sensing 
2 Solo improvisation Infiattentive verbal report and 
physical observation 
3 Solo improvisation External intrattention 
" internal intrattention 
" kinaesthetic intrattention 
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Task Task Means of access number 
4 Solo set movement and External intrattention 
performance > internal intrattention 
> kinaesthetic intrattention 
5 Solo choreography and External intrattention 
performance > internal intrattention 
> kinaesthetic intrattention 
6 Mover/observer improvisation External intrattention 
7 Duet improvisation Intrattentive verbal report and 
physical observation 
8 Duet improvisation External intrattention 
> internal intrattention 
> kinaesthetic intrattention 
9 Duet choreography and External intrattention 
performance > internal intrattention 
> kinaesthetic intrattention 
10 Group improvisation External intrattention 
" internal intrattention 
" kinaesthetic intrattention 
11 Group choreography and External intrattention 
performance > internal intrattention 
I 
> kinaesthetic intrattention 
The intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model 
Having completed the three training workshops, dancers are equipped to use the 
intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model whicb is depicted in Figure 2. 
The intrattentive strand consists of three different phases: choreographic process, 
rehearsal process and performance. Within the choreographic process the dancer uses 
external intrattention. Whether the dancer is improvising, generating material for self 
or another dancer, or learning the choreographer's or another dancer's material, 
external means of access are used in order for the dancer to access an intrattentive 
state. Once the movement has been choreographed, the dancer rehearses it using 
external means of access. Following this the dancer rehearses the material using 
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internal means of access and finally rehearses it using kinaesthetic intrattention. This 
part of the rehearsal process prepares the dancer for the intrattentive performance, as 
this final rehearsal state is the same as the performance state. If the dancer has had 
the necessary training and the intrattentive strand is used effectively, the dancer 
should be able to access a controlled kinaesthetic intrattentive dance consciousness 
during the performance. 
Figure 2: The intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model ft 
SELF GENERATED 4-lo- IMPROVISED 4-10- OTHER GENERATED 
Intrattentive 
choreographic Ddernal 
process intrattention 
------------- ------ -------------------------------------------------- 
Ddernal 
intTattention 
+ 
Intrattentive 
rebearsal Internal 
process intrattention 
Kinaesbetic 
intrattention 
------------- ------ -------------------------------------------------- 
Intrattentive Kinaesbetic 
performance intrattention 
Summary 
Following a thorough consideration of the three practices and theories which 
contributed to the formulation of the intrattentive strand - somatic practices, sport 
psychology and visual and verbal processing theories, this chapter has answered the 
third focussed research question: How can one access the intrattentive dance 
consciousness? 
This chapter has described the intrattentive training that is required for accessing 
intrattention and has also described the process by which the intrattentive strand was 
independently fonnulated and the relevant training programme designed. This 
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training and strand are intended for specific use within the context of the dance 
discipline and the Dance Consciousness Model. It has been explained how the strand 
is applied within choreogaphy, rehearsal and performance in order to create an 
intrattentive dance consciousness. 
Chapter 5 presents the second strand of the model and explains how dancers are able 
to access states of non-intrattention. 
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Chapter 5 
How can one access the non-intrattentive dance 
consciousness? 
Introduction 
In Chapter 3 the Dance Consciousness Model was introduced and it was ascertained 
that the model comprises four strands. This chapter introduces the second strand of 
the model; the non-intrattentive strand, and answers the fourth focussed research 
question: How can one access the non-intrattentive dance consciousness? 
In its most basic form the non-intrattentive strand represents the idea that, in order to 
experience a non-intrattentive performance, the dancer must experience a non- 
intrattentive process, which includes choreography and rehearsal. The way in which 
a dancer is able to access such non-intrattentive experiences is discussed in this 
chapter and, subsequently, an understanding of the non-intrattentive strand of the 
Dance Consciousness Model, and the training that is required in order to utilise the 
strand, can be gained. 
Chapter breakdown 
This chapter begins with a reiteration of the defmition of a non-intrattentive dance 
state which was introduced in Chapter 2. Attention studies, Buddhist Introspection 
and Bodyweather, all of which contributed to the formulation of the non-intrattentive 
strand and the training which precedes its use, are then discussed. These theories and 
practices each have their foundations in three distinct areas. Attention studies and the 
notion of 
Isplitting consciousness come 
from the Western study of psychology; 
Buddhist Introspection comes from the Eastern tradition of Buddhism, and the 
practice of Bodyweather amalgamates both Eastern and Western ideology. 
The comments made in Chapter 4 with reference to the use of such theories and 
practices also apply in this chapter, 85 and thus a certain amount of selectivity, 
85 See Chapter 4, page 112. 
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analysis, interpretation, adaptation and application was essential in order to make use 
of the practices and theories in the formulation of the non-intrattentive strand. 
The account of Buddhist Introspection, in particular, has been dealt with very 
cautiously as it is acknowledged that there may be problems with 'detaching a 
technique from its cultural background' (Pickering, 1999, p. 275): 
Of course, some engagement with meditation practices is possible 
without any commitment to the beliefs and values of the tradition 
from which these practices come [but] it is unlikely ... that they will have the same power to reveal the mind as they do when employed by 
someone who practices them in full knowledge of their wider 
soteriological. significance. 
(ibid. ) 
To 'employ Buddhist practices fully may require a deeper engagement with the 
whole ethos of Buddhism' (ibid. ). 
The account of Buddhist Introspection made in this chapter therefore attempts to 
provide sufficient information for a basic comprehension of the practice but it may 
omit some of the inherent principles and beliefs. This is the case for all of the 
theories and practices discussed in this chapter and each discussion culminates in a 
summary explaining how the practice or theory contributed to the Dance 
Consciousness Model. 
This is followed by a description of the non-intrattentive training, which includes 
how to access fundamental and higher states of non-intrattention, and each non- 
intrattentive training workshop. Finally, the non-intrattentive strand is explained and 
it is clarified how the strand is applied within choreography, rehearsal and 
performance in order to create a non-intrattentive dance consciousness. 
Non-intrattention 
A non-intrattentive state of dance consciousness is: 
A state in which a dancer is purely living and experiencing the dance, without 
thought or knowledge of that experience. The dancer is in a state of unattended 
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consciousness and is awake and engaged in the qualitative experience of the dance, 
but is nonetheless explicitly unaware of what the experience is or what the dancing 
body and mind are doing. Such a state may occur as a result of the dancer having 
become either habituated to the dance or totally involved in the dance, the 
experiential sensation for which is different for the dancing body and mind. 
The non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model provides access to a 
non-intrattentive state of dance consciousness. In order to utilise this strand of the 
model, and subsequently give a non-intrattentive performance, a dancer must initially 
be trained to access states of non-intrattention whilst dancing. 
How is it possible to experience or access non-intrattention? Try now to have a non- 
intrattentive experience. In other words try not to think about anything at all, empty 
your mind and lose awareness of yourself and your surroundings. This seemingly 
simple task is actually very difficult for most people. Of course, one undoubtedly 
experiences numerous non-infriattentive moments each day, but to try purposefully to 
create these moments and experiences is particularly complex. When faced with the 
task of thinking of nothing, often one's immediate response is to think of everything 
and become anxious about what, or what not to think about. If, however, one is 
asked to think hard about something in particular, for example the words on this 
page, then it is likely that one will automatically not think about, for example, the 
temperature in the room or how comfortable the chair is. In this instance, one would 
have created a state of non-intrattention without even realising it. Indeed, if one were 
to realise it then one might instantaneously shift from a non-intrattentive experiential 
state to a reflective state of intrattention and consequently eliminate the non- 
intrattention. 
Once one has directed the attention to the act of focussing intrattentively on 
something in particular, one can then experience everything else non-intrattentively. 
In the above example, one would be accessing a state of intrattention for the purpose 
of thinking about the words on this page, and concurrently accessing a state of non- 
intrattention for everything else but the words on the page. In this case, one would be 
splitting consciousness which, in this instance, seems to be more effective than trying 
only to create a state of non-intrattention. 
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The non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model uses the idea of 
splitting consciousness to enable dancers to access non-intrattention, and thus 
intrattention is an integral part of the non-intrattentive strand. How can splitting 
one's consciousness and introducing intrattention be an effective method for 
enabling a dancer to experience non-intrattention? Is splitting consciousness actually 
possible? The non-intrattentive strand and the non-intrattentive training allow 
dancers to understand how splitting consciousness is possible, and provide the means 
through which dancers can achieve non-intrattention. In order to formulate the non- 
intrattentive training and the non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness 
Model, research was undertaken into existing theories and practices that, in one way 
or another, deal with the experiencing or accessing of non-intrattention. 
Methods for accessing non-intrattention 
Attention studies 
Many theorists associate consciousness with paying attention, and attention studies 
deal with states of consciousness. Crick states that 'consciousness is closely 
associated with attention' (1994, p. 15) and Zeman describes attention as 'the sentry 
at the gate of consciousness' (2001, p. 1274). In common with other theorists, 
Velmans asserts that: 
What is at the focus of our attention enters our consciousness. What is 
outside the focus of attention remains preconscious or unconscious. 
(2000, p. 255) 
Over a century ago, James stated that: 
Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the 
mind, in clear and vivid form, of one of what seem several 
simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, 
concentration, of consciousness are of its essence. it implies 
withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others. 
(1890, pp. 403-4) 
It is this idea of withdrawing 'from some things in order to deal effectively with 
others' that is of interest here. If one is presented with a task which requires complete 
attention in order to execute the task effectively, then one may be withdrawing 
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attention from something else. If this is the case, consciousness could be said to be 
split between the task and the something else. This split would create a state of 
intrattention and a state of non-intrattention, the intrattention being directed towards 
the task and the non-intrattention towards the something else. If the something else 
were the act of dancing, then one would have accessed a non-intrattentive state of 
dance consciousness. It is this notion which connects the non-intrattentive strand of 
the Dance Consciousness Model and the theories presented within attention studies. 
Splitting, consciousness through dual- and multi-tasking 
Attention studies deal with the concept of splitting consciousness through dual- and 
multi-tasking. Gross and McIlveen claim that 'dual task performance' involves 
'divided attention' (1998, p. 219). It is important to note that 'historically and 
critically ... claims about the possibility of splitting consciousness have not fared 
well' (Lyons, 1999, p. 245). Philosophers such as Lyons do not believe that: 
... 
[one] could split fully attentive consciousness into two, whether that 
be for the purpose of engaging in two tasks or two experiences - both 
of which required careful attention. 
(1999, p. 245) 
Despite this, many experiments have been undertaken within studies of attention to 
examine the possibility of splitting consciousness and to assess the effect that dual- 
tasking has on a task, with positive results. 
Experiments in which the subject is asked to read and write simultaneously are fairly 
common. 86 Often the initial outcome is that, Whilst it is possible to direct one's focal 
attention to two discrete tasks, the quality with which the tasks are undertaken is 
lower than if the subject were to perform only one task at once. It appears as if the 
subject is simultaneously directing conscious attention to both tasks. Analysis of 
such experiments indicates, however, that what is in fact occurring is that the subject 
is continually alternating between paying conscious attention, intrattention, with 
paying pre-reflective attention, non-intrattention, to each task in turn. In other words, 
one's consciousness of one of the tasks moves between being very aware of it to 
having a lack of awareness of it. In the above example, therefore, when one pays 
86 See Spclke et al. (1994, pp. 54-63) for a full account on methodology and results. 
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significant attention to the act of reading, the attention to the writing drops, and vice 
versa. 
Lyons describes an experiment which he calls 'the two handed tracing game' (1999, 
p. 245), in which a subject is asked to trace continuously, in an anti-clockwise 
direction, a circle around the top of the head with the right hand. The subject is also 
asked to trace simultaneously, in a clockwise direction, a square around the perimeter 
of the abdomen, with the left hand. Lyons claims that in order to master this task 
'one might attempt to oscillate one's attention rapidly from one task to the other' 
(ibid. ). Similarly, Mangan describes the 'cocktail party effect', in which two 
conversations are in earshot but the listener is unable to attend entirely to both at the 
same moment (1999, p. 251). Mangan also claims that the best that one can do in 
such an instance is to 'shift attention back and forth' (ibid. ). 
Experiments have shown, however, a vast improvement in the ability to master such 
dual-tasking following continual exposure. 87 The non-intrattentive training embraces 
this notion and promotes continual exposure as a key factor in the developing ability 
of a dancer to split attention effectively in order to access a non-intrattentive dance 
state. Over a relatively short period of time, one can become so adept at performing 
two particular tasks, using dual-tasking skills, that the quality with which each task is 
performed is not affected at all. Is this because one is finally able to divide one's 
consciousness equally - as opposed to merely paying attention alternately to each 
task - or because the alternation becomes more rapid? Another possibility is, as 
Lyons claims with reference to the two-handed tracing game, that: 
... [the] best one can do is to render one of the operations automatic ... to withdraw it from the realm of the subject's experiences, so that in 
consequence consciousness is not now split and splintered but directed 
at any one moment to just one of the tasks. 
(1999, p. 245) 
Is it possible, then, in the above example, to reach a point in which one can focus all 
conscious attention on the act of reading, and experience an intrattentive state, and 
concurrently focus no conscious attention to the writing, thus simultaneously 
87 Continual exposure is a term coined for the purpose of this thesis and was discussed in Chapter 4 
with reference to the intrattentive strand. 
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experiencing a non-intrattentive state? In addition, is it possible to do so without an 
adverse effect on quality? 
Mangan's opinion is that, in the case of the cocktail party, the only option is a 'trade- 
off strategy' (1999, p. 251). He explains that if one were to hear both conversations 
simultaneously then one would be able to do so only with 'an intermediate level of 
clarity' as 'when something becomes clear, something else becomes vague [but] the 
sum of articulation remains at least roughly constant' (ibid). According to Gross and 
McIlveen, on the other hand, 'with sufficient practice many processes [can] become 
automatic and make no demand on attention' and 'as skill on a task increases ... less 
capacity is needed' (199 8, pp. 119-20). 
There is much evidence to suggest that it is possible to perform routine tasks with a 
high quality even if one is not intrattentively aware of the task, such as brushing 
one's teeth or driving a car, which suggests that, after sufficient practice, dancing 
non-intrattentively does not necessarily result in a decrease in performance quality. 
The learning of new tasks, for example a new movement sequence, often requires 
much focal attention, but it is possible for this attention to be reduced. During the 
formulation of the non-intrattentive strand in Empirical Project 2 it was discovered 
that it is possible to train a dancer to attend less and less to the experience of dancing 
whilst concurrently maintaining an awareness of another task; for example talking. 
Directing attention 
It is clear that, fundamental to one purposefully experiencing a non-intrattentive state 
whilst dancing is the retention of some control over one's consciousness. In all the 
examples provided above, it is the subject who decides to direct the conscious 
attention. In a dance context, therefore, the dancer is responsible for controlling the 
conscious attention. In doing so, he or she is not merely able to experience a process 
of exchange of consciousness from one task to another, and from intrattention to 
non-intrattention, but can also direct intrattentive consciousness to one particular 
task. This allows another task to be performed completely non-intrattentively. 
The dancer must therefore have access to a method for directing attention, but how 
are 'decisions ... made to channel attention'? (Gross and 
McIlveen, 1998, pp. 220-1) 
and 'how exactly do we direct our attentionT (Atkinson et al., 1996, p. 170). 
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According to Gross and McIlveen, 'humans must selectively attend to only some 
information and somehow tune out the rest' (1998, p. 210) and Atkinson et al. 
suggest that 'the simplest means is by physically reorienting our sensory receptors so 
as to favour those objects' (1996, p. 210). 
What is necessary, together with continual exposure, is a certain amount of will. To 
return to the example of directing attention to the words on this page; try for a 
moment to do so whilst actively willing yourself to complete the task effectively. 
Now try to focus attention on to the words whilst actually willing yourself to look 
away from the words and direct your intrattention on to the chair on which you are 
sitting. It should be clear, from this example, that one's willpower plays a part in the 
efficiency of consciousness control. During the non-intrattentive training, therefore, 
dancers are informed of the purpose of the non-intrattentive strand so that they have 
a clear understanding of the effect of its use on the performance and the dancer. In 
addition, dancers are reminded constantly that, to access non-intrattention whilst 
dancing, they must have the will to access that non-intrattention. 
In the non-intrattentive strand and the training that precedes its use, a further 
condition is necessary. It is of common consensus in studies of attention that the 
more complex a task is the more attention it demands. Simple tasks are subject to 
what Manstead and Semin (1980) describe as open-looped control, which is the 
equivalent of an automatic process, and therefore require attention of a non- 
intrattentive nature. Complex tasks are described as being subject to closed-loop 
control, which is the equivalent to controlled processing, and therefore require 
attention of an intrattentive nature. 
Within the non-intrattentive training, dancers are asked to perform fairly complex 
tasks, which are subject to closed-loop control, to ensure that intrattention is 
achievable. If the task is that dancers are to dance and talk simultaneously, for 
example, the talking must require optimum attention in order to allow the dancing to 
take place non-intrattentively. The verbal element of the task must not merely be a 
recitation of lists or text learned by rote, for example the days of the weeký as this 
may encourage open-loop control and thus non-intrattention. Asking a dancer to hold 
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a conversation or work out a series of multiplications, for example, encourages 
closed-loop control and thus a state of intrattention. 
Summary of the contribution of attention studies to the non-intrattentive strand 
and training 
Within the formulation of the non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness 
Model, some of the principles presented within studies of attention were taken into 
consideration. These are summarised below: 
The idea of splitting consciousness in order to create an experiential state of non- 
intrattention alongside a state of intrattention is fully" acknowledged. The purpose 
of this intrattention is merely to exist - as its subject is not the dance. The 
intrattention is literally the means through which the dancer is able to experience 
non-intrattention. 
e Dancers are asked to perform numerous dual- and multi-tasking exercises. 
Successful completion of the exercises is dependent on the dancers being able to 
direct intrattention to a non dance-related task, such as talking or listening, and 
simultaneously allow their bodies to dance non-intrattentively. These tasks are 
sufficiently complex to warrant closed-loop control and a state of intrattention. 
* Studies of attention have noted that, when first presented with a dual task the 
subject's attention may intuitively oscillate rapidly back and forth. The non- 
intrattentive training, therefore, enforces a process of continual exposure to 
decrease the possibility of switching attention from one task to another. 
In common with the general ideology within studies of attention, the intrattentive 
strand acknowledges the importance of willpower in the directing of 
consciousness. 
Buddhist Introspection 
The mind and consciousness are the principal subjects of Buddhist introspective 
examination. In The View From Within (1999) Wallace supplies a concise account of 
Buddhist tradition which provides insight into the nature of Buddhist Introspection. 
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According to Wallace, within the Buddhist tradition it is of common consensus that 
one's consciousness is located upon a continuum -a factor that was also discussed in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis - which comprises a series of consecutive instances of 
cognition, which may exist in two forms: instances of pure awareness - intrattentive 
states; and instances of awareness that hold non-ascertaining 88 cognition - non- 
intrattentive states (1999, p. 177). 
In Buddhist tradition it is believed that the mind should be trained to connect with 
these states of consciousness and that this is possible through the controlling of 
attention. Wallace describes how Buddha established a series -of techniques for 
stabilising and cultivating one's attention and how, over 2,500 years, Buddhist 
contemplatives have developed such techniques, resulting in the formulation of 
highly complex theories on the mind and on the nature of consciousness (1999, 
p. 176). Buddhist Introspection is one such technique that may be used as a means to 
connect with one's consciousness, and consequently was used as a source of 
reference during the formulation of the Dance Consciousness Model. 
Mindfulness and introspection - accessing intrattention 
Wallace notes that the first task in Buddhist Introspection is to refte conscious 
attention to such a degree that the mind becomes entirely utilitarian (1999, p. 176). In 
doing so one would succeed in maintaining a placid state known as Samatha. This is 
considered as a discipline and according to Wallace the principal objective in the 
fostering of Samatha is the advancing of attentional stability and vividness (ibid. ). 
The aim of Samatha is to focus attention onto a specific image. Other techniques 
which have a similar aim, such as Transcendental Meditation, use a 'mantra', which 
is a sound or phrase without any particular meaning, which is repeated 'until the 
mind becomes absorbed and settles down relaxedly' (Shear and Jevning, 1999, 
p. 193). 
Wallace explains that in Samatha the image may be a physical object such as a 
pebble but, very often, Buddhists use images with a religious significance such as a 
sculpture of Buddha (1999, p. 177). The act of maintaining attention on an object and 
resisting temptation to be distracted away from it is called mindfulness. At the stage 
88 What is intended by the term non-asccrtaining is that, in such a state, objects appear to the 
consciousness but are not reflected on. 
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of the Samatha training at which one feels complete familiarity with the object on 
which one is focussing, one may then advance to the part of the method known as 
reconstructing. One attempts to reconstruct a mental image of the object within the 
mind -a visual imprint - and focus attention completely on to this mental image 
(ibid. p. 17 8). 
According to Wallace, at this point the 'mental perception apprehends the form of 
the pebble by the power of the visual perception of it' (ibid. ). The mind does not 
'apprehend the pebble directly' but rather 'recollects it on the basis of the 
immediately preceding visual perception of that object' (ibid. ). It is thus the task of 
mindfulness to maintain the recollection of the image and to examine it inwardly and 
intrattentively in a way which is comparable to the actual, visual viewing of the 
ob ect. j 
In using the technique, it is not only important to rid consciousness of any non- 
ascertaining attention, but also to ensure that the mind does not surrender 
unintentionally to the hindrances of attentional excitation and attentional laxity. 
Attentional excitation is an 'agitated intentional mental process that follows after 
attractive objects' and it is a 'derivative of compulsive desire' (ibid. p. 176). 
Attentional laxity is an 'intentional mental process' that occurs when 'attention 
becomes slack and the meditative object is not apprehended with vividness and 
forcefulness' (ibid). Introspection, which is a 'type of metacognition that operates as 
the quality control' (ibid p. 178), is therefore essential. Indeed, it is claimed that 'the 
89 antidote for excitation and passivity is introspection' (2005). Thus, whilst the 
mindfulness attends to the image or visual imprint, it is the function of introspection 
to monitor the mindfulness, and track any materialisation of excitation or laxity. 
Within Samatha, therefore, there are two states: mindfulness and introspection. 
It is important to establish why the discipline of Samatha was of use in the 
formulation of the non-intrattentive strand, when both mindfulness and introspection 
clearly promote intrattention. In Samatha, one must attend intrattentively to one 
particular object to the exclusion of everything else and simultaneously monitor this 
attention intrattentively. So, how does one attend to everything else - one's 
89 http: //www. dharmafellowship. org/library/essays/nine-stages-of-abiding. htm#first 
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surroundings, one's emotions and so on? The conscious position of everything else is 
one of non-intrattention. One could suggest, therefore, that in order to become non- 
intrattentive it is vital to become primarily highly intrattentive. This is not a general 
intrattention, however, but a specifically focussed intrattention which can 
simultaneously allow an immense amount of non-intrattention. This seems to be 
consistent with the idea of a dual or split consciousness. 
Within the non-intrattentive strand there are two intrattentive states: a fundamental 
intrattentive state that observes the object, and a heightened intrattentive state that 
observes the act of observing the object. In addition there is a non-intrattentive state 
which is reserved for the dancing. Thus, al though the focus of Buddhist Introspection 
is the state of intrattention and the Samatha, the basic principles of this practice have 
been extracted and adapted for use in the non-intrattentive strand in order to ensure 
that the focus is on the states of non-intrattention. 
In the intrattentive training dancers are initially shown a series of physical images, on 
a television screen for example, to observe intrattentively whilst dancing. Dancers 
are required to attend to the images with intrattentive mindfulness, and to attend to 
the mindfulness with intrattentive introspection. After some time the images are 
taken away. The dancer is required to continue dancing and to recreate the images in 
the form of visual imprints within the mind and to sustain mindfulness and 
introspection, thus maintaining the intrattention. The dancers are therefore trained at 
a first level to use the images externally - which is entitled external non-intrattention 
- and then trained at a second level to use the images internally - which is entitled 
internal non-intrattention. 
This development is necessary for two main reasons. Firstly, within the non- 
intrattentive strand, a third level is introduced in which the dancers are required to 
access kinaesthetic non-intrattention, and this third level is completely dependent on 
the dancer having previously achieved internal non-intrattention. 9' Secondly, it is 
impractical for a dancer to use an external image, such as on a television screen, 
whilst performing; the ability to internalise and reconstruct these images in the form 
of visual imprints is therefore essential. 
90 The terms external, internal and kinaesthetic non-intrattention arc described later in this chapter. 
rl 
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Mindfulness and introspection are developed in Samatha in nine sequential 
attentional states. It is essential that the subject becomes fully accomplished at a state 
before advancing to the next state. An understanding of these states was of use in the 
formulation of the non-intrattentive strand and the three levels introduced above - 
external, internal, and kinaesthetic - and they are therefore described below: 
91 
1. 'Attentional placement' (Wallace, 1999, p. 180) or 'Stabilizing' (2005). 92 Within 
this first state, the subject must endeavour to develop a succession of moments of 
sustained intentional attention. In the early stages of the development of the 
technique, however, it is normal for the subject to be continuously disturbed by 
excitation. Wallace also notes that when the intention is to direct attention to a single 
object, it is common for the mind to roam around compulsively to a greater extent 
than in ordinary situations (1999, p. 180). 
According to the attention studies literature, the capacity for sustained attention is 
particularly limited and it is normal to be able to maintain focussed attention for little 
more than one to three seconds. In addition, experiments have shown that even 
voluntary attention, when one purposefully wishes to attend, cannot be sustained for 
more than a few seconds. It is on the basis of such experiments that James states that 
$no-one can possibly attend consciously to an object that does not change' (1890, 
p. 420). 
It is of common consensus within studies of attention that changing images are more 
likely than unchanging images to require closed-loop control. It is therefore more 
probable that one can sustain attention on a changing image than on a static image. 
Despite this, those who adhere to the Buddhist tradition believe that the ability to 
attend to one static image can be enhanced. The non-intrattentive training, however, 
does not use static images in order to increase the dancer's potential ability to sustain 
intentional attention instead, for example, moving images are presented via a 
television screen. 
91 The nine sequential states are defined in various ways. The following description takes account of 
the states discussed by Wallace in his article 'The Buddhist Tradition of Samatha' (1999, pp. 1 75-187) 
and the states defined in the Dhanna Fellowship Library (2005, 
http: //www. dharmafellowship. org/library/essays/nine-stages-of-abiding. btm#first). 
92 http: //www. dharmafellowship. org/library/essays/nine-stages-of-abiding. btm#first 
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According to Wallace attentional placement takes some time to master, as one needs 
to remain alert continuously and be aware of any impending presence of laxity and 
excitation, although even this is not enough (1999, p. 180). Apparently one must 
additionally take all possible steps to counteract laxity or excitation occurring by 
intervention, effort and immense willpower. Wallace describes how students of 
Samatha are encouraged to undertake many short sessions of attentional placement 
each day; as many as eighteen fifteen-minute sessions are recommended (ibid. ). 
Although the non-intrattentive strand does adopt some of the principles of Buddhist 
Introspection, it is not possible to include as many sessions of attentional placement, 
as the strand must be accessible and fit with some ease into an ordinary 
choreographic process. This does not mean, however, that the non-intrattentive 
strand does not effectively achieve states of intrattention; the training induces 
attentional placement through means additional to the observation of an image. For 
example, dancers are not only asked to observe an image whilst dancing, but also to 
describe the image. Amalgamating two intrattentive tasks in this way requires 
optimum attention to be directed towards the image and increases the possibility of 
attentional placement with an absence of laxity or excitation. This ensures that a 
multitude of training sessions is not essential. 
2. 'Continual placement' (Wallace, 1999, p. 180) or 'Continuous stabilizing' 
(2005). 93 In this second state 'one must use remembrance and watchfulness to 
bring the object of meditation close' (2005, ibid. ). Here one may experience 'brief 
periods of attentional continuity, for up to a minute or so' (Wallace, 1999, p. 18 1), in 
which one's mind does not disengage from the image. The subject may now feel as if 
his or her attention is permanently fixed on the mental image. According to Wallace, 
however, disengagement does occur but it is so brief that the subject believes he or 
she is experiencing attentional continuity (ibid. ). There are also still moments in 
which the image is neglected altogether because other thoughts and sensory 
impressions intervene. As attentional continuity improves, the frequency of the 
sessions may decrease and the duration of the sessions increase. This process is used 
in the non-intrattentive training, with dancers initially being asked to improvise, for 
example, for only a minute at a time and then gradually increasing the time 
93 http: //www. dharmafellowship. org/library/essays/nine-stages-of-abiding. htm#first 
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throughout the training. This ensures that, eventually, dancers can maintain 
attentional continuity for the performance of a whole piece should it be required. 
3. 'Patched placement' (Wallace, 1999, p. 18 1) or 'Habitual stabilization' (2005). 94 In 
the third state, attention is focussed mostly on the image and attentional. continuity 
increases in duration, but occasionally significant excitation still prevails. 
4. 'Close placement' (Wallace, 1999, p. 181) or 'Near stabilization' (2005, ibid. ). In 
this state, attention is fully stabilised and one no longer experiences disengagement 
from the image. 
5. and 6. 'Taming' and 'Pacification' (Wallace, 1999, p. 181) or 'Habituation' and 
'Pacifying' (2005, ibid. ). Attention is tamed and pacified through introspection, 
which the subject uses to monitor the attentional processes. Excitation and laxity no 
longer occur, 'gone also are the other distractions of the inner emotional and mental 
events' (2005, ibid. ) and even the problem of peripheral distractions is surmounted. 
This is the first point within the nine states that introspection is utilised. Throughout 
the non-intrattentive training, dancers are encouraged to use introspection, and a 
higher state of intrattention, with the latter normally becoming more sophisticated as 
progress is made. 
7. and 8. 'Complete pacification' and 'Single pointed attention' (Wallace, 1999, 
p. 182) or 'Thorough pacification' and 'Becoming one-pointed' (2005, ibid. ). A 
genuine desire to achieve these states is essential for their attainment in both 
Buddhist Introspection and the non-intrattentive strand and training. By the eighth 
state the subject should be able to maintain complete stability and vividness - 
intrattention - apparently 'there is no disturbance at all [and] concentration is 
possible for about four hours' (2005, ibid) The mind can now 'remain continually in 
absorption on the object of concentration" (2005), 95 allowing everything else to be 
attended to solely by the non-intrattentive consciousness. 
9. 'Balanced placement' (Wallace, 1999, p. 182) or 'Entrance into Samadhi' (2005, 
ibid. ) By this point, little will or effort is required in order to sustain attentional 
94 http: //www. dharmafellowship. org/library/essays/nine-stages-of-abiding. htm#first 
95 http: //www. dharmafellowship. orgAibrary/essays/nine-stages-of-abiding. htm#first 
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continuity and vividness and one is able to slip instantaneously into the state of 
balanced placement. At 'this stage there is no limit to the length of fixed 
concentration' and according to the 'meditator's feelings, his mind and the object 
become one' (2005, ibid. ). 
Mindfulness and introspection - accessing non-intrattention 
Within Buddhist Introspection and th e non-intrattentive strand, over time one is able 
to embrace intrattention towards a specific image. The non-intrattentive strand, 
however, is ultimately used for the accessing of a non-intrattentive state of dance 
consciousness, not an intrattentive state. One may wonder whether it is absolutely 
necessary for intrattention to play such a large part in the non-intrattentive strand; 
after all, can a dancer really be wholly non-intrattentive whilst simultaneously 
accessing intrattentive states? During the development of the non-intrattentive strand 
of the Dance Consciousness Model, it was found that it is indeed possible for all the 
intrattention to be removed part way through the choreographic process. The 
inspiration for this removal came from the ninth attentional state of Samatha - 
balanced placement. 
According to Buddhist tradition, even when one has accomplished the ninth state, 
'Samatha has still not been fully achieved' (Wallace, 1999, p. 182). In order to attain 
Samatha, a complete reversal must be performed and one 'disengages the attention 
from the previous meditative object' (ibid. ). At this point, attention is withdrawn 
from the physical senses and it becomes entirely internal and non-conceptual and 
apparently "many new and extraordinary experiences come, which have never been 
96 experienced before' (2005). 
In contrast with the process used in all the prior intrattentive states thus far, one is 
now required to release the image and no longer recall it. This results in one's 
consciousness focusing on no object and one exists only in the moment. So, in fact, 
one has absolute and pure non-intrattention. Wallace describes the experience of 
Samatha in the following statement: 
Any thoughts that arise are not sustained, nor do they proliferate; 
rather they vanish of their own accord, like bubbles emerging from 
96 http: //www. dharmafellowship. org(library/essays/nine-stages-of-abiding. htm#first 
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water. One has no sense of one's own body, and it seems as if one's 
mind has become invisible with space. 
(1999, p. 182) 
Sekida describes a similar experience: 
The time comes when no reflection appears at all. One comes to 
notice nothing, feel nothing, hear nothing, see nothing ... But 
it is not 
vacant emptiness. Rather it is the purest condition of our existence. 
(cited in Shear and Jevning, 1999, p. 193) 
The non-intrattentive strand and training adopt a similar reversal, through which a 
dancer is able to experience the dance kinaesthetically with a non-intrattentive state 
of consciousness - this was referred to as the third level earlier in this chapter. The 
process of initially combining intrattention and non-intrattention develops into one in 
which a complete and single experience of non-intrattentive consciousness is 
eventually cultivated. The intrattention, therefore, acts as a means of access to the 
non-intrattention. 
Summary of the contribution of Buddhist Introspection to the non-intrattentive 
strand and training 
During the formulation of the non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness 
Model, some of the principles of Buddhist Introspection were taken into 
consideration. These are summarised below: 
9 Dancers are taught to stabilise and refine attention through focussing attention on 
to a visual image, in order to access intrattention and allow movement to occur 
non-intrattentively. 
Whilst the focus of Buddhist Introspection is the intrattention, the focus of the 
non-intrattentive strand is the non-intrattention. 
A series of changing images is shown to the dancers initially and then removed, 
leaving each dancer to reconstruct an image within the mind. 
Dancers are informed about compulsive attention, in which the mind is distracted 
elsewhere, and are also taught to recognise negligent attention, in which one's 
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attention becomes careless and slack and vividness is lost. The terms attentional 
excitation and laxity are not used in the non-intrattentive training to avoid the 
possibility of misinterpretation or an adaptation of the meaning of the terms 
through the application into a Western practice. The terms compulsive attention 
and negligent attention, which have been coined for use within the Dance 
Consciousness Model, are used instead. 
* Dancers are taught to use a heightened state of intrattention alongside the 
fundamental intrattention, in order to monitor the presence of compulsive or 
negligent attention. -This is similar to the introspection that. is used alongside. - 
mindfulness in the practice of Buddhist Introspection. 
9 The non-intrattentive strand uses three states - external, internal and kinaesthetic 
- which encompass the main principles from the nine attentional states of 
Buddhist Introspection. 
* The kinaesthetic state abolishes the dual or split consciousness and allows the 
dancer to experience a full non-intrattentive state. The intrattention, therefore, acts 
as a means of access to the non-intrattention. 
Bodyweather 
Tanaka established the philosophical foundation for Bodyweather in the early 
1980S. 97 The practice has since been developed worldwide by practitioners who have 
worked first-hand with Tanaka. The practice conflates Eastern and Western 
philosophy and draws on a variety of dance and physical training practices, such as 
martial arts, contemporary dance, yoga and shiatsu. The practice of Bodyweather 
requires one to experience a state in which the mind is expressed through the body, 
and the body is expressed through the mind. This is a state in which one focuses 
neutrally and impartially on both self and other, and strives to experience 
nothingness. 
97 In the early 1970s Tanaka created original dance works which explored the meaning of the body 
and movement through improvisation. He worked closely with Hijikata, founder of Butoh. The power 
within Butoh derives from the individual dancer in a mental and physical sense. In 1985, Tanaka 
founded Bodyweather Farm, a co-operative environment for dancers and artists who explore the 
origins of dance through farming life. See http: //www. iugte. com/projects/Min_Tanaka-php 
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Although the practice of Bodyweather does not claim to deal with consciousness, the 
state described above is very similar to the state of non-intrattention defined in this 
study. An exploration into Bodyweather is therefore of use here. As the practice of 
Bodyweather has evolved fairly recently, there are very few research sources 
available 98 and anyone interested in Bodyweather at present is likely to be taught by 
a practitioner who has been trained by Tanaka in person. Lynch is one such 
practitioner and is currently artistic director of Paradance Theatre. Lynch uses the 
Bodyweather techniques within his company. Fundamental to the company's 
practice, known as Bodyweather Paradance, is the' 24-hour performance. The 
ideology behind this performance is that the dancers are: 
... at their best not when they are engaged in abstract reflection, 
critique or objective consideration, but when they are intensely and 
passionately'involved in being. 
(Lynch, 2004)99 
Bodyweather, as taught by Lynch, involves a physical training method called MB, 
which stands for muscle and bones, or mind and body. The MB comprises twelve 
sections which contain coordinative and choreographic phrases, improvisation, and 
acrobatic and sensorial exercises. The aim of the MB is to create an authentic, 
uninhibited and self-expressed body and although it does not offer a method of 
access to consciousness in itself, it does emphasise the importance of preparing the 
body and mind in an appropriate way. 
Following the MB, the practice of Bodyweather involves what is called the 
Bodyweather laboratory. The laboratory includes a variety of exercises which 
connect the dancer's body and mind. One exercise, for example, is omni-central 
imaging, -in which dancers create internal images within their minds and then allow 
their bodies to react physically to these images. Lynch also works with what he calls 
the Paradance arena, which involves performance research. This research includes, 
for example, improvisational methodologies that can operate both as techniques for 
98 Some of these articles can be found on http: //www. bodyweather. net/mainframel. htm] This site was 
created by De Quincey who is a former member of the Mai-Juko Performance Company - the 
company run by Tanaka. De Quincey introduced the philosophy and methodology of Bodyweatber to 
Australia in 1988. 
99 This quote was recorded during a Bodyweather workshop London 22 May 2004. 
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generating performance material and as ends in themselves, and cyclic state training 
100 (CST), which is a sequential rehearsal and choreographic technique. 
Lynch notes that in Bodyweather the emphasis is on dancers experiencing neutrality 
and he encourages dancers to live the experience in the present, to 'just move' and 
not engage in any kind of reflection -a state in which one allows the 'internal 
monologue to just dissolve' (Lynch, 2004). 101 This is, of course, particularly difficult 
in the same way that just thinking of nothing, as discussed earlier in this chapter, is 
difficult. Not all the exercises in Lynch's workshops and performances are directed 
towards thinking of nothing. In other words, not all of the Bodyweather practice is 
concerned with non-intrattentive states. Some exercises encourage intrattention and 
some exercises encourage a switch between non-intrattention and intrattention. Such 
exercises are discussed in Chapter 6. Below are some examples of Bodyweather 
exercises, as taught by Lynch, which were of use in the formulation of the non- 
intrattentive training. 
Using Bodyweather Paradance as a method of access 
Some of the exercises used in the Bodyweather laboratory are based around an 
exercise referred to as nose-finger. A dancer, places a finger under another dancer's 
nose; the former leads the latter around the space by their nose. The distance between 
the nose and finger must remain constant at all times and the follower should attempt 
to keep the nose on the same level as the finger. A development of this exercise is the 
hand-hand exercise in which two dancers hold their hands up opposite each other, 
palm to palm, about half a metre apart, and one dancer leads the other dancer. In this 
task it appears as if the hands are mirroring each other and when a genuine 
connection occurs, it is difficult to identify who is leading and who is following. 
These two exercises can be executed concurrently, and accompanied by verbal 
report. Two dancers (A and B) hold hands and use their spare hands as a pair of 
leading hands - as if they are one dancer - for the hand-hand exercise. Two more 
dancers (C and D) take the roles needed by the nose-finger exercise, with C's finger 
leading D by the nose. D follows C's finger with the nose; concurrently, D uses his 
100 The CST is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
101 This quote was recorded during a Bodyweatber workshop Brussels 4-6 June 2004. 
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or her hands to follow both the leading hands of A and B. The positions of each 
dancer are shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Bodyweather exercise 
D Follower 
c Finger leader 
AB Hand leaders 
It is the responsibility of the finger leader (C) to hold the group together and to direct 
the group around the space. The hand leaders (A and B) have to ensure that they stay 
directly behind the finger leader (C) at all times and that their hands are visible to the 
follower (D). After some time, the follower (D) is required to undertake the 
additional task of talking. The follower (D) is therefore talking, whilst following with 
his or her nose, as well as mirroring with the hands. 
For dancer D, the follower, this exercise involves multi-tasking and forces him or her 
to direct different amounts of attention onto the different tasks. Attention is capacity 
limited and it is difficult to focus fully on all three tasks at once. The follower may 
therefore choose to split consciousness and attend intrattentively, at any one time, to 
one of the tasks and leave the other two tasks to be executed non-intrattentively. This 
exercise is very similar to those in studies of attention, such as the two-handed 
tracing game (Lyons, 1999, p. 245), discussed earlier in this chapter, with respect to 
splitting consciousness and multi-tasking in order to create a dual consciousness. 
The practice of Bodyweather was considered during the formulation of the non- 
intrattentive strand and training not only because it seems to deal with non- 
intrattention and splitting consciousness, but additionally, unlike the other two 
practices discussed in this chapter, Bodyweather has its foundation in movement. It 
is important to note, however, that Bodyweather is a way of being and its purpose is 
not to provide a model for accessing non-intrattention. I have been fortunate enough 
to work with Lynch to gain some understanding of the practice, in both workshop 
and performance contexts. During the Bodyweather workshops my interest in 
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consciousness encouraged me to adapt the exercises and techniques supplied by 
Lynch for the purpose of using them as a method of access to non-intrattention. 
In'my experience of the Bodyweather exercise depicted in Figure 3, most of my 
conscious attention was directed towards the talking, as this was the task that I felt 
required most focus. As a result, the movement I executed became more intuitive as I 
did not have the capacity to think about it or consciously to attend to it. This multi- 
tasking allowed a dual consciousness and enabled me to move my body non- 
intrattentively. For some dancers the attention may, of course, have been allocated 
differently, with no intrattention on the talking and maximum attention on the 
movement. The very fact that I wanted to attend only to the talking, however, seemed 
to increase the probability of that being the case. 
Although the purpose of such exercises, in the context of Bodyweather, is to work 
with co-ordination skills, it is clear that the exercises are also of use for accessing 
states of non-intrattention. Similar exercises are therefore used in the non- 
intrattentive training to enable dancers to dance non-intrattentively. Within the 
training the dancers are informed that the purpose of such exercises is to allow 
movement to occur non-intrattentively and the dancers are encouraged to use his or 
her willpower to direct all attention to, for example, the talking. 
Summary of the contribution of Bodyweather to the non-intrattentive strand 
and training 
During the formulation of the non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness 
Model, some of the principles of Bodyweather were taken into consideration. These 
are summarised below: 
Within the practice of Bodyweather, the MB warm-up is a crucial part of the 
process of connecting body and mind. The non-intrattentive training incorporates 
a similar warm-up at the start of each training workshop, which prepares the body 
physically and encourages a state of non-intrattention. 
The Bodyweather exercises illustrated above involve multi-tasking and, providing 
that a certain degree of will is present, can allow one to move non-intrattentively. 
Similar exercises are used within the non-intrattentive training, in which, for 
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example, the dancers are asked to report and observe intrattentively, whilst non- 
intrattentively dancing. 
Non-intrattentive training and the non-intrattentive strand of the 
Dance Consciousness Model 
Having discussed attention studies, Buddhist Introspection and Bodyweather, all of 
which were taken into consideration in the non-intrattentive strand, this chapter now 
describes the nature of both the training and the model. 
Non-intrattentive training 
Dancers are trained, in a series of four workshops, how to access non-intrattention. 
They are taught to use a fundamental state of intrattention, which is directed towards 
exterior stimuli, to access a state of non-intrattention. They are also encouraged to 
use a higher order state of intrattention, which is directed towards the fundamental 
intrattentive state, in order to access a higher order state of non-intrattention. 
Fundamental non-intrattention 
The training for accessing a fundamental state of non-intrattention involves learning 
how to use three different means of non-intrattentive access: 
9 Non-intrattentive verbal report; 
* Non-intrattentive physical observation; 
9 Non-intrattentive active listening. 
As with the intrattentive training described in Chapter 4, dancers are taught to use the 
means of access whilst: 
9 Improvising - within both free and structured improvisation; 
Choreographing material; 
Learning material - which has been choreographed by another dancer or the 
choreographer; 
9 Teaching material - to another dancer; 
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o Rehearsing material; 
e Perfonning. 
Again, the dancers are trained to use the means of access whilst working as a: 
*Solo; 
9 Duet; 
e Group. 
As with the intrattentive training, dancers are initially, asked to access non- 
intrattention only for short intervals. With continual exposure and practice, these 
intervals are gradually increased in duration until dancers are eventually able to 
access the state actively for an hour or more at a time. Dancers are again required to 
participate in a warm-up at the beginning of each workshop, which embraces the 
means of access and therefore prepares both the mind and the body. 
Higher order non-intrattention 
Similar to the intrattentive training, teaching dancers to use a higher order state 
involves providing them with an understanding of the nature of such a state and 
encouraging them to have a heightened sense of awareness. It is crucial, of course, 
that this heightened sense of awareness is not directed to the self or the dance, but 
towards the intrattentive state which is attending to the external stimuli. It may take 
some time for a dancer to begin to use a heightened state alongside the fundamental 
state and it is partly the responsibility of the choreographer/trainer to inform the 
dancer of moments in which non-intrattention has ceased - this sort of mediation was 
discussed in Chapter 3, in relation to the method of examination. Equipped with this 
new experiential understanding, in subsequent workshops the dancer may begin to 
increase awareness and detect compulsive or negligent attention. Gradually, through 
continual exposure, the dancer gains an understanding of how to use the heightened 
state to monitor the non-intrattention. 
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Non-intrattentive stimuli 
Each of the non-intrattentive means of access utilises a particular type of stimulus - 
verbal, visual or aural. These stimuli provide the key to the access and it is therefore 
essential that they require a state of intrattention to be achieved in order to allow the 
dancer to dance non-intrattentively. There are three necessary conditions for the 
stimuli: 
The stimuli are changing stimuli; 
The stimuli are such that they inspire an adequate amount of active thinking 
which involves interpretation, evaluation and/or analysis; 
The stimuli are sufficiently complex to warrant a state of intrattention up to the 
point where there is no intrattention remaining for the dancing, but not so complex 
that they cause the dancer to disengage that intrattention. 
Non-intrattentive verbal report 
The purpose of non-intrattentive verbal report is to direct the dancer's intrattention 
completely away from the dancing self. Intrattentive verbal report therefore requires 
the dancer to talk, whilst dancing, about things that are external to self. It is essential 
that the non-intrattentive verbal report is a present-report as opposed to a pre- or 
post-report. This distinction and the exercises utilised to illustrate it are discussed in 
Chapter 4. The same exercises are used in both the intrattentive and non-intrattentive 
training. 
What to talk about? 
In the non-intrattentive training dancers are trained to use different verbal stimuli, 
including both of the following: - 
9 Random reports, in which the dancer talks about anything external to self that 
comes to mind; 
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9 Structured reports, containing lists of either numbers or words; for example 
multiplication tables. 
Dancers are trained to use these reports within any of the dance components and 
whilst working alone or with others. When working as a duet or part of a group, 
dancers can use two additional types of report: 
e Conversation/discussion; 
e Question/answer. 
Sharing a report in this way, whilst non-intrattentively sharing movement, allows a 
relationship between dancers to develop without which dancing non-intrattentively 
with another dancer(s) may feel disconnected. 
Pancers are trained initially to use all of the different verbal stimuli. Eventually, in 
most cases, dancers tend to develop a preference towards one or two particular verbal 
stimuli. The preferred stimuli should be those that are most effective, rather than 
those that the dancer finds the simplest or most enjoyable to use. An effective 
stimulus is one that allows complete access to intrattention. The most effective 
stimuli are generally those which require closed-loop control, and they are therefore 
usually the stimuli that the dancer considers to be complex. 
If the intrattentive stimulus is too simple, the dancer may execute the report non- 
intrattentively and devote the intrattention to the dancing, or even split the 
intrattention so that some is directed towards the reporting and some is reserved for 
the dancing. If, however, the intrattentive stimulus is too complex, the dancer may 
become overloaded and switch off. In doing so, the dancer may allow the, non- 
directed intrattention to affect the non-intrattention and thus may begin to dance 
intrattentively. Alternatively, in some cases, the dancer may become so concerned 
with the complex intrattentive stimulus that he or she stops dancing altogether. 
It is, therefore, not always straightforward to find stimuli which offer a balance 
between appropriate levels of complexity and effectiveness. The aims of having a 
balance are to warrant complete intrattention and, at the same time, enable the dancer 
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to direct the intrattention and maintain control of the non-intrattention without 
becoming overloaded. 102 
Non-intrattentive physical observation 
Non-intrattentive physical observation requires the dancer to observe something 
exterior to self whilst dancing, in order to create an intrattentive state directed toward 
the external object and a non-intrattentive state directed towards the self and the 
dance. The exterior object or image is entitled the visual stimulus. Within this means 
of access, it is essential that the observation of the visual stimulus is physical and 
active. Dancers are taught to position their bodies physically in order to observe 
every detail of an exterior object or image actively, and they are reminded of the 
difference between passive and active observation - which they were introduced to 
within the intrattentive training described in Chapter 4. 
What to observe? 
Within the training dancers are exposed to constantly changing visual stimuli that 
are, for example, pre-recorded and presented through a television screen or projected 
onto a wall. Ideally, the images are projected on to all four walls so that the dancer is 
provided with images to observe irrespective of the direction of the movement being 
executed. It is not essential, however, that images are pre-recorded and projected or 
presented through a television as, of course, this requires some specific equipment. A 
choreographer may wish, instead, to present the visual stimuli by, for example, 
placing a series of pictures or objects around the room. Four different types of visual 
stimuli may be used: 
Random film; 
Lists of words; 
Lists of numbers; 
Questions. 
102 Examples of dancers using non-intrattentive verbal report whilst improvising, choreographing and 
learning material as a solo and duet can be found in Chapters 18 and 23 and Chapters 27 to 33 of the 
DVD which accompanies this thesis. 
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Some visual stimuli are more effective than others for each dancer. The dancers are 
trained initially to experiment with each of the different visual stimuli before 
selecting those that they find the most effective. This selection can sometimes be 
difficult when dancers are working in pairs or groups as, of course, the dancers may 
have different preferences. In such an event, the trainer or choreographer must create 
a balance and present the dancers with visual stimuli which attempt to accommodate 
each of the dancer's needs by, for example, interchanging the different stimuli. In 
Empirical Project 2, which comprised the exploratory workshops for the formulation 
of the non-intrattentive training, it was reported that interchanging between different 
types of visual stimuli was not a problem; in fact most dancers claimed that it 
actually increased their intrattention. ' 03 
Non-intrattentive active listening 
Dancers are exposed to aural stimuli which are pre-recorded and projected through 
speakers, or a choreographer may instead wish to present the aural stimuli live. It is 
essential that the way in which the dancer listens to the aural stimuli is active as 
opposed to passive. 
What to listen to? 
Four different types of aural stimuli may be used: 
Random noises - such as those from a television or radio; 
Lists of words; 
Lists of numbers; 
Questions. 
Dancers are likely to prefer some aural stimuli to others and, in the early stages of the 
training, they are encouraged to experiment with each of the different aural stimuli 
prior to selecting the most effective. 
The aural stimuli are presented in three different forms: 
103 Examples of dancers using non-intrattentive physical observation whilst improvising, 
choreographing and learning material as a solo and duet Can be found in Chapters 19 and 24 and 
Chapters 27 to 33 of the DVD which accompanies this thesis. 
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Single presentation - in which the dancer hears only one type of stimulus, for 
example a list of words. The aural stimulus is directed at both ears and seems to 
originate in the middle of the head. 
Dichotic presentation - in which the dancer hears two types of aural stimulus 
concurrently, for example a list of words and list of numbers. One 'message is 
presented to each ear' so that the messages are 'discrete and appear to come from 
different directions' (Komatsu, 1994, p. 34). 
* Binaural presentation - in which the dancer hears two types of aural stimulus 
concurrently. Two messages are 'presented to both ears so that the messages are 
superimposed on one another' and seem to 'originate in the middle of the 
subject's head' (Komatsu, 1994, p. 34). 
Dichotic and binaural presentations can be created for pre-recorded aural stimuli, 
however differentiating between the two types of presentation is not essential. It is, 
therefore, not a problem if one does not have the means to create the two different 
types of recording. If one chooses to create the aural stimuli live, then two people 
talking at once is sufficient. 
The dichotic and binaural presentations have been introduced into the training 
because some dancers find that actively listening to a single presentation is not 
sufficient to warrant intrattention. The difference between dichotic and binaural 
presentation is minimal; evidence from Empirical Project 2 suggests, however, that 
some dancers do find one more effective than the other. Dancers are asked to use the 
most effective presentation, with the most effective aural stimuli. This can sometimes 
be difficult when dancers are working in pairs or groups, because the dancers may 
have different preferences. If necessary, it is possible to use personal stereos with 
headphones. Alternatively the choreographer may prefer to create a balance by 
presenting the dancers with various aural stimuli that accommodate the needs of all 
dancers; for example by interchanging between the different types of recording. 104 
104 Examples of dancers using non-intrattentive active listening whilst improvising, cboreographing 
and learning material as a solo and duet can be found in Chapters 20 and 25 and Chapters 27 to 33 of 
the DVD which accompanies this thesis. 
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All three non-intrattentive means 
As with the intrattentive training, the dancers are trained to work initially with a 
single means of access individually and then with two or three concurrently. Dancers 
may have engaged in combining means of access before reaching this part of the 
training; for example, when using verbal report whilst working with a group, dancers 
are permitted to engage in a conversation and therefore use both verbal report and 
active listening. Within the context of this thesis and the Dance Consciousness 
Model, the term external non-intrattention indicates that a dancer is using two or 
more means of access simultaneously in order to access a non-intrattentive dance 
state. 
As with the intrattentive training, dancers are trained to recognise for themselves 
which means of access or which combination is the most effective for a task and 
must remain aware of the possibility of overload. It was of common consensus 
during Empirical Project 2 that having all three means of access available, but not 
necessarily utilising all three simultaneously, is the most effective means of access. 
This provides the dancer with the opportunity to interchange freely between the 
different means of access and use every combination that is effective at a particular 
time. 
The verbal, visual and aural stimuli presented when using more than one means of 
access can either be complementary or juxtaposing, depending on whether one 
wishes to increase or decrease the level of complexity. An example of using 
complementary stimuli is observing a list of numbers and simultaneously actively 
listening to the same list of numbers. An example of using juxtaposing stimuli is 
observing a list of numbers and simultaneously actively listening to a different list of 
numbers or a list of words. Complementary stimuli tend to be less complex than 
juxtaposing. Again, any combination is possible and each dancer is likely to have a 
preference about whether complementary or juxtaposing is more effective within 
each combination of the means of access and within the different dance components. 
When being trained to use all three means of access together, dancers are asked to: 
* Observe alternately the four visual stimuli; 
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* Actively listen to a single, binaural or dichotic presentation of the four alternating 
aural stimuli; 
Describe, shadow or answer what they see and hear. 
The dancer can use the report to complement or juxtapose the visual and/or aural 
stimuli. The dancer takes complete control over the report and must actively select 
what they want to report on and when; they may report on both the stimuli, one of 
the stimuli or neither of the stimuli. Table 9 shows the possible combinations for the 
three means of access: 105 
Table 9: The possible combinations for the non-intrattentive means of access 
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105 Examples of dancers using external non-intrattention whilst improvising, choreographing and 
learning material as a solo and duet can be found in Chapters 21 and 22 and Chapters 26 to 33 of the 
DVD which accompanies this thesis. 
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Three non-intrattentive states 
Similar to the intrattentive training, the dancers learn to use means of access 
externally and intemally. Dancers are trained to use non-intrattentive verbal report, 
non-intraftentive active listening, non-intrattentive physical observation and external 
non-intrattention. These means allow dancers to access an external state of non- 
intrattention. Dancers are also trained to use non-intrattentive internal reports, non- 
intrattentive internal observation, non-intrattentive internal listening and internal 
non-intrattention as means of access. These means allow dancers to access an 
internal state of non-intrattention. It is important to note that: 
* Internal report is achieved through the creation of an internal monologue, during 
which the dancer continues to use the verbal stimuli. 
e Internal listening is achieved through the creation of an internal monologue, 
during which the dancer continues to use the aural stimuli. 
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9 Internal observation is achieved through the creation of visual imprints, during 
which the dancer continues to use the visual stimuli. 
a Internal non-intrattention, like external non-intrattention, requires the dancer to 
use more than one means of access at a time, or at least to have the three means of 
access available for use. Whilst using internal non-intrattention as a means of 
access, dancers are therefore encouraged to create an internal monologue and 
visual imprints simultaneously. 
Dancers are encouraged to master external means of access before moving on to 
internalise the means of access. Using external and then internal means of access to a 
non-intrattentive dance state allows the dancer's mind and body to experience and 
understand how it feels to be in a non-intrattentive state of dance consciousness. The 
dancer's body begins to understand how it feels to move without the mind attending 
to the movement explicitly. Having gained this understanding, dancers are trained to 
maintain access to the state without using the means of access; they are therefore 
asked to experience the state kinaesthetically - kinaesthetic non-intrattention. In 
order to achieve kinaesthetic non-intrattention, the dancer must disengage the 
intrattention, cease the report and allow the consciousness no object. 
Similar to the intrattentive strand, the external and internal non-intrattention is 
therefore the means of access to the kinaesthetic non-intrattention. Once the dancer's 
mind has achieved that access, or non-intrattention, it is present to just experience. 
Kinaesthetic non-intrattention is the target state of the non-intrattentive training and 
strand. It may initially take dancers some time to reach the kinaesthetic state. With 
continual exposure, however, dancers should have mastered all three states by the 
end of the training. Table 10 sununarises the three different non-intrattentive states. 
Table 10: Three non-intrattentive states 
Means of access: Achieved through: 
State 1: * Non-intrattentive verbal report - Verbal stimuli 
External non- 0 Non-intrattentive physical 9 Visual stimuli intrattention observation 
0 Non-intrattentive active 9 Aural stimuli 
listening 
II 
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Means of access: Achieved through: 
State 2: 0 Non-intrattentive internal 9 Internal monologue 
Internal non- report 
intrattention. 
0 Non-intrattentive internal e Visual imprint 
observation 
0 Non-intrattentive internal * Internal monologue listening 
State 3: 
Kinaesthetic non- 
intrattention. 
Non-intrattentive training summary 
The non-intrattentive training involves teaching dancers to: 
* Access states of intrattention in order to access a non-intrattentive dance state 
whilst improvising, choreographing, learning, teaching, rehearsing and 
perfonning, as a solo, duet or group; 
* Access fundamental states of non-intrattention. and higher order states of non- 
intrattention; 
* Understand the significance of continual exposure and willpower, and the 
importance of preparing the body both mentally and physically through a specific 
warm up; 
* Recognise and use effective stimuli - verbal, visual and aural - which are 
changing, sufficiently complex and require active thinking; 
Use external means of non-intrattentive access, including verbal report, physical 
observation and active listening, in order to achieve an external state of non- 
intrattention; 
Use internal means of non-intrattentive access, including internal report, internal 
observation, and internal listening through the use of internal monologues and 
visual imprints, in order to achieve an internal state of non-intrattention; 
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* Access a kinaesthetic state of non-intrattention, in which the means of access are 
no longer needed and the dancer is able to exist non-intrattentively in the dance. 
During the training, the dancers also use the method of examination described in 
Chapter 3. The use of this method allows the dancers to examine their experiences 
and ensure effective access to states of non-intrattention. In Chapter 3 it was noted 
that the method of examination for the non-intrattentive dance consciousness not 
only involves qualitative questions, but also quantitative stimulus-based questions. 106 
Following each task within the non-intrattentive training, the dancers are asked 
questions relating to the verbal, visual and aural stimuli that they encountered within 
that specific task. The questions are very precise, for example 'how many times did 
you hear the number ten' or 'name five objects that appeared on the screen'. 
Such questions provide quantitative information with regard to the dancer's 
intrattention and enable an assessment to be made about specific periods during 
which the dancer's attention may have wavered. For example, if a dancer were 
unable to remember a series of images from the middle of the task, despite clearly 
recollecting all the images from the beginning and end, this suggests that the 
dancer's intrattention wavered. One could question the dancer further on the 
awareness of self in an attempt to detect whether the intrattention moved away from 
the images in the middle of the task and on to the self. In addition, if dancers are 
informed before the task that they will have to answer questions on, for example, the 
formation of numbers, their will to intrattend may increase, which may subsequently 
increase their ability to attend. This stimulus-based questioning can provide great 
insight into the dancer's experience and is used throughout the non-intrattentive 
training workshops. 
The structure for each non-intrattentive training workshop is presented in Tables 11, 
12,13 and 14: 107 
106 The nature and purpose of these questions could not be provided in Chapter 3 as they are 
dependent on the means of access which have been described in this chapter. 
107 Only the workshop structures are included here because the workshop descriptions are particularly 
lengthy. A sample non-intrattentive workshop description can be found in Appendix B. Chapters 18 to 
33 on the DVD which accompanies this thesis provide some examples of dancers applying the non- 
intrattentive training and the non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model. 
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Table 11: Non-intrattentive training: Workshop 1 
Task 
number 
Task Means of access 
I Warm up No means 
2 Solo improvisation Random non-intrattentive verbal 
report 
3 Solo improvisation Structured non-intrattentive verbal 
report - numbers 
4 Solo improvisation Structured non-intrattentive verbal 
report - words 
5 Solo improvisation Non-intrattentive verbal report 
> non-intrattentive internal report 
6 Solo set movement and Non-intrattentive verbal report 
performance > non-intrattentive internal report 
7 Solo choreography and Non-intrattentive verbal report 
performance > non-intrattentive internal report 
8 Mover/observer improvisation Non-intrattentive verbal report 
9 Duet improvisation Non-intrattentive verbal report 
10 Duet improvisation Non-intrattentive verbal report 
> non-intrattentive internal report 
II Duet choreography and Non-intrattentive verbal report 
performance > non-intrattentive internal report 
12 Group improvisation Non-intrattentive verbal report 
> non-intrattentive internal report 
13 Group choreography and Non-intrattentive verbal report 
performance > non-intrattentive internal report 
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Table 12: Non-intrattentive training: Worksbop 2 
Task 
number 
Task Means of access 
1 Warm up Non-intrattentive verbal report 
2 Solo improvisation Non-intrattentive physical 
observation 
3 Solo improvisation Non-intrattentive physical 
observation 
> non-intrattentive internal 
observation 
4 Solo set movement and Non-intrattentive physical 
performance observation 
> non-intrattentive internal 
observation 
5 Solo choreography and Non-intrattentive physical 
performance observation 
> non-intrattentive internal 
observation 
6 Duet improvisation Non-intrattentive physical 
observation 
7 Duet improvisation Non-intrattentive physical 
observation 
> non-intrattentive internal 
observation 
8 Duet choreography and Non-intrattentive physical 
performance observation 
> non-intrattentive internal 
observation 
9 Group improvisation Non-intrattentive physical 
observation 
> non-intrattentive internal 
observation 
10 Group choreography and Non-intrattentive physical 
performance observation 
> non-intrattentive internal 
observation 
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Table 13: Non-intrattentive training: Workshop 3 
Task 
number 
Task Means of access 
I Warm up Non-intrattentive, physical 
observation 
2 Solo improvisation Single non-intrattentive active 
listening 
3 Solo improvisation Dichotic/binaural non-intrattentive 
active listening 
4 Solo improvisation Non-intratientive active listening 
> non-intrattentive, internal listening 
5 Solo set movement and Non-intrattentive active listening 
performance > non-intrattentive, internal listening 
6 Solo choreography and Non-intrattentive active listening 
performance > non-intrattentive internal listening 
7 Mover/observer improvisation Non-intrattentive active listening 
8 Duet improvisation Non-intrattentive, active listening 
9 Duet improvisation Non-intrattentive active listening 
> non-intrattentive internal listening 
10 Duet choreography and Non-intrattentive, active listening 
performance > non-intrattentive internal listening 
11 Group improvisation Non-intrattentive active listening 
> non-intrattentive internal listening 
12 Group choreography and Non-intrattentive active listening 
performance > non-intrattentive internal listening 
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Table 14: Non-intrattentive training: Workshop 4 
Task 
number 
Task Means of access 
I Warm up Non-intrattentive active listening 
2 Solo improvisation Non-intrattentive verbal report and 
physical observation 
3 Solo improvisation Non-intrattentive verbal report and 
active listening 
4 Solo improvisation Non-intrattentive physical 
observation and active listening 
5 Solo improvisation External non-intrattention 
" internal non-intrattention 
" kinaesthetic non-intrattention 
6 Solo set movement and External non-intrattention. 
performance > internal non-intrattention 
> kinaesthetic non-intrattention 
7 Solo choreography and External non-intrattention 
performance > internal non-intrattention 
> kinaesthetic non-intrattention 
8 Mover/observer improvisation External non-intrattention 
9 Duet improvisation External non-intrattention 
10 Duet improvisation External non-intrattention 
" internal non-intrattention 
" kinaesthetic non-intrattention 
11 Duet choreography and External non-intrattention 
performance > internal non-intrattention 
> kinaesthetic non-intrattention 
12 Group improvisation External non-intrattention 
> internal non-intrattention 
> kinaestbetic non-intrattention 
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Task 
Task Means of access number 
13 Group choreography and External non-intrattention 
performance > internal non-intrattention 
> kinaesthetic non-intrattention 
The non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model 
Having completed the four training workshops, dancers are equipped to use the non- 
intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model which is depicted in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: The non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model 
SELF GENERATED 4--Oo- IMPROVISED OTHER GENERATED 
Non-intrattentive 
Ddemal choreographic 
non-intrattention process 
------------------------------------------- -------- ---------------- 
Ddemal 
non-intrattention 
Non-intrattentive 
Intemal rehearsal 
The non-intrattentive strand, like the intrattentive strand presented in Chapter 4, 
consists of three different phases: choreographic process, rehearsal process and 
performance. Within the choreographic process the dancer uses external non- 
intrattention. Whether the dancer is improvising, generating material for self or 
another dancer, or learning the choreographer's or another dancer's material, external 
means of access are used in order for the dancer to access a non-intrattentive state. 
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Once the movement has been choreographed, the dancer rehearses it using external 
means of access. Following this the dancer rehearses the material using internal 
means of access and then using kinaesthetic non-intrattention. This final part of the 
rehearsal process ultimately prepares the dancer for the non-intrattentive 
performance, as this final rehearsal state is the same as the performance state. If the 
dancer has had the necessary training and the non-intrattentive strand is used 
effectively, the dancer will be able to access a controlled kinaesthetic non- 
intrattentive dance consciousness during the performance. 
Summary 
Following a discussion of the three existing practices and theories which contributed 
to the formulation of the non-intrattentive strand - attention studies, Buddhist 
Introspection and Bodyweather - this chapter has answered the fourth focussed 
research question: How can one access the non-intrattentive dance consciousness? 
This chapter has described the exact nature of the non-intrattentive training which is 
required for accessing non-intrattention and has also introduced the independently 
formulated non-intrattentive strand. This training and strand are intended for specific 
use within the context of the dance discipline and the Dance Consciousness Model. 
In addition, the chapter has explained how the strand is applied within choreography, 
rehearsal and performance in order to create a non-intrattentive dance consciousness. 
Chapter 6 discusses the third and fourth strands of the model and indicates how 
dancers are able to switch between states of intrattention and states of non- 
intrattention. 
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Chapter 6 
How can one switch between the intrattentive dance 
consciousness and the non-intrattentive dance 
consciousness? What constitutes the full Dance 
Consciousness Model? 
Introduction 
In Chapter 3 the Dance Consciousness Model was introduced and it was ascertained 
that the model comprises four strands. This chapter describes the third and fourth 
strands: the intrattentive to non-intrattentive (I-NI), and the non-intrattentive to 
intrattentive N-1). In doing so, it provides conclusions regarding the fifth focussed 
research question: How can one switch between the intrattentive dance 
consciousness and the non-intrattentive dance consciousness? In addition, the chapter 
presents the complete model and answers the sixth focussed research question: What 
constitutes the full Dance Consciousness Model? 
The I-NI strand represents the idea that, in order to experience a non-intrattentive 
performance, the dancer may experience an intrattentive process, as shown in Figure 
5. 
The NI-I strand represents the idea that, in order to experience an intrattentive 
performance, the dancer may experience a non-intrattentive process as show in 
Figure 6. 
The way in which a dancer is able to have such experiences is discussed in this 
chapter. 
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Figure 5: The intrattentive to non-intrattentive (I-NI) strand of the Dance Consciousness 
Model 
SELF GENERATED 4 00- IMPROVISED 4-10- OTHER GENERATED 
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Figure 6: The non-intrattentive to intraftentive (NI-I) strand of the Dance 
Consciousness Model 
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Chapter breakdown 
This chapter begins by introducing the I-NI and NI-I strands and the switching states 
training that is required in order to use the strands. The reason why the ability to 
switch states is essential is explained and the context in which the switching may 
take place clarified. The chapter discusses switching states within the dance process 
and describes the purpose and content of Workshop 1 of the switching states training. 
Following this is a discussion on switching states within dance perfonnance. The 
idea of interchanging between states in Cyclic State Training, which is used in the 
practice of Bodyweather,. is introduced. After explaining the influence of the Cyclic 
State Training on the. switching states training, the chapter describes a consciousness 
circuit and the purpose and content of Workshop 2. Finally this chapter presents the 
Dance Consciousness Model in its entirety. 
The intrattentive to non-intrattentive (I-NI) and non-intrattentive to 
intrattentive (NI-1) strands 
The I-NI and NI-I strands encompass both intrattention and non-intrattention. The I- 
NI strand involves an intrattentive process and non-intrattentive performance, and the 
NI-I strand involves a non-intrattentive process and an intrattentive performance. 
Within the Dance Consciousness Model there are four possible combinations, as 
shown in Table 15. 
Table 15: Four possible combinations in the Dance Consciousness Model 
Process Performance 
I Intrattentive choreography/rehearsal Intrattentive rehearsal/perfortnance 
2 
Non-intrattentive Non-intrattentive 
choreography/rehearsal rehearsal/performance 
3 Intrattentive choreography/rehearsal 
Non-intrattentive 
rehearsal/perfon-nance 
4 
1 Non-intrattentive 
Intrattentive rehearsal/performance choreography/rehearsal 
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Intrattentive and non-intrattentive training summary 
In order to use the I-NI and NI-I strands, the dancer must participate initially in the 
intrattentive training and the non-intrattentive training as outlined in Chapters 4 and 
S. The dancer must be able to apply the intrattentive and non-intrattentive strands 
when practising the I-NI and NI-I strands. Table 16 provides a summary of the 
intrattentive and non-intrattentive training: 
Table 16: Summary of the intrattentive and non-intrattentive training 
Training Means of access 
Intrattentive Intrattentive verbal report' 
Intrattentive physical observation 
Intrattentive blind sensing 
External intrattention 
Intrattentive internal report 
Intrattentive internal observation 
Internal intrattention 
Kinaesthetic intrattention 
Non-intrattentive Non-intrattentive verbal report 
Non-intrattentive physical observation 
Non-intrattentive active listening 
External non-intrattention 
Non-intrattentive internal report 
Non-intrattentive internal observation 
Non-intrattentive internal listening 
Internal non-intrattention 
Kinaesthetic non-intrattention 
Training for the I-NI and NI-I strands 
The fonnat of the training for the I-NI and NI-I strands is different from that of the 
first two strands; it is not centred on teaching dancers to access particular states of 
consciousness as, by this point, they already know how to access the desired states. 
In the training for the I-NI and NI-I strands, entitled switching states training, 
dancers do practise the intrattentive and non-intrattentive training but the main focus 
is on teaching the dancers to interchange between the various types of access and the 
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different conscious states. In the switching states training, dancers therefore use the 
following and learn how to interchange between them: 
" Extemal intrattention; 
" Intemal intrattention; 
" Kinaesthetic intrattention; 
" Extemal non-intrattention; 
Intemal non-intrattention; 
Kinaesthetic non-intrattention. 
Switching states 
If a dancer is already competent in accessing intrattentive and non-intrattentive states 
during the dance process in order to create a particular state for performance, why 
does the dancer need to learn to interchange between these states? It may be that the 
choreographer wishes to aim for an intrattentive process but a non-intrattentive 
performance, or vice versa, or for a performance which involves moments of 
intrattention and moments of non-intrattention. In both these examples, the ability to 
switch states is essential. The switching states training therefore involves, in 
Workshop 1, teaching dancers to switch states in the process and, in Workshop 2, 
teaching dancers to switch states in performance. 
Switching states during the process 
In the Introduction, it was noted that it is customary within conventional Western 
contemporary dance that the choreographer stresses the importance of increased 
body awareness during the choreography and rehearsal time and then requires the 
dancer to go on stage and just perform. The question was posed: how is a dancer to 
make the transition from an intrattentive process, to a non-intrattentive performance? 
The I-NI strand of the Dance Consciousness Model offers a solution to this problem. 
Similarly the NI-I strand offers a solution to those occasions when a dancer is asked 
to make the transition from a non-intrattentive process to an intrattentive 
performance. The I-NI and NI-I strands and the switching states training provide 
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dancers with a progressive structure which promotes an efficient and seamless 
transition and gradual development from choreography, to rehearsal, to performance. 
The four strands are surnmarised in Table 17. 
Table 17: The four strands of the Dance Consciousness Model 
Strand Dance phase Means of access 
Intrattentive Choreographic process Extemal intrattention 
Rehearsal process External intrattention 
" intemal intrattention 
" kinaesthetic intrattention 
Performance Kinaesthetic intrattention 
Non-intrattentive Choreographic process External non-intrattention 
Rehearsal process External non-intrattention 
" intemal non-intrattention 
" kinaesthetic non-intrattention 
Per onnance Kinaesthetic non-intrattention 
Intrattentive to Choreographic process Extemal intraftention 
non-intraftentive Rehearsal process External intrattention 
" extemal non-intrattention 
" internal non-intrattention 
" kinaesthetic non-intrattention 
Performance Kinaesthetic non-intrattention 
Non-intrattentive Choreographic process External non-intrattention 
to intrattentive Rehearsal process External non-intrattention. 
" external intrattention 
" internal intrattention 
" kinaesthetic intrattention. 
Perfonnance Kinaesthetic intrattention 
Workshop 1 
Workshop I trains dancers how to use the I-NI and NI-I strands of the Dance 
Consciousness Model. As with the other strands, dancers are taught to use the I-NI 
and NI-I strands whilst: 
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" Improvising - within both free and structured improvisation; 
" Choreographing material; 
" Learning material; 
" Teaching material; 
" Rehearsing material; 
" Performing. 
Whilst working as a: 
0 Solo; 
* Duet; 
e Group. 
The structure for Workshop I of the switching states training is shown in Table 18. 
The tasks in this workshop involve applying the strands within these different 
contexts. So, for example, dancers are trained to apply the I-NI strand within the 
context of a self-generated solo - see task 4 in Table 18. In this instance, each dancer 
choreographs and begins to rehearse his or her solo using external intrattention and 
then internal non-intrattention. The dancer then rehearses the solo using kinaesthetic 
non-intrattention in preparation for the performance and finally performs the solo 
using kinaesthetic non-intrattention. The dancers are also trained, for example, to 
apply the NI-I strand in the context of group choreography - see task 8 in Table 18. 
In this instance, the dancers choreograph and begin to rehearse their group piece 
using external non-intrattention. The dancers then rehearse the group piece using 
internal intrattention and progress to using kinaesthetic intrattention in preparation 
for the performance. Finally, they perform the piece using kinaesthetic intrattention. 
During the training, the dancers also practise the method of examination outlined in 
Chapter 3. This method allows the dancers to examine their experiences and ensure 
that they are switching states effectively. 108 
108 Chapters 34 to 39 on the DVD which accompanies this thesis provide some examples of dancers 
applying the I-NI and NI-I strands of the Dance Consciousness Model. 
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Table 18: Switching states training: Workshop 1 
Task 
number 
Task Means of access 
Warm up External, internal and kinaesthetic 
intrattention and external, internal and 
kinaesthetic non-intrattention 
2 Solo improvisation in External intrattention for 
choreography, rehearsal and choreography 
performance - I-NI strand External intrattention for initial 
rehearsal 
External 
" internal 
" kinaesthetic non-intrattention for 
rehearsal 
Kinaesthetic non-intrattention for 
performance 
3 Solo set movement in External non-intrattention for 
choreography, rehearsal and choreography 
performance - NI-I strand External non-intrattention for initial 
rehearsal 
External 
" internal 
" kinaesthetic intrattention for 
rehearsal 
Kinaesthetic intrattention for 
performance 
4 Solo choreography in External intrattention for 
choreography, rehearsal and choreography 
performance - I-NI strand External intrattention for initial 
rehearsal 
External 
" internal 
" kinaesthetic non-intrattention for 
rehearsal 
Kinaesthetic non-intrattention for 
performance 
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Task 
number 
Task Means of access 
5 Duet improvisation in External non-intrattention for 
choreography, rehearsal and choreography 
performance - NI-I strand External non-intrattention for initial 
rehearsal 
External 
> internal 
> kinaesthetic intrattention for 
rehearsal 
Kinaesthetic intrattention. for 
performance 
6 Duet choreography in External intrattention. for 
choreography, rehearsal and choreography 
performance - I-NI strand External intrattention. for initial 
rehearsal 
External 
" internal 
" kinaesthetic non-intrattention for 
rehearsal 
Kinaesthetic non-intrattention for 
performance 
7 Group improvisation in External intrattention for 
choreography, rehearsal and choreography 
performance - I-NI External intrattention for initial 
rehearsal 
External 
" internal 
" kinaesthetic non-intrattention for 
rehearsal 
Kinaesthetic non-intrattention for 
performance 
8 Group choreography in External non-intrattention for 
choreography, rehearsal and choreography 
performance - NI-I strand External non-intrattention for initial 
rehearsal 
External 
" internal 
" kinaesthetic intrattention for 
rehearsal 
Kinaesthetic intrattention for 
performance 
Having successfully completed Workshop 1, dancers have the ability to switch states 
effectively within the dance process and thus are able to apply the I-NI and the NI-I 
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strands of the Dance Consciousness Model. There may be instances, however, in 
which a more instantaneous switching between states is required, such as within the 
actual performance. 
Switching states during performance 
Some choreographers and dancers may create performances that are wholly 
intrattentive or wholly non-intrattentive, for which the intrattentive and non- 
intrattentive strands are applicable. Others may prefer to create performances in 
which the dancers sometimes perform intrattentively and sometimes non- 
intrattentively. For example, a dancer may non-intrattentively perform an improvised 
solo and then move straight into performing a highly structured and detailed contact 
duet which necessitates an intrattentive consciousness. The ability to switch states 
instantaneously within the performance is therefore vital. 
The training for dancers to switch between states instantaneously is not, however, 
encompassed within any particular strand of the Dance Consciousness Model. The 
ability to switch states in performance results from using more than one strand during 
the dance process - indeed the very nature of the model is that its four strands may 
be used in any one dance piece. The performance switching training teaches dancers 
to use more than one strand of the model and comprises a consciousness circuit. The 
inspiration for this circuit came from the Cyclic State Training (CST) that is used 
within the practice of Bodyweather. 
Cyclic State Training (CST) 
The CST is a sequential rehearsal and choreographic technique which comprises a 
circuit with various different stations. The purpose of the CST is to train dancers to 
move efficiently around the circuit and to enter fully into the movement task 
associated with each station. The circuit provides a structure for an improvisation. 
The CST can take various formats with any number of stations, but a typical fon-nat 
comprises seven to fourteen different stations. 
Table 19 provides details of an example of a simple CST circuit and the remainder of 
this section explains the actions which were observed by the author of this thesis at a 
Bodyweather workshop held by Lynch in Oslo in October 2004. In the example, at 
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least one person is positioned at each station initially and there must continue to be at 
least one person at each station during the circuit. The stations are numbered, as 
shown, and are positioned consecutively around the room. Dancers are instructed to 
move clockwise to the next station when 'change' is shouted by the dancer at station 
1, stopping at each in turn and carrying out the task for that station. 
Table 19: Cyclic State Training circuit 
Station Task Action for each dancer at the station 
1 Watching the Observe the clock for one minute and then shout 
clock 'change' as the signal for all dancers to move round to 
the next station. The time may be decreased in stages 
from one minute to thirty seconds, then to twenty, ten 
and five seconds. 
2 Copying Copy the movements of the dancer positioned at station 
improvisation 8. 
3 Sprinting Sprint on the spot as fast as possible. 
4 Bisuko Execute Bisuko, which is a slow walk. The speed of this 
walk is determined prior to the dancers commencing the 
circuit. Dancers may be instructed to walk at, for 
example, one sixty-fourth of the speed of their normal 
walk. Dancers are trained to do this at an earlier point in 
the Bodyweather workshop. 
5 Head Improvise using the head to lead the body. 
improvisation 
6 Stretching Stretch the body in any way that feels effective. 
7 Observing Sit and observe all the other dancers. 
8 Free Improvise freely around the space. 
improvisation 
Interchanging in the CST 
During the Oslo Bodyweather workshop it was observed that the dancers' physical 
transition from station to station is accompanied by a mental transition. The dancer's 
body has to adapt physically and instantaneously to make the changes, for example, 
from running very quickly to walking very sl6wly, or from sitting observing to 
improvising freely. Dancers seem able to manage the physical changes and move 
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fairly efficiently from station to station. The dancer's mind, or conscious state, 
however, does not seem to adapt so easily. What is happening during the transitions, 
and the effect this has on movement prior to and following the transitions, is of great 
interest for this study. Between some stations the change in consciousness is 
considerable and the dancer's ability to deal with this change can have an effect on 
the execution of the actual tasks. 
At station 7, the dancer is expected not merely to observe, but also to increase his or 
her awareness of the circuit as a whole and reflect and evaluate the actions of all the 
other dancers. This station requires an intrattentive state of consciousness. At station 
8, the dancer is expected to improvise spontaneously, with little reflection or 
awareness of self, other dancers, or the circuit as a whole. This station requires a 
non-intrattentive state of consciousness. Moving from station 7 to station 8 not only 
requires a physical change in activity, therefore, but also a change in consciousness. 
Although it is not the purpose of the CST circuit, this interchanging of conscious 
states is required throughout the circuit: from an intrattentive clock watch in which 
the dancer has a heightened awareness of time, and an intrattentive copying 
improvisation in which the dancer has a heightened awareness of the movement of 
another dancer; to a non-intrattentive sprint in which the dancer has little awareness 
of what the body is actually doing; to an intrattentive slow walk in which the dancer 
is very aware of speed, precision and balance; to a non-intrattentive head 
improvisation and so on. 
On the first lap of the circuit, entering fully into each task can be difficult. For 
example, when starting the non-intrattentive improvisation at station 8, the dancer's 
consciousness may be initially slightly intrattentive as a result of the observation just 
completed at station 7. When it is sensed that the dancer at station I is about to shout 
'change', it may feel as if consciousness automatically begins to prepare for the 
clock watching at station I and consciousness may become slightly intrattentive 
again. In continuing to feel the conscious effects of station 7 and preparing mentally 
for station 1, it may be difficult to improvise with a truly non-intrattentive conscious 
state. 
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Physically moving from one station to another seems to require an intrattentive 
consciousness, regardless of whether the preceding or subsequent station is an 
intrattentive or non-intrattentive station. During the transitions, dancers may slip into 
a more everyday state of consciousness compared with the dance state they appear to 
be in during the time spent completing each task. The dancers sometimes use this 
everyday state as an opportunity to cough, check watches or adjust clothes. The 
dancers subsequently may take a while to become truly engaged in the next task. 
During the first lap of the circuit, the dancers may have little control over 
consciousness and interchanging might not be executed effectively, with each 
conscious state affecting the next conscious state. 
The empirical testing implies that after the third repetition of the circuit, the 
transitions are smoother and dancers begin to enter more instantaneously into each 
task. The transitions might even disappear and the dancers can then move seamlessly 
from task to task. It seems that the physical rehearsal of moving around the circuit 
improves the quality with which dancers are able to move from station to station. The 
mental rehearsal, in terms of consciousness, also'appears to improve the dancers' 
ability to fulfil the aim of the CST of being able to move efficiently around the 
circuit and to enter fully into the movement task presented at each station. 
The consciousness circuit 
Although the purpose of the CST is not to train dancers to interchange between 
different conscious states, it does seem that it could be used for this purpose. As a 
result, a similar circuit entitled the consciousness circuit is used in the switching 
states training. The consciousness circuit consists of eight stations - four intrattentive 
and four non-intrattentive. At each of these stations, the dancers are asked to perform 
specified movement tasks, such as walking, running, improvising or standing still. 
The dancers spend one minute at each station before moving to the next station and 
therefore switching states. This training gives the dancers the opportunity to practise 
switching instantaneously between intrattentive and non-intrattentive states. 
The exercises in the example below comprise simple movements which can be used 
for a generic consciousness circuit. A key aim of the consciousness circuit is that 
each station requires the dancer to use a different conscious state - either intrattentive 
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or non-intrattentive - from that used at the previous station; the actual nature of the 
exercises is of secondary importance. It is therefore possible and legitimate for a 
choreographer to replace the exercises with an activity more relevant to, and 
appropriate for, a particular context. For example, a choreographer may decide that, 
whilst the walking exercise in the example below is applicable within the context of 
a piece, it is more appropriate to ask the dancer to walk in role as their character. In 
addition, the choreographer may decide that having more or fewer stations would be 
appropriate, depending on the number of dancers participating in the consciousness 
circuit. I 
Workshop 2 
In Workshop 2, before commencing the circuit, dancers are trained how to execute 
all the exercises and to do so whilst accessing the correct conscious state. During this 
preparation, dancers are encouraged to access these states externally, internally and 
kinaesthetically. The dancers are then asked to walk through the circuit with the 
choreographer as he or she explains the rules of the circuit and makes it clear which 
state of consciousness is required at each station. 
A basic circuit involves the dancers moving round all the stations a minimum of 
three times but, at the discretion of the choreographer, more revolutions may be 
completed. The first time the dancers go round the circuit, they are asked to 
externalise the - means of access they are ýusing, either intrattentive or non- 
intrattentive, the second time round they are asked to internalise the means of access, 
and the third time round to experience the state kinaesthetically without the use of 
the means of access. With three repetitions and one minute clock watches the circuit 
lasts for around 25 minutes. Should the choreographer wish for the circuit to last 
longer, it is possible to move more gradually ftom external means of access to 
kinaesthetic with, for example, three repetitions of the circuit using external, three 
using internal and three using kinaesthetic. Regardless of the number of repetitions, 
by the time the dancers reach the kinaesthetic execution of the circuit, they are 
switching states in the manner that is required within performance. This circuit 
therefore provides the necessary performance switching training. 
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A sample consciousness circuit, which is for eight dancers, is shown in Table 20. If 
there are fewer dancers, a second clock watch task must be added to ensure that a 
dancer is always present to shout 'change'. 
Table 20: Consciousness circuit 
Station Task Action for each participant at the station 
I Non- Non-intrattentively and freely improvise around the 
intrattentive space. 
free 
improvisation 
2 Intrattentive Intrattentively slow walk at roughly one sixty-fourth the 
slow walk speed of a normal walk. 
3 Non- Non-intrattentively sprint on the spot as fast as possible. 
intrattentive 
sprint 
4 Intrattentive Sit and intrattentively observe the other dancers and also 
observation observe the clock. After one minute shout 'change'. 
and clock 
watch 
5 Non- Open one hand and simultaneously close the other. The 
intrattentive action must be extremely slow to allow intrattentive 
closing and awareness to be directed to every detail of the 
opening of movement. 
hands 
6 Intrattentive Intrattentively minor any of the other dancers. 
minoring 
7 Non- Stand still, but maintain a non-intrattentive 
intrattentive consciousness, trying not to observe others or reflect on 
stillness self, but trying just to exist in the stillness. 
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Station Task Action for each participant at the station 
8 Intrattentive Intrattentively rehearse a set phrase of movement. This 
set phrase phrase will be taught to, or choreographed by, the dancer 
prior to the commencement of the circuit. The movement 
can, of course, be specific to the piece. 
At different intervals during the consciousness circuit, the dancers are instructed by 
the choreographer to exit the room or performance space. After varying amounts of 
time they are then asked to return to the same station and to continue with the task. 
Not only is it essential that the dancers are able to switch from one state to another 
whilst performing, it is also vital that they are able to enter a performance in a 
particular state, thus switching from their off stage everyday state to a performance 
state. The dancers are encouraged to maintain the appropriate state of consciousness 
whilst off stage and to continue to use the suitable means of access rather than 
switching off. 
The structure for Workshop 2 of the switching states training is shown in Table 21.109 
Table 21: Switching states training: Workshop 2 
Task 
number 
Task Means of access 
I Warm up External intrattention and external 
non-intrattention 
2 Solo improvisation External non-intrattention 
" internal non-intrattention 
" kinaesthetic non-intrattention 
3 Speed walk External intrattention 
> internal intrattention 
I > kinaesthetic 
intrattention 
109 Only the workshop structures for the switching states training have been included in this chapter 
because the workshop descriptions are particularly lengthy. A sample switching states workshop 
description can be found in Appendix C and Chapter 40 on the DVD which accompanies this thesis 
provides an example of two dancers participating in a consciousness circuit. 
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Task 
Task Means of access number 
4 Running and observing External non-intrattention 
> internal non-intrattention 
> kinaesthetic non-intrattention 
External intrattention 
> internal intrattention 
> kinaesthetic intrattention 
5 Closing/opening hands External non-intrattention 
> internal non-intrattention 
> kinaesthetic non-intrattention 
6 Improvisation and mirroring External intrattention 
> internal intrattention 
> kinaesthetic intrattention 
7 Stillness External non-intrattention 
> internal non-intrattention 
> kinaesthetic non-intrattention 
8 Choreograph/learn/rehearse set External intrattention 
phrase > internal intrattention 
> kinaesthetic intrattention 
9 Entering and exiting External non-intrattention 
> internal non-intrattention 
> kinaesthetic non-intrattention 
External intrattention 
> internal intrattention 
> kinaesthetic intrattention 
10 Consciousness circuit External non-intrattention 
> internal non-intrattention 
> kinaesthetic non-intrattention 
External intrattention 
> internal intrattention 
> kinaesthetic intrattention 
Having successfully completed Workshop 2, dancers have the ability to switch states 
effectively within dance performance and are therefore capable of applying more 
than one strand of the Dance Consciousness Model in any one dance piece. 
The complete Dance Consciousness Model 
Having completed all of the switching states training dancers are equipped to apply 
the Dance Consciousness Model. Each of the four strands of the model can be used 
independently or in conjunction with one another, giving choreographers and dancers 
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control over the conscious state for the dance process and dance performance. Figure 
7 represents the complete Dance Consciousness Model. 
Figure 7: The Dance Consciousness Model 
SELF GENERATED 4-10- IMPROVISED 4-10- OTBER GENERATED 
Intrattentive Non-intrattentive 
choreographic Ddemal Ddernal choreographic 
process intrattention non-intrattention process 
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rehearsal Internal Internal rehearsal 
process intrattention non-intrattention process + 41 
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Summary 
Following a thorough consideration as to why the ability to switch states in process 
and perfonnance is necessary and a review of Cyclic State Training, this chapter 
proposed an answer to the fifth focussed research question: How can one switch 
between the intrattentive dance consciousness and the non-intrattentive dance 
consciousness? 
This chapter has described the switching states training and the I-NI and NI-I strands 
of the Dance Consciousness Model. In doing so, the presentation of the Dance 
Consciousness Model has been completed, as was required by the sixth focussed 
research question: What constitutes the full Dance Consciousness Model? 
Chapter 7 considers the effectiveness of the Dance Consciousness Model. 
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Chapter 7 
How effective is the Dance Consciousness Model? 
Introduction 
The following is a summary of each preceding chapter and an explanation of how the 
research questions have been addressed and the way in which the outcome of this 
research has been developed. 
Chapter 1: Why is the. dancer's consciousness significant? Following a review of 
the existing literature dealing with the dance consciousness, the chapter 
introduced the intended outcome of this research: To create a model that can be 
used to enable dancers to access particular conscious states for performance - the 
Dance Consciousness Model. Seven focussed research questions were asked, six 
of which have been answered in Chapters 2,3,4,5 and 6. 
Chapter 2: What is the nature of the dance consciousness? In addition to 
examining various concepts of consciousness, this chapter formulated two 
concepts which provide insight into the nature of the dance consciousness: the 
intrattentive and non-intrattentive dance consciousness. 
* Chapter 3: How can one examine the dance consciousness? This chapter 
discussed existent methods for examining consciousness, namely 
phenomenological reduction and the explicitation session, and introduced the 
method of examination that was formulated for use within the context of the 
Dance Consciousness Model. 
e Chapter 4: How can one access the intrattentive dance consciousness? The 
theories and practices that inspired the intrattentive strand, namely somatic 
practices, sport psychology, and visual and verbal processing theories, were 
discussed. Chapter 4 explained the intrattentive strand of the Dance 
Consciousness Model, which can be used to access the intrattentive dance 
consciousness, and described the intrattentive training that precedes its use. 
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Chapter 5: How can one access the non-intrattentive dance consciousness? This 
chapter discussed the theories and practices that inspired the non-intrattentive 
strand, namely attention studies, Buddhist Introspection and Bodyweather. It then 
explained the non-intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness Model, which 
can be used to access the non-intrattentive dance consciousness, and described the 
non-intrattentive training that precedes its use. 
* Chapter 6: How can one switch between the intrattentive dance consciousness and 
the non-intrattentive dance consciousness? What constitutes the full Dance 
Consciousness Model? Having introduced the intratteptive to non-intrattentive (I- 
NI) and non-intrattentive to intrattentive (NI-1) strands of the Dance 
Consciousness Model, this chapter described the switching states training that 
precede their use. Included in this description was an explanation of Cyclic State 
Training, and how it inspired the switching states training. Finally, the complete 
Dance Consciousness Model was presented. 
Chapter 7 considers the final research question: How effective is the Dance 
Consciousness Model? 
Chapter breakdown 
The Dance Consciousness Model has been formulated, gradually over three years. 
During this time, three empirical projects have been undertaken with a group of 
trained dancers. Chapter 7 describes Empirical Project I and Empirical Project 2, in 
which the intrattentive strand and the non-intrattentive strand respectively were 
formulated. Empirical Project 3, which comprises seven phases, is then analysed. 
Phases 1 to 3 are considered in some detail. Phase 4 is broken down into the 
following parts: 
Fundamental intrattention; 
Higher order intrattention; 
Intrattentive stimuli; 
Intrattentive, verbal report; 
Intrattentive physical observation; 
Intrattentive blind sensing; 
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* Three means of intrattentive access; 
* Three intrattentive states; 
* Intrattentive training summary. 
Phase 5 is broken down as follows: 
" Fundamental non-intrattention; 
" Higher order non-intrattention; 
" Non-intrattentive, stimuli; 
" Non-intrattentive verbal report; 
" Non-intrattentive physical observation; 
" Non-intrattentive active listening; 
" Three means of non-intrattentive access; 
" Three non-intrattentive states; 
" Non-intrattentive training summary. 
Phase 6 comprises process switching and performance switching. The analysis of 
Phase 7 includes a consideration of the effect of the model within choreography, 
rehearsal and performance. 
A conclusion regarding the efficacy of the Dance Consciousness Model within the 
context of Western contemporary dance is then reached. Within this, the chapter 
considers possible improvements that could be made to the model and indicates how 
it is intended that this dance consciousness research will develop further in the 
future. This is followed by a hypothesis concerning the possible significance of the 
model within current dance practice and it is questioned whether the Dance 
Consciousness Model might be considered as a proposal for new practice. 
Ethics in research 
The research undertaken in the three empirical projects complied with the ethical 
guidelines of the University of Leeds. The dancers who participated in the empirical 
projects all consented to comply with the guidelines and their accounts of their 
experiences and feelings were provided freely. The dancers were informed of the 
purpose of , the empirical projects and their role within the projects. It was also 
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clarified why the projects were being undertaken and who would be conducting the 
research. The dancers were informed that, if necessary, they had the right to abstain 
from the project in which they were involved. In addition, the dancers were notified 
that, at any point during the project, they had the right to withdraw or renegotiate any 
consent given in relation to the use of their accounts or video recordings in which 
they appeared. The dancers were also informed that they were welcome to reject the 
use of recording equipment if they felt it inappropriate. 
In Empirical Project I it was necessary to withhold some inform' ation from particular 
dancers in order to examine the effect that being uninformed had on each, dancer's 
ability to access certain states. These dancers were provided with as much 
information as possible at the earliest opportunity and, on completion of the project, 
were informed fully of the information that had been withheld and the reasons for it 
being withheld. At this point the dancers were notified that they had the right to 
withdraw their accounts should they deem it necessary. 
At the outset of each empirical project, it was confirmed to the dancers that their 
accounts would be kept confidential, would remain anonymous and would be stored 
in a secure manner. This was also the case for any related research records, for 
example video recordings. The dancers were informed that they would be given 
access to their own records on request. In the disclosure and analysis of the dancers' 
accounts included in this chapter, the dancers are not referred to in any way that 
could result in their direct identification. The accounts provided in this chapter and 
the transcript presented in Appendix D110 have been shown to the relevant dancers to 
ensure accuracy and to give them the right to refuse the disclosure of any particular 
part of their accounts. The dancers were informed that any personal information 
made known to the author of this thesis during the empirical projects would be 
retained in a confidential manner. 
110 All of the dancers' discussions and interviews were video recorded. It is not possible to include in 
this thesis the transcripts for all discussions and interviews and so a sample is provided in Appendix 
D. 
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Empirical Project I- intrattention 
Between March and October 2003, six trained dancers participated in the 
intrattentive Empirical Project. The project was filmed with a video camera and the 
dancers were interviewed throughout. The project consisted of four phases. 
Phase 1 was undertaken by two dancers (D I and D2) and comprised six exploratory 
research workshops. The purpose of Phase I was to investigate the intrattentive 
consciousness through a variety of tasks, in order to find some possible methods for 
accessing intrattention within the dance process. It was intended that such methods 
would be used subsequently to transfer intrattention into dance performance. The 
dancers were informed of the purpose of the research and the Dance Consciousness 
Model and the concepts and terminology discussed in Chapter 2. They therefore had 
a comprehensive understanding of the different states and the characteristics of these 
states. The dancers were also taught to use the methods of examination explained in 
Chapter 3. 
The design of the tasks incorporated the theories discussed in Chapter 4, namely 
somatic practices, sport psychology, and visual and verbal processing theories. Many 
of the tasks proved successful, such as the physical observation tasks. Some tasks, 
such as the verbal report and blind sensing tasks, required constant modification. For 
example in the first workshop the notion of using present report as opposed to pre- or 
post-report had not been decided and some experimentation with the verbal report 
was necessary before it was ascertained that the present-report was most effective. 
Another example is the motion blind sensing tasks which required modification in 
terms of the way in which they developed. It was eventually decided that a gradual 
progression into the tasks was necessary to ensure that the dancers felt comfortable 
and able to maintain focussed intrattention. 
Several tasks were discarded when they were not considered sufficiently effective for 
the accessing of intrattention. One such task involved the physical manipulating of 
one's own body. This task, entitled physical manipulation, required the dancer to 
move his or her body parts only when moved by another body part. For example, in 
order to move a leg the dancer would have to lift the leg with the arm. Although this 
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task encouraged some intrattention, the dancers found it difficult to focus the 
intrattention and the task proved slightly impractical and limiting in terms of the 
actual movement material. Another discarded task was a mover/observer task in 
which the observer used verbal report to direct the movements of the mover. The 
mover therefore only moved in response to the observer's directions. Whilst this task 
resulted in some interesting movement material, those in the mover role found 
themselves responding on impulse to the directions and not finding time to focus 
intrattentively on the movement, and those in the observer role claimed that they 
were not really focussing on the mover at all as they became preoccupied with 
having to constantly list movement directions. 
From the analysis of the effective, modified and discarded tasks, the experiences of 
the two dancers - which were determined according to the methods of examination 
described in Chapter 3- and the theories discussed in Chapter 4, the intrattentive 
means of access were created. As a result, at the end of Phase 1, five intrattentive 
workshops were formulated. 
Phase 2 was undertaken by four dancers and comprised the application of the five 
intrattentive workshops that were defmed at the end of Phase 1. The two dancers (D I 
and D2) who had participated in Phase I were joined by two more dancers (D3 and 
D4). Unlike DI and D2, D3 and D4 were not informed about the Dance 
Consciousness Model or the underlying concepts and terminology. The reason for 
this difference in approach was to ascertain whether being informed of the purpose of 
the tasks had any effects on the way the tasks were completed and/or each dancer's 
ability to access effectively the desired states of consciousness. 
The five workshops were entitled: 
* Improvisation and verbal report; 
Improvisation, physical observation and blind sensing; 
Other imposed movement, verbal report, physical observation and blind sensing; 
Self-imposed movement, verbal report, physical observation and blind sensing; 
* Using all three means of access. 
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These workshops took a similar, although less refined, format to those described in 
Chapter 4. At the end of Phase 2, the workshops were analysed and a working model 
was created for accessing states of intrattention. This working model was later 
modified and refined to become the intrattentive strand of the Dance Consciousness 
Model. 
In Phase 3, the working model created at the end of Phase 2 was applied in practice. 
The six dancers who participated in Phase 3 included: the two (DI and D2) from 
Phase 1, who were fully informed about the purpose of the project and the means of 
access; the two (D3 and D4) who joined for Phase 2 and who had experienced using 
the means of access but had not been told all details about the project and were 
therefore deemed to be partially informed, and two additional dancers (D5 and D6) 
who were completely uninformed about either project purpose or means of access. 
Phase 3 took the form of a choreographic and rehearsal process, in which the dancers 
choreographed and rehearsed two 45-minute dance pieces. The first was a set piece 
in which all the movement, a combination of literal and non-literal, was precisely 
structured. The second piece was an improvisation in which the structure was 
determined but the movement content was not. The informed DI and D2 and the 
partially informed D3 and D4 all choreographed and rehearsed the movement using 
the working model, and thus used intrattentive means of access. The uninformed D5 
and D6, however, did not use the model and instead treated the process as they 
normally would in conventional dance practice. The purpose of this was not only to 
ascertain whether being informed was more or less effective in terms of using the 
model, but also to discern the difference between applying and not applying the 
model. 
Phase 4 was undertaken by the same six dancers and comprised the performance of 
the two dance pieces. During the first piece, DI, D2, D3 and D4 performed whilst 
using internal means of intrattentive access - internal report and internal observation 
- and DS and D6 performed in a conventional way. During the second piece, D I, D2, 
D3 and D4 performed using external means of intrattentive access - verbal report, 
physical observation and blind sensing - and D5 and D6 performed as normal. The 
pieces were performed on two separate nights in a theatre before an audience of at 
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least one hundred people. The performances were recorded on video and all six 
dancers were interviewed. 
The video footage and the results of the dancers' interviews throughout all four 
phases were analysed. As a result of the analysis: 
9 The methods of access explored in Phase 1 were adapted and eventually defined; 
9 The workshops formulated in Phase 2 were modified significantly and now act as 
the training which precedes the use of the intrattentive strand; 
The working model was revised and re-formulated to become the intrattentive 
strand, 
* The training and model were considered to be effective because of the feedback 
from dancers in the interviews. Dancers' comments included, for example, 'I felt 
completely in control of my consciousness and able to access intrattention at will 
during both performances' (D2,2003). 
It was discerned that those dancers who were informed seemed to be more able to 
access intrattentive states effectively than those who were completely uninformed; 
one dancer claimed that being informed provided an understanding of 'the dance 
consciousness and the nature of the states that [the dancers were] trying to access' 
(D2,2003). In addition, the analysis of the information also suggested that having 
uninformed dancers alongside informed dancers was not especially beneficial. The 
informed dancers commented that, at times, the uninformed dancers acted as a 
distraction when the informed dancers were attempting to use the means of access. In 
addition, the uninformed dancers felt that they were not able to engage in a 
conventional process when surrounded by dancers engaging in a non-conventional 
process. In planning and implementing Empirical Project 2, all of the above 
observations were taken into account when the extent to which dancers should be 
informed was being decided. "' 
111 Some footage of Empirical Project I can be found on Chapter 46 of the DVD which accompanies 
this thesis. 
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Empirical Project 2- non-intraftention 
Empirical Project 2, relating to non-intrattention, was undertaken between February 
and June 2004. The project was filmed with a video camera and the dancers were 
interviewed throughout. Taking the analysis of Empirical Project I into 
consideration, it was decided that Project 2 should consist of only two phases - Phase 
I for exploration and Phase 2 for application - and only two dancers (D7 and D8). 
D7 and D8 were completely informed from the outset and the dancers were at no 
point joined by partially informed or completely uninformed dancers, as this was 
deemed to be unnecessary. 
Phase I of Project 2 comprised eight exploratory research workshops. The purpose of 
Phase I was to investigate the non-intrattentive consciousness through a variety of 
tasks, in order to find some possible methods for accessing non-intrattention within 
the dance process. It was intended that such methods would be used subsequently to 
transfer non-intrattention into dance performance. The dancers were informed of the 
purpose of the research and the concepts and terminology described in Chapter 2 and 
taught to use the methods of examination discussed in Chapter 3. 
The theories and practices explored in Chapter 5, namely attention studies, Buddhist 
Introspection and Bodyweather, were used as a basis for the design of the tasks for 
use in the workshops. The workshops took a similar, but less refined, format to those 
discussed in Chapter 5 and were entitled: 
Introducing non-intrattention; 
Non-intrattentive verbal report; 
Non-intrattentive active listening; 
Non-intrattentive physical observation; 
Non-intrattentive verbal report and active listening; 
Non-intrattentive verbal report and physical observation; 
Non-intrattentive active listening and physical observation; 
All three means of access. 
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These exploratory task-based workshops took a similar structure to the intrattentive 
training formulated at the end of Empirical Project 1. As in the first phase of 
Empirical Project 1, many of the tasks proved successful, some required constant 
modification and several were discarded. Successful tasks were the verbal report 
tasks, which benefited immensely from the modifications made in Empirical Project 
I regarding the use of present- as opposed to pre- or post-report. The active listening 
tasks required some modification and the dancers experimented with using personal 
stereos and headphones prior to deciding that using over-head speakers was more 
practical. The dancers also experimented with using various single presentation 
recordings before deciding that binaural and dichotic presentations encouraged 
higher states of intrattention. 
Discarded tasks included ones which required the dancers to write and talk 
simultaneously. The premise behind such tasks was that they would encourage the 
dancers to become accustomed to moving, even if it were only moving the hand, and 
talking at the time same time. The dancers would thus have experienced dual-tasking 
and the splitting of consciousness prior to having to apply it whilst dancing. The 
dancers reported, however, that such tasks were unnecessary and it was difficult to 
direct the intrattention solely to the talking as the writing was too complex to execute 
non-intrattentively. 
From the analysis of the effective, modified and discarded tasks, the experiences of 
the two dancers - which again were determined using the methods of examination 
introduced in Chapter 3- and the theory discussed in Chapter 5, the non-intrattentive 
means of access were created, the non-intrattentive training determined and a 
working model formulated for accessing states of non-intrattention. 
Phase 2 comprised the application of the working model created at the end of Phase 
1. -In a formal performance workshop presented before an audience, D7 and D8 
presented a practical application of the non-intrattentive working model, using 
external, internal and kinaesthetic non-intrattention within improvisation and set 
movement, both as a solo and duet. The performance workshop was recorded with a 
video camera and subsequent to the workshop the dancers participated in an open 
discussion and interviews. 
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The video footage, the dancer interviews, the questionnaires obtained as a result of 
the dancers using the method of examination, and the open discussion were all 
analysed. As a result of the analysis: 
The methods of access explored in Phase I were adapted and eventually defined, 
and the workshops formulated in Phase I were modified significantly to form the 
training which precedes the use of the non-intrattentive strand; 
The working model was revised and re-formulated to become the non-intrattentive 
strand; 
* The training and model were considered effective because of the feedback from 
dancers. For example: 
I was not aware of what my body was doing - although looking back 
at the video I know that I was successfully choreographing, rehearsing 
and performing successful movement material. I really feel as if I am 
able to access states of non-intrattention. 
(D7,2004)' 12 
Empirical Project 3- applying the Dance Consciousness Model 
Between September and February 2005, four trained dancers (D9, D 10, DII and 
D12) participaied in the first full application of the Dance Consciousness Model and 
the training that precedes its use. The model was formulated after the first two 
empirical projects had been analysed with reference to the theories discussed within 
this thesis. As in the previous two projects, Empirical Project 3 was filmed with a 
video camera and the dancers were interviewed throughout the process. Project 3 
comprised seven phases which correspond with the seven chapters in this thesis, and 
thus the titles of each phase and each chapter are the same. The seven phases also 
correspond with the focussed research questions presented in Chapter 1 and were 
structured as follows: 
112 Some footage of Empirical Project 2 can be found on Chapter 46 of the DVD which accompanies 
this thesis. 
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* Phase 1: Why is the dancer's consciousness significant? The dancers participated 
in a discussion about the purpose of the Dance Consciousness Model in relation to 
the research questions and research outcome defined in Chapter 1. 
* Phase 2: What is the nature of the dance consciousness? The dancers were 
informed of the concepts of consciousness as described in Chapter 2, intrattention 
and non-intrattention, and the relevant terminology. 
9 Phase 3: How can one examine the dance consciousness? The dancers were 
informed of the method of examination, as introduced in Chapter 3, and taught 
how to apply the method. 
Phase 4: How can one access the intrattentive dance consciousness? The dancers 
participated in the three intrattentive training workshops as described in Chapter 4 
and, in doing so, learnt how to apply the intrattentive strand of the Dance 
Consciousness Model. During the training the dancers also applied the method of 
examination, which provided assurance that they were accessing the intrattentive 
states effectively and applying the intrattentive strand accurately. 
Phase 5: How can one access the non-intrattentive dance consciousness? The 
dancers participated in the four non-intrattentive training workshops as described 
in Chapter 5 and, in doing so, learnt how to apply the non-intrattentive strand of 
the Dance Consciousness Model. During the training the dancers also applied the 
method of examination, which provided assurance that they were accessing the 
non-intrattentive states effectively and applying the non-intrattentive strand 
accurately. 
& Phase 6: How can one switch states between the intrattentive dance consciousness 
and the non-intrattentive dance consciousness? What constitutes the full Dance 
Consciousness Model? The dancers participated in the two switching states 
training workshops as detailed in Chapter 6 and, in doing so, leamt how to switch 
states in both process and performance and thus apply the I-NI and the NI-I 
strands of the Dance Consciousness Model. During the training the dancers also 
applied the method of examination, which provided assurance that they were 
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switching states effectively. The dancers were provided with the illustration of the 
Dance Consciousness Model that is presented in Chapter 6. 
Phase 7: How effective is the Dance Consciousness Model? The dancers applied 
the Dance Consciousness Model within the choreography, rehearsal and 
performance of a dance piece lasting an hour and a half. Each section of 
movement was choreographed and rehearsed using different strands of the model, 
ensuring a combination of intrattentive and non-intrattentive movement material 
which, in turn, enabled the dancers to switch states in both process and 
performance. The piece was performed on three separate occasions, in a theatre, 
to audiences of at least fifty people. During the performances the dancers accessed 
the desired states of consciousness kinaesthetically and had complete control over 
this access. Following the third performance, each dancer participated in an 
interview in which they answered questions about the training and the application 
of the model in choreography, rehearsal and performance. The dancers were also 
invited to reflect on the experience of the Dance Consciousness Model and to 
compare this experience with normal, conventional practice. Finally, the dancers 
were asked to hypothesise about the effect the Dance Consciousness Model might 
have on Western contemporary dance practice. 113 
Analysis of Empirical Project 3 
The results of the four dancers' (D9, DIO, DII. and D12) discussions during 
workshops and of their fmal interview at the end Project 3, together with the 
observations of the choreographer, were collated and analysed. 
The information was collected by implementing the method of examination defined 
in Chapter 3, as summarised below: 
The use of the method of examination generates the accounts of an informed first 
person, the dancer, with the accounts of an informed second person, the 
choreographer/consciousness trainer. The fact that both persons are informed 
ensures that the accounts are based on third-person theory. 
113 Some footage from these interviews can be found in Chapters 41 to 45 of the DVD which 
accompanies this thesis. 
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9 Throughout Empirical Project 3, the dancers were observed and present-centred 
non-verbal information, which gave an insight into the dancers' experience, was 
collected. This information included comments about, for example: body 
language; focus; movement pace, quality and dynamics; posture; and a break in 
the use of the means of access. 
Retrospective verbal accounts were provided through interviews. During the 
interviews the choreographer used Ericksonian language, asked open questions, 
encouraged the dancer to use simple language and focussed attention on single 
experiences. 114 All interviews were in three parts: (1) retrospective open 
discussion, (2) retrospective questioning and (3) viewing of recording. 
The method of examination was applied in order to ensure that the information 
collected was as reliable and valid, and contained as little interpretation and pre- 
conception, as possible. The analysis of each of the seven phases is detailed below. 
Phases 1 and 2: Why is the dancer's consciousness significant? What is the 
nature of the dance consciousness? 
The general consensus of the dancers was that Phases 1 and 2 acted as an effective 
introduction to the project and provided them with a sufficient understanding of the 
training and of the Dance Consciousness Model itselL The dancers had no real 
difficultly in gasping the concepts or the relevant terminology and claimed that 
having this understanding aided them significantly during the training and the 
application of the model. 
It is important to note, however, that the success of the training and model is by no 
means entirely dependent on this understanding. Indeed, the model has been 
designed so that it can be used by any dancer, regardless of age, intellect, or prior 
training or knowledge of the purpose, concepts or theory underlying the model. In 
Phase 2 of Empirical Project 1, two uninformed dancers were trained to access 
intrattentive states and to apply the intrattentive strand of the model. Whilst it is 
difficult to determin& or quantify whether being informed permits a more effective 
114 See Chapter 3, pages 97 to 99, for a description of these interview techniques. 
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application of the model, it is considered that being uninformed does not seem to be 
problematic. Further theoretical and empirical research would be necessary, 
however, in order to reach any ffim concluýions. 
Phase 3: How can one examine the dance consciousness? 
The dancers understood the importance of the method of examination in reflecting on 
their own experience and providing valuable information for the research. This 
understanding grew as time went on and, in consequence, the quality of the accounts 
supplied by the dancers improved. The dancers also claimed that their understanding 
of intrattention and non-intrattention developed as their ability to access the states 
and examine their experiences improved. The dancers noted that, in the first 
workshop, they found it difficult to determine whether or not they had accessed the 
desired state but, by the final workshop and by the time they applied the model, they 
were able to examine their own dance consciousness with confidence. 
The method of examination was considered to be invaluable to the training by the 
dancers and to be equally important to the analysis presented in this chapter. It was 
the method of examination which allowed valid information to be collated regarding 
the efficacy of the training and the Dance Consciousness Model itself. 
Phase 4: How can one access the intrattentive dance consciousness? 
The dancers found the intrattentive means of access very effective and, according to 
D9, 'they definitely acted as a method for [one] to access states of intrattention'; 
whilst using them it is possible ' to become aware of self, the dance and every single 
detail to do with the movement [to the extent that one] cannot think of anything else' 
(2005). DIO stated that the intrattentive workshops were 'unlike anything else [she 
had] done before' and '[she] saw [herselfl in a way [she] had not seen [herselfl 
before' (2005). 
In order to provide a systematic and thorough analysis, each element of Phase 4 is 
compared with each of the headings from Chapter 4, where the intrattentive strand 
and intrattentive training were first discussed. The headings in Chapter 4 therefore 
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act as the framework of analysis for the intrattentive training. For ease of reference, 
these headings are repeated here: 
Fundamental intrattention; 
Higher order intrattention; 
Intrattentive stimuli; 
Intrattentive verbal report; 
Intrattentive physical observation; 
Intrattentive blind sensing; 
All three intrattentive means; 
Three intrattentive states; 
Intrattentive training summary. 
Fundamental intrattention 
Each dancer had a preferred means of intrattentive access. D 12 noted that 'we all had 
preferences and all developed our own ways of working with the means of access' 
(2005) and D10 felt that this was dependent 'on the way [one works] and whether 
[one is] a visual or verbal thinker' (2005). This comment substantiates the decision, 
introduced in Chapter 4, to incorporate a sense of dual functionality into the model 
and to place equal significance on verbal and visual processing. In offering different 
processing options, through teaching the dancers to use all three means of access in 
every combination, the Dance Consciousness Model enables dancers to select their 
preferred means. 
Not only did each dancer have a preferred means of access in general, but each one 
also found different means of access of use within specific dance components. For 
example, the dancers noied that verbal report was particularly effective when 
choreographing, teaching, learning, rehearsing and performing, but was sometimes 
less effective when improvising. Physical observation was considered to be of great 
use whilst improvising, choreographing, learning and rehearsing, but of less use 
when teaching and performing. Blind sensing was a valuable technique during 
improvisation and rehearsal, but less practical for choreographing, learning, teaching 
and performing. The dancers noted that experimenting during the training with all of 
the dance components ensured a more effective application of the actual model as, by 
233 
the time they applied it, they had actively sampled and evaluated every means of 
access within each dance component. 
The efficacy of the means of access also seemed to be dependent on whether the 
dancers were working alone or with others. For example, some dancers claimed to 
have preferred physical observation when working with others than when working on 
their own. Blind sensing, on the other hand, was more popular when dancing solo. 
The dancers experimented with using a combination of means when working as a 
duet or a group; for example, they rehearsed movement with one dancer reporting 
whilst another observed. In general, however, all the dancers felt that, when not 
dancing solo, it was most effective if all of the dancers were using the same means of 
access because this promoted a greater connection between self and others. Despite 
this, when using blind sensing in a group or duet, the dancers often found it 
beneficial for some dancers to use verbal report whilst others used blind sensing. 
Higher order intraftention 
It took some time for the dancers to begin to use higher order intrattention and, in the 
first workshop for example, they were far more concerned with mastering access to 
fundamental states. In these instances the dancers were sometimes unaware of the 
moments in which their intrattention lapsed. It was observed that there were 
occasions when a dancer stopped attending to self and allowed the mind to wander; 
perhaps, for example, this was to look at the clock on the wall, someone else moving 
in the space, or something outside the window. At such times, it appeared as if the 
dancer concerned was unintentionally allowing non-intrattention to impose upon the 
intrattention and thus affect the quality of that intrattention, or even negate it. 
Without the presence of a higher order state, the dancers did not detect the presence 
of the intruding non-intrattention or even the redirection of intrattention from self to 
an external object. Retrospective discussions were of great use here, as they enabled 
the choreographer to inform the dancers of the moments in which they appeared to 
lose the intrattention and encourage them to reflect back on the sensation 
experienced during those occurrences. 
These discussions helped the dancers to understand lapses in intrattention and, as the 
training progressed, the dancers claimed to be using the higher states and began to 
234 
have more control over the fundamental intrattention. Dancers seemed to be more 
competent in maintaining the fundamental state for longer periods, perhaps as a 
result of continual exposure. On the occasions when their minds did seem to wander, 
the dancers were able to apply thought-stopping techniques and redirect attention 
instantaneously to the fundamental state. The dancers each developed their own 
techniques, but they noted that, in general, the thought-stopping is not something: 
... [one has] to apply actively. It ... becomes second nature 
for the 
word 'stop"- or 'refocus' to enter the report when the mind is straying, 
or for a red light to appear when [one is] physically observing ... (D9,2005) 
Dancers also commented that accessing a heightened state 'is not really something 
[one] can be trained to do, there are no real techniques' instead it is 'more about 
having an increased awareness, it's something that after a while [one] can just do' 
(D9,2005). In addition, the dancers reported that they were not necessarily aware of 
accessing the higher states. Despite this, all the dancers claimed that they believed 
that developing the ability to access higher states was an essential part of the training 
process. 
Intrattentive stimuli 
The dancers had no problem at all, with the aid of the means of access, in attending 
to self, and they noted that whilst using the means of access during solo work: 
... it was possible to enter completely into [one's] own little world ... 
and in that world only the dancing self exists ... it's all [one thinks] 
about ... . (D 11,2005) 
The dancers noted that the mover/observer exercises assisted with the transition 
between attending to self, and attending to self and other. They stated that such 
exercises allowed an experiential understanding of how it felt to attend entirely to 
other. The dancers noted that, through amalgamating that experiential understanding 
with the experiential understanding of how it felt to attend solely to self, they were 
able subsequently to attend to self and other concurrently. 
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The dancers asserted that intrattending to self and other concurrently is possible and 
very effective, although it is more difficult than attending solely to self. Whilst 
working as a duet, many of the dancers claimed that they allowed the intrattention to 
move between attending to self, attending to other, and attending to self and other. 
They noted that this was often dependent on, for example, whether they were making 
contact with their partner, whether they could see their partner, or whether they were 
moving in unison or canon. 
Whilst working as a group, the dancers sometimes found it difficult to split the 
attention four ways, and they were forced constantly to keep redirecting the 
intrattention, depending on the nature of the movement. They felt that the 
intrattention sometimes became more generalised and, rather than-being directed to 
individual people, it encompassed the group as a whole. Physical observation was of 
particular use here as it allowed the dancers to create a visual imprint of the whole 
group and this, in turn, provided access to the intrattention. Verbal report, on the 
other hand, was not as effective, as the dancers struggled to have time to report 
concurrently on the movement of every dancer. 
Intrattentive verbal report 
Verbal report was the first means of access to which the dancers were exposed; it 
took them some time to become comfortable with it, especially as some of the 
dancers were not accustomed to working with their voices. Despite this, verbal report 
quickly became the most popular means of access for DIO and D12. These dancers 
both claimed to process things verbally as opposed to visually in everyday life, and 
this may have been the reason for their strong preference. All the dancers noted that 
this means of access was particularly easy to use once they had mastered it. For some 
of the dancers it became 'second nature ... and every time 
[they moved their] body 
[they] just instantaneously [began] to report' (1) 10,2005). DI from Empirical Project 
I also noted that: 
At the start of the training using verbal report seemed unnatural, but 
by the end of the training using verbal report was spontaneous, 
habitual and unconstrained. 
(2003) 
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The first few verbal report tasks focussed on equipping the dancers with an 
understanding of the difference between pre-, post- and present-report and the 
knowledge that the desirable intrattentive verbal report has a present-centred nature. 
The dancers stated that these tasks, in which they experimented physically with the 
different types of report, were a crucial part of the training process and provided a 
thorough insight into the nature and purpose of the report. 
The dancers were informed that their verbal report should include a consideration of 
the movements being executed and the sensations being experienced during that 
execution. The dancers reported on the shape, size, dynamic, pace and/or kinaesthetic 
sensation of the dance and, at times, also reported on the structure or form of the 
movement in relation to the overall phrase. One example of such a report is: 'I bend 
my left leg which is a repetition of an earlier movement and makes up part of the 
movement motif' (D9,2005). 
When the dancers first began working with the verbal report it was common for the 
pace of the movement to be slow and the movement to be almost staccato. It seemed 
that the dancers often slowed the pace down and disconnected each movement in 
order to allow plenty of time to report on it. This undesirable result was exacerbated 
by the fact that the training also promotes full body integration, which encourages 
awareness that the whole body is involved in each movement. The dancers therefore 
became very anxious about neglecting a body part and, at first, had difficulty in 
comprehending how they could possibly describe every single body part at all times 
without this affecting the pace and dynamic of the movement. 
Continual exposure, however, definitely improved the dancers' ability to use verbal 
report. As the workshops progressed, the dancers began to overcome their anxiety by 
ensuring that, each time they rehearsed a movement, they attended to a different 
body part. In addition, the dancers began to understand that, when reporting on one 
body part, it was still possible to be aware simultaneously of another body part. They 
also started to create their own verbal language and developed blanket terms which 
each incorporated an awareness of numerous body parts rather than just one. DI, 
from Empirical Project 1, stated: 
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At the beginning I would have to explain every single movement, but 
now I have short cuts, words that I can use that still encompass every 
detail. I no longer have to say it, to be aware of it. 
(2003) 
D 12 claimed 'you begin to talk in your own language or vocabulary' (2005), D 10 
said 'you sometimes use words which you associate with the movement rather than 
just describing words' (2005) and D9 stated 'sometimes you can't say every detail 
but you are still aware of every detail' (2005). In addition, the dancers noted that the 
verbal reports seemed sometimes to correspond with the movement in terms of the 
pace, quality and dynamic. In other words, the dancers manipulated their 
pronunciation and vocal speed to fit the movement and, according to the dancers, 
'this really helped to connect the report with the movement and allowed a higher 
state of intrattention' (D12,2005). As the training progressed, the dancers' ability to 
report developed considerably and, by the time it came to applying the model, the 
dancers seemed to be reporting with ease and were providing very complex and 
detailed reports. For some dancers, the reports became conversational rather than 
merely descriptive; they began to report in the third person and often corrected and 
praised themselves. 
All the dancers agreed that verbal report was a highly effective means of access to 
intrattention and that it was especially successful when working with others. D 11 
said: 
[Whilst using verbal report in group choreography] we were able to 
choreograph incredibly quickly and we came up with really interesting 
and connected movement material, it was like we were at one with 
each other. 
(2005) 
DIO stated that the intrattentive verbal report 'triggered off a sense of ensemble' and 
it is possible to 'become really in tune with each other and aware of the group 
movement' (2005). Using verbal report within a duet or group appeared to produce 
empathetic and trusting relationships and a sense of complicit6. D9 remarked: 
Normally the focus is on self within a duet but [verbal report] enables 
us to focus on both people, so I know exactly what my partner is 
doing even when my back is turned because I have reported on it. 
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Verbal report seems to create a shared bodily rhythm. When working 
as a group I know exactly what everyone else is doing. 
(2005) 
Similarly, D1 I commented that, when using verbal report, one is 'more connected to 
[one's] partner, whereas in normal practice dancers often dismiss the partner and are 
less sensitive' (2005). The dancers felt that, not only were they more connected, but 
the movement 'seemed tighter and more precise' (D 10,2005) and 'every single time 
it was exactly the same' (Dll, 2005). The use of verbal report when learning 
movement was deemed to be very effective, especially if the teacher was also 
reporting, as it enabled the dancers to learn the movement exactly as it had been 
choreographed. It was also claimed that verbal report was useful for remembering 
movement; this is possible because one is equipped with two memory resources, the 
body and the mind, which can both be used to retrieve the movement. It seems, then, 
that not only was verbal report effective as a means of access to intrattention, it also 
offered many other benefits which could positively affect both the dance process and 
dance performance. 
Intrattentive physical observation 
The dancers were taught the difference between observing passively and actively and 
they considered that this was a vital part of the training as it allowed them to see their 
dancing bodies objectively, rather than their merely being aware of them. In relation 
to this, D12 stated: 
Sometimes technique teachers or choreographers do tell you to, for 
example, "watch your aim as you move" but all you do is look at it, 
you don't actively observe it and really objectify it, you just direct 
your gaze in its direction. With physical observation the observation is 
completely active. 
(2005) 
Physical observation was the means of access preferred by D9 and D 11, both of 
whom claimed to be visual thinkers. All the dancers agreed that physical observation 
was effective in acting as a means of access to intrattention; it did, however, require 
discipline to maintain as it was easier for the mind to wander when using physical 
observation than when using verbal report. This may have been because the report is 
external and open to third-person observation. There is therefore more pressure to 
maintain the report, as it is easily discernable when the report ceases, whereas it is 
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not always as straightforward for a third person to detect when active observation 
becomes passive. Using a higher order state alongside the fundamental state whilst 
physically observing is therefore imperative. 
The dancers were again reminded of the notion of full body integration and they 
were able to apply this with some ease, without exhibiting the same anxiety they had 
experienced when learning to use the verbal report. The dancers were able to work 
methodically through the different body parts, regardless of whether the latter were 
involved directly in the actual execution of the movement or not. The dancers noted 
that their ability to apply full body integration was enhanced by the initial physical 
observation tasks in which they were required just to walk and observe self 
methodically; one dancer said, for example: 
Even if I was physically observing my feet, I could still be 
simultaneously intrattentively aware of my hands as I always had an 
image of my whole body moving. 
(D12,2005) 
DIO stated, 'it made you think about not just where the limbs are going' but also 
'what your pelvis and torso are doing at the same time and you don't normally think 
about that' (2005). D 11 claimed, 'it made you completely aware of the rest of your 
body' and one would constantly question 'oh what's the rest of my body doing 
nowT (2005). Whilst maintaining a whole body image, the dancers were also able to 
zoom in and out and focus on specific body parts. This indicates that they felt as if 
they had real control over their intrattention and had mastered the physical 
observation. One dancer said: 
I realised that in all my training I had never taken the time to really 
physically observe my own body moving. I noticed that my body does 
not necessarily move how I thought it did. Physical observation really 
made me much more aware of how my body does actually move 
rather than how I imagine it moves ... and I saw myself 
dancing in a 
different way than I ever had before. 
(DlO, 2005) 
DI, from Empirical Project 1, noted, 'I have never been so aware of my own body 
and how it moved' (2003). D9 stated, 'I could clearly visualise myself and 'I have 
never had such a clear sense of my partners and how they are moving' (2005). The 
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dancers seemed to have encountered a kind of disembodiment, in which it feels as if 
they were 'watching [themselves] on film' (D 10,2005). D1 claimed, 'it's like having 
a set of three-dimensional photographs' (2003) and DII stated: 
It feels like you are looking in a mirror and the image seems to refract 
... You can really detach your body parts ... It can 
feel as if your head 
is not part of your body, and you are looking at your body from 
another angle, as if your head is over there looking at you over here. 
(2005) 
One dancer noted that, in addition to allowing access to intrattentive states, physical 
observation forced the dancers to 'move in new ways' and 'created a really 
interesting movement quality' (DIO, 2005). Other dancers agreed and made the 
following statements: 'similar to verbal report, it can ensure that the movement is 
very precise' and 'using images of self and the choreographer it is possible to correct 
the movement' (D 11,2005); 'first of all you imagine the choreographer doing it and 
then you gradually imagine yourself doing it' (D12,2005); 'this makes the 
movement more precise than normal' (D9,2005). D 10 commented: 
You haven't got a choice not to finish off your movements, because 
you've seen it, and that's the whole process of learning it, observing it 
first, really thoroughly ... and you don't normally do that you normally just watch and copy ... and then rely on someone else to correct you. (2005) 
The dancers occasionally acted as audience members and observed each other whilst 
completing workshop tasks. Tbrough doing this, the dancers were able to gain some 
insight into the experience of an audience member when viewing an intrattentive 
dancer and they noted that physical observation 'directs the audience's attention to 
the body part that [one is] observing' (D10,2005). D9 noted that, 'it makes the 
audience at one with the dancer and a tiny shift in the dancer's focus can shift the 
audience's attention' (2005). 
Despite its apparent efficacy as a means of access, and the additional benefits 
illustrated within the dancers' feedback, physical observation was not judged to be of 
great use when teaching or choreographing material. This is because it distorts the 
movement, as the dancer is constantly moving the head and repositioning the body in 
order to observe. As a result, it is difficult for the dancer to ascertain exactly what the 
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movement is. Whilst teaching a phrase, clarity of movement is, of course, imperative 
in ensuring an accurate recapitulation on the part of the dancer. Likewise, whilst 
choreographing, it is essential for the dancer to discern exactly what the movement 
will be; this is difficult when the movement is changing constantly as a result of the 
observation. Thus physical observation must be applied tentatively during the 
teaching and choreographing process and the teacher and dancer must have a 
continual awareness of the potential resultant effect of this means of access. 
Intrattentive blind sensing 
The dancers found the motion blind sensing the most difficult means of access to 
practise. The dancers found that working with their eyes closed could sometimes be 
very effective as it allowed them to direct all their attention inwardly. At other times, 
however, it was very distracting as it affected their technical ability to execute 
movement. They claimed that they often found it difficult to keep their balance with 
eyes closed and found turning repeatedly particularly challenging. D12 stated: 
although 'blind sensing was useful whilst choreographing as it increased awareness, 
it became distracting during performance' (2005). D9 thought that this was because it 
is possible to 'almost became too aware' which resulted 'in the movement being 
affected, as [the dancer) might change movement in order to execute it effectively' 
(2005). DIO claimed: 
Blind sensing is difficult to maintain because of the possible collisions 
... once you've had a collision you become overly aware and then begin to adapt movement so that you feel in control. 
(DIO, 2005) 
At times, though, the dancers executed the motion blind sensing very successfully 
and it was possible to observe moments during which the dancers moved as if they 
had eyes open in terms of the actual movement, the temporal qualities of the 
movement and the spatial orientation. In some workshops the dancers were able to 
execute complex contact duets whilst blind sensing, thus indicating a high state of 
intrattention. In such duets the dancers walked with ease and assurance and were able 
to locate each other very quickly and move seamlessly into improvisation that was 
not uncertain or anxious. DIO considered that, in order for this sort of occurrence to 
become more regular, 'more time would be needed working with blind sensing with 
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the actual group that [one] is working with' in order to ensure 'that everyone 
becomes really comfortable and completely aware of each other' (2005). 
The dancers also stated that, in order to apply motion blind sensing successfully, the 
physical observation process must be thorough. One said: 
Even with eyes closed I would still direct my head towards the body 
part that I was imagining and that would really help with the visual 
imprints and enable me to really apply motion blind sensing. 
(D10,2005) 
The motionless blind sensing was deemed to be very effective for the dancers and 
they all claimed that it was an important part of the rehearsal process. It allowed 
them to thoroughly understand the movement and observe every detail. D12 stated: 
When I sit with my eyes closed I see a video of myself inside my 
head, it's like I can completely observe myself. 
(2005) 
DII noted, when using motionless blind sensing: 
I could see the shape my body was making and having reflected on 
this I would look at it even more. I've never been so aware of the 
shapes I was making. Now, afterwards, I feel like I could draw every 
shape that I created as I have such clear images of them. (2005) 
These accounts imply a sense of observing self almost from a third-person 
perspective, a perspective which can truly permit a heightened state of intrattentive 
awareness as it allows one to place the body as the explicit object of attention. D9, 
however, claimed: 
When I am using motionless blind sensing I still experience the 
movement, I feel myself rehearsing the movement in great detail even 
though I am sitting down. Motionless blind sensing allows me to slow 
the movement right down so I can see every little detail and work out 
exactly what each movement is. 
(2005) 
D9 seemed to be able to recreate all the sensual and kinaesthetic sensations involved 
with the movement and was thus able to engage in electroden-nal feedback. As stated 
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in Chapter 4, it is possible to create visual imprints from external and internal 
outlooks. It seems that what D 12 and D 11 described above is an external outlook, 
whereas D9 described an internal outlook. DI from Empirical Project I noted a 
similar experience to D9: 
I visualise the movement in slow motion, which gives me time to 
observe every detail from every angle, and although I am just sitting I 
can feel the motion in my body. 
(2003) 
Some of the dancers claimed to experience the visual imprints from both internal and 
external perspectives; D9 noted: 
I kept switching from looking at my body from my own perspective 
and looking at it from a third person perspective and imagining how 
someone else would see it. 
(2005) 
Using both perspectives can increase the intrattention and allow the dancer more 
intrattentive insight into the dancing self. 
In summary, it appears that the motion and motionless blind sensing are effective 
means of access. As it was quite challenging, however, especially in a group, it 
would be advisable to allot more time within the training for dancers to become 
familiar with the motion blind sensing technique. 
All three means 
The dancers claimed that, when using external intrattention, they did not necessarily 
always use more than one means concurrently, but interchanged between them, 
intermittently using whichever means or combination of means they deemed to be 
effective for the task in hand. The dancers noted that combining visual and verbal 
processing in this way increased their ability to access intrattention and also 
enhanced the quality of that intrattention. 
Prior to the external intrattention workshop, some of the dancers had already begun 
to experiment with utilising more than one means of access at a time. For example, 
when using blind sensing, the dancers sometimes also used verbal report as they felt 
that using the two concurrently increased their ability to access intrattention. D10 
244 
claimed that 'blind sensing with report is very effective and it is possible to create 
clear visual imprints' (2005). When it came to using external intrattention, therefore, 
the dancers did not find it too challenging and adapted very quickly. It was of 
common consensus that using external intrattention was generally more effective, in 
the majority of the dance components, than using a single means of access. D9 noted, 
'it is a different sensation when you are using all three means, you are even more 
aware and know exactly what you are doing' (2005). D12 stated that, when learning 
movement material, 'verbal report and physical observation were very effective, 
especially when used together' (2005). Dll agreed, saying, 'I would physically 
observe different body -parts to the parts I was verbally reporting on' and was 
therefore 'more aware of more parts' (2005). D 12 continued: 
We would physically observe the choreographer doing the phrase and 
at the same time we, and the choreographer, would use verbal report. 
This would allow us to create visual imprints of the phrase and you 
could even hear the report that the choreographer was using whilst 
rehearsing on your own - in the form of an inner monologue. This 
would enable you to perfectly recreate it. 
(2005) 
The dancers suggested that the combination of physical observation and verbal report 
was also effective as the former can be used to create an overall image and then the 
latter to zoom in to a particular body part. In addition, DIO noted that, when using 
these means of access, the movement 'got into the body really quickly and really 
accurately, it would strangely just be within the body' (2005). The dancers 
considered that the external intrattention allowed 'quicker and deeper access and 
[one was] more likely to maintain that access' (D 11,2005). Having the different 
means available ensured that 'in the moments that [one] would normally lose the 
intrattention, [one could] just swap to a different means' (D9,2005). 
The dancers commented that, at first, the decision to interchange between means or 
to apply more than one means simultaneously was a conscious one. After continual 
exposure, however, they claimed that the interchanging and simultaneous use 
became more natural and spontaneous. Some of the dancers preferred to interchange 
intermittently, some interchanged methodically and some did not interchange but 
used more than one means simultaneously. 
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It seems, then, that external intrattention is an effective means of access to 
intrattention and it was deemed by many of the dancers to be the most effective of all 
the means. Other benefits were also identified. D9, for example, said, 'you can work 
really fast with this means of access, much faster and much more thoroughly than in 
a normal process' (2005). D12 suggested that it was possible to 'learn movement 
really quickly' (2005). This is perhaps a result of the stimulation of two senses - 
sight and hearing. External intrattention did indeed seem to have a significant impact 
on the dancers' ability to learn and remember movement. DII stated: 
It will be invaluable to use intrattention during choreography and this 
will really save time in the rehearsal process. It really helps you to 
have more sensitivity towards other dancers. Intrattention leaves 
nothing to chance. 
(2005) 
Another observation was that using external intrattention improved the dancer's 
ability to mimic stylistically the movement of another dancer or the choreographer. 
In other words, the dancers were able not only to pick up the actions of another 
dancer or those taught by the choreographer, but also to take those movements into 
their own bodies. D 11 claimed: 
Sometimes I found myself doing a movement how I normally would 
do it in my style ... so I would physically observe and report on the 
choreographer and then re-Qbserve myself and be able to recognise 
and correct the differences. I wouldn't' normally be so aware of my 
own style coming in, it's normally something that is subconscious and 
goes unnoticed. Using this technique allowed me to recognise these 
points and alter them. This technique prompts you to attend to 
people's idiosyncratic details and embody them yourself The 
movement doesn't feel like someone else's movement, it feels like 
your own. 
(2005) 
Similarly, D12 suggested that 'it was starting to really look like people were 
inheriting each other's style' and 'normally when learning someone else's movement 
dancers still inject their own style' (2005). This is perhaps a result of the degree to 
which the dancers were able to access states of intrattention. 
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Three intrattentive states 
Before the training process started, it had been anticipated that using internal means 
of access would be more difficult than using external means, as internal means 
require less physical action and are not subject to third-person observation. Although 
the dancers at first found it difficult to maintain internal means of access, after 
continual exposure and the use of higher order states of intrattention, they felt as if 
the internal means were just as effective as the external means. The internal means 
require even more discipline to maintain than the external means of access and this 
discipline must be nurtured continuously. Each of the dancers seemed to have his or 
her own method for maintaining the internal intrattention and all were in agreement 
with D12 who said: 
Once you've got the hang of it, it's easy to maintain an internal report 
as it's not that dissimilar from an external report, and it's even easier 
to maintain visual imprints as you are accustomed to doing this in 
blind sensing. 
(2005) 
The dancers claimed that they were able to 'maintain the reflection [they] had created 
during the external process' (D9,2005) in each of the dance components and whilst 
working as a solo, duet and as a group. One of the dancers from Empirical Project I 
even suggested that the internal access was more effective than the external and 
claimed that: 
The visual imprints became far more vivid with the internal means 
and far more accessible ... they became three dimensional mapped images rather than the more translucent ones from the beginning. 
(D2,2003) 
This, however, may have beena result of other factors such as continual exposure, a 
development in the dancer's ability to access, and/or a development in the dancer's 
ability to examine. All the dancers in Empirical Project 3 were of the opinion that 
internal means of access are an essential part of the process, but that their use is 
dependent entirely on primarily being able to use external means of access. 
The dancers were also taught to experience the intrattention kinaesthetically without 
the means of access. It had been anticipated that the dancers might find this state 
difficult to access as, by this point, they are no longer equipped with any particular 
247 
means of access and are expected simply to allow their bodies and minds to 
experience the state. The dancers felt, however, that accessing kinaesthetic 
intrattention was not problematic at all. One stated, as a result of having mastered the 
external and internal means of access, 'my thinking body and dancing mind is now 
able to experience and understand the sensation of an intrattentive state' (D 12,2005) 
and therefore 'I am able to simply exist in the intrattention' (D9,2005). D 11 claimed, 
'it didn't feel difficult at all'; it felt 'completely natural, you just take away the 
means of access and you are left with pure intrattention' (2005) and D 10 maintained: 
I no longer needed the means of access. Although they had allowed 
me to understand the state in the first place ... they just weren't needed 
any more ... I can now access intrattention. without them. (DIO, 2005) 
From feedback such as the above, it is considered that kinaesthetic intrattention can 
be accessed effectively. This access, however, is dependent entirely on the external 
and internal means of access. Each of the three states - external, internal and 
kinaesthetic - is important in the training and in the application of the Dance 
Consciousness Model itself. 
Intrattentive training summary 
From the above analysis, it can be assumed that the intrattentive training worked 
effectively and enabled trained dancers to access states of intrattention whilst 
improvising, choreographing, learning, teaching, rehearsing and performing as a 
solo, in a duet or group. The dancers were able to access these states externally, 
internally and kinaesthetically. 
I 
At the end of Phase 4, the dancers claimed that the training allowed a clear 
4connection between body and mind' (D 11,2005) and, after the intrattentive training, 
D12 affirmed, 'I am generally much more aware of my body' (2005). There was, in 
addition, evidence to suggest that the dancers were even transferring the accessing 
skills into other dance contexts. For example, having successfully completed the 
intrattentive training, D10 said, 'I have been much more aware of myself in 
technique class' (2005). This is worthy of note and perhaps indicates that the means 
of access can be applied within contexts other than choreography, rehearsal and 
performance. Indeed, D12 claimed: 
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The intrattentive means have really helped me as a teacher, especially 
with my younger students. I now use a ... simplified version of the 
model with my students, in which I use verbal report when teaching 
them movement ... and I ask them to use physical observation on themselves. 
(D12,2005) 
It is considered, then, that the model promotes skills which are transferable into 
different parts of Western contemporary dance practice, such as technique class and 
dance teaching. 
Whilst the dancers were using the external intrattentive means of access, it was 
possible, of course, for the choreographer or trainer to hear them talking or watch 
them observing. Although the internal and kinaesthetic access could not be witnessed 
in such a way, it was still always possible to discern whether or not the dancers had 
accessed intrattention. There are some non-verbal indices and signals that seem to be 
inherent in, and characteristic of, intrattentive states! 15 
When dancing intrattentively the dancer is focussed and not distracted by external 
factors, such as other people moving or talking in the room. The eyes are usually 
directed downwards or straight forward and the facial expression is one of 
concentration. The dancer appears to be completely absorbed in the task and, at the 
same time, thoughtful and reflective. The body is most often controlled and the 
movement is precise, dynamically strong, neatly structured and formed. It was 
possible to observe all these qualities in the dancers and thus discern that they were 
accessing states of intrattention. At times it was possible to observe, for example, a 
change in focus, a relaxing of the body or an increase in pace, and this normally 
indicated a lapse in the intrattention. Observations about such changes more often 
than not correlated with the reports of the dancers in relation to the moments in 
which they had not managed to maintain access. 
To summarise, the intrattentive training allowed dancers not only to experience the 
dance but also knowingly, attentively and intentionally to be aware of the dance. In 
115 Although the purpose of the model, as outlined in Chapter 3, is concerned with the dancer's 
experience of the dance, as opposed to the nature or quality of the choreography or performance, it is 
of interest to make note of the following observations. One must maintain an awareness, however, that 
such observations are not the criterion upon which the effectiveness of the Dancc Consciousness 
Model is judged. 
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the majority of instances, the dance became the dancers' explicit object of attention. 
Through the means of access the dancers were able to be aware of the experience of 
the dance, including the dancing body, the dancing mind and other external factors 
surrounding the dance. At times the dancers experienced ordinary states of 
intrattention in which complete awareness was focussed on the dance. They also 
experienced heightened states of intrattention during which they were able to monitor 
their awareness introspectively. The dancers were able to report non-inferentially on 
these intrattentive experiences. Finally, it was possible for a third-party, such as the 
choreographer or trainer, to witness the dancers' experience through observation. 
It is worth noting, however, that music, properties and set, when they were used in 
later phases for the first time, had a significant impact on the dancers. This late 
introduction of key elements of the performance may have been a flaw. Although the 
dancers became used to working with these elements during later phases, the dancers 
expressed the view that it would have been beneficial if these elements had been 
introduced during the intrattentive training in Phase 4. 
Phase 5: How can one access the non-intrattentive dance consciousness? 
The dancers found the non-intrattentive means very valuable; comments included: 
'the non-intrattentive means of access allowed me to access non-intrattentive states' 
(D 12,2005); '1 was able to dance without thinking about what I was doing' (D 11, 
2005); the non-intrattentive workshops 'enabled me to dance in a way I have never 
really experienced before' (D9,2005). 
The analysis of Phase 5 is more concise than that of Phase 4 as many of the 
observations and information from interviews and questionnaires applied to both 
phases and have been included above. The headings in Chapter 5, in which the non- 
intrattentive strand and non-intrattentive training were first introduced, provide a 
convenient framework for the systematic and thorough analysis of Phase 5 and, in 
effect, the non-intrattentive training. For ease of reference the headings in Chapter 5 
are repeated below: 
9 Fundamental non-intrattention; 
9 Higher order non-intrattention; 
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" Non-intrattentive stimuli; 
" Non-intrattentive verbal report; 
" Non-intrattentive physical observation; 
" Non-intrattentive active listening; 
" All three non-intrattentive means; 
" Three non-intrattentive states; 
" Non-intrattentive training summary. 
Fundamental non-intrattention 
As in Phase 4, during which dancers each expressed or demonstrated a preference for 
particular means of access to an intrattentive state, t hey each developed a preference 
in Phase 5 for accessing non-intrattention. This again supports the decision to 
incorporate a sense of dual functionality into the model and to place equal 
significance on verbal and visual processing, and to teach the dancers to use all three 
means of non-intrattentive access in every combination. 
Again, the dancers found different means of access of use within different dance 
components. For example, all the dancers noted that non-intrattentive verbal report 
was particularly effective when improvising, choreographing, leaming, rehearsing 
and performing, but was less effective when teaching. Non-intrattentive physical 
observation was considered to be of great use whilst improvising and rehearsing, but 
of less use when learning, teaching, choreographing and performing. Active listening 
proved helpful for improvisation, learning, rehearsal and choreography, but less 
practical for teaching and performing. Once more, all the dancers noted that 
experimenting during the training with all of the dance components ensured a more 
effective application of the actual model. The decision to incorporate every dance 
component into each workshop was therefore considered to have been valid. 
As in Phase 4, the dancers were trained during Phase 5 to use the means of access 
whilst working in solo, duet and group contexts and, once again, the efficacy of the 
means of access seemed to be dependent on whether the dancers were working alone 
or with others. For example, although all the dancers claimed that verbal report was a 
fairly effective means of access whilst choreographing a solo, it was significantly 
more effective whilst a group piece was being choreographed as the dancers were 
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able to share a report and engage in a conversation. Consistent with their experiences 
during Phase 4, some dancers claimed to have preferred using particular means of 
access, for example verbal report, when working with other dancers than when 
working with that means on their own. Other means of access, for example physical 
observation, were more popular for solo work. 
Higher order non-intrattention 
The dancers gasped the notion of and utilised higher order states in Phase 4, and 
thus they were able to apply this understanding in Phase 5 without any difficulty. The 
difference in using this higher order state in Phase 5, however, is that it is essential 
that the awareness is not directed towards the self or the dance, but towards the 
fundamental intrattentive state, which is in turn directed towards exterior stimuli. 
This slight difference did not appear to be problematic and the dancers claimed to be 
using the heightened states very early on in Phase 5. The dancers' ability to use the 
heightened states seemed to develop in much the same manner as it did in Phase 4 
and, by the end of Phase 5, the dancers considered that they had 'complete control 
over the heightened state' (D9,2005) and were able to use it 'to its maximum 
potential' (Dll, 2005), to 'ensure that intrattention did not affect the non- 
intrattention' (D12,2005). 
Non-intrattentive stimuli 
Within each means of access the dancers had their preferred stimuli. For example, 
some dancers chose to use random words rather than structured numbers when 
reporting, some opted to observe random images rather than words, and some 
favoured listening to structured stories rather than random noises. Some of the 
dancers noted that swapping sporadically between the different stimuli was most 
effective as it 'kept [them] on [their] toes' (D8,2004). 
Ensuring that the dancers understood the purpose of the stimuli was essential. It was 
crucial that each dancer's choice of stimulus was not necessarily the stimulus they 
found easiest to use, but the one that was most effective in terms of allowing them to 
access states of non-intrattention. D12, for example, claimed: 
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I prefer using numbers when verbal reporting. If I recite my five times 
table then I find the task quite easy to do and I am able to report on 
something exterior and dance at the same time. 
(2005) 
Being able to dance and report at the same time seemed, to D12, to constitute an 
effective application of the non-intrattentive means of access. This was not, however, 
consistently the case during the training, as observed by the trainer/choreographer. 
D12 was using a report, the five times table, which did not require much intrattention 
and D12 was therefore left with enough intrattention within the capacity-limited store 
to direct to the movement. As a result the dancer was able to dance and report 
concurrently, but the dancing was executed intrattentively as opposed to non- 
intrattentively. In a discussion with D12, it was explained that it is essential that the 
stimulus is sufficiently complex to allow a state of intrattention to such an extent that 
there is no intrattention remaining for the dancing. D12 admitted that, although the 
use of numbers was preferable, in this instance it was not necessarily sufficiently 
effective as a means of access to non-intrattention. 
At the other extreme, it is essential that the stimulus is not so complex that it causes 
the dancer to disengage with the intrattention. D12's first reaction to the discussion 
mentioned above was to begin to use very complicated verbal reports, challenging 
herself to remember and recite an increasing list of random objects. The result of this 
was that, occasionally, D12 actually stopped dancing in order to remember an object. 
On other occasions, D12 stopped reporting and, again, the intrattention directed itself 
to the dance. Although the stimulus must be changing and necessitate active 
thinking, it must not cause the dancer to become overloaded. During Phase 5, this 
became known as stimulus overload. Finding a balance in terms of stimulus 
complexity is thus essential and much of Phase 5 was spent with individual dancers 
in establishing what the balance was for each. By the end of Phase 5, the problem 
had been resolved and, for example, one dancer claimed: 
I have now really grasped the idea that the stimulus must require 
complete intrattention, but not be too difficult. I have now found a 
balance for myself... this balance is different from everyone else's but 
it works for me and makes it possible to really access non- 
intrattention. 
(D12,2005) 
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Whilst working as a solo, the dancers were free to choose a stimulus and were 
therefore completely in control of making sure that the one they used was effective 
for them. Whilst working as a duet or group, this control was not always possible, as 
the stimulus sometimes had to be shared; for example, when using verbal report 
within a duet or group, conversations and discussions were permitted. The dancers 
noted that using the non-intrattentive means as part of a group or a duet was more 
enjoyable and immediately effective than when working as a solo. They claimed that 
the very act of working with another dancer provided many more stimuli towards 
which they could direct the intrattention. One dancer commented: 
Talking to someone else is much more interesting than talking to 
yourself and so it's easier to engage in the intrattention and allow your 
body to move on its own whilst you're not thinking about it. 
(D9,2005) 
The dancers agreed that sharing an intrattentive report, for example, whilst non- 
intrattentively sharing movement promoted a rapport amongst the dancers and this, 
in turn, often resulted in more connected movement. Without this rapport, dancing 
non-intrattentively with another dancer sometimes resulted in the dancers feeling 
disconnected from each other. 
Non-intrattentive verbal report 
Verbal report was the first non-intrattentive means to which the dancers were 
exposed. Having worked with report in Phase 4, the dancers did not find it very 
difficult to work with body and voice simultaneously and seemed to slip into the 
tasks with ease, immediately using present-centred, as opposed to pre- or post-, 
verbal report. DIO and D12, the verbal thinkers, once again stated that verbal report 
was their preferred means of access. All the dancers claimed that this means of 
access was particularly usable and effective, especially in terms of ascertaining a 
stimulus complexity balance. One dancer, for example, said: 
Using non-intrattentive verbal report really allowed me to dance 
without thinking at all about what I was doing, my body just seemed 
to dance along on its own whilst my mind was elsewhere, thinking 
about trivial things such as what is the sum of 176 and 892. 
(D9,2005) 
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All the dancers claimed to have experiences in which they had 'no idea about what 
[the] body was doing' (D1 1,2005) and 'afterwards [they] could not remember at all 
what [they] did' (DIO, 2005), indicating that they had accessed states of non- 
intrattention. 
It was noted in the analysis of Phase 4 that the means of access can have an effect on 
the movement. When the dancers first used the non-intrattentive verbal report whilst 
improvising, it seemed to make the movement very sporadic. Sometimes the dancers 
stood still for a moment, neither dancing nor reporting, and then suddenly and 
rapidly executed a short phrase whilst reporting, before once again stopping and 
standing still. The dancers' competence quickly developed, however, and after a 
couple of tasks they were able to report and dance concurrently and continuously and 
'the movement seemed to become automatic' (D9,2005). 
It was also observed by the dancers and the choreographer that the non-intrattentive 
movement executed during improvisations was often very repetitious and not very 
challenging with little complex contact work. It did seem, however, to be very 
unique, the dancers often executing movement which was quite different from their 
normal idiosyncratic repertoire. A typical response, when questioned about this was: 
I think the, movement we do is quite simple as it may be dangerous to 
do lots of difficult contact improvisation when neither of you is 
thinking at all about what you are doing ... I think the movement 
is 
very original though as it is completely spontaneous ... it is real and lived and comes from the heart not the mind. 
(D1 1,2005) 
One dancer commented, 'the style of the movement is affected by the conversations 
we are having at the time' (DIO, 2005). For example, when the conversations flowed 
and the dancers were reporting at an energised and rapid pace, the movement seemed 
to reflect this. This was not problematic with respect to the improvisations, but it 
might be problematic when one is choreographing to a brief For example, if a dancer 
is asked to choreograph a slow and sensual duet, and, whilst doing so, the report is 
fast and sporadic, what would the effect be on the movement? This is something 
which might be researched further, in conjunction with an exploration of whether it 
is preferable for the choreographer to determine the nature of the report as well as the 
movement. 
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It was of general consensus that the non-intrattentive verbal report was a particularly 
effective means of access to states of non-intrattention. With continual exposure the 
dancers were able to apply the means effectively whilst working as a solo, duet and 
group and within each of the dance components. In addition, the dancers commented 
that this particular means of access enabled them to work very fast as a group; one 
dancer said, 'we could not believe how quickly we were able to choreograph a 
successful, long and complex group piece' (D 10,2005). 
Non-intrattentive physical observation 
Having become familiar with the difference between passive and active observation 
during Phase 4, the dancers were able to work immediately with non-intrattentive 
physical observation, which was the non-intrattentive means of access preferred by 
D9 and D1 1, the visual thinkers. All the dancers noted that physical observation was 
effective in acting as a means of access to non-intrattention, although - similar to the 
intrattentive physical observation - it did require discipline to maintain. Despite this, 
the dancers noted that it felt quite natural to move non-intrattentively and 
concurrently to observe intrattentively. The reason for this may have been that 
undertaking such a task is a fairly familiar activity; the dancers' discussion about this 
subject was encapsulated by one who said: 
We are used to watching television and doing things at the same time. 
Often these things are simple tasks that involve movement, but that we 
can do without thought, for example I quite often do the ironing whilst 
watching television. I guess you could say that I iron non- 
intrattentively whilst watching the television intrattentively! 
(D 10,2005) 
The dancers all confirmed that they could complete routine tasks, to which they are 
habituated, whilst observing external stimuli and agreed that, if one were able to 
allow the dance to occur habitually and, at the same time, observe external stimuli, 
one should be able to dance non-intrattentively. 
After some of the physical observation tasks, the dancers were asked questions or 
required to complete questionnaires regarding the visual stimuli they had just 
observed. The purpose of these interviews and questionnaires was primarily to 
provide insight into the extent to which the dancers had observed actively the visual 
stimuli and subsequently to consider whether the dancers moved non-intrattentively 
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or not. However, there must be reservations about the validity of the information 
collected from the interviews and questionnaires, not least because such methods of 
collecting information retrospectively are reliant entirely on the capacity of each 
dancer's memory. In confirmation of this, the dancers often found it difficult to 
complete the questionnaires and insisted that this was not as a result of a lack of 
intrattentive observation, but because of their inability to remember the stimuli. 
The dancers did note, however, that the questionnaires and interviews had an 
unanticipated value in that they provided an 'incentive to attend' (D8,2004). For 
example, D12 stated: 
Knowing that you were going to be questioned about the stimuli after 
the task definitely made you more intrattentive towards the stimuli and 
therefore less intrattentive towards yourself. 
(2005) 
The dancers claimed that, at the beginning of the training, this incentive was of great 
use in forcing them into the desired state but, after some continual exposure, it was 
no longer necessary as they had achieved control. 
Non-intrattentive physical observation created a particular type of movement and a 
dynamic that was completely different from that created during the non-intrattentive 
verbal report. One dancer claimed, 'when I'm using physical observation I seem to 
do movement that I would never normally do' (D9,2005) and another said, '[the 
movement] is very organic and not at all forced' (D 10,2005). 
The movement was certainly affected by the dancers having to be forward-facing for 
the majority of their movement, because the images were projected on to one wall 
only. This was not especially problematic during improvisation, but it was very 
restricting for choreography or set movement as it resulted in the dancers rarely 
turning round or working on the floor. An additional problem was that, when the 
dancers worked as a duet or in a group, they hardly ever looked at each other and 
sometimes knocked into one another. D12 also noted, '[it is] difficult to connect with 
each other when just using physical observation' as 'your focus is completely away 
from you and your partner' (2005). External physical observation was, however, the 
only method which restricted the dancers to being almost entirely forward-facing. 
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When the dancers were working with all three means concurrently, the problem was 
insignificant as they were able to interchange between the different means when they 
wanted to turn away from the front. Having projections on all four walls of the studio 
would surmount the problem. 
The various visual stimuli affected the movement in different ways. For example, if 
the images were fast changing, the movement seemed to speed up and travel through 
space; if the dancers were asked a question which required some thought, the 
movement often slowed down. Very occasionally, the dancers even stopped dancing 
momentarily to observe the screen; this was attributed to stimulus. overload and. the 
dancers were reminded to utilise fully their heightened states to minimise the 
frequency of these instances. 
The dancers found that physical observation was particularly effective for 
improvisation, but difficult to use whilst learning material. The difficulty arose 
fundamentally because, whilst learning, the dancers had to observe two different 
stimuli at once, the choreographer and the visual stimulus. Without verbal report, the 
dancers had to rely entirely on observing the choreographer in order to learn the 
movement, and this did prove to be problematic. Although the dancers usually 
managed to pick up the movement through observation, they noted that using this 
method had a negative effect on the quality of the non-intrattention. They claimed 
that using verbal report and/or active listening was far more effective for the learning 
of material. Despite this, the dancers agreed that physical observation was an 
effective means of access for non-intrattention, with the proviso that its use needed to 
be appropriate to the context. 
Non-intrattentive active listening 
The dancers found active listening simple to use and a particularly manageable 
means of access. Based on their understanding of passive and active observation, 
they were quickly able to distinguish between passive and active listening and utilise 
a heightened state to monitor the nature of the listening. One dancer commented: 
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Active listening is accessible as it completely surrounds you ... It's all 
around you all the time ... Unlike physical observation you can't get 
away from it [and] you just have to be careful not to let yourself 
switch off. 
(DlO, 2005) 
The aural stimuli - random noises, lists of words, lists of numbers and questions - 
were projected fairly loudly through speakers and thus the sound engulfed the 
dancers completely, allowing non-intrattentive movement to arise. A potential danger 
was for the dancers to become habituated to the aural stimuli and so move the focus 
of the intrattention. so that the stimuli existed only as background noise. In such a 
situation, the dancers may unintentionally redirect the intrattention towards self and 
eradicate the possibility of dancing non-intrattentively. 
Out of the three means of access, active listening requires least action; verbal report 
involves the act of talking and physical observation requires the act of positioning the 
body in order to observe. The dancers claimed that active listening was most 
effective when used in conjunction with other means of access, and in particular with 
verbal report during which the dancers were able to answer questions or shadow the 
words on the recording. Some of the dancers noted that, in order to increase the 
intrattention whilst working with active listening as a single means of access, they 
often utilised internal monologues as well; they therefore still answered the questions 
or shadowed the words, but did so inside their heads. One of the dancers even 
claimed to use visual imprints and imagined the words in her mind or created 
connotative images. 
Ensuring a balance in terms of the complexity of the stimulus was essential for this 
means of access. If the aural stimuli were too simple, they became background noise; 
if they were too complex, listening to them resulted in stimulus overload. Either 
situation might result in a lack of intrattention. The dancers developed preferences 
about the different aural stimuli, with questions proving particularly popular as they 
permitted a clear internal monologue and required more intrattention than, for 
example, random noises. 
The aural stimuli interchanged between being presented singularly, dichotically and 
binaurally. In general, the dancers found the single presentations too simple and 
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stated that 'they did not require much intrattention' (D 11,2005). The dichotic and 
binaural presentations, however, required more intrattention as they comprised two 
different aural stimuli which were either complementary or juxtaposing. Some 
dancers noted that the greater complexity was preferable as it 'enabled [them] to 
choose actively what [they] wanted to listen to and [they] could swap between the 
stimuli' (D 10,2005). The binaural presentations were found to be more effective for 
some dancers as, in order to listen to them, they had to separate the two voices for 
themselves, which required very active intrattention. This, though, proved to be too 
much for some dancers. 
All three non-intrattentive means 
Some of the dancers had already begun to experiment with using more than one 
means of access before the external non-intrattention workshop. For example, when 
using physical observation or active listening, the dancers had sometimes intuitively 
also used verbal report, as they felt that using the two concurrently increased their 
ability to access non-intrattention. 
The dancers noted that stimulus overload was more likely to occur when using all 
three means of access simultaneously than when using a single means of access. In 
the first couple of tasks in this part of the training, the dancers appeared overloaded 
and occasional lapses in non-intrattention were observed. It is essential that the 
dancers maintain control of their consciousness and interchange between the means 
of access when necessary, rather than becoming overloaded through receiving 
simultaneously all three stimuli. 
The dancers felt that using external non-intrattention Whilst working as part of a duet 
or a group was particularly effective; this allowed the dancers to connect not only 
physically through the body, but also through the dancing mind by sharing the means 
of access. The dancers stated that it was 'exciting to be able to work together without 
having to worry about what to do with the body' (D 12,2005) and D 11 noted that 
'this would be a good way to start a workshop or introduce new people to working 
with each other' (2005). The dancers also claimed that the variety of stimuli 
facilitated the introduction of new movement and it was possible 'to feed off the 
energy of the stimuli which kept the movement fresh and spontaneous' (D9,2005). 
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As noted in earlier observations, there appeared to be a distinct correlation between 
the stimuli and the movement. This suggests that there may be potential new ways of 
choreographing, with the choreographer choosing stimuli which might sub- 
consciously influence the dancer's movementý instead of the dancer being restricted 
to a set brief 
Although the external non-intrattention. proved particularly effective for 
improvisation, rehearsal, choreography and performance, it was not as useful for the 
learning or teaching of movement material because it was difficult for the dancers to 
replicate the movement. Throughout Phase 5, the dancers found it very difficult to 
leam any of the set phrases precisely as they were tapght. Despite this, they did pick 
up most of the movement; it seemed as if they were able to absorb it intuitively. The 
dancers experienced the movement and subsequently interpreted it within their own 
dancing body. The dancers claimed that they 'were able to pick up the general shape 
and structure of the piece, but not the actual detail contained within the movement' 
(D12,2005). This resulted in unexpected movement material and some interesting 
developments and variations on the original material. The dancers claimed that this 
4was a very different way of working with movement, but it had an exciting and 
organic result' (D 10,2005). 
During the performance of material the dancers were often surprised, when 
observing each other, just how successful the improvisation or choreography actually 
was. The dancers claimed that they 'picked up more movement or created more 
movement than [they] would have expected' (D9,2005). In talking about one 
particular occasion, D 10 stated: 
I had no awareness of the duet whilst we were choreographing it, and 
in fact no awareness that we were even creating a duet ... 
but when it 
came to the performance we were able to perform a whole duet. 
Looking back at the recording I can see that it was well structured and 
contained moments of unison and canon. It was like seeing a duet that 
I had never seen before. 
(2005) 
Indeed, it seemed as if two bodies were able to create a duet and perform it to a 
satisfactory standard without the minds having to be involved actively in the 
choreography, rehearsal or performance. 
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The dancers claimed that they had found the external non-intrattention in which they 
used all three means of access very effective, more so than the single means of 
access, and they felt in control of their consciousness. They interchanged between 
the different stimuli at will, without this having a detrimental effect on the non- 
intrattention. They also expressed the opinion that undoubtedly intrattention towards 
self arose occasionally, for example if a dancer bumped into something, but they now 
felt as if they could control these interruptions and immediately re-access non- 
intrattention. 
Three non-intrattentive states 
It had been anticipated that using internal non-intrattentive means would be more 
difficult than external non-intrattentive means. Although the dancers found, at first, 
that it was demanding to maintain internal means, with continual exposure and the 
use of higher order states they realised that the internal means were just as effective 
as the external means. D10 stated, 'during internal I definitely don't start thinking 
about myself' (2005). The dancers also noted that it was essential to have techniques 
for maintaining the internal means. D9, for example, claimed, 'I internalise the 
stimuli and recap the words I have heard, inside my head' (2005). D 12 noted: 
Normally I can hear a constant drone of voices inside my head that 
represent the voices on the active listening recording ... but 
occasionally these run out and when they do I start to report intemally 
and create new internal monologues. 
(2005) 
Although all the dancers claimed to have some control over their consciousness, they 
agreed that making the transition from using external means of non-intrattentive 
access to using internal means of access was difficult. This was not the case with the 
intrattentive means, as the nature of the intrattentive state is, of course, reflective and 
thus asking self to progress to internal means is not problematic. With the non- 
intrattentive means, however, the state is non-reflective and non-aware and thus how 
can one ask oneself to stop reporting externally, for example, and start reporting 
internally without one's awareness moving to selP D12 described this transition in 
the following statement: 
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When it comes to the transition of internalising it's very strange, it's 
like a light going off and on. There's a transitional moment in which 
you have to make the decision to stop externalising and in doing this 
you attend to self. It needs to be more progressive though ... it just 
needs to develop from external to internal. When it's first quiet - 
when the voices and recordings stop - all my attention momentarily 
comes back to me just because I suddenly feel aware of me in the 
space again. 
(2005) 
One can try to make these transitions as seamless as possible, but it is imperative to 
remember that it may not be possible to rid performances completely of intrattention. 
Indeed, there may always be moments in which intrattention arises for one reason or 
another. Of paramount importance, though, is the dancer's control over his or her 
conscious state, and the ability to re-focus immediately and slip straight back into a 
non-intrattentive state. D12 continued: 
It's really important for performance because you do need to be able 
to just instantaneously swap states and therefore you need these means 
of access. What you need is control. 
(2005) 
The dancers confessed that, at times, their attention did move to self in this transition, 
and occasionally they were tempted to allow it to stay there in order to reflect on, or 
remember, the movement. They reported, however, that allowing it to remain was by 
no means beneficial. D8, from Empirical Project 2, said: 
During one task I cheated and allowed my attention to turn back to 
myself as we moved to the internal means. This was not a good idea 
though ... the result was that I couldn't remember what I was doing 
and I was completely thrown. I wasn't sure what to do with the 
information I suddenly had in my head ... and couldn't perform the 
phrase. 
(2004) 
On this occasion, the dancer had choreographed a phrase non-intrattentively using 
external means of access and was then required to perform it using internal means. 
Whilst choreographing the phrase, at no point did the dancer reflect on it or allow the 
mind to attend to it. As a result only the dancer's body had leamt the phrase, not the 
dancer's mind, as the mind had been focussed elsewhere. When it came to the 
performance and using internal means, the dancer decided to allow attention to move 
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to the phrase and let the mind, rather than the body, remember the movement. The 
problem appeared to be that the mind did not know the movement and therefore 
could not execute it effectively. Had the dancer relaxed, maintained the non- 
intrattention, ' and allowed the thinking body to stay in control and execute the 
movement, the dancer may not have faced the same difficulties. Whilst using the 
non-intrattentive means it is essential that the dancers trust their bodies to work 
independently. 
It had been anticipated that the dancers might have found kinaesthetic non- 
intrattention difficult to access as, by this point, they were no longer equipped with 
any particular means of access or any object for their intrattention. It is essential that 
the dancer trusts the body to continue to dance non-intrattentively, as it has whilst 
using the means of access. This involves giving up the means of access, letting the 
intrattention disperse and allowing the body and mind simply to experience the state. 
The following was noted: 
Accessing kinaesthetic intrattention was not problematic at all. If you 
had gone through using external and internal means in the correct way 
it just felt natural to experience the state kinaesthetically. You just 
reach a stage where you can exist in the state and you don't need the 
means of access anymore. 
(D10,2005) 
D12 added: 
By this point your body knows how it feels to dance non- 
intrattentively, and so it's not a problem just to relax and be 
kinaesthetically non-intrattentive. 
(2005) 
It seems, then, that kinaesthetic non-intrattention can be accessed effectively. This 
access is entirely dependent, however, on the external and internal means of access, 
and thus each of the three states is imperative to the training and the Dance 
Consciousness Model itself. 
Non-intrattentive training summary 
From the analysis above, it can be assumed that the non-intrattentive training worked 
effectively in the empirical research contexts. At the end of the Phase 5, the dancers 
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claimed that the training allowed them to 'be completely free' (D9,2005), 'to dance 
completely spontaneously' (DIO, 2005), 'to be present-centred' (D12,2005) and 'to 
just exist in the dance rather than anticipating it or reflecting on it' (DI 1,2005). D12 
stated: 
I can't believe that it's possible to choreograph non-intrattentively ... 
but it is and it's really effective. You would always somehow 
remember what you had done and without knowing it you could 
perform a three minute dance piece that you didn't even know you had 
created. The movement we came up with was very different to that 
which we would -choreograph normally. It was more of an impulse 
reaction to your partner and so interesting ... and with one particular 
group section we did, we did it completely non-intrattentively and it 
worked really well for that section and I really think that if we hadn't 
done it non-intrattentively it wouldn't have worked at all. 
(2005) 
All the dancers commented on the intense connection it was possible to experience 
with other dancers despite the lack of attention towards self or other. D 10 noted: 
It was amazing to have the connection with another person without 
having to think about them. Just knowing they are there, but not 
planning or reflecting, just doing. 
(2005) 
The non-intrattentive training allows the body to be in control of itself; it has to be, 
because the mind is somewhere else. The body becomes a thinking body and is able 
to move itself independently through time and space. Trusting the body to execute 
the movement without the mind directly attending to it is difficult, and the dancers 
claimed that this is because '[one is] so used to thinking about what [one's] body is 
doing whilst dancing' (D9,2005). It is essential, though, that the dancer allows the 
body to take control and allows self to experience kinaesthetically the non- 
intrattentive dance consciousness. At the end of Phase 5, D 11 commented: 
It's really exciting to just let the mind go and allow your body to take 
over ... and it's so nice to see movement that's just the body existing, 
with the body thinking for itself. 
(2005) 
It was possible to observe the dancers using external means of access, as one could 
hear them talking or see them observing. The nature of the internal and kinaesthetic 
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access meant that they Could not be observed in such a way, but it was still always 
possible to discern whether or not the dancers had accessed non-intrattention. There 
are some non-verbal indices and signals that are inherent in, and characteristic of, 
non-intrattentive states. 116 
When dancing non-intrattentively the dancer appears unconstrained, uninhibited and 
spontaneous. The eyes and face are relaxed and the gaze seems to wander. The 
dancer appears completely absorbed in the task, but at the same time, thoughtless and 
free. The body is very relaxed and appears comfortable, and the movement is 
flowing, unbound and sometimes indefinite. The movement pace tends to be fairly 
fast and continuous. It was possible to observe all these qualities in the dancers and 
thus discern that they were accessing states of non-intrattention. At times, it was 
possible to observe a change in focus, for example a tensing of the body or a 
decrease in pace, and this often indicated a lapse in the non-intrattention and the 
presence of intrattention directed towards self. These observations, more often than 
not, correlated with the parts of the dancers' reports in which they noted that they 
had not managed to maintain access. 
To summarise, the non-intrattentive training allowed the dancers to live and 
experience the dance purely, without thought or knowledge of that experience. The 
dancers were able to access states of fundamental, unattended consciousness whilst 
remaining awake and engaged in the experience of the dance. Nonetheless, they were 
unaware of what the experience was or what the dancing body or mind was doing. At 
times, the dancers experienced ordinary states of non-intrattention in which they 
became habituated to the dance. At other times, the dancers experienced heightened 
states of non-intrattention in which they became totally involved in the dance. 
As noted earlier in this chapter in relation to Phase 4, it is worth considering that the 
use of music, set and properties was overlooked in the training and was not 
introduced until a later phase. Being able to use these elements within a non- 
intrattentive performance is fairly complex and, again, this should perhaps be 
"' As noted in relation to Phase 4, although the purpose of the model is concerned with. the dancer's 
experience of the dance, as opposed to the nature or quality of the choreography or performance, it is 
of interest to make note of the following observations. Again, however, one must maintain an 
awareness that such observations are not the criterion upon which the effectiveness of the Dance 
Consciousness Model is judged. 
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something that is incorporated into the non-intrattentive training workshops in Phase 
5. 
Phase 6: How can one switch between the intrattentive dance consciousness and 
the non-intrattentive dance consciousness? What constitutes the full Dance 
Consciousness Model? 
The dancers considered that the switching states training was very valuable and that 
'this part of the training clarified how the model was going to work' (D 11,2005). D9 
said, 'it definitely taught me how to switch states' (2005) and D12 stated, '[it is] 
essential to have control of your dance consciousness' and to be able to 'swap 
between different states', without this sort of training 'I don't know how anyone 
could expect to be able to do it' (2005). 
The headings in Chapter 6, in which the I-NI and NI-I strands and switching states 
training were first described, provide a convenient framework for the systematic and 
thorough analysis of Phase 6. For ease of reference the headings in Chapter 6 are 
repeated below: 
* Switching states during the process; 
* Switching states during perfonnance; 
o Summary. 
Switching states during the process 
It had been anticipated that the dancers might find it difficult to switch between 
intrattention and non-intrattention part-way through a process, having become 
accustomed to working either completely intrattentively or completely non- 
intrattentively. This was, however, by no means what occurred. On the contrary, for 
example, the dancers were immediately able to choreograph and rehearse a phrase 
intrattentively, and then rehearse and perform it non-intrattentively. The dancers 
stated that their ability to interchange with such ease was a result of gaining control 
over their consciousness in the previous training. The dancers noted: 
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We were already used to interchanging ... because in some of the 
previous tasks we lost intrattention, for example, and entered non- 
intrattention, we then had to control our consciousness and switch 
immediately back to the intrattention. When it came to the process 
switching we didn't find it very difficult at all. 
(D9,2005) 
This control became increasingly evident in the process switching training. The 
dancers noted that, although they found the training fairly easy, they did not dispute 
its significance. They agreed that this part of the training was essential as it gave 
them a real understanding of the nature and potential of the Dance Consciousness 
Model. 
The dancers were very interested in how the various strands affected the movement 
in different ways. In the analysis presented earlier in this chapter in relation to Phases 
4 and 5, the distinctive nature of intrattentive movement and non-intrattentive 
movement was discussed. Using the I-NI strand and the NI-I strand: 
... not only allowed [the dancers] to have different conscious 
experiences to those [they] had already encountered, but also affected 
the movement in different ways. 
(DIO, 2005) 
The I-NI strand allowed movement which was precise and structured, to be 
performed spontaneously, as if for the first time. On the other hand, the NI-I strand 
allowed movement, which appeared free and unbound, to be performed with 
precision, ensuring that it was performed exactly the same in every execution. At this 
point, the dancers gained considerable insight into the model having the potential to 
create various experiences as well as particularised movement. For example, one 
dancer noted: 
We really enjoyed being able to choreograph something non- 
intrattentively ... and then later gain some insight into what the 
movement actually was, and intrattentively rehearse it and refine it, so 
we knew exactly what it was without taking away from its organic 
nature. We also enjoyed choreographing intrattentively and. -then freeing the movement later on in a non-intrattentive performance. 
(D 12,2005) 
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It is apparent, therefore, that the process switching training fulfilled its aim of 
teaching dancers to switch between states of intrattention and non-intrattention. 
Switching states during performance 
Within the performance switching training, the dancers were first taught to execute 
all the movement exercises that were to be used in the circuit, using external, internal 
and kinaesthetic means, and the dancers were able to do this with ease. The dancers 
then participated in three laps of the consciousness circuit, in which they were 
required to switch states each time they moved to a new station. The first time round, 
the dancers used external means, the second time internal means and the third time 
they experienced the states kinaesthetically. D12 stated: 
The circuit was really effective in teaching you to switch states and 
that is so valuable because that's what a performance is, all 
performances require you to switch states. You've got to be able to 
switch at will when you need to. 
(2005) 
The dancers also found that the movement tasks were effective. One stated, for 
example, 'the slow walk really made you aware of yourself and in the fast run you 
had no time to be aware' (D 11,2005). Some stations were considered to be more 
effective than others, however, and some tasks made it easier to maintain access than 
others. For example, the intrattentive mirroring allowed the dancers to access a high 
quality state of intrattention, in which they were forced to attend with focus to self 
and other in order to be able to copy the other precisely. On the other hand, the non- 
intrattentive stillness station proved more problematic. D 12 claimed: 
During the stillness it was difficult to maintain the non-intrattentive 
state and that is always the case on stage. I becafhe quite aware. It's 
difficult to just be. But it got better each time we went through the 
circuit. 
(2005) 
It is difficult to just stand and exist completely in stillness, with no thought for self, 
and without constant reflection on how one is standing and for how long one has 
been standing. The circuit allowed the dancers to experience such stillness, and then 
to move immediately into an intrattentive state at the next station. It might also have 
been of use to have allowed the dancers to experience the circuit in its opposite form, 
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so that the intrattentive stations become non-intrattentive and vice versa. This would 
have allowed the dancers, for example, to experience the stillness in an intrattentive 
state and then move from it into a non-intrattentive state. 
The dancers observed that, on the first lap, the transitions between the different 
stations, and therefore the different states, were quite obvious. As they progressed, 
however, the 'switching got easier' (D9,2005) and 'the transitions became less and 
less like transitions' (D12,2005). This indicates a development in the dancers' 
ability to interchange between the states and supports the notion of continual 
exposure. D12 noted: 
The circuit became really absorbing ... on the second and third 
execution ... and it felt really natural. I felt as if I could have carried 
on for ages. 
(2005) 
The dancers were asked whether they detected much difference between the external 
and internal executions of the circuit. D12 commented, 'there wasn't much 
difference as we are so used to moving from external to internal' (2005) and DIO 
added, 'we all still use the means inside our head so there isn't much difference at 
all' (2005). The dancers were then asked to describe their experience of the 
kinaesthetic lap and D 11 replied: 
The kinaesthetic lap was fine because of the progression, and because 
... we had warmed up physically and mentally by then. (D1 1,2005) 
When the dancers were asked whether they thought they would be able to enter into 
the kinae. sthetic lap without first participating in the first two laps, D9 commented, 
'with practice you should be able to train your mind to just switch on' (2005). This 
indicates that a consciousness warm-up is important. if a dancer is expected to enter 
a kinaesthetic state the moment he or she steps on stage, it is essential to prepare the 
consciousness off stage and work through a warm-up involving external and internal 
intrattention. 
One aim of performance switching is to prepare dancers for stepping on and off stage 
and maintaining their conscious states, which is why, during the circuit, the dancers 
270 
were asked to exit the studio at three points. After varying amounts of time, the 
dancers were asked to return and to continue immediately with the same task. The 
dancers noted that this was an important part of the circuit; one commented, 'the 
exits and entrances were effective, especially if you attempted to maintain the state 
whilst off stage' (D9,2005). 
The dancers' comments indicated that the performance switching training was 
effective and prepared the dancers for utilising more than one strand in a 
performance. 
Summary 
From the above analysis, it can be assumed that the switching states training works 
effectively and trains dancers to interchange successfully between states of 
intrattention and non-intrattention within the dance process and dance performance. 
At the end of Phase 6, the dancers claimed that the training 'definitely fulfilled its 
purpose' (DlO, 2005) and by this time they 'felt really strong and able to access the 
states' (D 12,2005). D 10 commented: 
[The switching states training] came just at the right time ... just when I felt like I had grasped the methods. I don't think it would have been 
so effective if we had tried it earlier in the process. It's a real skill, 
something we had to build up to. It's not really something that you can 
just do, which is interesting considering that most choreographers just 
expect you to be able to do it. I definitely couldn't have done it so well 
and with so much control without the training. 
(DlO, 2005) 
Before moving on to Phase 7, the dancers were each interviewed about their overall 
experience of the consciousness training. In response, comments included: 
Access is becoming much easier and much more instantaneous, it 
feels like we can switch with ease between everyday states and dance 
states. Now, after the training, I feel a lot more aware of myself as a 
dancer and of my own personal movement style. I think that when you 
know yourself better, that's when you can really push yourself as a 
dancer and push your boundaries more. That's what I feel like I am 
able to do now. This training will really help me to develop as a 
dancer. Now I have an awareness that I can move in these two 
different states I can start to work with them more and push myself 
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more instead of just existing in my normal dance state ... It's like I have a whole new dancer in me. 
(D9,2005) 
People tell you to think about your movement or not to think about 
your movement, but no-one tells you how to. Even if you do normally 
access these states you don't always know how you have accessed 
them. I feel like the training has really developed and changed me as a 
dancer. In technique classes I have become so much more aware of 
my body. It's a good way to get you moving in a different style [and] 
you might even find out that a different way of moving suits you 
better. 
(DIO, 2005) 
After the training I feel as if I understand what it means to be a dancer 
and I can now trust in my own body to exist in the different states. It's 
almost like you've been given a key to access yourself and your states, 
and realise who you really are. It enables you to recognise what sort of 
mover you are. When I started I was a non-intrattentive dancer, not 
that I knew this, now I have access to other ways of moving, 
intrattentive ways. This gives me insight into the experiences that 
other dancers might have, experiences I wasn't even aware of before 
as I was always non-intrattentive. This has widened my capabilities 
and movement possibilities. Now I have an awareness of both ways of 
moving, rather than thinking there is only one way, although never 
really knowing what that one way is. I never knew that other dancers' 
experiences were different from mine. 
(D 11,2005) 
The training is so comparable to everyday life in which you are 
constantly changing states and so it should be obvious how to do it, 
but when you are dancing it's just not. Tbat's why the training is so 
important. Having trained to access two different states I feel more 
complete as a dancer and I feel like the training has increased my 
movement vocabulary. I now have two different styles that I am able 
to access at will. The techniques really help you to make connections 
inside yourself and make connections with other dancers. I feel like I 
have mastered control of my dance consciousness and I don't know of 
any other training that allows you to do this. 
(D12,2005) 
The switching states training marked the end of the consciousness training and; at the 
end of Phase 6, the dancers were presented with an illustration of the Dance 
Consciousness Model. ' 17 
117 See Chapter 6, page 216. 
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Phase 7: How effective is the Dance Consciousness Model? 
Having completed all the training the dancers were equipped to apply the Dance 
Consciousness Model within the choreography, rehearsal and performance of a full- 
scale dance piece, the purpose of which was to assess the effectiveness of the model. 
In order to consider whether the model is effective or not, it is vital to ascertain what 
is intended by the term 'effective' - effective in what sense? It is of use here to return 
to the purpose of the Dance Consciousness Model which was provided in Chapter 3: 
The purpose of. the. Dance Consciousness Modýl is to allow choreographers and 
dancers to actively select the dance consciousness in which the dancer is to 
choreograph and perform and to subsequently access and control that chosen state, 
whether it be intrattentive and/or non-intrattentive. 
Thus, in order to be deemed effective in the context of Phase 7 of Empirical Project 
3, the model must have allowed the dancers to select, access and control their dance 
consciousness during the choreography, rehearsal and performance of the full scale 
dance piece. An analytical account of these processes is presented below. 
Choreography and rehearsal 
Every section of the hour and a half dance piece was choreographed and rehearsed 
using the Dance Consciousness Model. Each of the four strands was used for 
different sections of the piece, the chosen strand being selected to suit the nature of 
the section being choreographed. For example, when it was anticipated that a section 
would require very structured and precise movement, the intrattentive strand was 
applied. For some sections, it was not apparent, prior to the start of the choreographic 
process, which strand would be most appropriate. In these instances the dancers 
experimented with the different strands whilst improvising and gradually decided 
which strand would be the most applicable for that particular section or concept. 
As a result of using each of the four different strands, the final dance piece contained 
both intrattentive and non-intrattentive movement material and the dancers were 
therefore required to switch states within the performance. Consequently, the dance 
piece contained a variety of movements, some of which appeared to be very free and 
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spontaneous whereas others appeared to be structured and precise. The nature of the 
choreography also required the dancers to enter and exit the stage numerous times, 
again pennitting the dancers to apply their ability to switch states. 
The dancers were fairly disciplined in the use of the model during the choreographic 
process and applied it effectively within the choreography of each section. The 
dancers were very adept at using the means of access and accessing the states 
externally, internally and kinaesthetically. By this point, the dancers had developed 
strong preferences and had begun predominantly to use the means of access which 
were most effective for them personally, often to the exclusion of other means of 
access. This was not considered too problematic, although the dancers were 
constantly reminded that they had many different means available to them, and that it 
was always important to at least consider the means on offer and then decide which 
was the most appropriate for the task in hand. 
The model was easily incorporated into the choreographic process and it did not 
seem to disturb the process. The dancers endorsed this observation, and one claimed, 
for example: 
Using the model during choreography seemed really natural. By this 
point I really understood the model and how to access the different 
states. It was not at all difficult to use the model when we were 
choreographing. It just seemed really useful and I can't believe I ever 
used to choreograph without it. 
(D 12,2005) 
The dancers felt that using the model had a significant effect on the movement and 
one remarked: 
For some sections it would seem so obvious that it needed to be 
choreographed intrattentively, for example, and it seems strange that 
we never would have considered this before and would have just 
choreographed without even considering what should be going on 
inside our minds, inside our dance consciousness. 
(D 11,2005) 
The dancers claimed that switching states was a very effective technique and not 
only allowed them to move on and off stage seamlessly, but also to move effortlessly 
from one section to another. D 10 stated: 
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The first section of the piece began non-intrattentively and then 
suddenly went into a very intrattentive bit, and that was really 
interesting. The effect of the switching on the movement quality was 
significant, as well as the difference in the mind. I don't think you 
could move so well from one sort of section to another without 
switching states. 
(2005) 
There is no denying that a thorough application of the model can be expensive in 
terms of time. For example, when choreographing and rehearsing an intrattentive 
section the dancers often choreographed using verbal report and physical 
observation. They progressed to rehearsing the movement using motionless blind 
sensing and then motion blind sensing. The dancers then reassessed the movement 
and noted any sections that required further attention after which, if it was felt to be 
necessary, they rehearsed again using verbal report and physical observation. 
Following this, the dancers then rehearsed using internal means of access and then 
finally rehearsed whilst kinaesthetically accessing intrattention. This is a more 
lengthy process than the conventional process in current dance practice, in which the 
dancers simply choreograph and then rehearse. The choreography for the dance piece 
did therefore take some time, but the resultant movement was thoroughly considered 
and the dancers noted that it was 'more effective than if [they] had choreographed it 
normally' (D9,2005). 
By the time it came to the rehearsal process, the demands of producing a full-scale 
dance piece became very apparent. The dancers were suddenly faced with deadlines 
and a fast-approaching performance. They became less disciplined. in using the 
model and seemed to be taking short cuts. At times, it was noticed that the dancers 
were rehearsing material without applying the model and the choreographer had to 
remind the dancers to use it. When reminded, the dancers did generally sqern able to 
apply the model again immediately but, on some occasions, it took them 'a while to 
get back into it' (D 11,2005). 
As with any technique, it is important to practise it continually in order to ensure one 
remains proficient. The dancers noted that the sporadic rehearsal schedule 
contributed to the lack of discipline and their occasional failure to apply the model. 
The other commitments of the dancers resulted in the time between rehearsals being 
quite long; the rehearsals were short, three-hour sessions held twice a week over 
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three months. It would have been preferable to have had a continuous process, with 
choreography or rehearsal sessions held every day over a couple of weeks. The 
dancers agreed and their comments included the following: 
I felt like the model was really effective, but having the rehearsals 
spread out made it difficult to get back into the model. It would be 
really effective to do it much more intensively. At points I do feel as if 
I neglected the model and coming back to it was sometimes difficult, 
more difficult than if I had been disciplined throughout. 
(D 10,2005) 
Ideally you would be practising the model every day and if you had a 
continual process it would have'been even more effective. I definitely 
used the model during the rehearsal ... but I think you need to keep 
revisiting it and keep refreshing it especially if it's a long process. I 
wouldn't say that I ever neglected the model ... personally I used 
verbal report throughout - both intrattentive and non-intrattentive. It 
did need reinforcing by the choreographer though ... especially when it got to the point that we knew the movement really well. It was 
really useful to keep bringing the model back in and it really helped 
with the performance states, specific details and movement quality. I 
think had the process been more intensive there would have been no 
problem. 
(D12,2005) 
Despite these occasional lapses in the use of the model, the dancers did apply it 
effectively within both the choreography and rehearsal of all of the material. 
It is worth emphasising that Empirical Project 3 was a research project. In contrast to 
conventional dance practice in which the aim is normally the creation and 
performance of a dance piece, the main aim of this project was to apply the model 
within a dance process and dance performance and to assess its efficacy. The 
achievement of this main aim was the dominant driving force and occasionally the 
quality of the piece suffered in terms of cohesion and the overall concept. The 
dancers recognised this and one stated: 
It didn't matter what we were choreographing as long as we were 
using the model. I don't think this would have happened if we were 
applying the model in a normal process. 
(D9,2005) 
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Outside a research context, the Dance Consciousness Model should be seen as an 
addition to the normal choreographic process. It should not become the purpose of 
the choreographic process. The model is not a tool for generating successful 
choreography or ensuring a successful technical performance. Nor is it intended that 
the model replace conventional choreographic and performance techniques. 
Choreographers and dancers are advised to use the model as a valuable addition to 
the techniques they normally employ. In the context of Empirical Project 3, the 
model was not always applied as an additional tool but used as an independent tool, 
and this undoubtedly resulted in a less successful piece of choreography in relation to 
structure and form. As a preliminary investigative empirical project, however, 
Empirical Project 3 supplied usable and valid information regarding the efficiency of 
the Dance Consciousness Model as a model for accessing particular states of the 
dance consciousness. 
Performance 
The research outcome of this thesis was defined as follows: 
* To create a model that can be used to enable dancers to access particular 
conscious states for performance - the Dance Consciousness Model. 
The final part of Empirical Project 3 was designed to lead to an assessment as to 
whether this research outcome had been fulfilled and, if so, to what extent. Would 
the consciousness training, and the fact that the Dance Consciousness Model had 
been applied in the process, enable the dancers to access and control their dance 
consciousness within the performance? 
Having completed the application of the model in the choreographic and rehearsal 
process, the dancers were then faced with the prospect of the live performances. 
They were interviewed after the performances and asked to reflect on their use of the 
model. The following comments are representative of their answers: 
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In the performances I felt like I had control of my consciousness. 
Although I used the model most of the time and was therefore 
experiencing the states kinaesthetically, I would occasionally slip out 
of it. I don't think this is a problem though as unlike in other 
performances I was able to control my consciousness and get back 
into the performance. Normally this isn't possible, for example 
normally you can't just slip into that performance state especially if 
something goes wrong. It's really hard to keep with it normally. I 
didn't have this problem in these performances. I used the model all 
the time. 
(D9,2005) 
I used the model throughout the piece, and constantly switched 
between different states of consciousness. Even off stage you never 
switched off. The transitions between on and off stage were seamless. 
It wasn't the case that you would have to use the means of access, you 
were able to access the states kinaesthetically. You came on and just 
did it. When we performed in a different venue, I began being very 
intrattentive. I was much more aware of external factors, things that 
you shouldn't have been aware of, almost as if my consciousness was 
straying. But because of the training I was able to control this and 
hone it back and pull the attention back to myself. I definitely kept up 
with the model and the best performance was the one that I kept true 
to the model. 
(D 10,2005) 
I think I maintained the model throughout, I definitely felt in control 
of my consciousness and the sections we rehearsed intrattentively I 
performed intrattentively and the sections we rehearsed non- 
intrattentively I performed non-intrattentively. Also the nature of the 
piece required very quick switches especially going on and off stage. 
And we were able to switch because of the training. There is one 
particular section and I can remember being so aware, of the music, of 
my body, of others bodies, of unison and canon, of space and time and 
even toward the end I was aware of what's happening next, 
anticipating the next sections, and then suddenly I was just moving 
non-intrattentively with no thought at all. 
(D1 1,2005) 
In the performances I kept to the model as much as possible. I 
personally preferred the intrattentive sections, although this is just 
personal taste. Despite this I was definitely able to access both of the 
states. For most of the performance I experienced the states 
kinaesthetically, but occasionally I would need to use internal means 
if I became distracted, for example by the set or the audience. 
(D12,2005) 
The comments presented above provide evidence to indicate that all of the dancers 
felt in control of their dance consciousness during the performance and were able to 
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access kinaesthetic intrattention and non-intrattention effectively. In addition to these 
comments, and of particular interest with respect to the dancers' experiences, are the 
accounts of a section in the first performance during which some technical elements 
went wrong. The dancers were using ropes which they had to bring from off stage 
and set up in a particular way on the stage. The ropes became very tangled off stage 
and the dancers were unable to execute the movement as rehearsed. This was a real 
test of the dancers' ability to maintain their conscious states and sustain their control 
over these states. The dancers were questioned about this technical problem and a 
selection of their responses about what they had experienced in terms of their 
consciousness is given below: 
When things went wrong to do with props we had to improvise. This 
scene is normally performed very intrattentively, and we 
choreographed it intrattentively as well. But when it went wrong ... I 
chose to execute the movement non-intrattentively and let my body 
just move itself. I knew I could trust it do this because of the training. 
This was so important as it allowed my mind to reflect on how to deal 
with the situation. My body and mind were doing different things. My 
body was moving non-intrattentively to allow my mind to work 
intrattentively. This allowed me to carry on performing and still figure 
out what to do. I was pleased that I was able to control everything like 
this. 
(D12,2005) 
There were points where I was almost half and half, so I would be 
non-intrattentively dancing but having some intrattentive thoughts like 
"I need to go off and get a torch so I can see to untangle the ropes". I 
was also switching all the time as I was on and off quite a lot to sort 
the ropes out. I remember the off stage moments really well. I was 
very intrattentive and we were even talking and discussing what to do. 
At the time I was very aware. I would then have to come on again and 
switch ... back into the performance. I haven't got a clue what I did, I 
was completely non-intrattentive, but because of the training I knew I 
was able to dance like this ... I was able to switch back and forth. I just did it kinaesthetically. I didn't use the means of access as such, just 
switched in and out. 
(DIO, 2005) 
Although the movement outcome of the non-intrattentive improvisation may not 
have been appropriate at that point in the dance, it seems from the dancers' responses 
that use of model proved effective and that they were able to access particular states 
of consciousness within the performances and control these states - even when 
things went wrong. This was also observable from an informed audience perspective. 
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As noted in relation to Phase 4 and Phase 5, there are some non-verbal indices and 
signals inherent in, and characteristic of, the two different states of consciousness. It 
was clear that the dancers' focus was interchanging between sections and the dancers 
seemed to move from being very aware of everything to just performing. The 
movement style seemed to change alongside this. Whether an uninformed audience 
would detect these changes in consciousness, or even the changes in movement 
quality, is difficult to discern. It would also be interesting to monitor how changes in 
the dancers' consciousness affect the audience, and specifically the audience's 
consciousness, and this is an area into which this research could extend in the 
future. 1 18 
Summary 
All the empirical evidence suggests that the consciousness training and the 
application of the Dance Consciousness Model were effective in enabling the dancers 
to actively select, access and control their dance consciousness within the 
choreography and performance of the piece. The dancers were invited to reflect on 
the overall experience of the Dance Consciousness Model and to compare this 
experience with conventional practice. The dancers were also asked to hypothesise 
about the effect the Dance Consciousness Model might have on Western 
contemporary dance practice. Their responses included the following: 
Normally your conscious states aren't pointed out to you. I've never 
been told before what sort of state I should be in when performing, but 
it's so important! Dancers will benefit so much from the model. It 
does requires training though and perhaps for me a bit more intensive 
training would have benefited me even more. 
(D9,2005) 
I haven't ever done anything like the training before and definitely 
never used anything like the model before. It's completely different to 
how I have been taught to work normally. From now I will definitely 
always consider my dancing consciousness, as well as my dancing 
body, and I think all other dancers should too! 
(DIO, 2005) 
118 Haggendorn (2004) has undertaken some research into what happens within audience members' 
minds whilst they watch dance, and this may be of use for any further research which considers this 
aspect of performance. 
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I will definitely use the model again, I don't think I could work 
without it now, it's sort of within me and now when I'm dancing I'm 
always thinking 'hey what sort of state should I be inT. I'm just so 
much more aware of myself as a dancer, and I think that awareness of 
self is essential for all dancers. 
(D 11,2005) 
Normally what happens with professional and non-professional 
choreographers is that they just train you, and train you in tenns of 
your body and will then tell you to go on stage, let go, don't think and 
just perform. So, in saying that, they are telling you to perform non- 
intrattentively. But how can you, when you don't know how to access 
those states? This training is really important and I think once you've 
been trained to use the model, you will always apply it a little bit in 
everything you do. 
(D12,2005) 
It appears that all of the dancers felt that the overall experience of the Dance 
Consciousness Model differed significantly from the conventional practice in which 
they ordinarily engaged. All of the dancers found the experience a positive and 
beneficial one and considered that the Dance Consciousness Model would have a 
positive impact on their future practice. The dancers also noted that the model would 
be of use to other dancers working within the Western contemporary dance context. 
Concluding remarks 
The analysis of the empirical projects presented in this chapter indicates that this 
research has ascertained the nature of the states of consciousness that are experienced 
by dancers within the choreography and performance of contemporary dance, and 
has clarified the means through which dancers might access and control such states 
of consciousness. In doing so, the research has answered the focussed research 
questions, listed again here for ease of reference: 
9 What is the nature of the dance consciousness? 
9 How can one examine the dance consciousness? 
* How can one access the intrattentive dance consciousness? 
9 How can one access the non-intrattentive dance consciousness? 
1/ 
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* How can one switch between the intrattentive dance consciousness and the non- 
intrattentive dance consciousness? 
As a result this thesis has demonstrated that a model has been created which enables 
dancers to access particular conscious states for performance: the Dance 
Consciousness Model. 
As indicated earlier, the final research question is: 
9 How effective is the Dance Consciousness Model? 
This question must be considered in relation to the overall purpose of the model 
which is outlined in Chapter 3. Bearing this in mind, it is possible to present the 
following conclusion. 
From the accounts of the dancers who participated in the first complete application of 
the model, it is feasible to conclude that the answer is that the Dance Consciousness 
Model is effective, as it allows dancers to actively select, access and control their 
dance consciousness within choreography and performance. In doing so, the model 
has also been effective in affording the dancers more insight into, and understanding 
of, the experience of the dance and the ways in which it can be experienced. In 
addition, the model has been effective in allowing greater means of communication 
between the choreographer and the dancers through enabling both parties to 
understand the nature of different dance consciousness experiences, how the dancers 
can access these experiences and how these relate to the intentions of the dance. It 
seems, therefore, that the Dance Consciousness Model can be deemed effective in 
encouraging a consideration of the subjectivity of the dance experience. 
In addition, it is worth noting that, although the model is not essentially intended as a 
means for improving the efficacy of choreography or performance in terms of its 
artistic or aesthetic merit or validity, according to reports of participants in the 
research, it does seem to have had some resultant effect on both these processes. 
During all three empirical projects, the dancers, the choreographer and numerous 
audience members commented on the high quality of performance and the 
commitment and focus through which the movement was executed. However, any 
282 
judgement regarding whether the model enables more effective outcomes in relation 
to some choreographic processes/performances as opposed to other choreographic 
processes/performances is, at this point, rather subjective. Although quality in 
choreography and/or performance has not been a criterion for assessment in relation 
to the effectiveness of the model in this particular study, it may indeed be an area of 
research to be explored in the future - for example: what effect does a dancer's 
consciousness have on the execution of movement and the standard of performance? 
Such areas of potential further investigation are presented later in this chapter. 
Regardless of further investigation, it is fair to state that it can be concluded that the 
Dance Consciousness Model is effective in relation to its main purpose. There is 
always value, however, in casting a critical eye upon a research outcome and noting 
any components which may require modification to further enhance its efficacy. 
Potential modifications 
Although all the dancers asserted that the Dance Consciousness Model was effective, 
their accounts suggest that some modifications would potentially improve the model 
significantly. The proposals for the research and evaluation of such modifications are 
as shown in Table 22. 
Table 22: Potential modifications 
Problem Solution 
Within the consciousness training In future applications of the consciousness 
applied in Empirical Project 3, it was training, an additional workshop will be 
not considered what effect, if any, the offered in which dancers are trained to 
music, set, properties, and costume, and apply the model when these external 
other design tools and techniques such components, which are intrinsically 
as lighting and projections, would have related to dance, are in place. Such a 
on the dancer's consciousness. workshop will consider how a dancer can, 
for example, move non-intrattentively 
whilst maintaining awareness of the music 
or other design components, or dance 
intrattentively without having to extend 
intrattentive awareness to external factors. 
This workshop will be optional depending 
on what sort of dance practice the dancer 
ordinarily engages in; for example, the 
workshop would be essential for a dancer 
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Problem 
Some of the dancers who participated in 
Empirical Project 3 expressed the 
opinion that it would have been 
beneficial to have more consciousness 
training. 
The dancers from Empirical Project 3 
noted that motion blind sensing is 
particularly difficult and requires a 
significant amount of skill, especially 
when a dancer is working with a group 
comprising dancers who have not 
previously worked together. 
All the tasks in the training allow the 
dancers to progress though external and 
internal states before moving to the 
kinaesthetic states. In live performance, 
however, dancers are expected to enter 
straight into kinaesthetic states. 
All the dancers claimed that the 
switching states consciousness circuit 
was particularly effective and that it 
was progressively so - with each 
application they became more adept at 
switching states. They also noted, 
however, that they felt as if they wanted 
to carry on with more repetitions of the 
circuit. 
It was noted that the non-intrattentive 
physical observation tasks were 
hindered by the fact that the dancers had 
to remain facing forward in order to 
Solution 
who works in a dance theatre context. 
There are three alternative methods of 
extending the training, which will be' 
explored in the future. Firstly, doubling 
the number of training workshops would 
allow each means of access to be explored 
in more depth; one workshop would teach 
how to use the means of access and 
dancers would apply the means in a 
subsequent workshop. Secondly, the 
duration of each workshop could be 
increased from three hours to a full day. 
The third possibility is to offer a one-day 
top-up workshop for those who, having 
previously learnt how to use the different 
means of access, are able to practise using 
the means in a controlled environment. 
The dancers suggested that it would be 
beneficial to allow more time for the 
motion blind sensing tasks to develop. 
This will be implemented within future 
applications of the consciousness training. 
The training tasks will be modified 
slightly to include the instantaneous 
accessing of kinaesthetic states. For 
example, dancers will be asked to 
choreograph a phrase in one workshop 
and then perform it kinaesthetically in a 
subsequent workshop. This will allow 
dancers to practise this immediate access. 
Further research will be undertaken to 
investigate whether, and to what extent, it 
is beneficial to extend the circuit and 
allow the dancers to execute more 
repetitions of the circuit and/or for dancers 
to execute the circuit in reverse so that 
intrattentive stations become non- 
intrattentive and vice versa. This will give 
the dancers more practice at switching 
states and will also allow them to 
experience each station in a different state. 
This is a difficult matter to resolve as it is 
dependent on technical equipment. It 
would be beneficial to have images 
projected on to all four walls, but this ma 
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Problem Solution 
observe the images, as they were not always be possible. In the light of this, 
projected only on to one wall. it is worth considering other means of 
presenting visual stimuli, such as pictures 
on the wall or objects aro 
' 
und the room. It 
is worth noting, however, that the forward 
facing issue is problematic only during the 
training when the dancers are using solely 
the physical observation and not when 
they are using the three means 
concurrently and accessing the states 
internally and kinaesthetically. Although it 
is not necessarily ideal, therefore, one 
projection screen does serve its purpq1se. 
Indication of further investigation 
Throughout the fonnulation of the Dance Consciousness Model and the analysis of 
its application, many related issues have arisen that it has not been possible to 
consider in any depth within the confines of this particular research but which 
potentially represent areas for further investigation. A summary of these issues is 
presented in Table 23 with indications as to the direction in which this study may 
develop in the future. 
Table 23: Indication of further investigation 
Research issue Indication of content of further 
research 
The effect of the Dance Consciousness Although uninformed dancers were used 
Model on uninformed dancers. in Empirical Project 2, further theoretical 
and empirical research is required before 
any definitive conclusions can be reached 
regarding the effect of the training and 
model on uniformed as opposed to 
informed dancers. 
The effect of integrating dancers who Some of the dancers from Empirical 
are using the model with dancers who Project 3 noted that they had attempted to 
are not. use the model in different processes, but 
that their attempts had been hindered by 
the dancers who were not using the model. 
Can the Dance Consciousness Model still 
be effective in this context? What effect 
would use of the model by some dancers _J 
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Research issue 
The dance consciousness within other 
dance contexts. 
The effect of the Dance Consciousness 
Model on audience members. 
The effectiveness of the Dance 
Consciousness Model in a wider 
environment. 
The effect that the dancers' conscious 
state has on the actual movement they 
are executing. 
The effect of the non-intrattentive 
stimuli. 
Indication of content of further 
research 
have on the dancers who are not using it? 
Analysis of the research projects suggests 
that the model and its inherent concepts of 
dance consciousness are applicable within 
other contemporary dance contexts. The 
dancers commented that they had applied 
some aspects of the model within 
technique classes, and one of the dancers 
who works as a dance teacher, claimed 
that the model had greatly informed her 
teaching practice. The research undertaken 
already could be extended to explore these 
and possibly other contexts to determine 
whether the model is applicable as it 
stands, whether it needs to be adapted to a 
particular context, and whether further 
models should be formulated for use 
within different contexts. 
Further exploration of this effect might 
include an examination of the nature of 
the audience's consciousness, of whether 
the dancers' conscious state correlates in 
any way with audience members' 
consciousness, and thus whether an inter- 
subjective consciousness is possible. Such 
research might be extended to explore the 
effect the presence of an audience has on 
the dancers' consciousness. 
Contemporary dance companies could be 
approached and invited to implement the 
model within their practice and to provide 
feedback on their experiences and the 
overall efficacy of the model. 
The intrattentive choreography often 
resulted in movement that was particularly 
structured and precise, whereas the non- 
intrattentive choreography often resulted 
in movement that appeared free and 
unbound. There would be value in 
researching the effect of particular 
conscious states in the choreographic 
process in relation to intention and its 
realisation in content, forrn and 
expressio 
It was noted by the dancers during 
Empirical Projects 2 and 3 that the nature 
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Research issue 
The effect of using character on the 
model. 
The Dance Consciousness Model in 
contexts other than dance. 
Indication of content of further 
research 
of the stimuli affected the nature of the 
movement they were executing. 
Observation also suggested that there was 
a definite correlation between the stimuli 
and the movement. This presents potential 
for new ways of choreographing, in which 
choreographers can influence the dancers' 
movements by their choice of stimuli, 
without having to restrict dancers to a 
brief or a particularly reflective and 
constrained process. 
The performance in Empirical Project 3 
required the dancers to perform as 
particular characters, and the dancers 
successfully applied the Dance 
Consciousness Model within this context. 
It would be interesting, however, to 
explore whether any additional training in 
the use of character on the model would 
be beneficial when preparing specifically 
for performances in which dancers are 
portraying particular characters. The 
acting theories discussed in Chapter 1 may 
be of use here in ascertaining how it is 
possible to access different states of 
consciousness through character. I19 
The model could be extended to 
performers or actors working in non-literal 
theatre, such as physical theatre. The 
Dance Consciousness Model presents a 
different pathway, and one which is more 
founded in consciousness theory, from 
those currently available within theatre 
literature. The Dance Consciousness 
Model might, for example, be used to 
inform existing theatre practices or used in 
conjunction with existing practices within 
the theatre context 
I" These acting theories are surnmarised briefly in the following section. 
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The Dance Consciousness Model as a proposal for new practice 
Regardless of the potential modifications and possible further research, there is no 
doubt that the Dance Consciousness Model has proved effective in its aim of 
allowing dancers to access particular states of consciousness within performance. It 
is important to consider, however, how it compares with dance consciousness 
theories, concepts and methods which already exist within dance literature. Similar 
considerations might be made with respect to theatre literature focussing on actors' 
consciousness. Is the Dance Consciousness Model innovative and can it be 
considered as a proposal for new practice? 
Chapter I concluded that there is a distinct lack of literature dealing with the 
dancer's consciousness. It was noted that the literature of Sheets-Johnstone (1966) 
and Fraleigh (1987) represents the principal research undertaken within the dance 
discipline into the subject of the dance consciousness. Although both theorists do 
provide some insight into the nature of the dance consciousness and explicitly define 
two dance states, reflective and pre-reflective, the breadth of their discourse is 
constrained by their first-person phenomenological research approaches. This is 
similar to the situation within the theatre literature in which theorists and 
practitioners such as Stanislavski (1949,1961,1986), Strasberg (1988), Grotowski 
(1969) and Schechner (1973,1985,1990) promote a non-intrattentive state of 
consciousness for the actor, and Diderot (1955), Meyerhold (1969) and Brecht 
(1940) advocate an intrattentive state of consciousness. 
There is little or no indication that the dance or theatre theorists' concepts are 
founded in third-person consciousness theory. The concepts of the intrattentive and 
non-intrattentive consciousness in the Dance Consciousness Model, however, are 
based on third-person theory. In addition, having been empirically investigated and 
examined by dancers and the consciousness trainer, the concepts of intrattention and 
non-intrattention also take account of the first- and second-person. The concepts 
within the Dance Consciousness Model could therefore be considered to be more 
authoritative than those of the dance and theatre theorists. 
Both Fraleigh and Sheets-Johnstone consider how one can examine the dance 
consciousness and they note that phenomenology can provide some insight into the 
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states. The reliability and validity of resultant accounts must be questioned, however, 
because of their first-person nature. The method of examination used in relation to 
the Dance Consciousness Model also takes account of phenomenology and thus 
incorporates the first person into the method. In addition, however, the Dance 
Consciousness Model also incorporates second- and third-person theory into the 
method and attempts to provide a practical and accessible method that the dancers 
can readily apply in order to examine their own states. The combination of first-, 
second- and third-person examination methods in the Dance Consciousness Model 
provides more comprehensive, reliable and valid research information. 
Neither Sheets-Johnstone nor Fraleigh suggests any methods of access to the states 
of reflection and pre-reflection that they define. Within theatre literature, it is 
'possible to locate some methods, such as those of Brecht and Stanislavski, which do 
allow actors to access states that have an intrattentive or non-intrattentive nature. It is 
important to recall here, however, the significant distinction discussed in Chapter I 
regarding the difference between the methods provided by theatre literature and the 
means of access in the Dance Consciousness Model. The methods of access provided 
by theatre theorists are predominantly concerned with character. It is intended that 
the Dance Consciousness Model, on the other hand, be appropriate for all forms of 
contemporary dance, literal and non-literal, allowing dancers to access the states 
through means that are not necessarily related to character. The Dance 
Consciousness Model, therefore, offers accessible and practical means of access to 
states of intrattention and states of non-intrattention and methods of switching 
between them. This is a significant development in comparison with the theories of 
the above-mentioned dance theorists. The model also ensures that these means of 
access are applicable within all types of contemporary dance. 
Although Sheets-Johnstone implies that dancers should experience a reflective 
process and pre-reflective performance, neither Sheets-Johnstone nor Fraleigh 
suggests how one might change states. In addition, although acting theorists Barba 
(1985,1988,1989,1995) and Bloch (1993) promote the concept of a dual 
consciousness comprising both intrattention and non-intrattention, they do not clearly 
describe practical means for accessing these states or moving from one state to 
another. Meyer-Dinkgrafe (2005) offers a method in relation to the Natyashastra, but 
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he himself notes that Ruther empirical investigation is necessary before the method 
can be transferred into Western theatre practice. The Dance Consciousness Model, in 
contrast, provides dancers with a clear progression from an intrattentive process to 
non-intrattentive performance and vice versa and, in doing so, allows dancers to 
switch states within the process. 
Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh also imply that the pre-reflective dance consciousness 
is the ideal state for performance. The Dance Consciousness Model, however, 
refrains from promoting either intrattentive or non-intrattentive states as more 
effective than the other. Instead, the model -givesdancers the choice of four different -- 
strands which enable them to experience an intrattentive performance, non- 
intrattentive performance, or a performance that comprises both states - and thus 
they are able to switch states within performance. 
Having reconsidered the existing literature which deals with, or is applicable to, the 
dancers' consciousness, it is evident that the consciousness training and the Dance 
Consciousness Model develop significantly the research undertaken to date within 
current dance practice. This thesis has demonstrated how, through the application 
and amalgamation of a variety of existing theories with much -independent thought 
and practice, new theories have been formulated. The culmination of this activity is 
the Dance Consciousness Model, for which there is no comparable alternative within 
the discipline of dance. 
The Dance Consciousness Model may benefit any dancer working within the context 
of Western contemporary dance and can be applied within any type of choreographic 
process and performance. It is important to re-emphasise, however, that the model 
should be seen as an addition to choreographic process and performance, as opposed 
to existing independently. The Dance Consciousness Model is not explicitly 
concerned with product and thus it is not intended that the model replace 
conventional choreographic or performance techniques. Whilst applying the model 
dancers and choreographers are advised to also apply criteria and models for 
practice that focus on theme, intention, content, form, expression, style, production 
elements and so on in the choreography context and style, technique and skills in the 
performance context. 
290 
There are of course many different tried and tested approaches and techniques 
embraced in the conventional practice of choreography and performance, many of 
which focus on the product and on achieving artistic and aesthetic merit within the 
cultural milieu of current dance practice. The Dance Consciousness Model should be 
seen as a valuable and perhaps essential addition to these approaches and techniques 
in order to ensure that the subjectivity of experience is considered alongside the 
objectivity of the product outcome. 
The Introduction and Chapter 1 discussed how the dancer's mind, specifically the 
dancer's consciousness, is attributed little significance compared with that of the 
dancer's body. The Dance Consciousness Model readjusts the balance and negates 
the 'dualistic point of view' about the body and mind that 'has always been 
widespread in the dance community' (Fortin et aL, 2002, p. 173). The Dance 
Consciousness Model should be seen as an innovative proposal for new practice and 
it is hoped that the model will encourage more dancers, choreographers and dance 
theorists to ask 'what is a dancer conscious of while dancing? ' (Sheets-Johnstone, 
1966, p. 39). It is anticipated that the model will have a significant impact on current 
dance practice within the context of Western contemporary dance by providing 
dancers, for the first time, with a means of access to their dance consciousness. 
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Appendix A 
Sample intrattentive training workshop 
Intrattentive training: Workshop 2 structure and content 
Duration: approximately 3 hours 
Means of access to be applied: Intrattentive, physical observation and intrattentive 
blind sensing 
Key: 
Intrattentive physical observation IPO 
Intrattentive blind sensing IBS 
Intrattentive internal observation I10 
* Introduction: Discussion with dancers, led by the choreographer/consciousness 
trainer, about the nature of IPO and IBS and their use as means of access to states 
of intrattentive consciousness. Explanation regarding the differences between IPO 
and IBS, versus 110. 
* Task 1: Warm up - Group and individual warm up using intrattentive verbal 
report. 
9 Task 2: Solo improvisation with IPO - Dancers walk around the studio and 
simultaneously observe their own bodies. This self-observation must occur from 
every angle and be active as opposed to passive. Dancers are informed of the 
differences between observing then moving (pre-observation), moving then 
observing (post-observation), and observing whilst moving (present-observation). 
In a circle, each participant performs a movement of their choice whilst 
simultaneously observing their movement with present-observation. This process 
develops and dancers begin to execute and self observe short phrases of 
movement and then move into free improvisation. 
9 Task 3: Solo improvisation with IPO, IBS and IlO - Dancers walk around the 
studio and simultaneously observe their own bodies and the space around them in 
as much detail as possible. They create a visual imprint of their bodies and the 
studio inside their minds, close their eyes and begin to use blind sensing as they 
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walk around. The dancers are informed of the importance of maintaining the 
visual imprints, which they constructed when observing, whilst blind sensing. 
Dancers improvise freely with blind sensing and, finally, whilst internalising the 
observation. 
Task 4: Solo set movement and performance with IPO, IBS and HO - Dancers 
learn a set short movement phrase and simultaneously physically observe the 
movement being executed. The dancers rehearse the movement initially with the 
observation and then create a visual imprint for use with blind sensing. The 
dancers engage in motionless blind sensing - in which they rehearse the 
movement completqly in their minds and not with their bodies - and then with 
motion blind sensing - in which they physically rehearse with eyes closed. Finally 
the dancers rehearse whilst internalising the observation. The dancers are 
informed of the importance of maintaining the intrattention whilst internally 
observing. They perform the set material once with the observation, once with the 
blind sensing and then twice whilst internalising the observation. 
9 Task 5: Solo choreography and performance with IPO, IBS and 110 - Dancers 
choreograph a short solo phrase whilst concurrently physically observing. Dancers 
rehearse the movement initially with the observation and then with blind sensing 
(including motionless and motion sensing) and finally with internal observation. 
They perform the choreography once with the physical observation, once with 
blind sensing and then twice whilst internalisirig the observation. 
9 Task 6: Mover/observer improvisation with IPO and IBS - Dancers work as a 
duet and choose between two roles; mover and observer. The mover improvises 
freely and physically observes their body and the observer also physically 
observes the mover's body. Once they have gained a visual imprint of the mover, 
both the mover and the observer are given the opportunity to blind sense (the 
observer will be motionless). This task acts as preparation for task 7. 
Task 7: Duet improvisation with IPO - Two dancers improvise as part of a duet 
and simultaneously physically observe the duet. This observation may include 
movements executed by self and/or other. 
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9 Task 8: Duet improvisation with IPO, IBS and 110 - Dancers improvise as a duet 
initially utilising physical observation and then gradually moving into blind 
sensing. Dancers then improvise without physical observation or blind sensing 
and internalise the observation. Dancers are informed that, if necessary, it is 
permitted to move back to the physical observation in order to re-focus. 
* Task 9: Duet choreography and performance with IPO, IBS and 110 - Dancers 
choreograph a short duet phrase whilst concurrently physically observing self and 
other. Dancers rehearse the movement initially with physical observation and then 
with blind sensing (including motionless sensing) and finally with internal 
observation. The dancers perform the choreography once with the physical 
observation, once with blind sensing and then twice whilst internalising the 
observation. 
Task 10: Group improvisation with IPO, IBS and 110 - Dancers improvise as a 
group and continually observe both self and others. The dancers are informed that, 
at the point at which they feel they have the ability to execute group movement 
alongside physical observation, they may begin to use blind sensing. Subsequently 
the dancers improvise with internal observation. Dancers are informed that, if 
necessary, it is permitted to move back to the physical observation in order to re- 
focus. Dancers must maintain an awareness of the group throughout. 
* Task 11: Group choreography and performance with IPO, IBS and 110 - Dancers 
choreograph a short group phrase whilst concurrently physically observing self 
and others. Dancers rehearse the movement initially with physical observation and 
then with blind sensing (including motionless sensing) and, finally, with internal 
observation. The dancers perform the choreography once with physical 
observation, once with blind sensing and then twice whilst internalising the 
observation. 
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Appendix B 
Sample non-intrattentive training workshop 
Non-intrattentive training: Workshop 4 structure and content 
Duration: approximately 3 hours 
Means of access to be applied: A combination of non-intrattentive verbal report, 
physical observation and active listening to create external, internal and kinaesthetic 
non-intrattention 
Key- 
Non-intrattentive verbal report 
Non-intrattentive physical observation NIPO 
Non-intrattentive active listening NIAL 
Extemal non-intrattention 
Intemal non-intrattention 
Kinaesthetic non-intrattention 
ENI 
INI 
KNI 
& Introduction: Discussion with dancers, led by the choreographer/consciousness 
trainer, about the notion of combining NIVR, NIPO and NIAL in order to create 
ENI, M and KNI respectively. 
* Task 1: Warm up - Group and individual warm up using NLAL- 
9 Task 2: Solo improvisation with NIVR and NIPO - Dancers walk around the 
studio and gradually move into free improvisation. As they do so they are 
presented with the four alternating visual stimuli - random film, lists of words, 
lists of numbers and questions - to physically observe. In addition, they provide a 
non-intrattentive verbal report in which they describe or shadow the visual stimuli 
(recite the words or numbers) or answer the questions that appear. The dancers 
focus their attention on to the stimuli and the report and not on the movement. 
fo Task 3: Solo improvisation with NIVR and NIAL - Dancers begin by walking 
around the studio and gradually move into free improvisation. As they do so, they 
are presented with a single, binaural or dichotic presentation (depending on 
equipment available) of the four alternating aural stimuli - random text, lists of 
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words, lists of numbers and questions - to which they must actively listen. In 
addition they use a non-intrattentive verbal report either to shadow what they hear 
or to answer the questions. The dancers focus their attention on to the stimuli and 
the report and not the movement. 
Task 4: Solo improvisation with NIPO and NIAL - Dancers begin by walking 
around the studio and gradually move into free improvisation. As they do so, they 
are presented with the four alternating visual stimuli to physically observe and a 
single, binaural or dichotic presentation of the four alternating aural stimuli to 
which they must actively listen. The aural stimuli intermittently complement and 
juxtapose the visual stimuli. The dancers focus attention on to the visual and aural 
stimuli and not the movement. 
* Task 5: Solo improvisation with ENI, INI and KNI - Dancers begin by walking 
round the studio and then move into free improvisation. As they do so they are 
presented with the four alternating visual stimuli to physically observe and a 
complementary or juxtaposing single, binaural or dichotic presentation of the four 
alternating aural stimuli to which they must actively listen. In addition, the 
dancers describe, shadow or answer what they see and hear. The dancers have 
control over this report and can actively choose what they want to report and 
when, the report must, however, remain constant. The dancers focus the attention 
on to the stimuli and the report and not the movement. After some time, the visual 
and aural stimuli cease and the dancers stop verbally reporting, they are, however, 
expected to maintain the conscious state. Eventually the dancers disengage the 
intrattention and enter kinaesthetic non-intrattention. 
* Task 6: Solo set movement and performance with ENI, INI and KNI - Dancers 
learn a short movement phrase whilst being presented with the four alternating 
visual stimuli and a complementary or juxtaposing single, binaural or dichotic 
presentation of the four alternating aural stimuli. In addition, the dancers describe, 
shadow or answer what they see and hear. The dancers have control over this 
report and can actively choose what they want to report and when, the report 
must, however, remain constant. The dancers focus attention on to the stimuli and 
the report and not the movement. Tle dancers rehearse the movement with the 
296 
external intrattention. Part way through the rehearsal the projections, recordings 
and report cease, however the dancers maintain their conscious state. Towards the 
end of the rehearsal and for the performance the dancers disengage the 
intrattention and access Unaesthetic non-intrattention. 
Task 7: Solo choreography and performance with ENI, INI and KNI - Dancers 
choreograph a short solo phrase whilst being presented with the four alternating 
visual stimuli and a complementary or juxtaposing single, binaural or dichotic 
presentation of the four alternating aural stimuli. In addition, they describe, 
shadow or answer what they see and hear. The dancers have control over the 
report and can actively choose what they want to report and when, the report 
must, however, remain constant. The dancers focus attention on to the stimuli and 
the report and not the movement. The dancers rehearse the movement with the 
external non-intrattention. Part way through the rehearsal, the projections, 
recordings and report cease, the dancers must, however, maintain their conscious 
state. Towards the end of the rehearsal and for the performance, the dancers 
disengage the intrattention and access kinaesthetic non-intrattention. 
Task 8: Mover/observer improvisation with ENI - Dancers work as a duet and 
choose between two roles; mover and observer. The mover improvises freely and 
the observer watches the mover. At the same time they both simultaneously 
physically observe the projected stimuli, actively listen to the aural stimuli and 
provide non-intrattentive verbal reports of their choice. Dancers focus attention on 
to the stimuli and report, and not the movement. This task acts as preparation for 
task 9, and trains the dancers to observe passively without focal attention and 
allows the dancers to be in the space with one another without having to attend to 
one another. 
Task 9: Duet improvisation with ENI - Dancers improvise as part of a duet whilst 
physically observing the projected stimuli, actively listening to the single, dichotic 
or binaural aural stimuli and providing a non-intrattentive verbal report of their 
choice. They also have the option to use discussion as part of the verbal report. 
The dancers focus attention on to the stimuli and not the movement 
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Task 10: Duet improvisation with ENI, M and KNI - Dancers improvise as a 
duet whilst concurrently physically observing the visual stimuli, actively listening 
to the aural stimuli and providing a report, including discussion, of their choice. 
Part way through the improvisation the projections, recordings and reports cease - 
the dancers must, however, maintain their conscious state whilst using internal 
non-intrattention. Towards the end of the improvisation the dancers disengage the 
intrattention and access kinaesthetic non-intrattention. 
Task 11: Duet choreography and performance with ENI, PTI and KNI - Dancers 
choreograph a short duet phrase whilst concurrently physically observing the 
visual stimuli, actively listening to the aural stimuli and providing a report, 
including discussion, of their choice. The dancers focus attention on to the stimuli 
and report and not the movement. The dancers rehearse the duet with the external 
non-intrattention. Part way through the rehearsal the projections, recordings and 
reports cease, the dancers must, however, maintain their conscious state. Towards 
the end of the rehearsal and for the performance the dancers disengage the 
intrattention and access kinaesthetic non-intrattention. 
Task 12: Group improvisation with ENI, INI and KNI - Dancers improvise as a 
group and continually physically observe the visual stimuli, actively listen to the 
single, dichotic or binaural aural stimuli and provide a verbal report, including 
group discussion, of their choice. 'Me dancers focus attention on to the stimuli and 
reports and not the movement. Part way through the improvisation the projections, 
recordings and reports cease, the dancers must, however, maintain their conscious 
state. Towards the end of the improvisation the dancers disengage the intrattention 
and access kinaesthetic non-intrattention. 
Task 13: Group choreography with ENI, INI and KNI - Dancers choreograph a 
short group phrase whilst concurrently physically observing the visual stimuli, 
actively listening to the aural stimuli and providing a verbal report, including a 
discussion of their choice. The dancers rehearse the movement with the external 
non-intrattention. Part way through the rehearsal the projections, recordings and 
reports cease, the dancers must, however, maintain their conscious state. Towards 
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the end of the rehearsal and for the performance the dancers disengage the 
intrattention and access kinaesthetic non-intrattention. 
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Appendix C 
Sample switching states training workshop t9. 
Switching states training: Workshop 2 structure and content 
Duration: approximately 3 hours 
Means of access to be applied: External, internal and kinaesthetic intrattention. and 
external, internal and kinaesthetic non-intrattention. 
Key- 
Extemal intrattention EI 
Intemal intrattention II 
Kinaesthetic intrattention KI 
Extemal non-intrattention ENI 
Intemal non-intrattention INI 
Kinaesthetic non-intrattention KNI 
Introduction: Discussion with dancers, led by the choreographer/consciousness 
trainer, about the nature of the switching states training as a means to controlling 
the intrattentive and non-intrattentive consciousness - using EI, 11, KI, ENI, INI 
and KNI. 
* Task 1: Warm up - Group and individual warm up using a combination of 
intrattentive and non-intrattentive means of access. 
e Task 2: Solo improvisation with ENI, INI and KNI - Dancers improvise freely 
whilst using the means of access of their choice in order to maintain a non- 
intrattentive state. The dancers externalise, internalise and finally kinaesthetically 
experience the non-intrattention. 
* Task 3: Speed walk with EI, 11 and KI - Dancers walk at normal speed, half 
speed, quarter speed, one eighth speed, one sixteenth speed, one thirty-second 
speed and one sixty-fourth speed whilst using the means of access of their choice 
in order to maintain an intrattentive state. The dancers externalise, internalise and, 
finally, kinaesthetically experience the intrattention. 
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Task 4: Running with ENI, INI and KNI and observing with EI, II and KI - The 
dancers work in pairs. One participant runs on the spot whilst using the means of 
access of their choice in order to maintain a non-intrattentive state. The participant 
uses external, internal and, finally, kinaesthetic non-intrattention. The other 
participant observes the first participant running, whilst using the means of access 
of their choice in order to maintain an intrattentive state. The participant uses 
external, internal and, finally, kinaesthetic intrattention. The dancers switch roles. 
Task 5: Closing and opening hands with ENI, INI and KNI - Dancers sit cross 
legged and rest their hands on their knees. They simultaneously open one hand 
and close the other hand into a fist, at around one sixty-fourth their normal speed. 
TIhe dancers use the means of access of their choice in order to maintain a non- 
intrattentive state. The dancers externalise, internalise and, finally, 
kinaesthetically experience the non-intrattention. 
Task 6: Mirroring and improvising with EI, II and KI - Dancers work in pairs. 
One participant improvises feely and the other mirrors their movement. Both 
dancers use the means of access of their choice in order to maintain an 
intrattentive state. The dancers externalise, internalise and, finally, 
kinaesthetically experience the intrattention. The dancers switch roles. 
9 Task 7: Stillness with ENI, INI and KNI - Dancers stand completely still whilst 
using the means of access of their choice in order to maintain a non-intrattentive 
state. The dancers externalise, internalise and, finally, kinaesthetically experience 
the non-intrattention. The dancers are expected to simply experience the stillness 
and not engage in any reflective thought, such as how long they have been 
standing still. 
o Task 8: Rehearse a set phrase with El, II and KI - Dancers rehearse a set phrase 
from the previous workshop whilst using the means of access of their choice in 
order to maintain an intrattentive state. The dancers externalise, internalise and, 
finally, kinaestlictically experience the intrattention. 
o Task 9: Entering and exiting with ENI, INI, KNI, EI, H and KI - Dancers enter 
and exit the studio with an intrattentive state of consciousness and then enter and 
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exit '"ith a non-intrattentive state of consciousness. It is each participant's 
responsibility to choose the means by which they access and maintain these states. 
The dancers repeat the intrattentive task ffiree times, externalising, internalising 
and kinaesthetically experiencing, the intrattention. Ile dancers also repeat the 
non-intrattentive task three times, externalising, internalising and kinaesthetically 
experiencing, the non-intrattention. 
e Task 10: Switching states consciousness circuit with ENI, INI, KNI, El, 11 and KI 
- Dancers take part in a switching states consciousness circuit. The circuit 
consists of eight stations - four of which are intrattentive stations and four of 
which are non-intrattentive stations. Dancers carry out the particular tasks 
associated with each station and the tasks are based on those included in the 
previous exercises. At various intervals during the circuit, the dancers are 
instructed to exit the studio. After varying amounts of time, they are instructed to 
return to their station and to continue with the task. The dancers move continually 
around the circuit, which they complete three times with at least three exits and 
entrances. The first time round the circuit they are asked to externalise the state, 
the second time to internalise it, and the third time to experience the state 
kinaesthetically. 
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Appendix D 
Sample transcription 
An open discussion between D9, D 10, D 11, D 12 and an informed audience member 
immediately after the switching states training. 
Question asked by the choreographer How do you feel after completing the 
switching states training? 
Responses from dancers: 
DIO: It felt really good. 
D12: It did, yes, after a few stations you got in to it and moving between stations 
wasn't so much a transition it was fme, you just became used to doing it. 
DIO: It definitely felt like you were switching states between intraftention. and non- 
intrattention, especially from, for example, the walk to the run, with that you could 
really feel an obvious change in state. 
D9: Yes, and the exits and entrances were effective, especially if you attempted to 
maintain the state whilst off stage. It definitely taught me how to switch states. 
D12: The circuit became really absorbing and on the second and third execution I felt 
really into it and it felt really natural. I felt as if I could have carried on for ages. 
D 11: Yes, I definitely felt like I could have just carried on doing it. The whole thing 
felt very short. 
D9: Even when you looked at the clock at the clock watch station you didn't pay any 
attention to what time it was and so you kind of lost your awareness of time as a 
whole. 
D12: I couldn't believe it when it finished. 
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Comment and question asked by audience member: It was all fascinating, absolutely 
fascinating. What difference did it make when you had to internalise the means of 
access? 
D12: Well there wasn't much difference as we are so used to moving from external 
to internal so I guess it wasn't really a shock and you still talk or observe inside your 
head. 
D 10: Yes for me I'm still talking or something inside my head. I think we all still use 
the means inside our bead. so there isn't much difference at all. 
Dll: But then on the last lap you lose those internal monologues and just 
kinaesthetically enter the states. 
D 12: 1 really enjoyed the kinaesthetic actually. 
D1 1: It was a really gradual progression. I don't know how different it would have 
been if we had gone straight into the kinaesthetic state though. Because I felt by the 
third lap that I had warmed up mentally and physically. 
D 10: Yes the progression really helped. 
Question asked by audience member: So how did it change between the second and 
third lap, from the intemal to the kinaesthetic? 
Responses from dancers: 
D 12: It's really hard to explain, it's just a feeling. I mean you just don't need to talk 
or observe in your mind anymore. 
DIO: Yes it's just experiential. And I was able to kinaesthetically enter the states. 
Occasionally I did use the internal means on the third lap, just if I lost it, to help me 
re-access. Sometimes at the beginning of a new station I would have to begin by 
using internal and then a few seconds later when you could feel it a bit more you just 
experienced it. Especially with the non-intrattentive, otherwise I might have become 
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aware of having to be unaware and then of course you'd be intrattentive. So I would 
use the internal momentarily and then move into kinaesthetic. 
D 11: For me it just happened, I just felt it. The kinaesthetic lap was fine because of 
the progression, and because, like I said earlier, we had warmed up physically and 
mentally by then. 
Question asked by audience member: Do you think you would be able to enter that 
state straight away? 
Responses from dancers: 
D 10: As long as you've had a chance to warm up using the external and internal. So 
if you were using it for a performance, you could warm up off stage using the 
external and internal and then I think you would be prepared to access kinaesthetic 
straight away in the performance. 
DI I: Yes, you can definitely, with practice, and I think it's just about training 
yourself to be more receptive to the kinaesthetic states. 
D9: I agree, with practice you should be able to train your mind to just switch on. I 
think we could do that now actually. 
Question asked by audience member: How have you found the training as a whole? 
Responses from dancers: 
D 10: I've seriously in classes being using it so much. 
D 11: Yes, we've been saying how we can't believe what an effect it has had. 
DIO: I really notice it in my ballet lessons, I'm so much more aware of where my 
legs and arms are for example. 
D9: Yes I feel so much more aware of myself and my states. 
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DI 1: 1 think, as well, you have more trust in yourself - not just your body but also 
your mind - to know what you should be doing. You don't need anyone else to 
correct your movement for example, because you know exactly what you are doing. 
You can trust your body to understand the movement. 
D12: And you realise, how in everyday life you are always switching states. So really 
it's very like everyday life and so you should be able to do it, but somehow it's more 
difficult when dancing, not now I've had the training though. I understand how to 
bring that everyday switching into my dancing. 
D9: Access is becoming much easier and much more instantaneous, it feels like we 
can switch with ease between everyday states and dance states. Now, after the 
training, I feel a lot more aware of myself as a dancer and of my own personal 
movement style. I think that when you know yourself better, that's when you can 
really push yourself as a dancer and push your boundaries more. That's what I feel 
like I am able to do now. This training will really help me develop as a dancer. Now 
I have an awareness that I can move in these two different states I can start to work 
with them more and push myself more instead of just existing in my normal dance 
state. 
DIO: It's great to experiment with the different states. The movement you create 
when intrattentive is different from the movement you create when non-intrattentive 
and now I know how to access these different states I can experiment more with the 
two styles. It's definitely a good way to get you moving in a different style. It's 
opened my eyes to a new way of moving. 
D 11: It's not that one way is better than the other, but at least now you have an 
awareness of the different states. 
D9: Yes for me it's been good, as before I was more of a non-intrattentive dancer, I 
mean that's the sort of state I would normally dance in. But now I can see a totally 
different side and it's been really interesting to see how far I can go with the 
intrattentive side. It's like I have a whole new dancer in me. Before people would say 
that I would never finish movement properly but now I can because I am more 
aware. 
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D1 1: It's so useful to use the intrattentive when rehearsing, even if you then go on to 
use non-intrattention in the performance, it's so good to get that clarity. Especially 
with duets for example, you don't normally have such an awareness of your partner, 
and I realised that before I was never really aware of exactly what they were doing. 
D12: Yes they would just be there wouldn't they, they are just your partner and 
you're not necessarily mentally aware of what they are doing and thinking. 
D 11: But now I am far more sensitive and aware of my self and others. It's amazing. 
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